Pakistan says it is striking militant threats across the Afghan border. Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities say civilians are being killed. Both sides insist the other is failing to address the real security problem.
That is how a border crisis becomes a trap.
On October 1, Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Helmand and Kunar provinces killed at least 10 civilians, most of them children, according to the United Nations mission in Afghanistan. Pakistan said the strikes targeted militant hideouts and claimed 22 militants were killed, a figure that could not immediately be independently verified. Associated Press reporting captured the central dispute: Islamabad says the threat originates from Afghan territory; Kabul denies providing militant safe haven and condemns the strikes as violations of sovereignty.
The security concern behind Pakistan’s position is real. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has carried out repeated attacks inside Pakistan, particularly in the northwest. Islamabad has increasingly argued that pressure inside Pakistan is not enough if militant networks can organize or shelter across the border.
But military pressure across a disputed and politically sensitive border carries its own strategic cost.
Counterterrorism is not only about hitting targets
A strike can destroy a weapons cache or remove a militant commander. That is a tactical result. The strategic question is what happens the day after.
If civilian casualties rise, local anger grows. If the intelligence behind a strike is disputed, trust between governments falls further. If every attack inside Pakistan produces retaliation inside Afghanistan, both sides can slide into an escalation cycle in which the border itself becomes a new source of insecurity.
This is the part of counterterrorism that often receives less attention: a state can be tactically successful and strategically worse off at the same time.
The intelligence problem is now political
Pakistan says militant infrastructure exists across the border. Afghan authorities reject that accusation. The two sides do not appear to share a trusted mechanism for validating those competing claims.
That matters. When intelligence cannot be tested through a channel both governments recognize, every incident becomes political. Pakistan sees inaction. Afghanistan sees aggression. Civilians see another strike.
A functioning security relationship does not require the two governments to trust each other completely. It does require them to have ways to verify claims, communicate before escalation and investigate civilian harm after it happens.
Without that, military action becomes the default language.
Civilian harm is a security issue, not only a humanitarian one
The United Nations has repeatedly called for de-escalation and protection of civilians along the border. That should not be treated as separate from counterterrorism strategy.
When civilians are killed, armed groups gain material for recruitment and propaganda. Communities become less willing to cooperate with authorities. Local grievances harden. Even accurate counterterrorism operations become harder to distinguish from collective punishment in the eyes of people living under them.
That does not mean states should ignore militant threats. It means the standard for using force has to be higher when the political consequences can outlive the tactical gain.
What would reduce the risk
The answer is not a grand peace conference. It is more basic: a functioning military hotline, a joint mechanism for reviewing cross-border incidents, clearer intelligence-sharing procedures, and third-party or technical verification when facts are disputed.
Pakistan also needs a strategy that distinguishes between pressuring armed groups and broadening the conflict with Afghanistan. Kabul, for its part, cannot simply deny the regional security problem and expect the pressure to disappear.
Both sides have an interest in preventing militant groups from turning the border into permanent strategic depth.
The conclusion
The Afghanistan–Pakistan security problem will not be solved by airstrikes alone, and it will not be solved by denial.
Force may disrupt a threat. Trust, verification and sustained political pressure are what prevent the threat from regenerating.
Right now, both countries risk winning individual confrontations while losing control of the larger security relationship. That is the trap they need to avoid.
Ahmad Shah Mohibi
Founder, Rise to Peace