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Why The United States Needs to Reform Counter-Terrorism Efforts on the Home Front

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Since the September 11th attacks on the United States, many believe that the biggest threat to the United States is from foreign jihadists.  Media outlets constantly associate terrorism with foreign jihadist organizations such as ISIL or Al-Qaeda; however, they fail to give adequate attention or coverage to extremist incidents that occur directly on our own soil.

Today, the largest threat facing the United States does not comes from foreign jihadist extremists.  Instead, the largest threat to the United States appears to be the rapidly growing threat of domestic violent extremism. Domestic extremism includes homegrown radical Islamist terrorism, right- and left-wing extremism, white supremacist and neo-Nazi extremism, and more.  The domestic extremism threat facing our nation today has essentially evolved over time into two major issues that have gone unaddressed by policy makers. First, overseas terrorist organizations have become increasingly adaptable and now use online platforms to recruit vulnerable individuals across the country in order to incite violence.  Second, the rise in hate crimes and right-wing extremist events over the past decade has occurred at an alarming rate, and has been disregarded by many public officials and policy makers.

The Recruitment of Jihadi-Motivated Extremists in the US

With the availability of new technologies, foreign terrorist organizations no longer need to infiltrate foreign states to attempt attacks of their own.  Now, organizations have the capability to recruit, motivate, and initiate attacks online with false messages and propaganda. The rise in Islamophobia has led many to believe that individuals who have conducted such lone-wolf attacks are Muslim or Arab. However, this has not always been the case.  According to a study by the RAND Corporation, “the historic stereotype that Muslim, Arab, immigrant males are most vulnerable to extremism is not true to today.  Today, recruits in the United States are more likely to be white, black, younger, uneducated, and born citizens.”  New America’s study on Terrorism After September 11th explains how since 2001, the number of domestic jihadist terrorism cases

has risen dramatically, from only two individuals being charged in 2001 to a record high of eighty being charged in 2015.  The study also reiterates the trend that the majority of the individuals being charged with a lethal extremist attack have been American-born citizens; in fact, according to the study, eighty-five percent of individuals charged with a lethal attack in the United States have been citizens or legal residents.  Of this percentage, a majority (two hundred and twenty nine) of terrorism cases have involved American-born citizens. Ninety-nine of the cases have involved naturalized citizens, and fifty-five of the cases have involved permanent residents.  Only five cases have involved illegal immigrants, nineteen cases involved refugees or asylum seekers, and twenty-five cases involved non-residents of unknown status. The majority of domestic terrorists are now everyday American citizens and residents who have been inspired by the jihadist movement abroad to take action against the secular West.  As Anwar Al-Awlaki, an American-born cleric who joined Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, famously stated, jihad today has become “American as Apple Pie.”

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The Rise of Right-Wing Extremism

Jihadi-extremism, while mainly homegrown, now makes up only a small portion of the attacks occurring on American soil.  Throughout the last decade, right-wing extremist attacks have risen at an alarming rate.  Right-wing extremism includes white supremacy, anti-government extremism, and single-issue movements such as anti-abortion, anti-immigration, and anti-Muslim extremism. While the United States has remained focused on the danger posed by jihadi extremism, there has been a “glaring blind spot” towards the changing dynamic and magnitude of threats facing the United States.  According to statistics from the Anti-Defamation League, between 2009 and 2018, 73.3 percent of domestic extremism incidents in the United States were due to right-wing extremism, while only 23.4 percent of incidents were due to jihadist extremism and 3.2 percent were due to left-wing extremism.  Furthermore, the rate at which the incidents are increasing is dangerously rapid.  In 2018, of the 50 extremist-related murders that occurred, right-wing extremists caused almost all incidents.  In fact, right-wing extremists caused 98 percent of the incidents, while only 2 percent of the incidents were caused by domestic Islamic extremism.  According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, individuals targeted for the recruitment of right-wing terrorism are often one of three categories: “frustrated and angry youth looking for solutions to their problems; individuals looking for intimate relationships outside of their families; and younger adolescents who typically lacked maturity and may have been unable to fully comprehend the ramifications of the groups radical ideology.”

Policy Recommendations

  1. Politicians and policy makers need to make reducing domestic extremism a national security priority.

Domestic extremism needs to be recognized as a major threat.  In the past decade, it has largely been ignored and pushed aside by policy makers and politicians, who have been putting a disproportionate amount of attention on the foreign threat of jihadi terrorism.  Domestic terrorism needs to be made a federal crime by Congress.

  1. Seek to increase community awareness about the dangers of all forms of terrorist recruitment, especially in the populations that are deemed to be most vulnerable.

Community awareness programs should partner with the Department of Education in order to educate children, teachers, parents, and guardians about the dangers of terrorist recruitment.  The programs should specify the different types of extremism in the United States, the way groups attempt to recruit individuals, and the risks and consequences associated with being involved with such organizations.

  1. Promote anti-bias intercultural education and after-school programs in elementary and secondary schools.

Education can be the most proactive measure to counter youth radicalization.  With the average profile of radicalized individuals being young and uneducated, it is most important to promote educational programs in schools to counter the radicalization and recruitment of young individuals who feel frustrated, angry, and alone.  After-school programs should especially be promoted as a way to offer a sense of belonging, community, family, and purpose for individuals who are particularly vulnerable.

  1. Reframe the Countering-Violent Extremism Program, and reassess how to properly distribute CVE resources.

The CVE program does not just need a new name, it needs to be completely reframed.  As of right now, the program has been largely targeted at countering jihadi extremism in the United States, and has cut funding for programs that counter other forms of extremism.  Muslim communities have been targeted by the current CVE programs while young black, white and uneducated individuals have become more and more vulnerable to being recruited by different forms of domestic extremism.  Funding for grants and research needs to be expanded in order to combat all the different forms of extremism in the United States.

  1. Make an honest and prioritized effort to countering the ideology of hate.

The United States government must make countering hateful ideologies and extremist groups a top-priority. Politicians have continuously failed to punish right-wing extremist groups for their actions, sending a confusing message about what is constituted as terrorism and when it is considered acceptable to use such violence in the United States.   Continuously cutting funding for research grants and for countering right-wing extremism programs has also enabled such issues to escalate in the United States. To stop such incidents from occurring again, changes must be made.

Gulf Rivalries and the Afghan Peace Talks

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Major players in the Afghan peace talks. Image credit: Reuters/AP.

There are doubtless domestic factors behind the crisis in Afghanistan, from ethnic problems to low levels of education. Afghanistan’s geographic position is one of the main obstacles to a lasting peace. Surrounded by neighbors with different ideologies and regional interests, Afghanistan is seen as a geostrategic key to future power in the region. Afghanistan’s importance in the eye of rival countries has historically attracted the Soviet Union to the country, with American expertise and support offered through ISI to stand by the Afghans.

Nowadays, foreign intervention in Afghan internal affairs has become a usual part of almost every peace effort. Arab countries- particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, thanks to their shared ideology with the Taliban- are major players in Afghan peace. Saudi Arabia was certainly the most influential foreign actor in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. It raised the idea of Jihad which has since recruited young fighters from North Africa to European city suburbs to the war in Afghanistan.

The ten year Soviet occupation ended in 1989, but the Arab influence still remains. Saudi Arabia continued financing radical Wahhabist ideology during the devastating civil war in Afghanistan until the Taliban took power in 1996. The Taliban regime called itself an Islamic Emirate and was recognized by Saudi Arabia. In recent years, however, things have changed. Now other countries have emerged as mediators in the Afghan peace talks. Qatar is on the top of this list.

Qatar, with a fast rising economy in the Gulf, already influences Muslim countries such as Sudan and Lebanon. Now its influence is extending to Afghanistan. Doha hosted a few intra-Afghan meetings on peace and currently is the city where the Taliban has a political office. Doha benefits from a privileged position to be a conflict resolution actor when it comes to the Afghan peace talks: it has a strategic security and economic partnership with Pakistan and enjoys a friendly relationship with Iran. Iran supplied Qatar with necessary food items and gave airspace access to Qatari air traffic during the Saudi-led Blockade. Iran also hosts the largest American military base in the region, Al Udeid, which is the main source of airpower and logistics for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries.

Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, does not benefit from Qatar’s international prestige but it is ready to pay billions of dollars to buy the loyalty of other countries. The crowned Saudi prince, King Salman, recently went on a tour of the region where he promised to invest more than $4 billion in Pakistan. Rumors are that King Salman is going to buy the Premier League football club, Manchester United, where Sheikh Mansour, an Emirati royal, owns the Manchester city football club.

The rivalry of these two oil exporters is going to shape a new bloc in the region. They both have sufficient resources to direct relations in their own national interests. Saudi Arabia, losing its influence over the Taliban, is being replaced by Qatar. According to a Taliban official, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are trying to block the Afghan peace talks in Doha while Taliban are happy with Qatari mediation in the process.

The fight between Gulf countries leaves Afghanistan with no saying on its future. With all said and done, would a peace deal brokered by Saudis and Qataris bring peace to Afghanistan? That is the real question, and Afghans do not have a solid answer.

Plans for Still-Radicalized Members of the Islamic State

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A man surrenders outside Baghouz. Image Credit: Al-Jazeera.

            Near-victory has been declared over the remnants of the Islamic State’s self-declared caliphate in Iraq and Syria. However, some fighting still remains, and the implications of continued conflict are beginning to be explored. Waves of often-reluctant Islamic State members coming to surrender exacerbate the daunting job that those participating in the fight against extremist ideologies are facing. As recently as last week, 3,000 suspected fighters and active Islamic State members have surrendered, overloading those tasked with analyzing the future threat these individuals pose. This writing intends to promote a conversation about the dilemma of those ‘hardcore’ believers in the Islamic State, examining how or if they can assimilate to Western society.

            Since December, roughly 60,000 people have fled from the area around Baghouz, Syria, the last populated stronghold of the crumbling caliphate. These individuals have been captured or placed into displaced persons camps. Estimates suggest that around 10% of these people are believed to be Islamic State fighters, with many others being family members of current or former fighters. Through various Islamic State propaganda outlets, as well as debriefing reports from people who have previously fled Islamic State-controlled territory, it is known that there has been a strong effort to indoctrinate children into the ideology spread by the group. For this reason, the children of Islamic State members should receive increased attention in the deradicalization process.

            The Islamic State has continued its propaganda campaign, which was once a driving factor behind the groups rapid expansion, from within Baghouz. In one video, a man going by the kunya of Abu Abdel Adheem states that “it is said that we have lost – but God’s judging standard is different”. In another, a man going by Abu Abd al-Azeem, is quoted as stating “Tomorrow, God willing, we will be in paradise and they will be burning in Hell”. This is hardly the language of repentant individuals or individuals, making it unlikely that they will be susceptible to many deradicalization programs.

            It is unclear how many foreign fighters of Western origin remain in Baghouz, but those that are there should be considered some of the most adherent followers to the group. Many existing deradicalization programs are targeted towards individuals who are psychologically open to leaving an ideology. Those individuals still clinging to the last remnants of the caliphate in Syria, and those who have reluctantly surrendered, do not generally fit into this profile. Numerous Westerners, including Americans, have been captured recently and are considered suspected members of the Islamic State. It is important to distinguish between individuals who were indeed captured and those who willingly surrendered due to a change in ideology and not due to the caliphate being on the losing side of the conflict. Those who have surrendered of their free will are likely good candidates for deradicalization programs. Those who have surrendered but remain loyal to the vision of the Islamic State represent a real problem for all Western nations.

Further complicating the situation, there are Westerners still engaged in the fighting. Zulfi Hoxha, an American who goes by the kunya of Abu Hamza al-Amriki, has risen through the ranks of the Islamic State and is now believed to be a Senior Commander. There have been no public declarations of his death or whereabouts. How exactly do we plan to deradicalize Hoxha? Is deradicalization even a possibility?

            Those Islamic State members still operating in Iraq and Syria have been displaced from their once-vast caliphate. Some have given up on the vision, but it appears that many still place their loyalty in the future of the proto-state. Numerous officials from the United States have suggested that they do not believe that there are any senior Islamic State members, including caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in Baghouz. The unknown location of these leaders represents the continued threat that the group will once again reform down the road, with lessons learned. Until then, it is imperative that we decide what to do with those who have left.

 

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional and Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

The Israel-Palestine Conflict and the Rise of Hamas

The Israeli and Palestinian conflict is one of the most intense disputes of the century. It is rooted in issues of land and sovereignty, national pride, religion, and governance. The dispute resulted in the existence of two competing governments in the Palestinian territories, one in the West Bank controlled by the Palestine Liberation Organization and one in the Gaza Strip controlled by the radical militant group Hamas. Many agreements have been brokered since 2007 to unify both governments, but all have failed. In January 2019, the Prime Minister of the Palestine Authority government, Rami Hamdallah, tendered his resignation, reflecting the rise of public displeasure over failed efforts to reunite the government. Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have long rivaled each other for power over Palestinian territories. Hamas, refusing to renounce violence, is not just a radical Islamic group but a political faction with parliamentary seats. Their rise and growing popularity before the 2006 parliamentary elections reflected Palestinian sense of alienation from their government’s efforts to rebuke the Israeli occupation. Most significantly, it showed that Hamas’s embracement of radicalism and militancy resonated well with many Palestinians. But how and why did Hamas’ popularity grow?

The events surrounding the initial creation of Israel in 1948 and the Six Day War of 1967 may put the conflict and rise of Hamas in perspective. Even though they are 19 years apart, both events are emblematic of the complexity and fragility of peace prospects between Israel and Palestine, a process that the PA has been embracing and Hamas has been rejecting.

Towards the end of the 19th century, the so-called Jewish question was articulated as a predicament: could Jews ever find acceptance as Jews in a nation made up of non-Jews? Most Eastern European Jews did not believe they could assimilate or ever be accepted in any non-Jew nation. Zionism, an Eastern European phenomenon, quickly emerged as a response to that predicament and emphasized the need for a central Jewish home. That led to the settlement of Jews in Palestine, igniting issues of belonging and sovereignty. Pressured by the United States, the United Nations voted for a partition proposal that divided the land into seven parts, three for the Jews, three for the Arabs, leaving Jerusalem under UN control. As many as 700,000 Palestinians either fled the region or were driven out. As they failed to regain the territory, Palestinians refused to assimilate and demanded a return to their home land. Their efforts were futile and Arab states eventually signed separate armistice agreements with Israel in 1949.

The question of land has always been center stage in the struggle between Israel and Arab counties. It has greatly influenced the concept of Zionism and Arab nationalism. The question of land and sovereignty: who leaves and who stays? Who has the right? Who is stronger? That has become a central issue in Arab nationalist grievances, one that still controls both the foreign relations between the Israeli and Arab governments, and local relationship between Jews and Arabs.

The Six Day War of 1967 was a brief conflict between multiple Arab states and Israel which ended in the defeat of the Arab coalition led by Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.  Israel’s victory allowed it to capture Sinai, West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights.

It also led to the absolute humiliation and loss of legitimacy of Arab leaders, specifically signaled the end of Arab nationalism personified by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. It forced Syria, Jordan and Egypt to accept a cease-fire proposed by the UN Security Council after enduring very heavy losses. Finally, it created more political refugees and brought one million more Palestinians under Israeli rule.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, exacerbated by the Six Day War and the expansion of settlements in Palestinian territories increased existing hostilities and complicated peace prospects. Arab defeat in 1967 alone had significant territorial and demographic ramifications. Sinai and the Gaza Strip were captured from Egypt. Israeli control over the strip meant that 90 percent of the 360,000 Palestinians who lived there have become refugees. The West Bank was a more integral region. It is about one-quarter as large as pre-1967 Israel and it gave Israel control over territories that had been allocated for Palestine by the UN in 1947.  By the end of 1967, Israel controlled all of the land that had been previously allocated for a Palestinian state in 1948 and more than a million Palestinians were living under Israeli control. Furthermore, Israel separated East Jerusalem from the rest of the West bank and the government announced the unification of Jerusalem under Israeli control, thereby removing all barriers and military installations that divided the city in half. Israel also announced the application of Israeli law in all Palestinian area.

The 1967 war gave the international community new incentives to address the Arab-Israeli conflict. Various draft resolutions were proposed in the UN and many were rejected by both sides. Perhaps the most important resolution was UNSCR 2334. It called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories annexed as a result of the 1967 war, the termination of aspects of sovereignty for any state in the area, guarantee of civil freedoms for all citizens and a “just settlement of the refugee problem.” The vagueness of each demand lead to disagreements over how the resolution should be implemented. The Arab states expectantly wanted Israel to begin withdrawal from captured areas and the Israelis demanded the Arab states recognize Israel first. Extremely distrustful of one another, each side did not want to be first to surrender. This distrust continues to underline Arab and Israeli relations today as well.

Continuous defeat and failure to restore Palestinian land and rights gave Hamas an opportunity to influence the Palestinian people. It provided Hamas with a source of secure funding and recruitment as they exploited Palestinians’ frustration. Hamas was also uniquely effective at delivering and offering services to the people of Palestine which increased public content with the radical group.

Hamas’s primary objectives have been the complete destruction of the Israeli state and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on the 1967 borders. They have continuously rejected any two-state solution, refusing any negotiations with Israel. The PA’s goal is similar in that it wishes to create a Palestinian state on the1967, but they believe in negotiations with Israel and have renounced militancy. Hamas on the other hand embraced direct confrontation with Israel. Their tactics include suicide bombings, rocket attacks, military blockades, etc.

In 2006, they participated in national elections of the Palestinian Legislative Council, signaling their intention to become a represented political party. They won a slight majority of seats which put them in a commanding position for the Gaza Strip. This led to a brief unity with the PLO which soon disintegrated as Hamas refused to accept previous agreements the PLO negotiated with Israel. The Mideast Quartet, an ongoing diplomatic effort led by the United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia, responded to Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006 by offering support only if Hamas renounced violence, recognized Israel and abided by past Mideast agreements. Hamas rejected all three pillars prompting foreign nations to freeze aid to Palestine. Tensions between both factions ultimately escalated into a civil war that divided Palestine even more: Gaza became independently governed by Hamas and the West Bank fell under the PLO’s governance. Peace talks have been initiated multiple times since then, but always disintegrated due to internal rifts and external pressures.

Hamas’s rejection of any agreement between Israel and Palestine is not only due to their ideological beliefs. Hamas is also fearful of losing its power if it embraces negotiations. Hamas came to power because they capitalized on the PA’s weakness and willingness to compromise with Israel. Even attempting negotiations would open the door to rivalries to challenge Hamas’s rule just like Hamas challenged the PA in 2006.

The question of sovereignty and land, mistrust that both Palestine and Israel will fulfill their promises, the divide between Hamas and the PA, and both of their eagerness to control the levers of power have always and will continue to put a dent in peace efforts. It will also continue to alienate Palestinians towards militancy as they attempt to restore their human rights and sovereignty from Israel.

The True Meaning of an “Islamic State”: A Brief Historical Look

The rise of radical groups who claim to be Islamic, growing instability in Muslim-majority countries, habits and norms that constitute “anti-modernity” to Western norms all tend to distort Islamic values and what Muslims hold dear. That specifically influences politics. Islam has a particular relationship to politics. It is broadly shaped by cultural practices, religious scripts and traditions. Since Islam’s emergence in Mecca, there has been a strong emphasis on Islam as an Ummah, or a political community. Muhammed was the Ummah’s political and religious leaders. Over time, the emphasis on the creation of an Ummah spilled up to the political sphere and became more heavily underlined. However, the structure and the core beliefs of the Islamic community has been open to interpretation. Neither the hadith nor the Quran outline a blueprint of an Islamic State or its governance. Throughout history, many Islamic theorist used the notion of the Ummah to unify and gain Muslim support but that was also the foundation of their respective sensation theory of Islam.  The notion of an Islamic state continuously emerges as something desirable and can be more accurately described as Islamic Revivalism: “a revolutionary force whose aim is to topple the established order in the Muslim world, be they authoritarian or democratic” (Dekmejian). It is a persistent and continuous phenomenon that has occurred in virtually every Islamic society. Revivalism is generally a natural response to multi-dimensional crises facing global Islamic communities: political, economic and military catalysts, legitimacy crises and inadequate leadership.

Islamic societies have faced a legitimacy crisis due to the failures of their intellectual elites to create social cohesion for Islamic legitimacy, especially in regard to European countries. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism emerged in Islamic societies, but it mimicked a number of other countries’ norms and practices: European, German idealism, Marxism and socialism. After decades of experimentation, “of the major attempts to forge a synthesis of political thought as a guide to political action, two-Ataturkism and Nasirism- appear to have failed after some temporary success.” Ataturk of Turkey attempted to formulate a viable political community after WWI using charismatic legitimacy. He had charisma and was attributed as a hero. He undertook sweeping cultural, bureaucratic, economic and military reforms, adopted Western models of military and bureaucratic organization and rapid industrialization.

Ataturk also sought to de-emphasize Islam as he viewed it as the “vestige of the Ottoman past he was seeking to eradicate”, according to Peter Mandaville in his Islam and Politics book. In contrast, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s formula for legitimization did not rely on a wholesale rejection of the past, but on “an eclectic synthesis of pre-revolutionary political thought and action” (Dekmejian). He emerged after a coup d’état by the Free Officers Movement against Farouk I (Mandaville). He fused elements of nationalism, socialism and nonalignment in Cold War geopolitics and managed to play both sides of the war to Egypt’s advantage. That made him even more popular. However, just like Ataturk, the legitimization Nasser created was only based on his charismatic leadership. Thus, it faded away after his death. Both of Ataturk and Nasser’s failures further emphasized the need for revivalism as a method of establishing legitimacy and a united Islamic community. That notion was only further reinforced by the failure of Middle Eastern leaders to fulfil their promises of social justice and development.

There is no clear sense of what Islamic governance should look like. Nasser, Ataturk, and other Islamic theorists took different approaches simply because they can. There is no Pope or middle man in Islam. Today, there is an extremely radical version of an Islamic State. Their strategies and goals are unacceptable and completely incompatible with the theorists and scholars that came before them. However, looking at multiple intersections of politics and Islam throughout history, the emergence of the Islamic State can be understood as a response to a larger historical crisis: abandonment of Islamic values, Western unacceptance and colonization of ideals. Furthermore, theorists or self-proclaimed leaders always use nostalgia as a weapon and strategy for unification: nostalgia to the old days of the caliphates and prophet Muhammed. This suggests that the concept of Islamic revivalism is a foundational strategy that has been used to justify the Islamic State’s existence.

Assessment of the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

Following the horrific events of 9/11, media narratives created a paranoid fantasy in which terrorist groups obtain and deploy nuclear weapons of mass destruction. In 2017, Mathew Bunn and Nickolas Roth, a professor and a research associate at Harvard University argued that a “nuclear nightmare” is possible and could result from a single terrorist nuclear attack on a major city. They articulate the fatal consequences of another Hiroshima and Nagasaki event: long-term radioactive fallout, a nuclear counterattack, and a half million people dead. However, those scenarios are extremely overblown and exaggerated and Hiroshima and Nagasaki were acts of war by a state actor, not terrorists.

Bunn and Roth argue that a nuclear terror attack is possible if a terrorist group acquired the necessary nuclear material, but such a scenario is highly unlikely, according to Leonard Weiss, a visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. Only nine states have nuclear weapons capabilities: The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. A scenario in which nuclear materials are stolen from any one of those nations is almost impossible. All nuclear weapon states have multiple layers of safeguards that prevent security breaches. Any scenario for seizure would require major security breakdowns followed by an extremely fast takeover of weapons by terrorist groups with no time for other state actors like the United States to intervene. No existing non-state actor terrorist group has ever reached such sophistication. Even Al-Qaeda, who perpetrated the worst terror attack in modern history, could not acquire nuclear weapons. Furthermore, none of the nuclear weapon states would willingly give nuclear weapons or materials to any terrorist group due to existing nuclear deterrence. If a terrorist group manages to deploy a nuclear bomb as a result of a transfer from a sovereign nation, that will ultimately result in the transferring nation becoming a nuclear target as a form of retaliation. No country will risk absolute annihilation in favor of any terrorist organization.

Another scenario for a nuclear terror attack outlined by Bunn and Roth is the acquisition of nuclear material. However, necessary material such as uranium and plutonium are highly protected. Even if a terrorist organization were to acquire the necessary materials, it is extremely difficult to build and denote, requiring high level of expertise that no non-state actor can access. Technical hurdles and logistical difficulties is a huge challenge to nuclear terrorists

Deployment of a nuclear weapon by stateless terrorist organization should be the least of our worries in a world where minor provocations between any nuclear weapons states, such as Pakistan and India, are more likely to escalate. There have been no instances in which a terrorist group acquired and deployed a nuclear weapon. Terrorist groups do not have the capability, expertise or sophistication to carry out a catastrophic nuclear attack.

The Power of Social Media in Terrorism

Image courtesy of AP/The Independent.

Society currently has a strong need for a new topic of discussion. Almost everyone has social media profiles that keep them up to date on current events going on around the world. Many members of society want to gain followers or notoriety and be one of these topics of discussion. Acts of terror are the perfect opportunity for people to gain notoriety. The recent shooting in New Zealand by white nationalist Brenton Tarratt which he live streamed on social media is a perfect example of the power of social media in the digital age and how it acts as a conduit for terrorists to spread their message.

There are estimated to be at least 2.8 billion users of social media worldwide. This number is expected to grow even more in the next few years as our world becomes more globalized. This is a huge audience for terrorists to spread their message to the rest of the world. The power of social media has given a voice to those who feel like they have been marginalized, it amplifies their voice so they can reach the masses. When these terrorists send out their message to the masses it has two jobs:  1) To instill fear in their opponents and 2) to recruit others to their cause with similar mindsets. This is the Islamic State’s modus operandi which has raised their threat from the confines of their region to a worldwide threat. This has inspired many other terror groups or lone wolves to adopt similar methods and mindsets. It is not just jihadists either who are using the media to spread to the masses. Right wing nationalists have also used this method and have even formed their own networks such as 4Chan and Fachosphere in America and France respectively, to communicate with those with similar ideologies.

Many terrorists now rely on shock value and the “theater of terror” which forces the media to write reports on various terror attacks and this is what the terrorists live for because it gives them the notoriety they were hoping for. Sharing or retweeting acts of terror it gives them exactly what they wanted, as seen in the aforementioned shooting in New Zealand. The shooter live streamed his malicious act and a couple hours later it was all over social media. One way to prevent the spread of violent extremist ideals is to not share these heinous acts and not give these terrorists the notoriety that they want. Conversations about terror attacks on social media creates fear and perpetuates rumors which causes hysteria. This is exactly what the terrorists feed off of. The problem is that society is beginning to become desensitized to such violent acts because they happen so often. However, Cliff Staten a political science professor believes that this desensitization can serve as a deterrent to terrorists. He stated, “One could argue that becoming less sensitive to these terrorist events will make it more difficult for groups like ISIS or Al Qaeda to achieve their goals.” The terrorists prey on fear and if they don’t find it, then they can’t achieve their goals.

Social media can also help raise awareness about different terror attacks, especially those that may not get the same attention as others. Terrorism is not something that can be resolved in a day, a number of measures need to be put in place to raise awareness to prevent these acts from happening. The rise of social has provided the tools necessary to make change in the world. This can happen through sharing counterterrorism efforts around the world or reporting terrorist propaganda that found on social media feeds. People have the means to rid the world of the violence of terrorism.

 

Subterranean Warfare: The New Frontier

Image Courtesy of Reuters

Ever since aircraft were created, they have been an integral part of society. While they have been an integral part of society, they have also become an important tool for militaries around the world. Whether that be for transportation, reconnaissance or airstrikes, the use of aircraft has played a major part in nearly every war.

Military technology has become so advanced now that someone operating a drone in the U.S. can strike an area in the Middle East. Drone strikes have been one of America’s most used weapons in the War on Terror. These American strikes have killed many terrorists but have also come under scrutiny for also killing many civilians who happen to get caught in the crossfire. Many terror cells have begun to recognize this and have countered it by taking their operations underground.

Subterranean warfare isn’t a new idea per se, we saw the beginnings of this during the Vietnam War. However, it has never operated at the levels seen today in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. These underground tunnels are usually operated by terror groups or rebel insurgency groups.

During the Afghan War, American soldiers encountered a tunnel in the Zhawar Kili complex which contained structures a command center, mosque, and even a hospital. This just goes to show intricate these subterranean tunnels have become.

What has been the biggest nuisance to the United States in the dawn of subterranean warfare is the locations where these groups build these tunnels.

Groups such as Hezbollah and ISIL are plotting their underground operations beneath areas filled with civilians to hinder the possibility of enemies bombing their operation.

Enemies are also reluctant to send their soldiers down into the tunnels because the builders have a strategic advantage over them. These tunnels also can be used to smuggle weapons, people and materials to various locations based on the tunnel system. However, their biggest threat is their ability to be a means for terrorists to execute sneak terror attacks such as those committed by Hamas and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah has built a vast tunnel system along the southern Lebanese border due to the fact that they do not have to fear much interference from the Lebanese government due to the strength of their operations and also because they receive aid from Iran.

The ISIS underground system was first discovered after the liberation of East Mosul in 2017 in Iraq after ISIS destroyed a Christian shrine in the area. On the other hand, it is believed that some senior ISIS officials still reside in these caves. The Syrian rebels have also instituted a tunnel system in cities such as Douma, which has helped them keep up their fight against the regime during the Civil War.

Subterranean warfare seems to be the next domain of modern warfare.  The US government has already begun to implement underground training for American soldiers in preparation for this new frontier of war. This is to avoid the soldiers being unequipped to deal with potential combat situations with terrorists in these caves.

Daphne Richemond-Barek, an army writer said that “Even for well-trained soldiers, the multidimensional aspect of the subterranean threat is not easy to handle.”

Terrorists may use these caves to plot attacks on major urban areas due to some of these underground networks being built directly under major urban cities.

Another problem may be that some of these tunnel networks may be rigged with explosives by these terror cells that could lead to even more deaths of their enemies. Lastly, as was mentioned earlier, these tunnel networks can be used to smuggle weapons and high-value targets covertly.

They can serve as a means for a terror group to invade another country, commit their terror act, and easily travel back to their point of origin without a trace.

It is important that America continues to train soldiers for the subterranean battlefield because terror cells are building new tunnel networks every day with greater capabilities and we must be prepared for this new frontier of war.

Contested Kashmir: A Critical Analysis and Possible Solutions

105660748 98e3dc2f bd18 444c a115 7aadf70c5389 300x169 - Contested Kashmir: A Critical Analysis and Possible Solutions

The attack against Indian forces which occurred on February 14 was the deadliest thus far in the Kashmiri insurgency. Image credit: Getty Images.

Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is one of the most militarized areas in the world. India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed, have fought three wars since their independence, two of which have been over J&K. The tensions began in 1947 after the two countries won independence from Britain. The second India-Pakistan war in 1965 followed, with the rise of the Jammu Kashmiri Liberation Front – a Kashmiri nationalist organization aiming to unite both the Pakistani- and Indian-administered regions of the territory. More recently, tensions between the two neighbours have flared due to a suicide bombing by an Islamist militant group known as Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), or Army of Muhammad, which killed forty Indian paramilitary operatives in the Indian-administered part of J&K. The same group also launched an attack on an Indian army base in Kashmir in 2016, prompting India’s military to cross the border and launch surgical air strikes into Pakistan.

For Pakistan, Islamist groups are a key leveraging tool against India. Undertaking a complete crackdown against these groups would therefore counter their interests. JeM, for example, continue to raise funds in Pakistan under different names, andMahmood Azhar initially founded JeM with generous support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. Although the Indian government has tried to have JeM’s leader blacklisted by the UN Security Council, these attempts have always been blocked by China. Pakistan has recently demanded more substantial evidence before they consider arresting Azhar, demonstrating clear noncooperation in the fight against JeM. The failure of Pakistan to actively counter terrorism in its administered regions has been a key issue for India, who claim that Pakistan must do more to curb terrorist activity.

The introduction of social media and cable news in both countries has further polarized public opinion surrounding the issue. Both sides use jingoistic nationalism to rile up support – creating new and influential public lobbies. For example, interrogation footage of the recently captured Indian pilot, Abhinandan Varthaman,  widely circulated on Whatsapp and was shown on nationalistic media outlets in India. Pakistan have also taken part in this information war by filming footage of the pilot saying how well he is being treated by his captors and how the Indian media embellish the smallest thing, present it as if on fire, and people fall for it.”

The reason for such tension in Indian-administered territory is that most people within the territory do not want to be governed by India. Around sixty percent of its population is Muslim, making it the only state in India with a majority Muslim population. Moreover, high unemployment and human rights abuses by security forces have triggered protests against the authorities for over thirty years. Attacks in the region are carried out by the fedayeen (“those who sacrifice themselves”), and the last such attack on this scale was carried out in 2000 by a Birmingham-born man who was using the name Mohammad Bilal.

Going forward, how can ensuring short and long term peace work in practice? Throughout history, numerous UN resolutions have been introduced to try and resolve the conflict to no avail. Pakistan argues that J&K should be Pakistani because it is a majority -Muslim state. India argues that J&K should be a part of India because Kashmiris want to remain part of India (a claim which has not been proved). To paper over the cracks, both governments could agree to a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K.

In other words, a return to the status quo is the first substantive action that should be taken in the short-term. In light of the fact that people living near the LoC have started packing their bags to escape the conflict, a ceasefire will ensure confidence and trust can build between the two nations again. We have seen evidence pre-2003 of how Pakistan infiltrated terrorists into the region under the cover of shelling along the LoC, and if this ceasefire does not hold, Pakistan can do the same today. This step is therefore of paramount importance, but it requires dialogue and cooperation from both countries.

India’s ultimate goal is to dismantle terror outfits and the networks that support them. Hence, they must try to convince the international community to put more pressure on Pakistan to shut down its support for terrorism in J&K. For now, this seems unlikely. With the recent Indian air assault on a JeM camp in Balakot, the ongoing escalation in hostilities is counterintuitive to this goal. However, Pakistan’s release of an Indian pilot is one small step in the right direction. Most likely this is an empty gesture that does not cost Pakistan much at all, just like the “cosmetic measures” they undertook in 2003 to dismantle terror networks in the face of international pressure. This time, if this is to work, the international community must find a way to hold Pakistan to account.

From there, we build on. Over time, if we want real peace, public opinion must change. This is the responsibility of politicians, the media, and ultimately the people. However, the role of the media will be to promote balanced debate and turn away from the current nationalist sentiment so prevalent in Indian and Pakistani media.

Most militants in J&K are in fact homegrown youth, which adds another dimension to this issue. No longer can India solely blame Pakistan for providing weapons, explosives, and training militants in the region. India itself must now do more to support de-radicalisation in the area through engagement with civil society. The government of Jammu and Kashmir broke down last year as the ruling party in India, the BJP, ended its alliance with a Kashmiri regional party which left the territory to be ruled by the central government in New Delhi. In turn, this fosters more adverse sentiment from the people towards India. To establish stability, India must not directly rule but support a Kashmiri government that represents the people to help quell unrest and offer some sort of legitimacy. Pakistan must reciprocate. Both sides should put an effort to hold regional elections in J&K, offer political freedoms to the people, and end the disqualification of candidates based on their views.

A short-term, fragile peace is the most likely outcome for the region – albeit a welcome one considering the current situation. To build long-term stability, trust and confidence must exist between both sides. And this will take time.

Who are Warren Christopher Clark and Zaid Abed al-Hamid?

returning extremists - Who are Warren Christopher Clark and Zaid Abed al-Hamid?

Warren Christopher Clark (left) and Zaid Abed  al-Hamid (right) in SDF Custody.

In January 2019, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured a group of men who they state were seeking to launch attacks against civilians fleeing the small pockets of territory still under Islamic State control. The group consisted of men from around the globe, including Pakistan, Ireland, and the United States. Warren Christopher Clark and Zaid Abed al-Hamid, two of the men captured by SDF forces, were named and identified as American citizens by their captors on social media based on forms of identification on their persons. Clark, who goes by the kunya of Abu Mohammad al-Ameriki, has since been positively identified as an American from Texas. Al-Hamid, who now goes by Abu Zaid al-Ameriki, has a much less clear background.

Clark’s background has been explored and significant insight has been gained from Clark himself in videotaped interviews he participated in while in SDF custody. Clark is a former substitute teacher from the Houston metropolitan area. It is believed that Clark is 34 years of age. It has been confirmed that he graduated from University of Houston, where he majored in political science and minored in global business. After several years of being a substitute teacher, Clark began to watch videos of the Islamic State online. Curious, Clark was able to make contact with an Islamic State representative, sending them a resume and cover letter explaining his desire to teach English to children in the caliphate. Clark states that he is a convert to Islam, though it is unclear when he converted. After traveling to Syria via Turkey, Clark states that he never picked up arms for the caliphate. In interviews after he was captured, Clark stated that he did not regret joining the group, and even justified beheadings conducted by the group, comparing them to executions in the United States criminal justice system.

While questions remain about al-Hamid and his background, it is known that he is originally from Trinidad, where he was detained in 2011 for plotting to kill their prime minister. Beyond this, al-Hamid was featured in numerous Islamic State propaganda videos where he discusses converting to Islam and the struggles he faced practicing his religion there. Rumors have circulated that al-Hamid is a dual-US citizen. This has not been confirmed, but his use of al-Ameriki in his kunya suggests some background in the United States. When al-Hamid made his journey to the caliphate, he brought along his wife and multiple children. It is unclear if they are still alive.

Clark, who has been transferred to US custody and brought back to Texas, has since been indicted and charged with providing material support to the Islamic State. The indictment covers a period from 2011, when he first drew the attention of federal law enforcement officials for online activities pertaining to jihadists social media entities.

Early investigation into both Clark and al-Hamid has not resulted in substantial findings in terms of potential solutions for further countering violent extremist ideology. Both Clark and al-Hamid were converts to Islam. In both of their lives, it appears that there was or may have been a feeling of marginalization within society. Clark, despite having a formal education, could not find a full-time position teaching. Al-Hamid, in Islamic State propaganda videos, stated that he struggled practicing his faith in Trinidad and felt like an outsider. Both men appeared to have been at least partially influenced by online extremist sites.

The lessons learned thus far in both Clark and al-Hamid’s cases is limited. However, perceived or real marginalization appears to be an underlying factor in both cases respectfully. Time will dictate policy recommendations to prevent radicalization, but one cannot ignore the continuous appearance of marginalization in case studies of those who have become radicalized towards extremist ideologies.

Rise to Peace