When we think about security, the state is usually the first actor that comes to mind. Yet experiences from Iraq and Syria demonstrate that security is not always produced by the state alone. What happens when state authority becomes weak, contested, or absent?
The answer is not necessarily a complete “security vacuum.” Instead, security can become fragmented among multiple actors, including militias, tribal organizations, local councils, armed opposition groups, community networks, and international forces. Research on hybrid security governance shows that security and legitimate authority can emerge through interactions between formal and informal, state and non-state actors.
This raises a fundamental question: Who provides security when the state cannot? And what happens when several actors claim the authority to do so?
Beyond the State Security is broader than military protection. It can include controlling territory, regulating movement, resolving disputes, and maintaining everyday order. Research on rebel governance demonstrates that armed groups can develop institutions and systems of rule in territories they control rather than functioning solely as military organizations.
The question is therefore not simply: who provides security?
It is also: security for whom, according to whose rules, and with what consequences?
Hybrid arrangements can provide protection while simultaneously reproducing exclusion and unequal power relations. The existence of a non-state security provider therefore does not automatically mean that security is legitimate or beneficial for all communities.
Iraq: Security Through Multiple Actors
Iraq provides a clear illustration of fragmented security provision.
Following the 2003 invasion and the subsequent weakening and restructuring of state institutions, security became increasingly contested. The emergence of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and later ISIS further exposed the limitations of relying exclusively on centralized state institutions.
The campaign against ISIS involved multiple security actors alongside the Iraqi state, including Kurdish forces, tribal actors, Popular Mobilization Forces, local communities, and international coalition forces. The Iraqi experience therefore illustrates how security provision can involve overlapping state, local, and armed actors rather than a single centralized authority.
This also complicates the distinction between state and non-state security actors. Voller’s analysis of Syria and Iraq shows how governments can rely on armed groups for security and counterinsurgency while these groups simultaneously develop political influence and organizational autonomy.
Syria After Assad: Rebuilding Security Authority
Syria’s security landscape changed fundamentally after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The country has moved from fragmented wartime governance toward an uncertain attempt to rebuild centralized state authority.
During the conflict, security was provided by multiple actors, including government forces, Kurdish-led authorities, opposition groups, militias, tribal networks, and foreign-backed forces. The post-Assad government now attempting to consolidate these fragmented security arrangements under state institutions.
In early 2026, government forces expanded into areas previously controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while negotiations over SDF integration continued. This illustrates that territorial control does not automatically produce a unified security order.
The transition also matters for counterterrorism. Northeastern Syria remains central to the fight against ISIS, including the management of detention facilities and camps. Changes in security control have therefore created new operational challenges.
Syria consequently raises a new question: What happens when a new state attempts to reclaim security functions previously performed by local and non-state actors?
The answer may depend on whether these actors are integrated, displaced, or resist centralization, and whether local communities accept the emerging security order as legitimate.
When Security Produces Insecurity
Security provision should therefore not automatically be equated with legitimacy or stability.
Hybrid security arrangements can create protection for particular communities while simultaneously reinforcing exclusion or unequal access to security.
This creates an important paradox: An actor can provide security for some while producing insecurity for others.
This distinction matters for counterterrorism. Military campaigns may defeat an armed group’s territorial control without resolving the political and social relationships surrounding an insurgency. Understanding these local relationships is therefore important for explaining how armed groups interact with civilians, how they establish authority, and how governance arrangements change during conflict.
From “Who Has the Guns?” to “Who Produces Security?”
The experiences of Iraq and Syria suggest that we should move beyond asking who has the greatest military capability and instead examine who protects communities, controls territory, resolves disputes, and is perceived as legitimate.
When state authority is weak or contested, security does not simply disappear. It becomes pluralized, fragmented, and politically contested, with multiple actors shaping security outcomes.
This raises a broader question: How does the formation of local security providers and political authority shape the ability of jihadist groups to emerge, survive, resist counterterrorism, and reorganize after territorial defeat?
Answering this requires looking beyond the state and examining how security is produced and contested on the ground.