Panama, Haiti, Iraq—and Now Venezuela: Lessons in Regime Change
In the early hours of Saturday, January 3rd, the United States military entered the airspace of Caracas, Venezuela. Just after 1 A.M., a multitude of different aircraft began initiating strikes in and around the Venezuelan capital city, damaging and destroying military infrastructure and any means in which the limited capabilities of the Venezuelan air force, and Bolivarian National Guard could hinder the main objective of what we now know was named Operation Absolute Resolve.[1] Just after the strikes, Delta Force operators were lowered onto the grounds of President Nicolás Maduro’s compound. Accompanied with agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the operatives neutralized the Cuban security detail guarding the President, numbering thirty-two, and apprehended Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.[2] The entire operation took about two and a half hours, and the US casualties amounted to two injuries by ground fire into a helicopter. Civilian casualty numbers are currently unknown but according to the Trump administration, are little to none, which the Venezuelan government disputes. By 5 P.M. EST, Maduro was in custody in New York.
The objective of the strikes, before it was revealed to those awake, seemed to be to cripple the Venezuelan military capability, but according to President Donald Trump’s own truth social account it immediately became apparent that the primary objective of the entire operation was always to arrest Nicolás Maduro, on domestic, United States charges. It would be a difficult argument to make, that effectively decapitating another country’s leadership, and striking their military is not an act of war, which in this instance was done without the approval of congress. This, however, is not unprecedented in the long history of regime changes by the United States. Other administrations have also committed to military strikes against targets (either insurgencies or state militaries) without the approval of congress. What is unprecedented is the abduction of a state’s leader and by the administration’s own words, extraditing him to the US.[3]
Of course, the case will be made about how Nicolás Maduro is in fact not the legitimate head of state of Venezuela on account of stolen elections and was instead a de facto ruler and dictator. There is merit to this argument, maybe not for the legality of his abduction, but against the legitimacy of his tenure as president. In 2018, Maduro’s victory in the presidential election was heavily contested, and many UN members did not recognize him as the victor.[4] In 2024, his reelection was widely observed and believed as fraudulent with statistical improbabilities and was halted before a fifth of the votes were counted.[5] Upon declaring his own victory, Maduro issued an arrest warrant for his opponent Edmundo González Urrutia, who doubled Maduro’s pre-election polls. Amnesty International’s breakdown of human rights abuses by Venezuela in the months that followed, details violent suppression of peaceful protests, disappearances, imprisonment of entire political wings, fixed trials, and a culture of torture and crimes against humanity by secret police forces that the International Criminal Court claim goes back to the protests against corruption that began in 2014.[6] Nicolás Maduro was a dictator, one that undermined the republican values of Venezuela by abusing its democratic system to stay in power, and consolidated it by abusing, torturing, and murdering his own people.
Maduro, however, is no longer the leader of Venezuela, and likely will never be again. Therefore, what is now being brought into question, is not the legitimacy of Maduro’s rule, but the legitimacy of his capture, and what it means. The United States is no stranger to attempted state building or rapid regime change, whether covert or overt.[7] By looking at history, one may be wary about the future of Venezuela as it is mostly, nominally, in American hands. While a dictator being removed from power is a good thing in a vacuum, the factors that surround regime change, especially the type of regime change that has just occurred, are more important than the event itself. These factors are more often than not the ones that decide how an event is viewed in United States history. Factors like how the regime change was performed, why it happened, and what the plan was to ensure its success if that was indeed the plan, are what determines the future of the affected nation.
Obviously, brief interventions like the one that occurred on January 3rd have been performed by the United States in the past. Events like Absolute Resolve are easier to commit to logistically when they occur in the same hemisphere. In 1994, the Haitian situation bore similarities to the presidency of Nicolás Maduro. The dictator Raoul Cédras was the leader of a military junta that overthrew the first democratically elected leader in Haiti since before the Duvalier, effectively returning the country to a military dictatorship that had plagued it for more than thirty years. When the United States, among other UN nations entered the country in the aptly named Operation Uphold Democracy, the Cédras government was forced to capitulate.[8] The scale of this invasion is quite different from the Venezuelan operation, involving a multinational coalition and 25,000 American troops, but the objective remained the same: use any means necessary to end the governance of Raoul Cédras. After a short occupation with even more troops, the United states withdrew losing only one soldier and the Haitians with ten military casualties of their own.[9] With a larger force in a smaller country, the United States was able to accomplish a better outcome than in Venezuela, the natural return to free and fair elections.[10]
The one glaring difference between Haiti and Venezuela is the legitimacy of the invasion. The invasion and occupation of Haiti was as legal as an invasion can be in terms of international law. Operation Uphold Democracy was approved under Resolution 940 of the United Nations Security Council and, the Coalition, which the Americans led, had a cycle of leadership that limited the rules of engagement to the strictest scenarios.[11] With that being said the purpose of resolution 940 was to remove the military junta by force if necessary. UN approval and the involvement of multiple international organizations such as CARICOM (Caribbean International Community), separates the Haitian invasion from the Venezuelan event in all but objective: the end of a government. It can be argued that the Venezuelan operation did not even achieve this, as it only removed Maduro, leaving Delcy Rodriguez, his vice president, as acting president, leaving matters only worse for the people of Caracas. The most important part of the comparison between Haiti in 1994 and Venezuela, is that only one was legal in the eyes of the international community.[12]
There is a more similar event that occurred five years prior to Haiti. The invasion of Panama in 1989 was closer to that of Operation Absolute Resolve in objective, and more importantly, in cause. The removal of Panama’s dictator Manuel Noriega and the further occupation of the country for more than a month, bears striking resemblance to the removal of Nicolás Maduro. It also can be seen as the best possible case scenario for the future of Venezuela. This can be argued simply by looking at the history of Panama post-1989. The first five years after the invasion saw a return to democracy, a surge of economic growth, a return of tourism and more, despite continuing issues like corruption. If one were to look at the numerous similarities between the two invasions/operations, they could see that the same outcome might be the one hope that is possible for Venezuela.[13]
The two most important similarities between Venezuela and Panama are the fate of the leader, and the reasons for which the invasion happened. For the former, we can only analyze the first week after Noriega’s “extradition,” as that is the amount of time it has been for Maduro. It took ten days to finally capture Manuel Noriega as he took refuge in the embassy of the Holy See, but by the new year of 1990, as the invasion began on December 20th, he was on a flight to Miami to be charged with similar crimes as Maduro is being charged with. As to the casus belli for the invasion of Panama, it bears even more resemblance to the operation in Venezuela.[14] Identifying and solidifying the reasons for the Venezuelan Operation remains tricky, due to only being able to claim what the Trump administration has officially stated. The biggest issue in both cases is the accusation of drug trafficking, which the Trump administration has dubiously accused Maduro of not only allowing, but assisting.[15] In the case of Panama, which had become a hotbed of cartel trafficking, money laundering and racketeering, the Bush administration attached many of the same charges on Noriega, hence the reason he was prosecuted in Miami. The second large issue is the one that the Trump administration has surprisingly admitted: the issue of resources. Venezuela’s oil and rare minerals have been a focal point of the administration’s issues with Maduro, especially with the nationalization of the country’s oil deposits.[16] In Panama that resource was much more concrete. The safety of the Panama canal, which was essential for regional and international trade. The Bush administration had claimed that Noriega was threatening the Torrijos-Carter treaties in which the canal would be turned over to Panama over a set period where both countries would administer it. If one was to consider the canal as a resource, then the invasion would be one to secure resources, a type of invasion which the U.S. has no shortage of in history.[17]
There are also many smaller similarities. The Trump administration had been extrajudicially striking what they considered drug trafficking vessels for months, leading Maduro to consider Venezuela and the United States in a state of war.[18] Noriega, towards the end of his rule, also considered the two states in a conflict, which the Bush administration used to claim they were defending American citizens in Panama.[19] The international issue with the invasion of Panama bears similar themes to Venezuela as well. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling the invasion a “flagrant violation of international law,” and while a similar resolution was presented in the security council, the United States being a permanent member prevented it from passing.[20] The Secretary General of the UN, Antonio Guterres has just recently called the Venezuelan operation “dangerous,” and a UN general assembly resolution on the matter can be expected in the coming weeks.[21]
The major difference between the three operations so far has been what came after. In Panama and Haiti, the United States and United Nations respectively, occupied the country in question to ensure a smooth transition to democracy, to avoid the further abuse of human rights, and to quell any violence. That is not to say that this will not happen in Venezuela, but already it has deviated from the previous two examples, whereas in Haiti and Panama, once boots touched the ground, they stayed on the ground. In Venezuela there is no current United States military presence, leaving Caracas trapped in the dead ground.
The United States is no stranger to state building. If one were to gauge the efforts of the United States in state building since the Second World War, it would even be safe to say that they have been more successful than unsuccessful in their efforts. Like all national efforts, however, the failures outshine successes in historical memory. As previously stated, efforts to bring a country back to a functioning democracy, ensure the personal freedoms of its people and stabilize its position within the regional community is logistically more achievable when that country is in the United States’ hemisphere.[22] Even without the hemispherical hegemony though, the American efforts to reform and control Iraq in the early 2000s still serves to this day as a “what not to do” list in the efforts of state building. Iraq was a much different situation that occurred in a much different context, however the overarching mistakes that were made in 2003-04 still ring true today. After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, amidst looting, rioting, and celebrations, were those responsible for implementing the civilian reconstruction that the American military and civilian administrations had been working on separately for the past year. When the 3rd Infantry Division’s civil affairs officer, Colonel Alan King asked his division’s chief of staff, Colonel John Sterling what he had been told by the high command of the CJTF, what Sterling told King spelled disaster for the early occupational period in Iraq: “I asked him [the marine corps chief of staff] for the reconstruction plan, and he said there isn’t one. So, you’ve got twenty-four hours to come up with one.”[23] The same lack of planning appears to be happening in Venezuela today.
If one were to try and find more positive examples they need only look at Panama. The United States deservedly took the blame for their invasion that was dubious under international law with restraint. Thousands of protestors took to the street with the support of the democratically elected President Guillermo Endara. Yet, when the “black march” was over, Endara kept to his purview and with the shadow of the United States looming over Panama, he took measures to ensure that any figure like Noriega could never appear again in his country.[24]The major problem with this comparison, is that there is no figure like Endara in Venezuela, or like Haiti’s Aristide. The multiple candidates for a US-friendly government in Caracas are all outside of Venezuela. María Corina Machado, a proponent of the democratic process, barred from running for President by the Maduro regime is currently outside Venezuela, and if the Trump administration had plans for her to take up the mantle, then they would not have performed Operation Absolute Resolve while she was receiving a Nobel Peace Prize in Norway. The likely true victor of the 2024 election, Edmundo González Urrutia, has exiled himself in Spain, out of the nominal influence of any US efforts. While the Trump Administration lacks for a plan to restore democracy and human rights in Venezuela, repression under Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has only intensified in Caracas.[25]
With all of these previous examples and possible successes, setbacks, and otherwise providing context, Venezuela exists at a crossroads. It is important to note that Venezuela is not Panama, nor Haiti, nor Iraq, and the situation that the United States now finds itself in is unique to the current time. This essay has ignored the unprecedented strangeness of the FBI being escorted into a foreign capitol militarily in order to capture a foreign leader, dictator or not, for extradition to the United States. This operation that unfolded was clearly not a full-fledged invasion, and reactions to it are still emotionally charged. The Trump administration may yet choose to walk away from the table with what they have achieved, but it is hard to determine what that is. To argue that they have toppled Maduro’s regime would be an insult to the Venezuelans who are still being oppressed under his party’s leadership. The party that caused the issues of Venezuela did not begin with Nicolás Maduro, and it is now apparent that they will not end with his tenure as president. Donald Trump, who ran for president on a platform of the slogan “no new wars,” may have to venture into interventionism in order to achieve his goals, whatever they are. For now, however, the people of Venezuela are still holding their breath, likely not knowing what the future may bring.
By Alex Fitzgerald – Rise to Peace Fellow
[1] “Trump Administration Makes an Example of Maduro, Will ‘Run’ Venezuela for Now,” World Tribune, January 3, 2026.
U.S. Embassy in Venezuela, Security Alert: Venezuela: Explosions Reported; Shelter in Place, January 3, 2026.
[2] “Thirty-Two Cubans Killed during US Attack on Venezuela,” BBC, January 4, 2026.
[3] “Trump says U.S. will run Venezuela after U.S. captures Maduro,” Reuters, January 3, 2026.
Idrees Ali et al., “Mock House, CIA Source and Special Forces: The US Operation to Capture Maduro,” Reuters, January 4, 2026.
[4] Yashraj Sharma, “Who Is Nicolas Maduro?,” Al Jazeera, January 4, 2026.
Jonathan Wolfe, “Venezuela and U.S. Tensions Escalate amid Military Action and Maduro Capture,” The New York Times, January 3, 2026.
[5] “La probablidad de que resultados del CNE sean ciertos es de 1 entre 100 millones, dice matemático,” Diario Las Américas, October 6, 2024.
[6] “Venezuela 2024: Human Rights in Venezuela,” Amnesty International.
[7] Lindsey A. O’Rourke, “The Strategic Logic of Covert Regime Change: US-Backed Regime Change Campaigns during the Cold War.” Security Studies 29, no. 1 (2020): 95.
[8] Walter E. Kretchik et al., Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 78.
[9] “U.S. Soldier Killed in Haiti.” UPI, January 12, 1995.
Armando Trull, “U.S. commander, Cedras visit Cap-Haitien,” UPI, September 25, 1994.
[10] Kretchik et al., Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion, 97-98.
[11] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 940 (1994), S/RES/940(1994). Adopted July 31, 1994.
[12] “World is Less Safe After US Action in Venezuela, Says UN Human Rights Office,” Reuters, January 6, 2026.
[13] Independent Commission of Inquiry, The U.S. Invasion of Panama: The Truth Behind Operation ‘Just Cause’ (Boston: South End Press, 1991), 26.
[14] Thomas Donnelly et al., Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1994), 220-24.
[15] Barros Leal et al., “A Timeline of Rising Tension Between the U.S. and Venezuela,” The New York Times, January 3, 2026.
[16] Spencer Kimball, “Trump says U.S. oil companies will invest billions of dollars in Venezuela after Maduro’s overthrow,” CNBC, January 3, 2026.
[17] “A Transcript of Bush’s Address on the Decision to Use Force in Panama,” The New York Times, December 21, 1989.
[18] Leal et al., “A Timeline of Rising Tension Between the U.S. and Venezuela.”
[19] “A Transcript of Bush’s Address on the Decision to Use Force in Panama.”
[20] Rodolfo Dam, “Legality of the 1989 Panama Invasion and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine,” United Nations Peace and Progress, 3 no. 1 (2012), 55.
Stephen Woo, “Re-documenting the US Invasion of Panamá amid the Contact Zone in Diciembres,” JCMS: Journal of Cinema and Media Studies 62, no. 4 (2023): 85-87.
[21] “US actions in Venezuela ‘constitute a dangerous precedent’: Guterres,” Peace and Security, United Nations News, 3 January, 2026.
[22] Karl Sandstrom, Local Interests and American Foreign Policy: Why International Interventions Fail, (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2013), 17.
[23] Cited in Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 150.
[24] Lawrence Yates, “Panama, 1988–1990: The Discontent between Combat and Stability Operations,” Military Review, May, 2005.
[25] Jack Nicas, “Maduro Is Gone, but Repression in Venezuela Has Intensified,” New York Times, January 7, 2026.
