The Strait of Hormuz has become more than a shipping lane in the U.S.–Iran confrontation. It is now the place where military pressure, sanctions, nuclear diplomacy and global energy security are colliding at the same time.
That makes the current negotiations important for a reason that goes beyond oil prices.
On September 30, Reuters reported that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had received U.S. feedback through Qatari mediators on a seven-day trust-building proposal. The main disagreement was described as sequencing: which side takes which step first, and when. Iran has linked reopening normal maritime passage through the Strait of Hormuz to conditions involving sanctions, the conflict and its nuclear program. The Trump administration has continued to apply military and economic pressure while also leaving open the possibility of a negotiated outcome.
This is where pressure can either become leverage or become a trap.
Pressure works only if the other side can see an exit
The logic behind sanctions, blockades and military pressure is straightforward: raise the cost of the status quo until the other side changes its behavior.
That can work. But coercion is most effective when the target understands what concrete steps would reduce the pressure.
If the terms keep shifting, if the sequence is unclear, or if either side believes concessions will simply invite new demands, pressure can harden resistance rather than produce compromise.
That appears to be the central difficulty in the current U.S.–Iran talks. The disagreement is not only about the final terms. It is about who moves first.
Hormuz changes the stakes
The Strait of Hormuz is narrow, strategically exposed and central to global energy flows. Any disruption affects far more than Iran and the United States.
Gulf states, Asian energy importers, shipping companies and insurers all have an interest in predictable passage. That gives outside actors a reason to push both sides toward de-escalation.
It also gives Iran leverage. Tehran understands that pressure on maritime access can create economic consequences far beyond the battlefield.
But that leverage has limits. If attacks on commercial shipping increase or passage becomes persistently unreliable, Iran risks strengthening the case for a larger international security response.
The Trump administration faces a sequencing problem too
President Trump has repeatedly emphasized pressure on Iran while also signaling that a negotiated outcome remains possible. That creates a strategic choice for the administration: how to preserve leverage without making diplomacy appear politically cost-free for Tehran.
If Washington reduces pressure too early, critics will argue that coercion was traded away before Iran delivered meaningful concessions. If Washington waits for Iran to move first on every issue, Tehran may conclude that negotiation offers no practical benefit.
That is why sequencing matters more than the headline terms.
A workable deal often requires both sides to take limited, verifiable steps in parallel so neither appears to surrender first.
The real test is verification
Any arrangement involving maritime access, sanctions relief and nuclear commitments will depend on verification.
The United States will want evidence that agreed Iranian actions are actually taking place. Iran will want evidence that sanctions relief, maritime access or other commitments are real and reversible only under clearly defined conditions.
Without that, each side will assume the other is buying time.
This is the same lesson seen in many security negotiations: trust is useful, but verification is what allows governments that do not trust each other to still make agreements.
The conclusion
The Strait of Hormuz is becoming a test of whether pressure can be converted into diplomacy.
Military and economic pressure can create leverage. It cannot by itself create a durable political settlement.
If Washington and Tehran cannot agree on sequencing, verification and a credible path for reciprocal steps, the pressure campaign may continue producing tactical leverage without producing strategic resolution.
The important question is not whether either side can impose more costs. Both can.
It is whether those costs can be turned into an agreement that makes the strait safer, the nuclear dispute more manageable and another cycle of escalation less likely.
Ahmad Shah Mohibi
Founder, Rise to Peace