Introduction
On September 10, 2026, the Houthi movement successfully staged an offensive against the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) aligned forces, capturing the city of Mokha and its port along the Red Sea, just north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait [1]. By September 11, 2026, the Houthis captured the entire Red Sea coast and strategic islands, including Perim Island [2]. The PLC is the internationally recognized government of Yemen, militarily backed by Saudi Arabia while the Houthis are supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran [3]. The international waterways of the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz have become a battleground, strangling international shipping and raising oil prices. The United States and Iran battle over control of the Strait of Hormuz while the Saudi Arabia-backed PLC and the Houthis spar over the Bab al-Mandab Strait [4]. Thus, the seizure of Mokha port, Taiz, the western coast, and internal islands is highly strategic, as it entrenches greater Houthi control over the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The Houthi capture of this coastline and islands represents not only a victory for themselves, but for Iran and the “Axis of Resistance” as a whole as it cements further control over international maritime chokepoints. The possible implications of greater Houthi territorial control along the Red Sea and the vital Bab al-Mandeb are two-fold:
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Greater Red Sea control will afford the Houthis with increased importance in the “Axis of Resistance”.
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The Houthis will acquire a greater ability to threaten shipping.
Increased Importance in the “Axis of Resistance” and Support by Iran
The Houthis position along the Red Sea is a force multiplier for Iran’s current strategy of selectively choking international shipping to force concessions from Washington [5]. In addition to conformity with Iran’s current strategy, the Houthis are currently the most tactically stable force in the “Axis of Resistance”. While the Houthis are able to mount successful offensives against the Saudi-backed PLC and capture strategic territory, Hamas and Hezbollah have been severely degraded over the past three years [6]. Therefore, the Houthis’ most recent tactical and strategic victory demonstrates their competence and capabilities in contrast to the decline of Hezbollah and Hamas, signaling to Iran that they are worth investing more resources and support into. The principle of their recent success coupled with their territorial position, conducive to Iran’s nascent strategy of command over international waterways, will very likely concentrate more of Iran’s material support to the Houthis.
The Houthis’ have already demonstrated that they are willing and capable of credibly threatening shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait sufficient to cripple transit. In response to the war in Gaza, Houthis launched assaults on shipping in the Red Sea between November 2023 [7] and October 10, 2025 after the announcement of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas [8]. Despite only claiming to target Israeli vessels, ships heading to Israeli ports, and vessels related to countries participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian, an operation designed to open the Red Sea, the Houthis have also attacked vessels with little to no connection with the aforementioned actors [9]. Houthi attacks on shipping during this period reduced traffic in the Red Sea by sixty percent [10]. On July 20, 2026, the Houthis renewed their blockade, targeting Saudi vessels in response to Saudi Arabia’s sustained embargo of the Houthis [11]. For now, the Houthis have not announced additional targets, but that can change. For instance, Houthi Deputy Information Minister Mohammed Mansour stated, The Houthis retain the option to completely shut down the Bab al-Mandab Strait should attacks against Iran and Lebanon intensify or if any Gulf states directly involve themselves in military operations in support of Israel or the US [12].
The Houthis’ vow to possibly defend Iran in the case of intensified attacks against it is now tested by the potential for economic catastrophe posed against Iran by the US’s blockade of Iran and unprecedented sanctions [13]. Iranian leaders reportedly fear that hyperinflation, supply shortages, and other negative economic indicators can cause a resurgence of nationwide protests [14]. This confluence of factors affecting Iran could force the Houthis to leverage its newly established proximity to the Bab al-Mandab Strait to clamp down on shipping. The calculus behind such a decision would be an extension of Iran’s objective to pressure the US to concede to Iranian demands, including withdrawing from the Strait of Hormuz. The inclination of the Houthis to defend Iran is simple: Iran is the Houthis main backer, supplying them with weapons and training [15].
Greater Ability to Threaten Shipping
With more territory along the western coast of Yemen, the Houthis are positioning themselves to be more tactically capable of commanding the Bab al-Mandab Strait. To start, the southern portion of the western coast of Yemen borders a far narrower portion of the Red Sea along the Bab al-Mandab Strait. As such, the Houthis’ documented practice of laying sea mines [16] would be far more efficient, concentrated, and effective along their newly captured territory and potential future seizures further south. Moreover, the Houthis’ lack of a traditional navy is substituted by fast attack boats, unmanned surface vessels (USVs) [17], drones, and missiles [18]. These assets are far more effective in a narrow maritime chokepoint than wide open seas like the wider portion of the Red Sea. The reason for this is that narrow chokepoints, like the Bab al-Mandab, reduce the disadvantages of these systems while increasing the vulnerability of traditional large tankers. Finally, the Houthis’ takeover of territory in the mountainous Taiz region, overlooking the Red Sea [19], enhances their visual monitoring of the strait, intelligence capabilities, and targeting abilities given a direct line of fire on a high ground.
The Bab al-Mandab Strait is merely 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, funneling shipping into two roughly two-mile-wide shipping channels for inbound and outbound traffic, making vessel movements both concentrated and predictable [20]. By concentrating operations around this chokepoint, the Houthis can locate targets more easily and quickly and use UAVs, fast attack boats, and USVs to reach targets more quickly, advantages that diminish when ships are dispersed across the wider Red Sea. Therefore, with the capture of the coast and islands, the Houthis can effectively maintain a stranglehold on the strait asymmetrically, leveraging it for themselves and to support Iran’s objectives.