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 by Ahmad Mohibi

What’s Next for Afghanistan Under the Taliban Regime?

In just 10 days, the Taliban was able to take control of most of the major cities and towns across Afghanistan. On Tuesday, an all-male interim government was established by the Taliban, in which it declared Afghanistan an ‘Islamic Emirate.’ Many of the senior figureheads were veteran Taliban officials who were active in the resistance against US-led coalition forces over the last two decades. Notable leaders include Acting Defense Minister, Mullah Yaqoob, the son of Taliban founder, Mullah Omar, and Acting Minister Sirajuddin Hawwani, the head of the affiliate Hawwani network which is recognised as a US-designated foreign terrorist organization.

Despite its quick succession, the Taliban will face multiple issues in the coming weeks. Afghanistan remains highly fragile, exacerbated by a humanitarian crisis that will require immediate action from the international community.

An Inclusive Afghanistan

The international community has not yet recognized the Taliban as the ruling government in Afghanistan. This is unlikely to change until the Taliban demonstrates that it is not fundamentally against the world. Instead, it must prove that it is for the rebuilding of Afghanistan. This begins first and foremost with the Taliban demonstrating its intentions of establishing an inclusive Afghanistan. Various groups including women, ethnic minorities, and political opponents, will need protection for their civil liberties.

Over the last 30-years, Afghanistan has seen a wealth of different leaders, all of whom have been largely negative in one way or another. As a result, Afghanistan has been turned into a ‘hub for money-making with systematic government policies.’ Consequently, many leaders of the old government have fled in the wake of the Taliban takeover, taking millions worth of assets with them. One of the key challenges that the Taliban will face will thus be unifying the Afghan population under a trustworthy government.

High officials of the Taliban command have promised to respect women’s rights, with the group proclaiming that ‘everyone will be forgiven’ in regards to their political opponents. However, this has not yet been evident. Despite the previous speculation of inclusive representation, the government contains no female representatives. The US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, has asserted that the newly established Taliban government ‘does not meet the test of inclusivity,’ and instead comprises of ‘people with very challenging track records.’ Consequently, Interim Prime Minister, Mullah Hasan Akhund, has advocated for the denial of civil rights for ethnic and religious minorities and the imposing of restrictions on women. For example, recent developments have banned women from competing in sports. It is not enough to have false promises. Instead, the new interim government must act upon its promises.

The international community will not accept the Taliban if it imposes oppressive measures that infringe on human rights. For the Taliban to succeed, it must work towards unifying the Afghan population to become accepted within the political landscape. Once (and if) some level of unity is achieved, then international leaders can begin to work with the Taliban and recognize its new position.

Request for International Aid

Afghanistan is currently plagued by humanitarian despair. While the Taliban has made a promise to improve the economic landscape in Afghanistan, it are fundamentally unable to do this without international aid. Likewise, the Taliban’s succession should not mean the end of international aid. It is the duty of the international community to act and save the lives of those who are still vulnerable and need assistance in Afghanistan.

In the past, Afghanistan has received millions from foreign actors. Until August, the US, UK and EU had donated tens of billions of dollars to Afghanistan in a bid to develop the country. According to the World Bank, in 2020 aid flows accounted for 42.9% of Afghanistan’s $19.8 billion GDP. However, since the Taliban has assumed power this aid has been cut off, with the US freezing approximately $9.5 billion in Afghan assets held in American banks.

Basic services including food and water supplies are rapidly diminishing. The United Nations Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), has appealed for $600 million to meet humanitarian needs for those still in Afghanistan, in anticipation of weather warnings of upcoming droughts. Consequently, UN Assistant Secretary General, Kanni Wignaraka has proclaimed ‘we are facing a full-on development collapse on top of humanitarian and economic crises,’ warning of the need to prevent an impending ‘national implosion at all costs.’

However, this should not be mutually exclusive with a professional relationship with the Taliban. The international community still bares responsibility for assisting with humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, the lack of which would prove detrimental in upcoming weeks for millions of Afghan citizens.

The Role of Pakistan

Neighboring countries, like Pakistan, should be recognised as having played an important role in the Taliban’s accession. The international community, particularly the United States, will have to work tirelessly and efficiently to ensure that Pakistan is not presented as a haven for future militant groups. This includes the likes of ISIS and al-Qaeda, who have the potential to resurge now that the Taliban has regained power.

This is perhaps one of the key issues facing Afghanistan. The 9/11 attacks are a forceful reminder that neglecting Pakistan has grave consequences for international security. It is no secret that in the past, Pakistan has sheltered and to some extent inadvertently supported terrorism. Pakistan has previously harboured thousands of militant groups and has been influential in inspiring the conservative movement of Wahhabism, which was the driving ideology that inspired Osama Bin Laden. While Pakistan had minimal involvement with the Taliban until after 9/11, then head of al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, was harboured in Pakistan leading up to the lethal attacks.

However, the international community and its intelligence networks – namely the United States – failed to recognise the gravity of this relationship. Back in the 1990s, the US State Department, months before the al-Qaeda embassy bombings, failed to recognise the magnitude of the nexus between Pakistan-Afghanistan and subsequently Bin Laden. Instead, officials focused on the rising tensions between India and Pakistan, which ultimately resulted in a failure to pinpoint the forming terrorist network. Over the last decade, United States policymakers have underestimated the role Pakistan could play to facilitate peace, but equally so, violence and war.

The need for Pakistani cooperation is just as salient twenty years later. Responsibility falls on the international community to ensure that Pakistan no longer harbors terrorists or encourages terrorist activity to flourish.

Looking Forward

The upcoming weeks will be pivotal for the Taliban. It must prove that it is willing to unify the Afghan population. However, words are not enough. Instead, the Taliban must actively demonstrate that it is willing to include women and ethnic/religious minorities in its new agenda. Only then can the international community begin to work with the Taliban. Despite this, international aid is essential. Consequently, the international community have an obligation to support the Afghan population in the turbulent weeks ahead.

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 by Sydney Neuman

Racial and Religious Profiling in the United States in the Name of ‘National Security’

Many things changed in the United States following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Changes in law, policy, and security were made not only in the United States but around the world, in order to tackle the growing threat of terrorism. In response to these attacks, the United States government launched a military campaign called the “War on Terror.” This led to the enactment of many laws for law enforcement agencies to protect against terrorist activities.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security are just some of the law enforcement agencies that are effective in combating terrorism. However, there is a major flaw in their combating measures. This is their improper use of racial profiling used to address national security and public safety concerns. Racial profiling is wrong and has been proven to be a very ineffective measure for preventing terrorism.

The post-9/11 era has seen racial profiling of people perceived to be Muslim in the U.S. through many different factions. This has included airport profiling, surveillance of Muslim communities, detention, deportations, special registration of immigrants, and much more. Many American Muslims have been treated as potential terrorists based on their faith alone. Following the attacks, law enforcement agencies detained over a thousand Muslims in the United States, both citizens, and noncitizens, while the government figured out whether they had any connection to the attacks.

This blatant racial and religious profiling went on for years. The first step to try and prohibit this was in 2003 when the Department of Justice issued guidelines prohibiting racial and ethnic profiling in most law enforcement contexts. According to the guidelines, profiling is ineffective because it is “premised on the erroneous assumption that any particular individual of one race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in misconduct.” These guidelines also emphasize that race-based assumptions in law enforcement “perpetuate negative racial stereotypes that are harmful to our rich and diverse democracy, and materially impair our efforts to maintain a fair and just society.”

Shortly after his inauguration, President Joe Biden reversed former President Donald Trump’s Muslim Travel Ban. This ban was an executive order that prevented individuals from primarily Muslim countries, and later, from many African countries, from entering the United States. It was seeking to keep out or deport people perceived to be Muslim based upon the racist assumption that “they” are violent potential terrorist enemies of the U.S. nation. There are solutions to improve this major flaw through more intense and reconstructed training as well as implementing new policies for all law enforcement agencies.

The next step that can be taken is for Congress to pass the End Racial and Religious Profiling Act which was most recently introduced as part of the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act. This Act would prohibit federal, state, and local law enforcement from targeting a person based on actual or perceived race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, gender identity, or sexual orientation without trustworthy information that is relevant to linking a person to a crime. These measures would help demonstrate to the many diverse communities in our nation’s commitment to protecting national security based on facts rather than on bias.

It is so important now than ever before, to change racist, common sense ways of thinking about Arabs, Iranians, Afghans, and anyone perceived to be connected, in one way or another, to the idea of a “Muslim terrorist threat.”

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 by Stefan Bakumenko

The United Nations in Africa: Mali’s Challenging Future

The Long Road Ahead

The UN’s peacekeeping operation in Mali faces an uphill battle to stabilize the country, made even more difficult by recent events. The peace that this operation hopes to keep stems from a 2015 peace agreement between northern Tuareg and Arab rebels and the government of Mali. But the civilian government was deposed in an August 2020 coup, hampering mission goals and further destabilizing the country. This article highlights three challenges to the mission mandate and how best to respond to them. 

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established in April 2013 by Security Council resolution 2100, has become the UN’s most dangerous current peacekeeping operation. To date, there have been 253 fatalities out of the 15,209 authorized personnel in-country. On April 2nd, four peacekeepers were killed and nineteen wounded in a direct assault on their camp in Kidal region. Significant challenges abound for this mission aiming to implement its transitional roadmap and seven-part mandate. Its main goal since June 2015 has been safeguarding and implementing an Algiers peace agreement signed between the government and the Coordination of Movements for Azawad (CMA) rebel coalition. Further complications come from jihadist insurgents such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), as well as brutal communal violence in central Mali. Understanding these hurdles, concrete strategies must follow. 

Dual Military Coups

The most immediate challenge facing MINUSMA’s mandate is the August 2020 coup, which saw the resignation of President Keïta and Prime Minister Cisse after they were detained by the Malian Armed Forces. On January 18th, 2021, the military junta’s transitional National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) was disbanded, with interim president Bah Ndaw supervising an 18-month transition back to civilian rule. This promise of civilian rule gave cause for optimism, but the second coup in late May saw the removal of Ndaw by Colonel Assimi Goïta, who also organized last year’s coup. Goïta has since become Mali’s new president while maintaining that elections and the release of Ndaw and his prime minister will eventually occur. 

Both coups have demonstrated the militarization of politics and the weakness of government legitimacy in Mali, and have significantly undermined item 2 in MINUSMA’s mandate; to support “national political dialogue and the electoral process.” Though protestors before and during the first coup had been calling for Keïta’s resignation due to economic woes and ongoing violence, a coercive resolution to an unpopular administration undermines national stability. Credibility has been damaged twice now among key allies of both Mali and MINUSMA, with the African Union (AU) suspending Mali twice, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposing sanctions for the first coup, the United States cutting off military aid, and the UN Security Council condemning the military’s actions all throughout.

Close coordination with the government in Bamako is required for MINUSMA’s continued operation. Mission policymakers have the unenviable task of cooperating with the self-preservationist military regime while simultaneously upholding item 1’s ideals of “constitutional order, democratic governance, and national unity.” The strategy moving forward must be one of continued pressure on and agreement with Goïta’s government on the timeline and specifics of a transfer back to civilian rule. The real power brokers in Mali must be identified and engaged, and the UN must not be satisfied with easy promises from the military. Together with AU, EU, and US partners, MINUSMA’s liaisons must extract from the military firm dates for elections and guarantees that they will be “inclusive, free, fair, and transparent,” as per the mandate.

Protection of Civilians

Alongside the tragic loss of 253 UN peacekeepers since 2013, MINUSMA has also witnessed a great deal of civilian casualties in areas outside of government control. Peacekeepers have been patrolling and expanding social services in these areas, in line with items 1 and 3 of the mandate; supporting “reestablishment of State authority throughout the country” and “protection of civilians and United Nations personnel.” But as peacekeepers navigate deadly improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes, the multitude of violent actors, vast expanses of contested land, and complicated communal dynamics have allowed thousands of civilian casualties to slip through their fingers since 2013. Atrocities and possible war crimes have been well documented, further driving a wedge between hostile communities in central Mali. This continued violence against civilians undermines mission legitimacy and the 300+ development projects it has carried out.

Protecting civilians is often an issue of policing. Protecting them from separatists requires greater policing of the vast, contested northern regions, while population centers must be protected from jihadists. Communal violence in central Mali must be lessened by policing the boundaries between feuding communities. The number of police on mission should be increased, as MINUSMA has a 13-2 split of soldiers and police. More importantly, peacekeepers should step up technical assistance and recruitment drives for local police; this is a classic method to build peace and is included in the mandate. 

A new, complex frontier in peacekeeping

The final challenge concerns a relatively important shift in UN peacekeeping doctrine. Of sixteen active UN missions, MINUSMA is the only one authorized to conduct counterinsurgency. Its mandate allows it to use “all necessary means… [to] deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas.” Resolution 2164, an update to the mission, identified “asymmetric threats” as spoilers of peace; military jargon for insurgent groups. This has created challenges on the ground and great debate in the policy world. Strategically, peacekeepers appear not to have been deployed to keep the peace, but to reach peace through force, conducting counterinsurgency alongside France and the G5 Sahel (soldiers from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). Tactically, counterinsurgency requires specialized training and equipment, two things that are far from standardized or even guaranteed in the UN system. Mission effectiveness is hampered by the unique challenges and confusions presented by this dissonance between peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. And with France recently announcing the end of its eight-year campaign in the Sahel, now is the time for MINUSMA to take up the mantle with clear and confident policy.

Any good counterinsurgency must clearly lay out its strategy. An understanding of the insurgents and of one’s own capacities is essential in choosing how to train soldiers and allocate resources. The 9 experts on-mission and 514 staff officers need a proper division of labor and understanding, including programs for intelligence, search-and-destroy, and public relations. All of this can only come from a unified, top-down doctrine. That is why this new arena for UN peacekeeping needs a field handbook that systematically demarcates tactics and limitations of action. This also lowers MINUSMA’s high death rate: training troops not for pitched battles but for countering IEDs and ambushes is vital, as argued by former mission commander Michael Lollesgaard.

Overall, much needs to be done. Two coups in under a year, the protection of civilians, and counterinsurgency strategy must be addressed through diplomatic pressure, increased police efforts, and tactical guidance, respectively. Relative peace is not on the immediate horizon, but these strategies will push the situation in Mali in a constructive direction.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

A Tale of Two Withdrawals: What the U.S. Can Learn from the Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon

On August 15th, 2021, Taliban fighters captured Kabul without firing a shot, sending shock waves across the world and expediting the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. Like the Afghanistan withdrawal, the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was long expected and planned. Nevertheless, the events on the ground shifted quickly and forced Israel to complete the withdrawal overnight. With events in Afghanistan still unfolding, the U.S. can learn from Israeli experiences in Lebanon and prevent a humanitarian disaster from occurring at the Kabul airport.

The Invasion

Israel and the U.S. invaded Lebanon and Afghanistan, respectively, in order to eradicate the havens these countries had become for terrorist organizations. Since the 1970s, the PLO has used southern Lebanon as a launching pad for attacks against Israel. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and successfully removed the PLO from Lebanon. Israel subsequently supported the establishment of a friendly regime in Beirut led by the Phalanges.

Following its initial success, Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon and created a security zone in southern Lebanon. The military rationale underlying the establishment of the security zone was to prevent Hezbollah, another anti-Israel insurgent group, and its terror cells from entering Israel, and to deflect fire away from Israeli territory toward the IDF and the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a local militia fully funded and equipped by Israel.

Similar to the haven Lebanon provided the PLO and Hezbollah, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan provided sanctuary for Al-Qaeda. On September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four commercial airliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. On October 7th, 2001, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and with local anti-Taliban forces routed Al-Qaeda and ended the Taliban regime. On May 1st, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared an end to “major combat” in Afghanistan.

The Withdrawal

For over fifteen years, Israelis believed that their presence in southern Lebanon and the casualties associated with it were necessary. As their presence drew on, however, Israeli consensus shifted, leading to broad public support for a unilateral withdrawal and the election of Prime Minister Ehud Barak, a vocal supporter of the withdrawal. Barak tried to tie his plans for a withdrawal from Lebanon to a peace agreement with Syria. But this plan failed, leading to his decision to withdraw from Lebanon unilaterally and reject the advice of his senior military leaders that advocated against it. Consequently, the withdrawal from Lebanon didn’t go according to plan and what unfolded on the ground was described as chaos.

When Israel began to transfer its military outposts to the SLA in mid-May, the SLA proved unable to hold its ground, deciding to abandon its outposts and disband rather than continue fighting. Barak had to advance the timetable for the IDF’s withdrawal from July to May 24. The collapse of the SLA and Hezbollah’s lightning advance initiated a massive flood of SLA members and their families to the Israeli border, fearing Hezbollah’s retribution.

Unlike the Israeli withdrawal, the U.S. withdrawal was an integral part of the agreement the U.S. signed with the Taliban. While the Taliban has overwhelmingly violated the agreement, President Biden remained committed to the withdrawal, ignoring the warnings of his top military generals and diplomats. Emboldened by the U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban launched its major summer offensive. Once the first provisional capital fell, the Afghan Army collapsed in days, often surrendering to the Taliban without firing a shot. On August 15th, 2021, the Taliban entered victoriously into Kabul.

Conclusions

Every day we bear witness to the unfolding events in Afghanistan. Similar events were unfolding on the Israeli-Lebanese border in 2000. Then, Israel was overwhelmed with the rapid collapse of the SLA and the flood of refugees towards its border. Israel opened its borders and allowed Israel’s allies and their families to enter Israel. Nevertheless, it took Israel 20 years to officially honor the SLA fighters and their sacrifice.

The U.S. shouldn’t wait 20 years to honor its Afghan allies. The U.S. has a moral obligation of not leaving them behind, regardless of whether they are citizens or allies. The U.S. can still do the right thing and open Kabul’s airport gates, its aircraft’s doors, and most importantly its heart, to the fleeing Afghan allies.

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 by Sydney Neuman

An Assessment of the Current Terror Threats to the United States

As the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks approaches and coronavirus is in rapid circulation, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has issued a new National Terrorism Advisory System bulletin, warning of the threat of extremist violence in the United States. This advisory is an update of the previous assessment. It is not based on any specific threat information, but rather represents the DHS’s analysis of the condition of the United States.

Coronavirus Threat

The DHS has warned local police departments that opposition to another pandemic-related lockdown policy could constitute a “terror threat.” However, this new advisory is “not based on any actual threats or plots” but has stemmed from the “rise in anti-government rhetoric.” This is largely connected to mask and vaccine mandates. The advisory states that, “through the remainder of 2021, racially- or ethnically-motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) and anti-government/anti-authority violent extremists will remain a national threat priority for the United States.” It warns that these extremists may seek to exploit the resurgence of COVID-19. Pandemic-related stressors have contributed to an increase in societal strains and tensions. In turn, this could lead to several plots by domestic violent extremists.

Houses of Worship and Commercial Gatherings Threat

Also included in Friday’s advisory, is a warning of the threat of RMVEs that sometimes target houses of worship and crowded commercial facilities or gatherings. As more institutions are beginning to reopen including schools, churches, synagogues, and mosques, there are several dates of religious significance. This includes the Jewish holidays Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur coming up in September. These significant dates could provide an increased target of opportunity for violence though there are currently no credible or imminent threats identified to these locations.

Online Threat

One other major warning of the advisory is for people to continue to be cautious of false narratives, conspiracy theories, and misinformation being spread online and through online communities. It states that:

“Ideologically motivated violent extremists fueled by personal grievances and extremist ideological beliefs continue to derive inspiration and obtain operational guidance through the consumption of information shared in certain online communities.”

Violent extremists may use messaging platforms or techniques to obscure operational indicators that provide specific warnings of a pending act of violence. Russian, Chinese, and Iranian governments, have all been linked to media outlets, aiming to “sow discord” and amplify conspiracy theories. These are largely concerning the origins of COVID-19 and the effectiveness of vaccines. This rhetoric has also led to amplifying calls for violence targeting persons of Asian descent.

Afghanistan Threat

While the report does not specifically mention the worsening situation in Afghanistan, it mentions acknowleges that:

“Al- Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula recently released its first English-language copy of Inspire magazine in over four years. This demonstrates that foreign terrorist organizations continue efforts to inspire U.S.-based individuals susceptible to violent extremist influences.”

It is a huge concern to both US government officials and their citizens that Al-Qaeda could rebuild in Afghanistan. Consequently, this may be a signifiacant threat under the Taliban rule. Unfortunately, this will lead to an increased threat of terror to the United State. Subsequently, this could become a major target of terrorist plots.

How the DHS is Responding

The DHS is taking various steps in response to these new threats. They are monitoring all online platforms to identify and evaluate calls for violence. This includes online activity associated with the spread of disinformation, conspiracy theories, and false narratives. The report moreover encourages the public to maintain awareness of the evolving threat environment and report suspicious activity.

The DHS is coordinating with state and local law enforcement and public safety partners. They aim to maintain situational awareness of potential violence in their jurisdictions and maintain open lines of communication with federal partners. Finally from a more broad standpoint, the DHS states that it will “remain committed to identifying and preventing terrorism and targeted violence while protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all persons.

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Boko Haram Soliders
 by Rise to Peace

Is Boko Haram on the verge of defeat?

Boko Haram - Is Boko Haram on the verge of defeat?

Boko Haram insurgents (Photo Credit Ndtv: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/nigerias-boko-haram-leader-dead-islamic-state-west-african-province-says-2457798)

Over the last few months the Nigerian armed forces have enjoyed a series of military victories against Boko Haram, who have also been plagued with infighting and defections. Notably the recent suicide of Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, marked a major blow to the Islamist terrorist group who, for the last two decades, have spread chaos and death, killing thousands across Nigeria.

Shekau’s suicide occurred not after a defeat to Nigerian government but at the hands of another terrorist organization, the Islamic States West Africa Province (ISWAP). Nevertheless, his death benefited the Nigerian government greatly, and was a severe blow for Boko Haram. Indeed, Boko Haram’s recent loss at the Battle of Sambisa Forest, emphasises the declining state of these terrorists. Not only was it a decisive defeat for Boko Haram, Sambisa was their former stronghold, but the fact that they lost to the ISWAP, another terrorist group with whom they had once been allied with marks a significant change in Boko Haram’s fortunes. This infighting illustrates the division and lack of unity between the Islamist terrorist groups in Africa. The Nigerian military has benefited greatly from this infighting and have pressed their advantage against the weakened and vulnerable Boko Haram.

Earlier this year, operation Hadin Kai saw Nigerian troops drive Boko Haram terrorists out of several of their territories in north-eastern Nigeria, including Borno state and Damboa. The Operation was commended for destroying several known terrorist camps in Borno before moving on to capture the resident rebels. Other detachments engaged the Domboa terrorists in intense combat and drove them into retreat. These decisive victories were both an enormous morale boost for the Nigerian military, and a PR Coup for the government, as previously their military had often suffered repeated defeats and heavy casualties of the course of their conflict with the Boko Haram. Now that the tide appears to be changing and Nigerian forces are winning battles in regions where once they had suffered ignoble defeats.

While the Nigerian military have been successful against Boko Haram before, Shekau’s death and the subsequent news that more than a thousand members of the organization have since surrendered to the Nigerian forces, signal a radical change in Boko Haram’s fortunes. Another key indicator is collapse of support for Boko Haram among their former allies and their own fighters. Since May, hundreds of Boko Haram fighters voluntarily surrendered in Cameroon. The surrender of these soldiers was likely driven by a loss of faith in their cause, rather than fearing a decisive military defeat.

Throughout history insurgencies have been notoriously difficult to defeat on a permanent basis. Guerrilla fighters and insurgents such as Boko Haram use hit-and-run tactics, striking without warning, before slipping away into the shadows to be sheltered by sympathisers. These tactics make it difficult for conventional troops to defeat insurrections in the long-term. Guerrilla groups also rely on spreading an ideal and romanticised image of their cause to gain supporters; narratives of martyrdom and dying heroically for the cause are key to inspire potential new recruits to take up the mantle and continue the fight. Thereby allowing these insurgent conflicts to last for many years. Such tactics have ensured the success of guerrilla insurgencies throughout history across the world.

The mass surrender by Boko Haram fighters indicates that one of the insurgent’s key weapons, the ability to inspire and recruit new members, is weakening. It has been thought that this may be due in part to Shekau’s suicide as the large number of defections started after his death. This suggests that he personally was a critical element holding the organization together as, without him, hundreds are no longer committed to Boko Haram.

Without the charismatic leader who inspired them, Boko Haram’s ideological grip on its members suddenly appears fragile. And time is against them. The Nigerian forces are “poised for a final routing” of the insurgency. Whilst the war is not over, this year marks a significant change of fortune for Boko Haram. They are now in a clearly vulnerable position to the Nigerian forces, who are pressing their advantage relentlessly, and continue to take decisive steps to finally defeat Boko Haram.

 

 

 

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