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 by Sydney Neuman

Views from Washington: How US Troop Withdrawal Will Affect the Taliban

On October 7th, 2001, former president George W. Bush launched the war in Afghanistan, following the 9/11 attacks. 20 years later, current President Joe Biden says, “it’s time to end America’s longest war,” as he announced that the United States is pushing for a full withdrawal of troops by September 11, 2021. The 3,500 troops remaining in Afghanistan will be withdrawn, regardless of whether progress is made in intra-Afghan peace talks or the Taliban reduces its attacks on Afghan security forces and citizens. NATO troops in Afghanistan will also leave.

Leaders in Washington will continue to assist the Afghan security forces and do all that can be done to support the peace process. However, the Taliban has stated that it will not participate in “any conference” on the future of Afghanistan until all foreign troops leave.

There are very mixed responses to this announcement. This is likely due to the Taliban’s psychological and military momentum in the country. The Taliban is an Islamic fundamentalist group that ruled in Afghanistan from 1996-2001, following the U.S.-led invasion. Since then, it has waged an insurgency against the U.S.-backed government in Kabul. Many experts are concerned that the Taliban is stronger now than ever. They currently control over half of Afghanistan’s districts.

The first direct peace negotiations with the Afghan government began in 2020, signing an agreement with the United States. However, little progress has been made.

Former President Bush called the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan a mistake and predicted that the consequences, especially for Afghan women and girls, will be “unbelievably bad.” Former Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton has also voiced her concerns about the Taliban regaining control if the US withdraws its troops. She has stated that:

“This is what we call a wicked problem. There are consequences both foreseen and unintended of staying and of leaving. The US government has to focus on two huge consequences: the resumption of activities by extremist groups and a subsequent outpouring of refugees from Afghanistan.”

Clinton furthermore highlighted that the potential collapse of the Afghan government and a possible takeover by the Taliban, could result in a new civil war. On the flip side, Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont does not think the troops should be there. Former President, Donald Trump, advocated for US troops to return home and subsequently criticized the US military interventions for being costly and ineffective.

When the war began in 2001, the public largely supported it. In early 2002, 93%, a record high, of Americans supported the war. As time went on and troops remained, majorities continued to hold these beliefs between 2004 and 2013. Then for the first time in 2014, an equal amount of people believed that it was a mistake. More and more people began believing that it was a mistake and the war made the US less safe. In 2021, 47% say U.S. military involvement was a mistake; 46% say it was not. From a political party standpoint, the recent polls show that 56% of Democrats and 29% of Republicans now say it was a mistake.

There is no military path to victory and peace talks are believed to be the best way to resolve the insurgency. Many U.S. security experts remain concerned that under the Taliban’s rule, Afghanistan would remain a safe haven for terrorists, who could launch attacks against the United States and its allies.

In its 2021 report, the United Nations team that monitors the Taliban has gathered significant data. This has demonstrated that the group still has strong ties with al-Qaeda. The Taliban continues to provide al-Qaeda with protection in exchange for resources and training. Between 200-500 al-Qaeda fighters are believed to be in Afghanistan, and its leaders are believed to be based in regions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Biden is optimistic that the withdrawal will be completed by the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The current United States Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, said the Biden administration was “very focused on a deliberate, safe and orderly” withdrawal of troops, but that the US would continue to assist the Afghan government. “Even as our forces are pulling out of Afghanistan, we are not withdrawing – we are not disengaging.” Also adding that if US troops were attacked before leaving the country, “decisive action” would be taken.

Biden and those who support the drawdown made this decision based on the U.S. accomplishing its main goals in Afghanistan: finding the terrorists who orchestrated the 9/11 attacks, killing Osama bin Laden and trying to limit the country’s base of operations for terrorists. Nation-building was not part of the original strategy, and this is a war that has dragged on for too long, costing the U.S. far too many lives and money.

 

 

 

 

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 by Stefan Bakumenko

The United Nations in Africa: South Sudan’s Quest for Stability

Background

On July 9th, South Sudan celebrated ten years of independence, remembering how its people overwhelmingly voted for independence from Sudan in 2011. But another entity, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), is also marking ten years of existence this year. Initially meant to consolidate peace and development in the world’s youngest country, UNMISS has grown into the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world, currently deploying 19,233 personnel. With a budget of over $1.2 billion for the 2020-2021 fiscal year, it is also the second most expensive ongoing UN mission. This is after the mission in Mali. This article hopes to analyze this monumental mission that has shaped a country.

Early UN attempts at state-building were violently reoriented by a civil war between President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar and by broader communal violence between (and within) their respective Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups. Though a 2018 peace agreement facilitated the tenuous formation of a unity government in 2020, a recent UN report found that violence has only gotten more brutal, unaccountable, and decentralized since the end of the country’s civil war. The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has failed to implement major security and accountability measures from the peace agreement. Consequently, its security forces are frequently accused of obstructing peacekeepers and violating civilians’ human rights. With the UNSC recently renewing UNMISS’ mandate until 2022 and establishing a three-year “strategic vision” for the country, practitioners are tasked with interpreting mission effectiveness within the four key pillars of the mandate. 

The UN Mandate

Keeping in mind the centrality of the mandate to any UN mission, this article uses UNMISS’ updated mandate as a point of departure for evaluating mission effectiveness. It will also keep the 2018 peace deal as an additional guideline. The terms of the mandate reaffirmed in 2021 are essentially the same as those in Resolution 2155 (2014), which was updated when the nascent country fell into civil war. With some important clarification in the language in the 2021 resolution, the four pillars are broad: protection of civilians, monitoring of human rights abuses, facilitation of humanitarian aid delivery, and supporting the active peace agreement. 

Sadly, these four pillars look nothing like the original mandate from 2011. This is because UNMISS has had to drastically scale its ambitions back from consolidating the state to alleviating and containing a multi-dimensional crisis. Using the mandate itself to measure effectiveness is essential. In part, it reflects the wishes of concerned multilateral actors and frames what the mission is actually allowed and expected to do. This article distills the goals of the mandate into two broad, dynamic criteria for evaluating UNMISS: providing protection and facilitating aid to civilians and promoting institutional stability and security. These have been constant, salient challenges facing UNMISS, and they encompass much of what the mission is there to achieve.

Providing protection and facilitating aid to civilians

Though UNMISS can only exist with the consent of the GoSS, one might forget considering how often peacekeepers are blocked or even attacked by government forces. The UNSC acknowledged this in 2014 and again in Resolution 2567 (2021), when it “[condemned] the continued obstruction of UNMISS by the GoSS and opposition groups, including restrictions on freedom of movement, assault of UNMISS personnel, and constraints on mission operations.” Government intransigence amid vast civilian suffering presents UN personnel with difficult decisions and frequent occasions of paralysis in the face of violence against civilians. Since it cannot achieve protection of civilians (PoC) in every case, UNMISS has also been tasked with reporting on government privations, hoping for long-term accountability through documentation and human rights pressure.

Though UN missions are frequently criticized for the lives they fail to save, a critical analysis must try to understand what would have happened had peacekeepers not been there. As of 2020, there were almost 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside UN-administered PoC sites. UNMISS’ recent focus has thus been protecting civilians and administering aid and basic services in and around these sites. This establishment of veritable peace corridors is reminiscent of early visions of peacekeeping, but even through this lens, UNMISS can only be viewed as semi-successful. This is because it has frequently been unable to protect civilians and aid workers within its own PoC sites. Subsequently, it has had little success expanding the domain of its PoC sites outwards. There remain 1.5 million IDPs outside of PoC sites. Ultimately, violence against civilians and aid workers has continued and even worsened since the end of the civil war. 

Similar things can be said for humanitarian aid. The UN has estimated that 8.3 million South Sudanese are currently in need of humanitarian assistance, an increase of 800,000 from 2020. Both sides were known to intentionally starve communities during the civil war, and the GoSS continues to block access to peacekeepers and aid workers seemingly at will. Though a great deal of aid has moved through roads restored and protected by UNMISS, GoSS corruption and violence and the frequent pilfering of humanitarian goods have deterred major international donors in recent years. UNMISS should leverage these once-eager financiers against GoSS intransigence, putting economic pressure on a government reliant on international support.

Promoting institutional stability and security

In terms of building a stable and responsive state in South Sudan, the 2018 Revitalized Agreement offers valuable metrics, such as refugee resettlement, rebuilding of physical infrastructure, and finalization of a permanent constitution. Unfortunately, any traction on these issues is largely out of the hands of UNMISS. This is because African regional organizations have led the way in mediation and implementation. Relations with the GoSS have soured ever since the 2014 mandate said UNMISS would protect civilians “irrespective of the source of…violence,” tacitly pitting it against government troops. 

But the mission is not completely ineffective on the political front. At a community-level, UNMISS-facilitated dialogues have deescalated violence in numerous areas recently. There is significant potential to partner with communities instead of the GoSS, but UNMISS has yet to hire a sufficient number of community liaisons to foster engagement. Subsequently, its patrols have been notably hesitant to engage on foot in communities. These are tangible policies UNMISS must correct if it is to overcome the challenges posed by the government. UNMISS should institutionalize and expand these often-successful dialogues for reconciliation and deradicalization in local South Sudanese communities.

Conclusion

It is certainly better for hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese that UNMISS was deployed, but with its resources, the mission could do far more to push the country in a constructive direction towards peace. From a strictly peacekeeping lens, UNMISS receives a somewhat passing grade for establishing areas of relative protection. But with the post-Cold War pairing of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, UNMISS has fallen flat. Frequently marginalized from the peace process, it has largely abdicated its role in shaping post-war South Sudan. 

Most South Sudanese remain susceptible to factional violence and dire humanitarian need, and little has been done to grow state capacity or even state interest in helping them. As much good as UNMISS has done in specific areas, it can only be national stability that helps those millions of South Sudanese still living on the precipice. And now that UNMISS has begun transitioning its PoC sites into GoSS-controlled IDP camps, it is unclear what major tools are left for this mission to fulfill its mandate. 

Overall, UNMISS has a great deal of experience and success to pull from but has not been bold enough in tackling one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. The UN must either recommit to the political process in South Sudan or accept that it is merely being used to protect a civilian population ignored by the government. It should also expand and standardize conflict resolution initiatives of the kind frequently highlighted in its own reports. Much of the violence in South Sudan stems from specific, community-level disputes. Engaging with at-risk communities and investing in specialized civilian personnel would go a long way towards saving lives in South Sudan.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa: Introduction and Analysis

Introduction

United Nations peacekeeping operations are meant to help countries down the complex path of peace and reconciliation. Such peacekeeping missions are mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A smaller subset of peacekeeping missions, stabilization operations, are not regulated by the UN Charter, but make-up three of the four largest ongoing peace operations. Their legitimacy rests between Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes) and Chapter VII (use of force to restore peace), constituting the so-called “Chapter VI and a half.” These operations are a joint instrument of the Security Council (the highest political authority) and the Secretary-General, the highest administrative and functional authority of the organization.

Peacekeeping interventions are based on some strategic points, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and the possibility of deploying and integrating police forces and civilian personnel. The work that the UN conducts during peace operations is based on three fundamental principles, namely consent to intervention by countries in conflict, impartiality, and non-use of force (unless in self-defense or in defense of the mandate).

Thousands of “Blue Helmets,” the military body belonging to member states and “loaned” to UN missions, have over time morphed from mere observers limited to logistical and technical support to being assigned sensitive functions. They now operate more complex programs including political mediation, de-mining, public affairs and communication, protection and promotion of civil rights, and reintegration of combatants into society. The missions have thus become multidimensional and integrated.

Instability is not just a military fact, with a truce to guard or a cease-fire line to patrol, but has many causes. Stabilization operations thus include ever greater responsibilities, including the democratization of local institutions, economic and social development, environmental and natural resource protection, and the retraining of military forces, police, and prison services, according to modern, democratic criteria.

Africa 

An example of these new and expanded functions are assistance and support missions, which are deployed in countries that have seen the total collapse (or almost total degradation) of state structures, countries such as Libya, Sierra Leone, Mali, Central Africa, and South Sudan. UN functions are also diversified and no longer restrained to patrolling truce lines. They have been involved in such diverse efforts as decolonization in Namibia, independence in Eritrea, protection of populations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the transition to democratic regimes after years of civil war in Angola, Mozambique, Central America, or West Africa. All these missions see not only the change in the profiles and structures of the missions but also their composition. 

In West Africa, there are two very different missions, MINURSO and MINUSMA. The first aims to ensure, sooner or later, the holding of a regular referendum in the territories of Western Sahara, still disputed between Algeria, Morocco, and the local population. The mission has been active since 1991 and has 485 units, of which 245 are military.

MINUSMA, in Mali, started in 2013 shortly after the French military operation Serval, which halted the advance of Tuareg and other armed groups towards Bamako. Despite the collaboration with Operation Barkhane (formerly Serval) and the G5 of the Sahel, the area is still deeply unstable. MINUSMA’s annual budget exceeds one billion dollars and over 15,000 military personnel are deployed. The states that support the mission militarily are interested in containing the Malian crisis (Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal).

As for Central Africa, MINUSCA is the stabilization mission of the Central African Republic. It was born in 2014, following the outbreak of civil war. Despite numerous peace agreements signed between parties, skirmishes and structural violence remain. The mission has an almost exclusively “regional” character since the troops present are Rwandan, Egyptian, Zambian, Cameroonian, and Senegalese. MONUSCO, on the other hand, is an operation that started in 2010 and aims to stabilize the Democratic Republic of Congo, devastated first by spillover from the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and then by its own wars from 1998 to 2003, which left over 5 million dead.

Additionally, three peacekeeping missions are active in the Horn of Africa, two in Sudan and one in South Sudan. The last one, UNMISS, was born in 2011 in South Sudan. After gaining independence, the country fell into a bloody civil war, dictated by patriotism and exploitation of ethnic tension, which have been intensifying since December 2013.

Analysis

Over the years, this United Nations instrument has been criticized extensively but has also received some positive feedback. Too often, in the initiatives of the powers that act in the name of the so-called international community, in which Africa, politically speaking, seems to be considered more an object than a real subject, the goal of “security” prevails. Very often, the issues of jihadism and human mobility towards Europe are considered separately from other issues plaguing African governments. There is a need for a repositioning of international diplomacy that considers the constant and progressive modification of the African geopolitical chessboard in the age of globalization.

The colonial and postcolonial models, to the test of facts, no longer represent a paradigm of reference in Africa for the control of aid institutions or even investments. The traditional partners of African countries (the former colonial powers) must now compete with the low index of “conditionality” strategies of emerging powers such as Brazil, China, India, Turkey, and Russia itself, which is reappearing in Africa after the withdrawal imposed, about thirty years ago, by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It is precisely within these parameters that the United Nations, as an organism of peoples, is called to play an indispensable role. It is worth recalling what happened in the early 1960s with the wave of African independence movements. At that time, the UN, established as an organization after World War II with the aim of preventing future conflicts by replacing the ineffective League of Nations, played a politically relevant role.

In particular, the recognition of the principle of self-determination of peoples, sanctioned by the United Nations Charter, received a warm response. International law also outlawed war, in particular, due to Articles 2 & 4 of the Charter, declaring that member states must renounce war and resolve their conflicts.

To weigh negatively on these missions are a series of factors found in many investigations. The first of these factors is the lack of discipline among Blue Helmets and the fact that the contingents are sometimes composed of soldiers from countries where training standards are not adequate for modern crises in Africa. There have also been pervasive issues of sexual violence against women and minors.

Regardless, the United Nations has taken a central and irreplaceable role in the building of congenial international relations in the modern era. In the case of the African continent, the UN provides international legitimacy and an irreplaceable and indispensable forum for negotiation at global level on the issues of development, peace, and security.

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 by Rise to Peace

The World Needs to See the Taliban for What It Is: A Hybrid Terrorist Organization

Over the last weekend, the Taliban continued its country-wide offensive, successfully capturing several Afghan provincial capitals. While the U.S. continues to pin its hopes on a Taliban-Afghan government peace deal to halt the country’s relentless violence, the reality on the ground tells a different story. The Taliban’s offensive casts serious doubt on its supposed desire to reach a peaceful resolution. The U.N. special envoy for Afghanistan, Deborah Lyons, has questioned the Taliban’s commitment to a political settlement.

The statements of the Taliban’s Doha-based political office regarding their willingness to negotiate are no more than smoke and mirrors, maintaining a glimpse of hope for the West for a peaceful resolution while at the same time continuing the offensive. It represents a conceptual failure of the West in understanding the organizational nature of the Taliban. The Taliban, with all of its branches, is a terrorist organization, or more precisely, a hybrid terrorist organization.

Definitions

Terrorism is the deliberate use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political ends. The terrorist has political goals, whether nationalistic, separatist, socioeconomic, or religious. The Taliban’s end goal, for example, is to establish an Islamic caliphate in Afghanistan. Terrorism is differentiated from criminal violence by its deliberate use of violence against civilians for political ends.

A hybrid terrorist organization is one that stands on multiple legs. First, it has a military or paramilitary leg that engages in terrorist acts. Second, it has a political leg that allows the organization to operate and win in both the “illegitimate” arena of terrorism and the “legitimate” arena of the media. Third, it acts as an alternative provider of welfare services through seemingly innocent organizations serving a potential or actual constituency. Among jihadist organizations such as the Taliban, this activity is known as da’wa and subsumes a combination of religious services, educational services, ideological indoctrination, and welfare services.

The Taliban as a Hybrid Terrorist Organization

The Taliban’s operations today are divided between its three legs: military, political, and social welfare-da’wa.

Its military forces are advancing on all fronts, seizing provincial capitals, and increasingly utilizing terror tactics against civilians and governmental installations. In recent weeks, the Taliban kidnapped and executed a popular Kandahari comedian Nazar Mohammad, apparently because he ridiculed Taliban leaders.  The Taliban tried to assassinate the acting defense minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi in a bombing attack, leaving dozens dead but failing to kill the minister. The Taliban shot and killed the director of Afghanistan’s government media center, Dawa Khan Menapal, after ambushing him in Kabul. In its overall strategy, the Taliban has been conducting summary executions, beating up women, shutting down schools, and blowing up clinics and infrastructure.

Its political office presents a different face. From its seat in Doha, Qatar, the Taliban’s political office maintains its commitment to negotiation and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Taliban has dispatched delegations to Russia, China, and Iran in hopes of gaining international legitimacy. Finally, the Taliban has also emphasized its willingness to grant rights to women.

As part of its da’wa efforts, the Taliban has created a network of Islamic religious schools, called madrasas, all across the country. These schools attract many poor families because the Taliban cover all expenses and provide food and clothing for the children. On some occasions, the Taliban has encouraged families to send their children to their schools by offering families cash. These schools are used as recruitment and training sites for the Taliban.

Conclusions

Despite what it may say, the Taliban has not changed and holds the same views as it did before. The only difference is that it has become more sophisticated in its use of technology and is better integrated within the jihadi universe. In order to successfully confront the Taliban, the world must first conceptually understand the nature of the organization. Second, it must designate all of the Taliban’s operational legs as part of the same hybrid terrorist organization. Finally, this designation will enable the world to use counterterrorist strategies to better confront all of the Taliban’s legs.

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 by Rise to Peace

Special Report On Youths’ Views on the Afghan Peace Process

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Youths’ Views on the Afghan Peace Process-2

This report sought to explore the youth of Afghanistan’s views and perspective on the Afghan peace process. 187 respondents between the ages of 18-39 responded to the questionnaire and provided data for this report. Overall, the report highlighted youth concerns regarding women’s role following peace agreements with the Taliban, but are of the opinion they have an effective role in these talks. Consequently, the youth expressed mixed feelings regarding negotiations with the Taliban, which following the increase of violence, leaves little optimism for peace.

Policy recommendations will follow the report, which will suggest investment in education for the youth. Moreover, recommendations will be offered to neighboring countries, including Pakistan and Iran. This report suggests that more research is necessary to ensure inclusivity in the peace process, in anticipation of the withdrawal of foreign troops.

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Encouraging messages written on signs by London Underground staff for commuters the morning after the 2016 Westminster terror attack. The “Blitz Spirit” of WW2 is often invoked to rally community moral in London after terrorist incidents.
 by Rise to Peace

How Local Identities Can Shape a More Balanced Response to Terror

The traumatic impacts of terrorist attacks reverberate far beyond physical injuries and loss of life. Victims must often cope with the loss of family and friends, damage to the wider community and social structures, as well as the potential personal and wider economic consequences. In the search for security and stability, exposed individuals often demand a radicalization of their society’s values and a rapid expansion of the state security apparatus. Against the backdrop of Terror Management Theory and the concept of Psychological Resilience, this article aims to open a new perspective on responses to terrorism based on local identities.

Terror Management Theory

Terror Management Theory was designed around the research of Ernest Becker, it refers to how people cope with fears and anxiety facing the idea of their mortality when there is an event that removes their psychological protective structures. According to this theory, individuals psychologically cope with terrorism by stressing their society’s world views and security structures. This gives them a sense of meaning, justice, and orderly life. In political terms, they typically demand a strengthening of their country’s economic, military, or judicial power.

In Western Democracies, responses to terrorism are primarily organized in the form of nation-states. Nations and their normative and organizational structures are survival vehicles because they make people stick together in an uncertain and dangerous world. However, at the same time, seeking shelter in one’s own national identity and beefing up security structures can lead to fewer concerns about privacy rights and racial or religious prejudices, as many examples from the recent past have shown.

Different peoples respond differently to trauma, some will be more tolerant and less alarmist than others. Societies that embrace dynamic multiculturalism can reduce the risk of aggressive measures against certain racial and religious groups in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. However, effective multiculturalism only really occurs as a consequence of personal contact with out-group members, on a local scale.

Building Psychological Resilience by Fostering Local Identities

Psychological resilience, in general, has to do with a population’s “ability to find a new balance in life after a dramatic incident has occurred.” There are three separate levels that can be distinguished. The first, individual-level resilience is developed by one’s own personality and individuals’ surroundings. This takes the form of personal determination, self-confidence, friends, neighbors, and family.

After that, the community level is seen. This involves the emotional ties to a geographical place that the victim can call “home.” This may be a sense of communal belonging. Finally, the third level has to do with the characteristics of the attack. The scale, violence, and aftermath. Naturally, those closer to, or deeply affected by the terrorist event will have endured more trauma to their own resilience.

Hence, the national response to terrorism will be directly affected by how society responses at a communal level. State responses to terrorism is a dimension we mostly associate with terrorism in political terms because the nation-state appears to be the only organization that can effectively guarantee physical security. However, this view underestimates the psychological help local networks and identities can give. As research has shown, strong social networks on the level of neighborhoods, districts, or local clubs and organizations do not only have a positive effect on education and wealth, but also on physical and social security, happiness, and identity, and bringing together diverse groups strengthens social tolerance.

Applying for state support at this local level could present a way to give individuals affected by terrorism psychological coping mechanisms beyond that of the nation-state and its structures. This would allow for a more balanced and measured response to terrorist attacks. Further research that explicitly links the rich literature on local communities and identities to terrorism could advance this approach further and contribute to preventing excesses in response to terrorism.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

Afghan Interpreters, the Peace Process, and the Future of Indigenous Support for US Combat Operations

As the United States prepares for its withdrawal from Afghanistan, discussions have continued about the fate of Afghan interpreters who played a vital role in US combat operations. These interpreters not only served as bridges to language barriers between soldiers and Afghan communities but also as cultural advisors to US soldiers. Their area knowledge and translations saved numerous US lives during the two-decade presence in Afghanistan.

The Current Challenge:

Because of insufficient awareness about interpreters, international media outlets have played a vital role in spreading the plight of those still in Afghanistan. After weeks of dialogue and advocacy, the first group of Afghan interpreters and their families arrived at a Virginia military base. This was to await the final process of their Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) and escape likely retribution from the Taliban. The Department of Defense has planned additional emergency airlifts to evacuate approximately 3,000 more interpreters and their families. 

The success or failure to evacuate most Afghan interpreters has great strategic implications for the United States. Consequently, it will affect its future combat operations in the long term. The Biden administration must not betray these local heroes, as it will compromise the United States’ reputation as a force for good at a time of global consternation about democratic legitimacy. In understanding the historical role of Afghan interpreters, it becomes evident that their fears of abandonment have persisted for years and that preserving their trust will require policymakers to make difficult decisions.

A Rocky History:

The phrase “winning hearts and minds” underscores the importance of local support during the war. For many conflicts like the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, French operations in Vietnam, and even the American Revolution, lack of support for invading forces by the local populace foreshadowed inevitable failure. Indigenous support is so important in winning conflicts, that the US military has a unit dedicated to strengthening these partnerships, the US Army Green Berets. Local support from interpreters was crucial in the United States’ toppling of the Taliban. Local support also helped lay the foundation for a political solution to the conflict.

Although there is little data about the first interpreters who began working for US forces, it is highly likely that demand for their language abilities began and continued shortly after conventional troops began deploying to Afghanistan. Even before conventional forces, Green Beret and CIA officers relied heavily on translators to coordinate airstrikes, understand enemy maneuvers, and map partner forces to begin the initial offensive against the Taliban.

But interpreters and their families faced increased threats from Taliban retribution as coalition operations surged in 2007. The Obama administration’s 2014 initiative to withdraw the remaining US forces from Afghanistan foreshadowed the bureaucratic hurdles and anxieties encountered by interpreters during the drawdown. Many felt betrayed by the lengthy visa process, especially by unexplained rejections when they satisfied all requirements. Their families were constantly threatened by the Taliban, eventually forcing them to abandon wives and daughters during the lengthy visa process.

Their journeys to escape death were often unpredictable and expensive, relying on smugglers to ferry them to Iran, Greece, and Western Europe. Those who did not have funds to cover the entire journey were left in countries with nothing but false documents, eventually becoming homeless as countries failed to support them with refugee status or jobs. Those who suffered the most in escaping Afghanistan started to regret serving US troops, setting a dangerous precedent for the future of local cooperation in the age of major power competition. This is particularly concerning because local support will become more crucial as major powers like the US, China, and Russia rely on proxies in various countries to achieve their foreign policy goals.

The Need to Do More:

The newest arrival of the Afghan SIV applicants is a welcome development. However, this is insufficient because some reports indicate that the Defense Department would have to conduct 16 evacuation flights per day leading up to the August 31 deadline to account for all SIV applicants in Afghanistan. The US and Coalition governments are moving far too slow and risk sending a message to the world that they will not fulfill promises to local partners in conflict. Maintaining the reputation of democracies around the world has become increasingly important if the West hopes to combat a rising China.

If the US government fails to secure the safety of interpreters and leaves them marked for death by the Taliban, local allies in strategically important countries are less likely to work with American forces in the event of a conflict. Peace in these regions will be less attainable without this robust local support for US or allied forces.

It is not logistically possible to evacuate all SIV applicants, but the State and Defense Departments need to allocate more planes, diplomats, and locations to process at least 40-50% of SIV applications and ferry them from the Taliban retribution. They should also increase transparency regarding why applicants are denied. These actions would enhance American soft power and foster trust in the local population crucial to the success of a military campaign. Biden administration should look at evacuating interpreters as a strategic imperative, one that may play a driving factor in an era defined by state competition. Afghan lives and successful US strategy hang in the balance.

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