The Battle for the Vanguard: ISIS-K and Taliban Competition for Jihadist Leadership
By Jamaluddin Mohammadi – Rise to Peace Fellow
Often, we paint Islamist-aligned organizations with a broad brush; they all believe in one cause and seek to achieve their objectives through identical means. The reality is far more complex. Islamist groups throughout the globe differ significantly in their goals, tactics, and political ambition, and frequently compete with one another as much as they confront external enemies. This article explores the relationship between ISIS-K and the Taliban in Afghanistan and how they compete with one another for Islamist-Jihadist legitimacy and hegemony in the region.
Who Are the Taliban?
The Taliban are a Sunni-Islamist movement that emerged in the early 1990s amid the chaos and civil war in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal (1992-1996). The movement, known as the Taliban (Pashto for “students”), was created by Mullah Mohammad Umar, an Islamic school teacher, and was made up of lower-class workers and Islamic school students. The Taliban’s governing ideology is based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law, rooted in the Hanafi-Deobandi school of thought. In contrast to many other Islamist groups in the region, the Taliban are primarily more nationalistic and ethnically (pro-Pashtun) motivated, and their goals are limited to establishing an Islamic Emirate and consolidating their power inside Afghanistan’s borders. They do not support creating a post-modern Islamic Caliphate and have no transnational ambition.
In September 1996, the Taliban gained control of Kabul and soon exercised effective control over most of the country, ruling until removed in 2001 by the United States-led invasion for their role in harboring the individuals responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Taliban leaders subsequently fled to neighboring Pakistan and re-launched an insurgency campaign against the Afghan government and coalition forces. After nearly two decades of conflict, the Taliban continued to gain control of territory throughout the country despite the massive amount of aid, training, and support by international forces to the Afghan government. This sparked negotiations between the United States and the Taliban, culminating in the 2020 Doha Agreement, under which the United States agreed to fully withdraw their troops in exchange for the Taliban’s promise to forbid terrorist organizations from using their territory as safe havens and to enter negotiations with the Afghan government to reach a peace deal.
Peace negotiations began but were unsuccessful as the Taliban continued to target and kill civilians and government forces, increasing their territorial gains leading up to the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops in August 2021. In an almost bloodless offensive, the Afghan Security Forces collapsed, the President fled the country, and 20 years later, the Taliban were back in power.
What is ISIS-K?
Islamic State of Syria and Iraq – Khorasan Province, better known as ISIS-K, is an affiliate of ISIS and an integral part of their broader Islamic Caliphate project. ISIS-K was officially formed in 2015 by members of other Islamist militant groups, including Taliban-Pakistan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, who pledged their allegiance to the movement’s leader and caliph at the time, Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi. In its current iteration, ISIS-K is the most prominent affiliate of the Islamic State.
ISIS-K subscribes to the ideological and religious beliefs of the broader Islamic State organization, commonly defined as Salafi-Jihadism. Mainstream Salafis, a current within the wider spectrum of Sunni Islam whose adherents are mostly non-violent and peaceful, believe in a strict interpretation of Islam based on the original teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Even among Salafi-Jihadists, ISIS is a minority group and the most extreme current. Al-Qaeda, which can also be defined as a Salafi-Jihadist organization, differs in their strategies, tactics, and overall goals.
ISIS co-opts the Salafi ideology to justify armed struggle against those it considers non-Muslims or apostates, a position that has drawn strong condemnation from the majority of Sunni and Shia Muslims worldwide, governments and civil society alike. For example, ISIS deems anyone who believes in, supports, or participates in democracy to have apostatized from Islam even if they profess their belief in the religion. This includes entire groups that have organized in the name of political Islam; ISIS believes the Muslim Brotherhood to be idolators for their acceptance of democracy and man-made laws. In contrast with the Taliban, which focuses on primarily ruling Afghanistan, ISIS seeks to establish a transnational Islamic Caliphate void of borders based on ethnicity, race, or nationality. These fundamentally different visions for Islamic governance lay the groundwork for post-2021 escalation over who represents the “true” vanguard for jihad in the region.
Post-2021 Context: Rivalry after Taliban Takeover
Since the Taliban’s 2021 takeover, ISIS-K and the Taliban have been engaged in a struggle to frame themselves as the sole legitimate jihadist actor in Afghanistan. ISIS-K portrays itself as the only authentic jihadist force in the region, criticizing the Taliban’s diplomatic efforts – from the 2020 Doha Agreement to Foreign Minister Muttaqi’s recent trip to India – as a betrayal of the core tenets of jihad.
ISIS-K categorically rejects nationalism, arguing that a true Islamic state is based sole on religious authority and identity, allowing them to religiously and ideologically de-legitimize the Taliban due to their lack of presence outside of Afghanistan’s borders, labeling them as “filthy nationalists.” Although not explicitly declared by ISIS-K’s leadership, many foot soldiers and ideologues of the group have described the Taliban (and other non-ISIS jihadist groups) as apostates and idolators for their rejection of the ISIS-style transnational caliphate project, their cooperation with non-Muslims, and more.
Taliban Counter-Narratives and Counterterrorism Posture
Following the 2020 Doha Agreement and the 2021 government takeover, the Taliban have attempted to portray themselves as the “true Mujahideen” who were successful in ousting the world’s top superpower, establishing their own government, and providing security to its people against groups like ISIS-K. The Taliban – internationally sanctioned and designated terrorist organization by the United States – join the rest of the world in viewing ISIS-K as an extreme terrorist organization, labeling them “Khawarij” – an Islamic term synonymous with “terrorist group.” The Taliban attempt to delegitimize ISIS-K through this label, as the Prophet Muhammad called this group “the worst of creation” that should be religiously fought against.
The Taliban have been forced into a corner: do they engage with the international community as a counterterrorism partner, risking their jihadist legitimacy but consolidating an absolute monopoly on violence by eradicating ISIS-K and becoming the sole Islamist actor in the region, or do they act alone, risking further instability to both their security and their regime?
This question is yet to be officially answered, but there have been indicators pointing towards the latter decision. The United States and the Taliban have worked together in the past to fight ISIS-K, albeit on a tacit rather than political level, and have discussed formalizing cooperation through intelligence sharing to further counterterrorism efforts against their shared enemy. This highlights the level of threat ISIS-K poses in Afghanistan: two adversaries who fought one another for close to two decades have considered, and continue to consider, expanding their cooperation against the deadliest terror group in the world.
Despite these coordinated efforts to weaken ISIS-K, the group increased in its attacks and number of people injured or killed in their operations following the Taliban takeover, highlighting increasing security concerns in Afghanistan.
ISIS-K’s Recruitment Battle and Violence Escalation
The rivalry between ISIS-K and the Taliban increasingly plays out as a competition for recruits, influence, and legitimacy rather than territory alone. At its current state, ISIS-K views itself as engaged in a phase of destabilization in Afghanistan, seeking to challenge the Taliban’s authority through various forms of warfare including economic warfare, high-profile assassinations, and cross-border operations.
ISIS-K has continued to expand its operational scope and geographical reach, increasing attacks in northern-Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) post-American withdrawal. This expansion, facilitated by the Islamic State in Pakistan’s announcement that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa fighters would be merged back into ISIS-K in 2022, pays major significance because Khyber Pakhtunkhwa hosts a large Afghan diaspora and Salafi seminaries, which are key for recruitment and network building purposes for ISIS-K. Although many Afghans, mostly from the northwestern regions, have since been forcibly deported by the Pakistani government, ideological indoctrination developed through the Salafi seminaries and worsened economic conditions (blamed on the Pakistani and Taliban governments) may still serve the recruitment purposes of ISIS-K, which also deems the Pakistani government to be an apostate regime that must be fought against. Together these dynamics give ISIS-K a pool of disillusioned, mobile, and vulnerable individuals – by virtue of extreme life circumstances – that may view joining ISIS-K as a viable alternative to their current situation.
ISIS-K has also broadened its propaganda and outreach efforts extensively since the Taliban’s return to power. It now publishes material in various languages – including Arabic, Pashto, Dari, Urdu, Hindi, Malayalam, Bengali, Uzbek, Tajik, Russian, Farsi, and English – targeting diverse populations across South and Central Asia. Employing a multilingual media campaign furthers ISIS-K’s strategy to recruit fighters dissatisfied with their local government, diversify their outreach on de-legitimizing rhetoric surrounding the Taliban, and to present themselves of the carriers of the “true jihad.” ISIS-K backs up their claims by noting that they are fighting the “enemies of Islam” in Iran, India, Russia, and Tajikistan, citing that the Taliban have no ambition or ability to do so given their confinement within Afghanistan’s borders. This kind of rhetoric intends to attract more hardline jihadist fighters who may now view the Taliban to be illegitimate due to their cooperation with non-Muslims and their acceptance of the nation-state framework. To back up their transnational image, ISIS-K has shown their commitment to fighting foreign adversaries outside of Afghanistan in recent years, including killing over 130 people in an attack in Moscow and bombing a Chinese restaurant in Kabul leaving 7 dead and many more injured.
Taliban Countermeasures against ISIS-K
The Taliban have not held back in their fight to eradicate ISIS-K from Afghanistan. Some analysts argue that the Taliban utilize the ISIS-K situation to gain international legitimacy as a viable counter-terrorism partner. Although that may be a secondary objective, there is little available evidence to prove that the Taliban truly view ISIS-K as controlled opposition rather than a sworn enemy.
Post 2021 takeover, the Taliban have been deeply involved in deploying various tactics to fight against ISIS-K’s influence in the region and solidify their own legitimacy. Many Salafi scholars have been killed, schools and mosques have been shut down or replaced with Hanafi teachings, and extrajudicial executions have been carried out. These harsh tactics disrupted ISIS-K networks in the short-term, but risks of deepening grievances among Afghan-Salafi communities and vindicating ISIS-K’s message that the Taliban persecutes them because they are fighting the “true jihad” have caused the Taliban to scale back in these methods. Spies and informants have been placed in many key areas to facilitate Taliban raids on ISIS-K cells, to the point where ISK had to warn its members to be wary of Taliban infiltration through their social media channels.
As Afghanistan’s de facto government, the Taliban also possess material advantages unavailable to ISIS-K, including state resources, employment opportunities, and official positions within government ministries, which they use to recruit and retain recruits.
2026 Outlook and Policy Implications
Despite Taliban claims that ISIS-K has been neutralized, recent attacks show the group remains capable of deadly operations both in Afghanistan and abroad. While its operational capacity and effectiveness have declined since 2023, ISIS-K continues to pose a persistent security threat in the region.
Given these realities, international actors should avoid re-militarizing in Afghanistan under the banner of counterterrorism. Not only would this create issues with the Taliban, who have been clear that they will not welcome any militarized foreign actors in Afghanistan, it would avoid the crux of the issue at hand. The Taliban have both the incentive and capacity to fight ISIS-K themselves, whose existence serves as a direct threat to their rule and legitimacy. Working with the Taliban on counter-terrorism efforts would reinforce ISIS-K’s message: the Taliban are an illegitimate Jihadist group who cooperate with foreign actors to further their own nationalist agenda, rather than an Islamic one. Taliban fighters may defect and join ISIS-K, further exacerbating Afghanistan’s security problem.
Instead, the Taliban should be left to contain ISIS-K internally, while international attention and resources should be focused on the ever-worsening humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Over 4 million Afghans refugees from Pakistan and Iran have recently been forcibly deported back into the country, in many cases with no money, no job prospects, and nowhere to go. In the absence of a viable alternative governing authority, prioritizing humanitarian assistance over a renewed counterterrorism initiative offers the most pragmatic path to reducing long-term instability in Afghanistan.
