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January 8, 2019January 8, 2019 by John Wilson

Countering Extremism in the Digital Age

Source: Rand Corporation (2016)

The Global War on Terror has challenged Western conceptions of warfare. The days of clearly defined winners and losers amongst nation states, as seen in the world wars, are largely in the past.

Tomorrow’s winners and losers will be defined in much more blurred terms as ongoing battles of information and communication seek to win over the hearts and minds of people around the world.

The State Department has acknowledged that for any legitimate success to occur in the fight against terrorism, countering the propaganda of extremist groups like the Islamic State (IS) is critical. While entering the fight in the war of information is a massive step in furthering counterterrorism efforts, the State Department has not yet taken the steps necessary to match the surging campaigns of extremist networks, particularly IS.

The State Department first officially began this type of counterterror operation with the creation of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). The CSCC was active on social media, directly challenging IS profiles with counter-messaging while conducting various media campaigns such as ‘Think Again, Turn Away’.

Conceptually these were reasonable strategic maneuvers that attempted to challenge the cyber prominence of the IS’s media strategy as well as online recruitment efforts. However, what came to be considered tit-for-tat online trolling between low-level jihadists and the United States government likely emboldened and legitimized the IS.

The State Department would go on to restructure the CSCC, creating the Global Engagement Center (GEC), which is also tasked with addressing social media activities of nation states such as Russia. The GEC however is experiencing similar issues in conjunction with reported limited staffing and funding.

The IS media strategy has often been simplified by Westerners in an effort to de-legitimize the IS as a whole. However, this has led to a fundamental separation between our understanding of the IS propaganda campaign and the means by which we counter it. In order to truly combat a propaganda campaign, its purpose, narrative and mission must be understood.

Once these elements are comprehensively understood, a counter-narrative strategy must be implemented rather than a counter-messaging strategy. A successful counter-narrative strategy must address issues to include factors that IS relies on to recruit vulnerable individuals to their ranks: desires for purpose and belonging. A counter-narrative campaign must also be inclusive of the Muslim faith, understand local cultural concerns, and be conducted in a way that does not appear to be dictated by the West.

The CSCC did re-post relevant material from news outlets in the Arabic world in an effort to appear more representative of local cultures, as opposed to speaking purely as an American source. Beyond the limited scope of the CSCC and GEC efforts, several governments now deny terror networks a platform to circulate their propaganda.

This strategy places pressure on social media platforms to promptly delete extremist content and profiles. This strategy does slow the spread of propaganda, but does not provide a counter-narrative to what these groups are using to recruit and draw sympathy.

The State Department’s GEC has implemented one significant upgrade from its predecessor: one of the GEC’s core competency areas, ‘partnerships’, has the GEC develop partnerships with organizations, religious leaders, and community leaders to help engage with those at risk of becoming radicalized or to help those who are already.

One recommendation for a counter-narrative strategy proposes that the narrative must portray the IS as manipulative and as a failure, as opposed to promoting the often-observed idea that the group is tremendously dangerous. Any successful counter-narrative campaigns must be directed towards specific sub-audiences of those vulnerable to radicalization or those radicalized who are vulnerable to being deradicalized.

The IS has been the latest international terror network to capitalize on the ease of using the internet to communicate propaganda. Terror networks have become adept at using the internet to accelerate the radicalization process, share ideals, and develop support networks across the globe, all while remaining largely uncontested by the governments of the world.

The State Department must conduct systematic changes in the near future if there is to be hope for success in this war of ideas.

First, the State Department must see an increase in staffing to properly manage the overwhelming load of work that comes with fighting international terror propaganda on the internet.

Second, incorporating community and religious leaders will be essential to foster an image that this is not a counter-narrative strategy dictated solely by the United States government.

Third, the GEC, in conjunction with these community and religious figures, must jointly develop the counter-narrative strategy.

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional as well as a Research Fellow at Rise to Peace.

January 5, 2019January 2, 2019 by John Wilson

Lessons from the KKK

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KKK recruitment propaganda. Source: Link

Upstate New York experienced a unique threat to the safety of their community this year: attempted Ku Klux Klan (KKK) recruitment of their school children. Specifically, the United Northern & Southern Knights of the KKK, two specific sects of the Klan, printed propaganda and placed it into bags accompanying candy. These bags were then placed onto driveways of school children in the early morning hours in an effort to ensure that the children got the packages while exiting their homes for school.

Oneida County Sheriff Robert Maciol was careful to note that the recruitment effort was a form of protected free speech; however, any attempt to solicit acts of violence would be prosecuted. Upstate New York is not alone in experiencing Klan activity, despite the fact that many perceive the KKK as essentially defunct. As of 2017, 42 known Klan groups were active across almost two dozen states. Current estimates place the number of Klan members, or those sympathetic or open to their ideology, at around 3,000 people. However, blanket recruitment efforts such as those used in upstate New York are distinctly unsophisticated and rely on chance, because the propaganda will only work if it lands in the hands of a child vulnerable to the beliefs presented.

Interestingly, many members of the modern Klan have a mixed ideology of traditional Klan beliefs and neo-Nazi beliefs. In some cases, these mixed ideologies can weaken extremist groups as it makes their members’ loyalties much more complicated.

However, Ken Parker, a former leader in the Ku Klux Klan, is an example proving that full-fledged members of the Klan can change their ideological loyalties. Parker was recruited into the Klan after spending 11 years in the United States Navy, leaving the service during a terrible economic downturn. Parker was first driven to contact a local chapter of the Klan by programs on Netflix that looked at the history of the Klan and neo-Nazism. At first, according to Parker, he was uncomfortable with the anti-Semitic rhetoric of his newfound friends; even so, he fully radicalized within 6 months. Though he met his fiancée at a cross burning, Klansmen close to Parker disapproved of the relationship, leading Parker to renounce his position in the Klan and commit to being a neo-Nazi. After some time with the neo-Nazi National Socialist Movement, Parker became friends with a Muslim filmmaker and renounced neo-Nazism altogether. Parker now spends his social time as an active member of a local church group.

What does Parker’s case tell us about those vulnerable to recruitment by the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups? Their belief system is not as strong, nor is it as deeply rooted as other extremist ideologies. The identity associated with being a Klansman has perhaps become diluted, making for weaker loyalties. If Parker’s case is representative of even a moderate percentage of Klan recruitment, then the Klan is relying on recruiting individuals who are susceptible to recruitment from a wide variety of groups. Many of these individuals are high-risk to be recruited by a wide variety of organizations, whether they be extremist groups, cults, or street gangs. These high-risk individuals often are looking to belong, to be meaningful members of a group, and to find an ideology which explains their real or perceived problems. While this may be seen as beneficial for the Klan, in reality it fails to produce long-term members for the group.

Lack of sophisticated recruitment capability likely is representative of a disorganized organization. While it is repulsive to experience Klan recruitment efforts at all, attempts like the candy drive in upstate New York are an indicator that the Klan is not in a position of returning to the strength it once held. Local law enforcement should monitor such cases to look for solicitation of specific acts of violence or changes in sophistication of targeted recruitment efforts. A change in recruitment operations for the Klan likely will signal a change in the organization, towards a more decentralized structure or to a more rigid structure depending upon the direction the Klan attempts to take going forward.

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional and a Research Fellow with Rise to Peace.

January 4, 2019January 7, 2019 by Kyle Chapman

What Constitutes Terrorism?

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An Israeli woman carrying a coffin with family members and friends to protest domestic violence. Source: The Guardian Photographer: Jim Hollander/EPA

Throughout the world, the word “terrorism” has many different connotations; however, each definition shares certain elemtns. The conventional definition of terrorism under U.S. law is that it is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” To dissect this definition a bit further, an act of terror must meet four criteria: premeditation, political motivation, targeting of noncombatants, and violence perpetrated by a non-state actor. This definition is similar to others agreed upon by scholars studying terrorism and political violence with minor differences, and is generally the most comprehensive definition in use.

However, the interpretation of what constitutes “terrorism” is constantly undergoing change. Recently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that domestic violence is a form of terrorism. This declaration was made after thousands of women across Israel went on strike due to inaction by the government in curtailing the rise of domestic violence incidents within the country, arguing that domestic violence incidents have not been given priority by the Israeli government. One recent incident involved the murders of two teenage girls, both of whom were found dead on November 26, 2018. Their murders marked a total of 24 women in the state of Israel this year that have been killed by domestic violence. The objective of the strike was to increase government awareness and increase state funding to address the issue. In response to this, Netanyahu and other officials are working to pass legislation that enables the Israeli government to track domestic violence offenders via an electronic bracelet to ensure they do not violate restraining orders. By branding domestic violence as “terrorism,” Netanyahu may have aimed to mobilize political opposition to domestic violence and increase its priority level on the government’s agenda.

The case with Israel highlights one reason why the definition or interpretation of terrorism is constantly undergoing change. Often, the definition changes for political reasons. Due to an inappropriate response to the rise of domestic violence incidents, the Israeli government faced severe backlash from thousands of women, so an anti-domestic violence declaration of equal proportion was needed. To increase the scale of their response, the Israeli government declared domestic violence an act of terror, even though the common definition of domestic violence shares almost no relation to the definition of terrorism. For example, a common definition of domestic violence is violent or aggressive behavior within a home, which typically involves the abuse of a spouse or partner. This definition does not include premeditation, political motivation, the targeting of noncombatants, or a non-state actor. Ultimately, redefining domestic violence as terrorism is simply unfounded and takes away from what criminal offenses should be constituted as terrorism.

While the rise in domestic violence within Israel is of great importance and needs to be addressed properly, it has nothing to do with terrorism. Terrorism is a political instrument used by non-state actors and individuals to incite fear and reduce the legitimacy of state governments. It is separate from common criminal offenses that are committed in far greater numbers around the world. Once policy makers and government officials start using the word terrorism nonchalantly to define every heinous crime or offense, the word itself will lose its own significance and true meaning.

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January 3, 2019 by Rise to Peace

The Naxalite Insurgency

On October 30, 2018, a journalist and two policemen were killed in an ambush in Eastern Indian state of Chattisgarh. This attack is particularly notable given that it was carried out by the Naxalites, a group who has been responsible for a series of deadly attacks carried out against the Indian government, including one in 2010 which killed 76 police officers.

Unlike many other insurgent groups that are fighting in the 21st century, the Naxalites see themselves as fighting a Maoist struggle for liberation. To understand why a communist insurgent group still exists in India, it is important to understand the story of the Naxalites. The Naxalites emerged in the 1960s, when an aristocrat turned revolutionary named Charu Majumdar lead a branch of the Indian Communist Party. Unlike the rest of the Communist party, which generally supported the Marxist Leninism of the Soviet Union, Majumdar looked toward Mao with an emphasis on organizing the peasantry into a fighting force capable of withstanding oppression. This was best exemplified with one of their major slogans: “China’s Chairman is our Chairman.”

These efforts of rural organization culminated in the Naxalbari uprising of 1967, when groups of sharecroppers rebelled against landholders over harassment in the famed tea growing area of Darjeeling. Majumdar was soon arrested and later died in prison. With his death, the hope of a unified movement was lost as well. With the death of Mao in 1971, the rebels also lost a strong pillar of moral, (and possibly material) support as the People’s Republic of China began the gradual process of economic liberalization. These factors lead to a splintering of the movement, with over 140 groups claiming to be the rightful representatives of Maoist thought in India in the 1980s.

Beginning in the 1980s, however, violent Maoism began seeing a resurgence in Eastern India, especially in the provinces of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. This is largely due to the importance of growth of mining in these areas. This has been driven by a booming demand for coal and iron ore to fuel factories in both India and China. Many of the inhabitants of these areas have failed to see the profits of the industry, and work in dangerous conditions for little pay.

This sense of alienation is furthered by the fact that many of the inhabitants of these areas are Adivasi, a general term for members of indigenous groups in India. The assortment of tribes who inhabited these areas long lived as subsistence farmers and were left relatively disconnected from the rest of India. The mining boom deprived them of their previous livelihoods and thereby forces them to work in the mines for low pay. This makes them especially vulnerable to the pull of organizations such as the Naxalites.

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January 3, 2019January 2, 2019 by Sonia Lay

The Psychological Battle Against Terror

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A man prays by a memorial for the dead. Image credit: Christian Hartman, REUTERS.

There is a special aspect to be considered when analyzing the modus operandi and tactics of jihadist movements. As we all know, criminals usually act in secrecy, trying to leave no trace of their underground activities and avoiding capture. However, jihadi attacks and claims of responsibility have largely proven that violent extremisms aim to operate in the open.

In a word where communication is key, contemporary terrorism has become a constant and disruptive daily presence. Because their attacks are in the open, we feel a threat even when terrorists seem inactive.

The reason of this spectacularization can be found in their main purpose: what do terrorist groups want to gain from their attacks?

Behind all criminal activities, there is a certain desire for power. In the specific case of terrorism, it is all about power to influence people’s emotions.

It is plain to see that terrorists want to instill fear. As the German philosopher Hannah Arendt stated, “fear is an emotion indispensable for survival”- but violent extremism has led to a pathological and relentless “state of terror”. The Big Threat of our time has quickly wormed its way into our lives, and now we need to cope with its several consequences.

Terrorists want to develop a general and constant state of insecurity that follows people everywhere, in everything they do. The impact of terrorist attacks on the human psyche ranges from short-term psychological conditions to long-term pathologies: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, constant sense of doom, anxiety and anguish about future risks, feelings of terror and helplessness, anger and desire for revenge.

If even a few of these signs sound familiar to you, then their aim has been achieved.

It is not easy to deal with the effects of terrorism on mental health, and it is even harder to put into practice effective strategies to properly counter this insidious violence.

It is clear that we all should play an active role in facing this threat by taking action on a daily basis with a pure “contrasting strategy.” This strategy simply consists of disappointing the terrorists’ expectations: since extremists want to disrupt our sense of safety, we should be even more resilient, take back control of our lives, and resume our daily activities as soon as possible.

The most challenging part of this strategy will be learning to deal with our personal emotions, which is why civil and governmental institutions should try diverse approaches to boost social cohesion and control. This will help people mitigate the sense of loneliness and helplessness that normally occur after shocking events and traumatic times.

Given the amount of power terrorists now wield over everyday life, it is critical that we do not give them any more influence. Ultimately, the power to reduce this influence begins in our own hearts and minds.

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