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December 9, 2021 by Rise to Peace

Hezbollah’s Tentacles Threaten Latin America

Hezbollah, also known as Hizbullah, is a Lebanon-based Shia terrorist organization. Its creation dates back to 1982, after the Israeli intervention in Lebanon. Since its foundation, Hezbollah has participated in several terrorist attacks against civilians in the Middle East.

For instance, Hezbollah militants carried out the 1983 suicide truck bombings against the U.S embassy and Marine Barracks in Beirut, the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, the kidnappings of Israeli soldiers in 2006, and the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005.

The Middle East is Hezbollah’s main geographical area of influence. Moreover, Hezbollah has participated in the Lebanese government since 1992, was involved in the Syrian Civil War through the use of militants to support the Bashar Al-Assad Regime, and is backed by Iran in its anti-Israeli and anti-Western activities.

However, Hezbollah’s activities and influence are not restricted to the Middle East. Their presence has been reported in several areas throughout Latin America, and it is probable that Hezbollah’s tentacles will continue to spread in the southern zone of South America.

Historical Background of Hezbollah’s Presence in Latin America

Hezbollah’s presence in Latin America dates back to the group’s foundation. An essential factor in the establishment of Hezbollah cells was the flow of Lebanese migrants arriving at the Tri-Border Area (TBA) connecting Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay during the 1960s and 1970s. The multi-generational diaspora and zones that facilitated trade for Lebanese migrants enabled Hezbollah militants to infiltrate the subcontinent and carry out their activities.

After Hezbollah was officially founded in 1982, Latin American cells began cooperating with Iranian personnel to commit terrorist attacks in Argentina. For instance, Hezbollah used a car bomb against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 23 people. Furthermore, Hezbollah allegedly participated in the terrorist attack against the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), a Jewish center in Buenos Aires, where 85 people died.

Venezuela, a Safe Haven for Hezbollah’s Criminal Activities

Once Hezbollah’s presence in the Tri-Border area was consolidated, this terrorist organization found a safe haven to carry out its illicit activities. When Hugo Chávez took power in 1999, a relationship began between the regime and Hezbollah, allowing Hezbollah to build a vast network to carry out illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and smuggling.

In fact, Hezbollah established a crime structure in Venezuela that operates through compartmentalized, familial clans, such as Nassereddine, Saleh y Rada, that embed into the regime-controlled illicit economy and the regime’s political apparatus and bureaucracy. Hezbollah has control in zones such as Margarita Island, where they operate freely.

The advantage for Hezbollah operating in an area with so many facilities and where the current government is a close ally is that the terrorist group receives billions of dollars annually, mainly from drug and arms trafficking. However, Hezbollah’s main source of income is the funding it receives from Iran, which is also a close strategic ally of Venezuela.

Hezbollah’s Presence in Other Latin American Countries

Hezbollah has a strong presence in the countries comprising the Tri-Border Area. Activities such as counterfeiting and drug trafficking have been identified in Puerto Iguazú, Foz do Iguaçu, and Ciudad del Este in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The authorities found that Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, a Hezbollah militant from this zone, has sent more than $50 million to Hezbollah since 1995.

Hezbollah’s activities and presence have also been identified in Colombia. The Colombian Intelligence Services has detected enterprises and commercial platforms that operate as money laundering centers. Furthermore, counterfeiting networks were identified in Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Maicao.

In addition, Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) converged to cooperate with crimes such as drug trafficking, which is the most profitable source of funding for both groups. The FARC specialized in cocaine trafficking and production, while Hezbollah specialized in money laundering, thus creating a nexus between crime and terrorism.

Finally, Hezbollah is establishing itself in an area known as the New Tri-Border Area, which is comprised of northern Chile (Arica and Iquique), southern Peru (Tacna and Puno), and Bolivia (from El Alto to the Iranian Embassy in La Paz).

In Chile, Hezbollah seeks to take advantage of its ports and indoctrinate young people to join its cause. In Bolivia, Hezbollah seeks to increase its presence by taking advantage of its poor diplomatic relations with the United States. Finally, in Peru, Hezbollah seeks to profit from cocaine production, again facilitating the crime-terror nexus.

What Should be Done?

Hezbollah’s presence in Latin America illustrates how the region’s crime-terror nexus is a significant security threat. Factors such as little state control in border areas, strategic routes to traffic weapons and drugs, money laundering, and support from regimes, such as Iran and Venezuela, have allowed Hezbollah to transform into a wealthy terrorist organization with a considerable presence in Latin America.

In order to reduce the power and influence of Hezbollah in the region, the United States has implemented financial sanctions against the group. However, sanctions are not enough to reduce the activities and income of this organization.

Thus, it is necessary to improve cooperation among Latin American countries, implement more effective legal instruments against money laundering and terrorist financing, increase security in the Tri-Border Area, and continue efforts to cut off Hezbollah’s tentacles in Latin America.

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

December 4, 2021 by Chris Ynclan Jr

Powder Keg of the Pandemic: Exploring the Ongoing Situation in Bosnia

Since the start of the pandemic there have been many worrying trends within global affairs. Among these have been the deteriorating relations between global powers and a stark contrast between the allocation of vaccines of affluent nations with that of the globe’s poorest nations. Additionally, there exists a dire crisis within the Balkans, which has been critically overlooked. Renewed ethnic tensions within Bosnia and Herzegovina are threatening the integrity of its governing institutions.

The Bosnian War has largely defined the small Balkan nation, which ravaged the country in the late 1990s. The conflict shaped the governance in the country, with the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords splitting the nation into ethnic divisions with the Serbs residing in Republika Srpska and the Muslim Bosniaks as well as Croats residing in the rest of the country.

As a result of the ethnic divisions which plagued the country, the government was organized into a tripartite presidency allowing a representative of each major ethnic group to have their voice heard in policy matters. This measure was intended to ease tensions between Bosnia’s ethnic groups, as they feared that an opposing group could marginalize them if given the sole monopoly on power.

The Current Crisis

The current crisis stems from Bosnian Serb politician Milorad Dodik espousing irredentist rhetoric about leaving key institutions. Among these talking points include withdrawing from the military of Bosnia, which reignited sore memories of atrocities committed by Serbian paramilitary groups during the Bosnian War. His actions were also emboldened by nefarious regional actors who simply seek to weaken the integrity of Bosnia’s institutions at the expense of the nation’s citizens. A renewed conflict along ethnic lines would lead to a loss of economic progress made since 1995 and a humanitarian crisis.

Mounting Tensions

Prior to the pandemic, there were clear signs of political gridlock in the country surrounding several key issues. One such issue, which has become emblematic of gridlock among the major ethnic groups, is that of NATO membership.

Russia has used the separatist aims of the minority Croat party (Croatian Democratic Union) and the Bosnian Serb party (Alliance of Independent Social-democrats) to influence the ascension of Bosnia to key continental institutions, which would weaken their foothold in the Balkans. Russia has long viewed itself as a brother-Slavic nation to Serbia and came to its defense in the First World War. It now capitalizes on this historical relationship to only further its political aims at the expense of smaller states. It has long been a sphere of influence in which it sees as vital to its security.

Policy Recommendations

To reduce the possibility of armed conflict between Bosnia’s major ethnic groups, the United States and Europe need to take action. The actions of Milorad Dodik have been caused by the reduction of credible deterrence and concrete assurances of bringing Bosnia into the fold of key European institutions. The scope of Operation Althea needs to be expanded with Bosnia to send a credible deterrence to nations seeking to interfere in the country’s internal affairs. Chief among the most salient atrocities of the Bosnian War is the Srebrenica massacre, which resulted in the deaths of 8,000 Bosniaks left behind by a United Nations force bereft of deterrence.

Second, the United States and European Union should introduce sanction regimes in concert on individuals who seek to engage in continued separatist rhetoric while in an official capacity of the Bosnian government.

Third, the European Union should reengage with Bosnia to encourage permanent reform within the governance of the country, to be more inclusive of the ethnic minorities within the nation, as well as provide tangible timeframes for Bosnia to join European institutions.

A Region to Be Heeded

Historically, the Balkans have long been a source of conflict, ranging from the Balkan Wars of the 1910s to the Yugoslav Wars of the late 1990s. With a region that has produced devastating crises to international security, it is important for the aforementioned policies to be implemented to avoid igniting the powder keg of Europe.

In present conditions, the presence of COVID-19 only serves to exacerbate a potential humanitarian disaster, should armed conflict arise. Such a disaster would also serve to impede a pandemic response with larger powers backing their preferred factions rather than coordinate global public health efforts such as COVAX.

Chris Ynclan, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

December 2, 2021December 2, 2021 by Rise to Peace

FARC Removed from Terrorist List – What’s Next for Colombia’s Peace Process?

On November 30^th the United States announced plans to remove the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) from its list of foreign terrorist organizations. The decision to redesignate the terrorist status of the former guerrilla group follows the signing of a peace deal between the Colombian government and the FARC in 2016. In a statement following the announcement, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the FARC “no longer exists as a unified organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or has the capability or intent to do so.”

Background

The FARC was founded in 1964 by a group of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in response to anti-communist repression across Colombia. The group waged a half-century war to overthrow the government, funding its operations through extortion, taxation, kidnappings, illegal mining, and the drug trade. At its height, the FARC counted 20,000 men and women under its command, controlled around 70% of Colombia’s coca crop, and generated well over 1 billion dollars in annual income.

The conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government represented the longest-running war in the western hemisphere, having cost the lives of over 220,000 people and displacing over five million civilians. After decades of meetings and negotiations, Colombia’s 2016 peace accord was signed. The deal was celebrated as one of the most all-encompassing peace agreements in modern history. The FARC agreed to demobilize, and the Colombian government promised to address poverty and inequality across the country’s rural regions.

Why is the FARC Being Removed from the Terrorist List?

The State Department’s decision to revoke the FARC’s terrorist designation comes five years into the deal’s 15-year time frame and represents the United States’ continued support for the country’s peace process. Whilst the move has been criticized by some U.S. politicians, including a number of senior Republicans, many Colombians have lauded it as a necessary step that will allow the United States to play a more central role in the country’s peace-building efforts.

Since the signing of the 2016 peace deal, 13,000 former FARC combatants have laid down their arms, and many of these former members now play crucial roles in the country’s peace process. Indeed, the FARC has been succeeded by a legal, registered political party, and many of the guerilla group’s former commanders now serve as prominent politicians. However, under the FARC’s designation as a foreign terrorist organization, U.S. officials were prohibited from meeting or working with former FARC militants and were unable to fund important peace-building programs, such as a formerly FARC-led campaign to destroy land mines across the country. Mr. Blinken’s statement said that delisting the FARC would allow the United States to “better support implementation of the 2016 accord, including by working with demobilized combatants.”

Preserving the Peace Process

The United States’ decision to redesignate the FARC comes at a pivotal point in the peace process. The Colombian government’s promise to tackle poverty in rural regions was at the heart of the peace accord, but experts are increasingly warning that these efforts are moving too slowly. As of 2020, just 4% of the deal’s rural reform measures are complete and security experts warn that the slow implementation of the promised reforms risk undermining the trust of rural communities and the return of armed conflict.

Colombia is already seeing a worrying surge in mass violence directed at rural communities. The government has been slow to seize control of the territory once held by the FARC, and a number of violent criminal organizations have moved in. The measures of the peace agreement, including the establishment of a national transitional justice court, threaten these groups’ illegal operations, and mass killings are increasingly used to let civilians know the high cost of supporting the deal.

Colombia’s peace process is at a precarious point. Five years have passed since the signing of the 2016 accord, but the peace remains delicate. The State Department’s decision to remove the FARC from its list of terrorist organizations will allow the U.S. to increase its support for the implementation of the 2016 deal by working alongside former members of the FARC and funding important peace-building programs across the country.

However, this alone will not be enough to secure the long-term success of the peace process. Colombia must accelerate the rollout of its rural development program. These promises were central to the peace deal, and failure to honor them will deeply damage the trust of rural communities, exacerbating the same frustrations that fueled the conflict for decades. Colombia must also work to protect communities from violent criminal organizations, providing rural Colombians the security to participate in a democratic society and supporting the efforts of the country’s transitional justice court.

The 2016 peace agreement gave Colombia the chance to move beyond its violent past, but its success is not yet guaranteed. The United States should continue to work with its Colombian partners to advance the cause of peace. The removal of the FARC from its terrorist list is an important step, but the U.S. must remain cognizant of the broader threats to the peace process. It should work with those in the government and those on the ground in rural Colombia to restore trust, promote economic development, and prevent the influx of armed criminal groups.

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Colombia / Latin America / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments

November 28, 2021 by Rise to Peace

Kidnappings in Haiti Terrorize the Nation

In recent weeks, two collective kidnappings have been registered in Haiti. After the death of President Jovenel Moïse, Haiti has suffered a wave of crimes and kidnappings throughout the country, which have severely affected the local population.

The situation in Haiti is critical. Despite the fact that two hostages were released a few days ago, insecurity terrorizes the country and the Central American region.

Background

Haiti is currently recovering from the political crisis generated by the assassination of its president, Jovenel Moïse, and from an earthquake in August. In addition, the Haitian State does not have the capacity to effectively address these problems and the increased violence. In fact, the Haitian Armed Forces have not been able to control the territory and prevent the proliferation of armed gangs.

The power of the Haitian criminal gangs can be evidenced in situations such as the blocking of the country’s fuel supply. After Moïse’s death, gangs such as G9 and Family blocked Terminal Varreux, the country’s largest oil terminal. This blockade restricted access to fuel across the country to destabilize the government, impact the nation’s electricity grid, and threaten citizens’ lives and wellbeing. The gangs are so powerful that the blockade only ended due to a truce between the G9 and Family and the local government.

Overall, security and public order in Haiti are worrisome. An estimated 165 gang factions operate in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and these gangs have carried out numerous kidnappings in 2021 alone.

The Kidnappings

The first mass kidnapping occurred on October 16^th, when 17 members (12 adults and five children) of a U.S.-based missionary group were kidnapped by the 400 Mawozo gang, which controls the Croix-des-Bouquets area east of Port-au-Prince. According to authorities, the missionaries were kidnapped when en route to visit an orphanage and carry out humanitarian aid. The gang has demanded a $17 million ransom, $1 million per hostage.

In addition, on November 21^st 2 of the 17 kidnapped missionaries were released. However, only after FBI agents, Haitian authorities, and the anti-kidnapping unit of the national police negotiated with the kidnappers for more than one month.

The second mass kidnapping occurred on November 23^rd, when an armed gang kidnapped 15 passengers from a bus in northwestern Haiti. Authorities have indicated that the gang is asking for a large sum of money to release the hostages, although the exact ransom amount remains unknown.

As of late, the number of kidnappings in Haiti has increased exponentially. So far in 2021, nearly 800 kidnappings have been reported in Haiti. In fact, The Center for Analysis and Research in Human Rights (CARDH) notes that at least 782 kidnappings were reported this year, up until October 16^th, compared to 796 cases in all of 2020, without taking into account unregistered cases.

What’s Next for Haiti?

Due to the weak presence and lack of territorial control by the Haitian State, the power of the gangs, the criminal governance in certain areas of the country, the increased crime rate, the difficult economic climate, and mounting social tensions, crimes, such as mass kidnappings, are likely to persist.

Public order and security will only stabilize once security forces, such as the Haitian National Police, are reinforced and improved, allowing them to effectively confront the gangs and regain control of the country. Furthermore, after the death of President Moïse, political power needs to be reorganized to effectively address the ongoing security challenges.

For this reason, the country has experienced events such as the new Haitian cabinet, which will be made up of members of the opposition, the impending delivery of 19 police vehicles and protective equipment to the Haitian police by the United States, and more actions by the armed forces to restore order. These planned actions and events are expected to reduce violent crimes, such as kidnappings, and improve security conditions, throughout Haiti.

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Latin America / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments

November 27, 2021November 28, 2021 by Ahmad Mohibi

The Taliban Kingmaker: Haqqani or Durrani?

Author’s note: The Taliban group was founded in the 1990s by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and appointed Mullah Omar as founder and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar as co-founder–the two Pashtun leaders from the Durrani tribe of Afghanistan from heavily populated density provinces in western Afghanistan (Kandahar, Helmand, and Uruzgan regions). In 1996, after the Taliban’s first victory, the Haqqani Network joined the Taliban and since then have committed some of the deadliest bombings and have advanced terrorist targeting capabilities.

A key factor for the prolonged war in Afghanistan has been the thirst for power among the groups and, subsequently, within those groups, other factions, who all want to rule but are unwilling to compromise. There is a layer of interest within each group. The Taliban are a majority-dominated Pashtun-led group that emerged in the 1990s and are now on their second attempt to form their government. However, they are struggling to unify due to tribal, religious, regional, and political differences.

The Taliban took power in Afghanistan in August 2021 but have struggled to maintain power in their second attempt at forming a government. However, the dynamics of the Taliban government have changed.

While the Taliban seeks global recognition, a political dispute between its factions is occurring. Although the Taliban Islamic Emirate is characterized as radical, anti-democracy, and anti-Western values, there are some differences in how Taliban factions view social norms, politics, and governance. The Mullah Baradar Ghani Group is keen to compromise. At the same time, the Haqqani Network is a hard-core extremist group that is unwilling to deviate from its path of an Islamic emirate. The Haqqani Network is considered an extreme faction of the Taliban with no desire to engage with the world, particularly the West.

In general terms, the Haqqani Network, a designated terrorist organization per the U.S. State Department, is considered a more conservative and radical wing of the Taliban. In contrast, Baradar’s group is more liberal and seeks greater rapprochement with the international community.

20210914 taliban whos who no head 780px - The Taliban Kingmaker: Haqqani or Durrani?

Current Taliban Leadership. Source: The Counter Extremism Project, United Nations, Taliban, Pakistan Foreign Ministry, US Treasury, US State Department Photos: Handout/Taliban, Getty Images, The Counter Extremism Project, US Federal Bureau of Investigation Graphic: Henrik Pettersson, Laura Smith-Spark, Saleem Mehsud, Kara Fox and Tim Lister, CNN

Background

The Haqqani Network was founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a Sunni Islamist, and ex-mujahidin warlord during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. During the 80s, Jalaluddin’s group was aided and supported by several members of the international community, becoming one of the most influential groups in Eastern Afghanistan. Furthermore, Jalaluddin had close ties to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and to Osama Bin Laden.

Despite the fact that Jalaluddin died in 2018 from illness, the group continued under the command of his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani.

The Haqqani Network is one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. During the Afghan war, they were responsible for some of the highest-profile terrorist attacks against U.S. forces and civilians. For instance, the June 2011 assault on the Kabul Intercontinental Hotel and two major suicide bombings, in 2008 and 2009, against the Indian Embassy in Kabul.

The military and financial power of the Haqqani Network derives from its involvement in illegal activities such as smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion. However, they also receives financial support from agencies such as the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and other wealthy donors, which makes the fight against this organization complex.

On the other hand, the Mullah Baradar faction is also seeking political control of Afghanistan. This group seeks to represent the interests of historical Taliban leaders such as Mullah Omar and his son, Mullah Yaqoob, who are originally from the Kandahar region in southern Afghanistan; unlike members of the Haqqani Network, who come from the northeastern region of the country.

Mullah Baradar is the co-founder of the Taliban and participated in negotiations with the United States in Doha during 2020, resulting in the eventual withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. Also, Baradar met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing this year. Mullah Baradar is considered a respected negotiator among the organization and his faction is perceived as the moderate and more liberal wing of the Taliban.

Mullah Baradar’s faction seeks greater rapprochement with the world and is open to negotiation, exemplified by the U.S. negotiations in Qatar. Additionally, this faction proposes a more inclusive government that allows for the participation of ethnic minorities. This approach to foreign policy contradicts the Haqqani Network’s ideals, which, form a more conservative perspective and prefers that other states not interfere in the Taliban government.

The differences between these two factions have led to a current dispute within the Taliban. Mullah Baradar hoped to head the government but instead, he was appointed as a deputy. In fact, on September 21^st 2021, there was an armed confrontation between the two groups, resulting in Baradar’s brief disappearance and subsequent move to the Kandahar region.

One of the perpetual afflictions plaguing Afghanistan in the modern era has been an inability for Kabul to consolidate governance over their entire territory. While geography has played a considerable role in this hindrance, it cannot be understated how tribal differences have obstructed the peace process.

In Afghanistan, a significant portion of the Pashtuns are a part of the Durrani confederation and have comprised a large number of the Taliban’s political elite, such as Hamid Karzai. Their power base extends into Pakistan, providing refuge to rebuild strength for future campaigns.

Presently the Durrani are represented by Mullah Baradar, who hopes to continue their monopoly of power within the country. Moreover, with their policy of rapprochement with larger powers, such as China, they can benefit from substantial capital. They could also benefit from arms, which could be used to consolidate power within the country and further transnational infrastructure projects, like the Belt and Road Initiative.

At the moment their primary rivals within Afghanistan are the Haqqani Network, which is primarily composed of the Zadran tribe. The group has traditionally used armed opposition against conflicting foreign powers. Their strength draws from this resistance as well as past alliances with the most dangerous Islamic fundamentalist groups in the region, such as Al Qaeda.

They may see their opposition as only a conduit for foreign influence, and thus feel emboldened to conduct a prolonged conflict against the Duranni faction. Without reconciliation by a third party, the nation may devolve into devastating conflict along tribal and ideological lines, leaving civilians caught in the crossfire.

The most affected: The civilian population

While the Afghan government internally disputes over which Taliban faction should prevail, the civilian population suffers.

Afghans are currently experiencing widespread famine throughout the country. This is due to the current drought, difficult economic climate, and cessation of international food aid.

Today, Afghanistan has a poverty rate of 72%. However, even more worrisome is the notion that the quality of life will continue to decline due to the current political instability, uneconomical public finances, freezing of foreign aid, and the COVID-19 pandemic. If current conditions persist, 97 percent of Afghans could plunge into poverty by mid-2022.

What is next?

The internal dispute between the Haqqani Network and the Mullah Baradar faction is likely to jeopardize the government and consequently negatively impact the civilian population.

Therefore, while the political confrontation between the two factions continues, it is necessary to think about solutions in public policy to prevent and stop the ongoing humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan. It is necessary to evaluate alternatives to intervene on problems such as generalized famine and extreme poverty.

Ahmad Shah Mohibi is the Founder of Rise to Peace and a former US Counter-Terrorism Adviser in Afghanistan @ahmadsmohibi

Christopher Ynclan Jr, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Daniel Ruiz, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments