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Vehicles as Tools of Destruction: The New Weapons of Terror

It was a day of celebration. Strolling down the waterfront with fireworks overhead. Thousands gathered to mark the holiday.  The evening was ideal, but all things come to an end.  You heard a commotion and turned.  Next, you heard screams.  You didn’t know what it was, but you knew that something was horribly wrong.  The crowd started moving, immediately it was a stampede – a rush to get away from the horrible thing causing the terror.  In your panic to flee, you looked back to see what it was.  A truck had jumped the curb and was running people over.

This could’ve been the story of any one of the hundreds who experienced the Bastille Day horror in Nice, France on July 14, 2016.  The terrorist Mohamed Lahuaiej Bouhlel, inspired by an ISIL call to arms, drove a 19-ton truck into the French crowd.  Bouhlel was able to drive a mile, kill eighty-six people and wound three hundred. Nice certainly wasn’t the world’s first vehicular terrorist attack and it wouldn’t be the last.  Attacks in Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and several other nations demonstrate the destructive capabilities of terrorists using vehicles for attacks.

Vehicular terrorist attacks are on the rise. ISIL and Al Qaeda have both called for using vehicles as weapons.  If a terrorist can’t use a bullet or bomb, they’re encouraged to use any means at their disposal. ISIL and other Islamist groups aren’t even the only ones to use cars and trucks as weapons.  In May 2017, Richard Rojas, a U.S. Navy veteran, drove his car through Times Square crowds in New York City evidently seeking suicide by cop. Fewer than three months later, James Alex Fields Jr., a  white supremacist from Ohio, used his car to run over dozens of counter-protesters during the Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville Virginia.

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© CNN On May 18, 2017, Richard Rojas drove his vehicle into pedestrians in New York City’s Times Square. Evidence indicates Rojas was moved by personal motivations and drug use, not terrorism.

Vehicles are used because they are easy to acquire. An individual must simply obey driving rules to obtain a license in that state or country. In Europe, guns and other weapons are hard to come by due to heavy regulation. Vehicles, however, have less stringent requirements.  In the United States, with its lax gun restrictions, terrorism has occurred with both firearms and vehicles. But, vehicle attacks have frequently occurred in cities that have tighter gun laws.

Vehicles are used because of their potential for maximum destruction. The speed, size, and power of a vehicle can exceed the destructive capabilities of other methods.  Often, vehicle attacks only stop when the attacker can drive no further. A vehicle striking a crowded street or event can easily kill dozens and injure hundreds.

Vehicles are used because they are ubiquitous. Cars and trucks are everywhere.  We cannot avoid them in our modern lives. The true essence of terror is its caprice. By turning something unremarkable into a weapon of war, the actual terror factor increases. No one knows who, what, or when something will strike.

Vehicular attacks are difficult to counter. Cities and their streets were designed before the advent of vehicular terrorism. Pedestrians walk within meters of traffic. And most open spaces – plazas, waterfronts, cultural attractions – require street access. Finally, fiscal considerations always remain primary in establishing effective prevention and mitigation protocols.

While elimination of the problem is unrealistic, mitigation is not and measures can be taken to improve the status quo. Cities can establish barriers.  These include erecting posts, fences, and planting trees alongside streets.  Many cities strategically park large trucks outside large, outdoor public events to prevent vehicular attacks. Governments can slow the speed of traffic by lowering limits and erecting speed bumps. Or, alternatively, cities can expand their car-free pedestrian zones to ensure that walkers can safety travel and enjoy areas and events designed for the public.

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© Mark Metcalfe/Getty Images – A newly installed barricade in Sydney, Australia to prevent vehicular attacks like those in Nice and London

After the attack in Nice, the world united in condemning the horrors perpetrated in France’s streets.  Men, women, and children were indiscriminately targeted.  Families were forever changed by the actions of one individual moved by the violent advocacy of his terrorist group.  The world has come together too many times to mourn lives lost when trucks and cars have been used as weapons of war.  More can be done to make our streets and public spaces safe from violent actors.  More must be done to ensure citizens don’t have to fear walking along the sidewalk, partaking in public demonstrations or just living their everday lives.

From Remote, Luxurious Islands to Terrorist Breeding Ground: Trinidad and Tobago

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© Getty – Trinidad and Tobago

When people hear the words Trinidad and Tobago they think of lush, remote islands, all-inclusive resorts, and some of the most beautiful beaches the Caribbean offers. They might think of the country that beat the United States’ men’s soccer team in its 2018 World Cup qualifier. It’s unlikely that many would think of the islands as a potential Caribbean terrorist breeding ground. Few associate the Caribbean with terrorism at all – it is, axiomatically, a place we visit to leave our worries behind.

But between 2013 and 2014, “At least 130 people (have) traveled to Syria to live and fight under the flag of ISIS,” according to the government of Trinidad and Tobago. “More than 200 people (have) traveled from the Caribbean in recent years to join ISIS” [1]. These numbers are increasing at an alarming rate as ISIS continues to bombard Trinidad, and the greater Caribbean, with propaganda. To put these numbers into perspective, Canada, and the United States, together, “…have produced fewer than 300 recruits who made the journey east” [2]. The numbers seem comparable until you consider that Canada and the United States are, collectively, 263 times as populous as Trinidad.

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© Getty Images – ISIS propaganda targets the people of Trinidad and Tobago

Security in the Caribbean pales to that in the United States and Europe and that makes Caribbean officials’ nightmare worse. If Trinidadians radicalize in Syria or Afghanistan and return to the islands they could ideologically poison a vast reserve of Caribbean youth. “Trinidad’s citizens can travel through the Caribbean without visas” [2]. Radicals could hop from island to island converting new recruits to their cause.

A reader could be forgiven for thinking this is Trinidad’s first brush with terrorism. But, there was a failed coup in 1990 mobilized by the Trinidadian Islamist group Jamaat al Muslimeen. For six days, Jamaat al Muslimeen held hostages including the Prime Minister and government officials at Trinidad’s seat of Parliament (the Red House), and at the headquarters of Trinidad and Tobago Television. There was also a foiled terrorist plot to attack New York’s J.F.K. airport in 2007 hatched by Islamists in Trinidad’s neighbor, Guyana [1].

Given Trinidad’s proximity to the United States, radicalized individuals potentially plotting attacks on U.S. soil poses a significant security risk. There is the fear that, “Trinidadian fighters will return from the Middle East and attack American diplomatic and oil installations in Trinidad, or even take a three-and-a-half-hour flight to Miami” [3]. President Trump recently spoke, “…with Prime Minister Keith Rowley of Trinidad and Tobago about terrorism and other security challenges, including foreign fighters” [3]. That conversation is already occurring at the highest levels between the U.S. and this modest Caribbean island speaks volumes about the gravity of the situation.

President Trump’s conversation with Trinidadian Prime Minister Rowley comes just after, “…U.S. troops participated in anti-terror raids Thursday in the Caribbean nation of Trinidad and Tobago helping to capture four ‘ high-value targets’ [4]. US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) forces, “…advised and assisted local Trinidadian security forces,” in the capture of these individuals, “…who are believed to be part of a network engaged in plotting terror attacks” [4]. The Caribbean celebration of Carnival was set to begin Monday, February 12th. With the, “…vibrantly coloured costumes of the participants and incredible celebrations” [5] the prospect that this Carnival could be the site of the next terrorist attack is not far off.

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© CNN/Mara Soff – Carnival J’ouvert in Trinidad and Tobago, Feb. 16, 2015

Trinidad and Tobago is, “…top of the list of Western countries with the highest rates of foreign-fighter radicalization,” and, “…by far the largest recruitment hub in the Western Hemisphere” [6]. Trinidad and Tobago must address, at root, issues of radicalization and recruitment on the island before they begin to take a toll on tourism. If not handled properly, we may see ISIS inching ever closer in coming years to the U.S. mainland. As for right now, Trinidad and Tobago must continue to capitalize on its access to foreign forces like the U.S. and Canada to continue deterring the ever-growing problem of radicalization in its midst.


Sources:

  1. https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/870509/ISIS-latest-news-holiday-warning-threat-Caribbean-Trinidad-Tobago-jihadi
  2. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/02/trinidad-jihadis-isis-tobago-tariq-abdul-haqq
  3. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/world/americas/trying-to-stanch-trinidads-flow-of-young-recruits-to-isis.html
  4. https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/09/politics/trinidad-carnival-terror-attack-thwarted/index.html
  5. https://www.ticketgateway.com/c/trinidad-and-tobago-carnival
  6. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/isis-trinidad/509930/

Harrowing Death, Calls For Action: The Syrian Genocide Persists

The Assad regime has been conducting airstrikes on its own citizens for six years now. To date, more than a quarter million civilians have perished. Hundreds of thousands more have been burned, dismembered, or otherwise scarred physically and psychologically.

Diana Semaan, a Syria researcher at Amnesty International, commented on the matter saying, “For six years, the international community has stood by as the Syrian government has committed crimes against humanity and war crimes with total impunity” [1]. Dispiritingly, all the international community can do now, it seems, is help the victims as best they can.

The cry for help is at its latest peak as more than 500 Syrians have been killed this week in the suburbs of Eastern Ghouta. More than 1,000 have been injured. [2] Russian-backed Syrian forces claim they are trying to uproot rebels, but civilians comprise the majority of the casualties. “Nearly 400,000 people live in Eastern Ghouta. They account for 94% of all currently besieged Syrians.” The airstrikes, suffice it to say, are ineffective at targeting so-called rebels.

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© Amar Al Bushy/Al Jazeera – Survivors of the latest bombings in Eastern Ghouta struggle with horrific destruction and loss of life

On Friday, February 23rd, 2018 the United Nations will be voting on a “30-day truce in Syria to allow [much needed] aid deliveries and medical evacuations” [3]. Medical supplies could be delivered and those who are critically wounded could be evacuated to receive life-saving treatment. U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has demanded before the U.N. that there be, “An immediate end to ‘war activities’ there.” [3] The resolution might sound like progress. But Russia, Bashar al-Assad’s key backer, is a U.N. Security Council member and is likely to veto the resolution. It has already, “…cast 11 vetoes on possible Security Council action on Syria since its civil war began in 2011,” [3].

So many images, tweets, news reports, and videos have emerged from Syria over what has already been so many years revealing devastation and disarray. It sometimes seems there is little that can be done. The U.N. tries to step in, but Syria has become a frenzy over power, religion, and territory. Russia, Iran, Turkey and the United States all have equities in Syria, making it all but impossible to give precedence to the Syrian people’s needs.

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© Dominic Waghorn/Sky News – Balkanization makes Syrians’ homeland a self-perpetuating warzone

“Ghouta will fall,” says Robert Fisk, Middle East correspondent for the online British newspaper The Independent, and once it does, “Idlib must surely be next” [4]. The carnage will not end anytime soon. All we can do is help those who suffer the brutal consequences of the war, day after day, especially the children. They should remain central to what is fought for in Syria.

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© Ghouta Media Center- Syrian children flee a kindergarten bombing in Eastern Ghouta


Sources:

  1. https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/20/middleeast/syria-eastern-ghouta-deadliest-day-intl/index.html
  2. http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/rights-group-turkey-avoiding-civilians-syria-strikes-53297707
  3. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un/u-n-security-council-to-vote-on-friday-on-demand-for-syria-truce-idUSKCN1G70E8
  4. http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/syria-civil-war-eastern-ghouta-assad-regime-rebels-talks-artillery-air-strikes-a8224701.html     

Click here to learn more about Ahmad Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace

How the United Nations Is Empowering the Leaders of Tomorrow

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The United Nations’ Friendship Ambassadors Foundation (FAF) brought together more than 1,000 students and young professionals from around the world to collaborate at the 2018 Winter Youth Assembly from February 14th to February 16th, 2018. The theme of the 2018 Winter Youth Assembly was Innovation and Collaboration for a Sustainable World.

Students and young professionals engaged in seminars, workshops, and presentations to dialogue about the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Agenda includes 17 goals which aim to eradicate poverty, protect the planet, all while encouraging continued prosperity. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals, also known as the SDGs, seek to foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies free of fear and violence.

The 17 SDGs envision a world free of poverty, with universal literacy and equitable access to all levels of quality education; a world committed to safe drinking water, sanitation and hygiene; a world with sufficient, safe, affordable and nutritious food; a world with safe human habitats and universal access to sustainable energy; a world which honors universal respect for human rights, dignity, culture, race, and ethnicity; a world in which every child grows up free from violence and exploitation; a world in which every woman and girl enjoys full gender equality with all legal, social and economic barriers to their empowerment removed; a world in which every country enjoys sustained economic growth and decent work for all; a world in which natural resource production and consumption – from air to land, rivers to lakes, oceans to aquifers – is sustainable; a world where we live in harmony with nature, where wildlife is protected.

Of the 17 SDGS, Goals 4 and 16 are paramount to today’s global security issues.

Goal 4: Ensure inclusive, equitable quality education with universal, lifelong learning opportunities. Ensuring that children and adults have access to quality education is one way to eradicate extremism. Some targets include:

• A world, by 2030, where all girls and boys complete free, equitable quality primary and secondary education
• Provide safe, inclusive and effective learning environments for all by building and upgrading educational facilities to be child, disability, and gender-sensitive
• Ensure all learners acquire knowledge and skills requisite for global citizenship and sustainable lifestyles
• Ensure that youth and adults achieve literacy and numeracy

Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions

• Significantly reduce all forms of violence and consequent mortality rates
• End all forms of violence towards children including torture, abuse, exploitation, and trafficking
• Promote the rule of national and international law, ensuring equal access to justice

These goals require the cooperation of all nations. All countries, acting in partnership, will implement the SDGs together. Governments should commit to working tirelessly for the implementation of this agenda by 2030.

Can Deradicalization Reduce Violent Extremism? This Expert Thinks So

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When seeking counter-terrorism explanations and solutions, the focus is generally on why radicalization occurs. What happens after radicalization–deradicalization–is much more complicated. Deradicalisation programs are becoming increasingly important in countries that aim to avoid further violence and rehabilitate those who have been radicalized.

Deradicalization programs vary but can include counseling, theological education, and attempts to deemphasize violence in the radicalized person’s value system. There is much criticism of the programs’ effectiveness, however, since there is little evidence at this point to confirm whether or not these programs work.

The writings of Daniel Koehler, Director of the German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies, and contributor to George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and Homeland Security are vital to understanding this new path. Despite much of the criticism leveled at deradicalization programs,

Koehler argues that arresting or killing people is not the answer to violent extremism since it leaves its appeal untouched or even strengthened[1]. Koehler argues that deradicalization is not the same as disengagement. Disengagement is a mere behavioral change ensuring that a person no longer commits illegal activities, but it does not imply a change in ideology[2].

It is important to understand what motivates a person to engage in violent extremism in the first place. A  broad survey of the literature regarding radicalization suggests that possible driving forces include lack of professional prospects, education, community support, or simply a person’s attempt to find meaning and honor in his (sic) life. Diverse schools of thought including sociological, empirical and psychological theories are converging to grapple with this problem.[3]

Koehler suggests a broad set of tools could be used to address an individual’s concerns, from vocational training to religious or psychological counseling, and even creative art therapy[4].

It is important, however, to tailor the deradicalization techniques to each individual. The ideology and identity that is ingrained during the radicalization process are deeply personal and difficult for a person to simply forget. This lack of efficiency is one of many legitimate concerns about deradicalization programs. Despite those concerns, more research and development could demonstrate that investing in these programs could significantly alter the way extremist groups operate, and perhaps, diminish their success.


[1] Price, Michael. (2017, May 26). Can terrorists be deradicalized? Science Magazine. 
[2] Boghani, Priyanka.  “Deradicalization” Is Coming To America. Does It Work? (MARCH 18, 2016 .). 
[3] Koehler, D. (2014). The Radical Online: Individual Radicalization Processes and the Role of the Internet. Journal for Deradicalization, 0(1), 116–134.
[4] Boghani, Priyanka.  “Deradicalization” Is Coming To America. Does It Work? (MARCH 18, 2016 .). 


Click here to learn more about Ahmad Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace

Semantics Matter: ARSA and the Difference Between Insurgency and Terrorism

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Independent Online/AFP

While tensions between the Rohingya Muslims and the Myanmar government have existed for decades, violent eruptions over the last year have catalyzed the growth of the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army (ARSA). The Myanmar government has since designated this group a terrorist organization, diminishing the legitimate political grievances of the Rohingya. An analysis of the distinction between insurgency and terrorism will demonstrate that the government’s categorization is inaccurate and that ARSA’s momentum, in addition to the government’s brutality, may lead to a successful insurgency.

Formed in 2013, ARSA started as a “small-scale effort to organize a Rohingya resistance.” The Rohingya have been systematically marginalized by the military and government for years. Stripped of their citizenship and living in extreme poverty, they remain a vulnerable, and largely displaced, population. Weary of the persecution against the Rohingya and their inability to seek political redress, ARSA planned and executed two attacks on military outposts. Last October, ARSA killed nine officers. In late August 2017, ARSA attacked another army base and 30 police posts, resulting in the death of 71 people, of which 12 were security officers. The government’s response to the attacks has been heavy-handed and disproportionate, often targeting civilians. In an attempt to flush out ARSA, the military set fire to villages, forcing hundreds of thousands of innocent Rohingya to flee, attacking some with bullets, machetes, and even landmines as they retreated. Following the first attack, the group’s leader, Ataullah abu Amar Junani, released a video in which he claimed responsibility and indicated that the decades of crimes against the Rohingya justified the attack and the right to defend themselves.

Contradicting ARSA’s narrative of self-defense stand instances of violence towards their own people. In the midst of the clashes between the military and the Rohingya, young men fleeing must not only escape the military but avoid ARSA, as many find themselves forced by their own to stay and fight.

Many Rohingya remain committed to joining the fight against the government, nevertheless, willing to risk their lives and those of their families in order to secure rights for the Rohingya. While ARSA participates in violence, the ensuing analysis will demonstrate that their designation as a terrorist group is inaccurate and the government’s response is unjustified.

The definition of terrorism varies between governments, agencies, and academics. This analysis will use International Affairs Professor Bard O’Neill’s definitions of both the terms terrorism and insurgency found in his book Insurgency and Terrorism. He defines terrorism as, “The threat or use of physical coercion, primarily against non-combatants, especially civilians, to create fear in order to achieve various political objectives,” whereas insurgency is “a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”

ARSA does not fall under the category of terrorism, as the violence is primarily employed against Myanmar militia and not civilians. Furthermore, ARSA repeatedly affirms that it wants the Rohingya to live in peace, to secure their rights and for “greater autonomy as Myanmar citizens.” Rather than hoping to achieve a political objective to bring them leverage over other groups, ARSA simply wants the Rohingya to be afforded equal rights. ARSA uses political resources, such as organizational expertise, to muster fighting forces in the struggle against the Myanmar government in the hope of gaining legitimacy for the Rohingya. Accordingly, ARSA is more appropriately labeled as an insurgency group.

Contrary to the Myanmar government’s intent, their “violence and abuses are likely to boost support for the armed group,” raising the question of whether ARSA could evolve into a successful insurgency. According to American University Professor Bill Belding, eight elements of a successful insurgency can be evaluated to better understand whether ARSA could maintain growth and eventually succeed in their quest for rights for the Rohingya. These eight elements are critical mass, better idea, effective leader, external support, resources, communication, safe haven, and intelligence. The government’s continued violence may push more sympathizers to join ARSA and gain a (1) critical mass. ARSA has “significantly influenced many Muslim religious leaders in northern Rahkine State to endorse [ARSA] despite earlier feelings [of the] violence to be counterproductive.” ARSA hopes to gain rights for the Rohingya people, effectively establishing a (2) better idea. It is difficult to measure the (3) efficacy of their leader, Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi, but his presence is known and he has released videos taking responsibility for the attacks. During ARSA’s attacks, members obtained arms from the Myanmar militia giving them (4) resources. ARSA gained (5) external support by urging Rohingya clerics to issue a “fatwa” stating the campaign against the security forces is legal in Islam. Analysts believe that ARSA receives funding from the Rohingya diaspora and private donors in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. Around August 2016, two Saudi-based senior leaders spent a month in the Rakhine State assisting with training. ARSA members use encrypted messaging applications including Whatsapp and Viber to (6) communicate. Their leader effectively communicates because he speaks Peninsular Arabic and the Bengali dialect found in northern Rakhine. Because the Rohingya are displaced persons, since neither Myanmar nor neighboring Bangladesh considers them citizens, they lack a typical (7) safe haven. However, the large Rohingya diaspora, as well as its ability to communicate on texting applications, gives members some semblance of safety. While a typical safe haven provides physical security and the ability for members of a group to convene without fear of attack, the Rohingya still can reap some of the same benefits even as displaced persons. Communication through texting applications allows them to discuss and plan free of government intrusion, and a Rohingya diaspora that is not actively persecuted can assist with logistics. Lastly, ARSA gains important (8) intelligence through their texting applications, which allows quick dissemination of information, but it is noted that they do not appear to have any advanced intelligence operations. Unlike more organized groups which may have technology or spies that can actively gather information, ARSA relies on encrypted messaging applications to spread news and word-of-mouth information to its members. Almost every element of a successful insurgency is found in ARSA’s campaign against the Myanmar government, and if not explicitly present, the lacking elements remain on the cusp of fruition in the volatile and uncertain climate.

Accordingly, the Myanmar government’s labeling of ARSA as terrorists appears to be an attempt to capitalize on the global fear of Muslim extremism to provide cover for their disproportionate military assault. ARSA, while not irreproachable, are fighting for political legitimacy, and thus should be labeled insurgents. The widespread suffering and displacement the military has caused will likely fuel rather than extinguish an uprising. Although ARSA does not yet demonstrate every element of a successful insurgency, it would be in the Myanmar government’s best interest to rethink its counterproductive strategy if it hopes to stifle backlash.

Iraq after Daesh

After years of conventional, media, and cyber warfare, Daesh has lost most of the areas that it seized in Iraq and Syria in 2014. The post-Daesh phase will be filled with new priorities. [1]

Amir Hassan Fayyad, the Dean of the Political Science College at Iraq’s Al-Nahrain University, says that the defeat of Daesh, “…should not be understood [to mean] that the time of confrontation is over” [2]. Fayyad pointed out that Iraq will now be confronting the “…long-term battle,” to eradicate extremist ideologies.

1059026635 - Iraq after Daesh

Iraqi PM Declares Victory Over Daesh After Control of Border With Syria Restored

According to Abdul-Karim Ali al-Jubouri, a member of the Iraqi parliament, Iraq will have to deal with four priorities in the wake of the military elimination of Daesh. Al-Jubouri explained that Iraq’s top priority will be securing the border and, “…returning the situation to what it was before,” Daesh’s seizure of large swathes of Iraq in the summer of 2014. The other priorities, according to Al-Jubouri, will be the reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure, the organization of elections, and reconciliation of national entities. Al-Jubouri said that the Iraqi government should begin rebuilding the affected areas, returning the displaced people, and compensating those who have been physically and morally damaged” [2] Al-Jubouri stressed the importance of reconstruction and compensation of those affected by the war on Daesh, “to provide an environment suitable for [fair] elections” [2] The elections will take place in May 2018.

Kuwait hosted conferences from February 12th, 2018 to February 14th, 2108, in search of aid for rebuilding Iraq. Iraqi officials explained to international donors that the reconstruction of Iraq following its three-year war on Daesh will cost an estimated $88.2 billion Providing homes for the displaced will be the main priority [3].

Most importantly, internally, the Iraqi government must discourage sectarianism. It must ensure stability and security in the liberated areas, create a suitable environment for dialogue between sects and promote the spirit of patriotism. On a global scale, the Iraqi government must establish good relations with its neighbors based on common interests and arms-control, it must comply with the rule of international law, and it must fight corruption in all of its forms. It’s a tall order, but the key to keeping corruption at bay lies in restructuring, rebuilding, and reforming the country’s institutions.

Sources:
[1] http://www.post-gazette.com/news/world/2018/02/12/A-88-2B-price-tag-is-offered-at-the-Kuwait-conference-for-rebuilding-Iraq-after-the-Islamic-State-war/stories/201802120175
[2] https://www.alhurra.com/a/Iraq-what-after-defeat-of-Isis/403021.html
[
3] https://www.arab48.com/أخبار-عربية-ودولية/أخبار–الوطن-العربي/2018/02/12/إعادة-إعمار-العراق-بعد-داعش-ستكلف-88-2-مليار-دولار

The War in Afghanistan: Will It Ever End?

The War in Afghanistan: Will It Ever End?

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(The U.S. Army/Flickr) -American military personnel in Afghanistan

The War in Afghanistan has ground on for more than 16 years since its start on October 7th, 2001. Operation Enduring Freedom was part of the response to the September 11th attacks, but there does not appear to be a clear end in sight. [1] Over the years, the number of troops in Afghanistan has risen and fallen, but the war has ground on. At one point, in August of 2010, [1] there were as many as 100,000 troops. The budget for 2018 was just released and the sum will cost the American taxpayers $45 billion dollars. [4] 3,200 young American men and women have lost their lives fighting for our freedom. Mustn’t we acknowledge that from where things now stand, you’d be forgiven for asking if will this war never end?

Our main goals in 2001 were to dismantle the Taliban government in Afghanistan and end Osama Bin Laden’s reign as leader of Al-Qaeda. Although Osama Bin Laden was killed and the Taliban were disassembled, the latter have been regrouping. It seems we are in a Doom Loop.

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(AP/BBC News)- “Defecting Taliban fighters drive through the front line in the village of Amirabad, northern Afghanistan”

Our leaders realize there is no end to this war. The cat and mouse game of killing and capturing Taliban has been going on for a decade and a half. Afghanistan does not have a stable government or infrastructure to rely on. There is a “combination of state collapse, civil conflict, ethnic disintegration and multi-sided intervention that has locked it in a cycle that may be simply beyond outside resolution.” [2] Afghanistan has been in disarray for a long time; any hope for a stable country may reside ten years down the road.

The main reason the U.S. stays in Afghanistan is to avoid creating a vacuum that would turn into a terrorist breeding ground. Roger Shanahan from Sydney’s Lowy West Asia Program said to achieve what we want, “You need to destroy that safe-haven element and as part of that strategic aim, you want to build Afghan governance so that it can control the areas it supposedly has sovereignty over” [1].

Much as we would like to leave, we simply can’t. During the past few weeks, we have seen how strong the Taliban remains. There was a “series of bold terror attacks in Kabul that kill[ed] more than 115 people” [3]. The Trump Administration has responded to these attacks by, “…deploying troops across rural Afghanistan to advise Afghan brigades and launching air strikes against opium labs to try to decimate the Taliban’s finances.” [3] President Trump has also ruled out the idea of directly negotiating with the Taliban. [5]

Training the local Afghan military has seen some progress, but not nearly enough for the Afghan military to take on the Taliban itself. The Army recently announced that six units of 1,000 soldiers from the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade will deploy in the Spring “specially designed to ‘advise and assist’ foreign armies so that they can contain guerrilla movements on their own” [5]. The goal of creating these special units is that they will be able to advise the Afghanistan military rather than simply overseeing operations.

The harsh reality is that America’s longest running war will not end for some time unless the U.S.decides to pull its troops from the country precipitously. To the contrary, the U.S. presence will remain for the foreseeable future. That fact notwithstanding, the Washington Post recently noted our outlook, how we approach elements of the war may change. According to the Washington Post, “The expansion of the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan to target a little-known Chinese terrorist group is an example of how the 16-year-old war has changed under President Trump” [6].

Targeting groups such as ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement) and TAP (Turkistan Islamic Party) betrays just how many formerly independent terrorist organizations are beginning to consolidate in-country. The war, simply stated, is not simply about fighting the Taliban anymore. According to Air Force Brigadier General Lance R. Bunch – the director of future operations at U.S.-led military headquarters in Kabul – it’s about fighting, anybody that is an enemy of Afghanistan” [6].

2018 02 19 Austin Ludolph Image 3 300x170 - The War in Afghanistan: Will It Ever End?
(U.S. Air Force)-A B52 Bomber dropping its payload on training camps of ETIM and TAP


Sources:

  1.    https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/21/asia/afghanistan-war-explainer/index.html
  2.    https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/world/asia/afghanistan-intervention-state-collapse.html
  3.    https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan
  4.    http://thehill.com/policy/defense/372641-pentagon-war-in-afghanistan-will-cost-45-billion-in-2018
  5.    https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/26/afghanistan-specialized-units-army-312032
  6.    https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2018/02/10/bombing-of-chinese-separatists-in-afghanistan-is-a-sign-of-how-trumps-war-there-has-changed/?utm_term=.38ae9169e425

 

The Terrorist Threat in France: A Look at Prison Radicalization

130605 ferranti prisonmexico tease k2urhn - The Terrorist Threat in France: A Look at Prison Radicalization

ANNE-CHRISTINE POUJOULAT/AFP/GETTY

French counter-terrorism policy rejects the soft measures carried out by many of its European counterparts. So then, why has France, despite its aggressive stance against terrorism, seen more high-profile terrorist incidents than any other Western European country in the last six years?  An absence of terrorist attacks in France for more than a decade created a false sense of security. However, since 2012 France has been the victim of several jihadist attacks that have placed it on the frontline in the battle against terrorism. While some observers blame the attacks on France’s large Muslim prison population, citing prisons as a breeding ground of radicalization, others blame France’s delayed implementation of counter-radicalization programs. Other critics attribute the attacks to marginalized Muslim populations that find France’s secular policies stifling. None of these analyses, standing alone, provides an explanation sufficient to guide an effective strategy to end attacks. But this piece will focus on the prisons.

The notion of prison serving as a breeding ground for radicalization is not new. Khalen Kelkal, the main perpetrator of the 1995 Paris subway attacks that spurred counter-terrorism legislation, is believed to have been radicalized in prison. As of 2015, at least four men underwent radicalization while in a French prison and went on to attack locations in Europe. Furthermore, Cherif Kouachi, the Charlie Hebdo attacker, arrived at Fleury Merogis, a French prison, in January 2005. While imprisoned, Kouachi met Djamel Beghal – also known as Abu Hamza – who was serving 10 years for plotting to attack a US embassy in 2001. Kouachi also encountered Amedy Coulibaly, the man behind the 2015 Jewish supermarket attacks. In another instance still, Mehdi Nemouche, underwent radicalization in prison, traveled to Syria, and then traveled to Belgium where, in 2014, he attacked the Jewish Museum of Belgium. While these men represent only a small portion of the total prison population, their social ties to one another, as well as the magnitude of their crimes, demonstrates prison radicalization is an area worthy of counter-radicalization focus.

Radicalization can occur in prison for several reasons. It can stem from a confrontation with jail authorities, often worsened by the negative images Muslim inmates see on television and in other media regarding Islam. In addition, radicalization is molded, “by the conditions prevailing in prison, its organization and specific architecture.” Overcrowding can lead to sharing cells, restrictions on bathing, and unheard demands due to prison guards’ heavy workloads. This leads to exasperation, often exacerbated by the prison’s refusal to allow the practice of religion. Muslim prisoners believe Islamophobia runs rampant within their walls. Problems associated with prisons globally are vexing for many French Muslims and the disaffection they feel outside prison is only magnified behind bars.

Focusing counter-radicalization efforts in prisons would likely yield positive results if done astutely, and with advice from experts. As of 2015, according to authorities, French prisons held 238 inmates charged with terrorist offenses, with 152 of them classified as “dangerous Islamists.” There are approximately 67,500 imprisoned individuals in France. It is estimated that 70% of the prison population is Muslim, yet Muslims notably comprise only 8% of the French national population. Romain Quivooij, Associate Research Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for National Security at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, acknowledges that the number of “dangerous Islamists” is a very low number in comparison to the total prison population, and argues that “radicalization in prison does not only involve people singled out as ‘radical Islamists.’ Cases of ordinary criminals who adopt violent extremist views in jail and engage in terrorist activities upon their release are common.” One French prison director implemented a trial run in which the radicalized individuals were segregated from the general population. While the director deemed the segregation successful, an ex-inmate of the French prison stated, “I don’t understand the idea at all of putting all the radicals together and hoping they will change.” Some believe putting radicalized inmates together strengthens bonds and facilitates jihadist ideology. Regardless, it does seem to limit their ability to attract new recruits.

Haras Rafiq of the Quilliam Foundation states neither segregating nor allowing radicalized inmates to mix with the general population is a good model, rather he advocates for an increase of professional imams. Prison guards do receive some training, however, due to the large population of inmates in prisons, in addition to the changing profile of a radicalized jihadist, guards find it difficult to detect radicalized individuals. According to one expert the, “…lack of Muslim chaplains is thought to have created a vacuum that leaves room for self-appointed and self-taught imams and their radical ideas.” In fact, Hassan el-Anoui Talibi, Chief Imam of French prisons issued a press release advocating for more financial support and resources for prison imams, as they currently receive no pay except reimbursement for basic expenses (Alexander). One offender stated that in the six years he was imprisoned, he did not see an Imam until year five (Alexander). With a surplus of resources going into hard counter-terrorism measures, it’s reasonable to assume that France could procure an appropriate number of imams.

While an augmentation in imams, in quality and quantity, may be sound policy akin to soft measures found in other European countries, one author asserts that the majority of radicalized inmates may actually go through the process of radicalization prior to their first sentence. This indicates that prison programs may need an emphasis on de-radicalization rather than solely counter-radicalization.

Does a promising policy exist that can incorporate the two? The same author argues that increasing the number of imams is urgently needed, however so is “the integration of additional services as part of a wider interdisciplinary approach.” Effective programs can be hard to implement in a favorable setting. Creating an effective program in French prisons to hinder radicalization and promote deradicalization remains an enormous challenge. However, in light of France’s high incidence of terrorist attacks, it is likely to continue augmenting its prison programs. It would be well-served by focusing on approaches that are multifaceted and by listening to suggestions from community members and academics.

 

Women and their Role in Violent Extremism

Recruitment of women by violent extremist organizations has increased in recent years due to their value as strategic, political, and social tools in service of the organization’s mission. They attract less suspicion, making them valuable in bombing missions, but they also are of deep symbolic importance in the organization’s daily progress.

Al Qaeda Women - Women and their Role in Violent Extremism

Recruitment of women by al-Qaeda disturbs Iraq government

In 2016, Indonesian police arrested two women, Dian Yulia Novi and Ika Puspitasari, after they had planned a suicide bomb attack.[1] These occurrences are often puzzling to officials since it is usually assumed women are only indirectly involved in extremist organizations through supporting or hiding their husbands or other men. This is not necessarily true.

While the exact number of women in terror organizations is unclear, the recently collapsed IS caliphate sheds light on the tally, like the approximately 800 women who had joined Daesh that are now being detained in northern Syria[2]. Roughly 10% of radical Islamic groups’ members are women, a portion that is surprisingly large and inspires questions about why women join these organizations. [3]

Women join terror organizations for the same reasons men do, despite the disparity in numbers from each gender who join. While women are often portrayed as more “virtuous” and “passive” than violent, they are drawn to the community, the ideology, and the identity just like men are. The promise of liberation, empowerment, and a cause to live for draws men and women alike to extremist groups[4]. In recent years, both women and men have come from all over the world to join the cause they believe in.

The presence of women in violent extremist organizations is important due to the symbolic significance they carry. Women joining ISIS, for example, are vital to the ideological effort through social-media recruitment. They represent the future of the cause and perpetuation of the ideology as wives and mothers.[5] While research suggests that they are not involved in daily violence as much as men are, they are far from passive.

While there are some valuable accounts, more research is needed to shed light on the exact roles women play in these communities, and what potential impact they have. Terror organizations have long understood women’s significance to their cause. They are potentially even more dangerous due to the lack of suspicion they arouse, and the support they are able to inspire in young recruits.[6]

Sources:

[1] Ayuningtyas, Kusumasari. Indonesian Seminar Outlines Women’s Roles in Terror Prevention. (January 26, 2018). 
[2] 800 female Daesh terrorists detained in northern Syria. (February 10, 2018). 
[3] Moss, C. (2017, July 2). Why Do Women Become Terrorists? The Daily Beast
[4] Attia, B. M.-E. and S. (2017, May 9). Female terrorists and their role in jihadi groups. 
[5] Baker, Aryn (September 6, 2014). How ISIS Is Recruiting Women From Around the World. 
[6] Says, A. E. (2016, October 28). Increasing number of women recruited by terrorists.

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