FARC

FARC Removed from Terrorist List – What’s Next for Colombia’s Peace Process?

On November 30th the United States announced plans to remove the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) from its list of foreign terrorist organizations. The decision to redesignate the terrorist status of the former guerrilla group follows the signing of a peace deal between the Colombian government and the FARC in 2016.  In a statement following the announcement, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the FARC “no longer exists as a unified organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or has the capability or intent to do so.”

Background

The FARC was founded in 1964 by a group of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in response to anti-communist repression across Colombia. The group waged a half-century war to overthrow the government, funding its operations through extortion, taxation, kidnappings, illegal mining, and the drug trade. At its height, the FARC counted 20,000 men and women under its command, controlled around 70% of Colombia’s coca crop, and generated well over 1 billion dollars in annual income.

The conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government represented the longest-running war in the western hemisphere, having cost the lives of over 220,000 people and displacing over five million civilians. After decades of meetings and negotiations, Colombia’s 2016 peace accord was signed. The deal was celebrated as one of the most all-encompassing peace agreements in modern history. The FARC agreed to demobilize, and the Colombian government promised to address poverty and inequality across the country’s rural regions.

Why is the FARC Being Removed from the Terrorist List?

The State Department’s decision to revoke the FARC’s terrorist designation comes five years into the deal’s 15-year time frame and represents the United States’ continued support for the country’s peace process. Whilst the move has been criticized by some U.S. politicians, including a number of senior Republicans, many Colombians have lauded it as a necessary step that will allow the United States to play a more central role in the country’s peace-building efforts.

Since the signing of the 2016 peace deal, 13,000 former FARC combatants have laid down their arms, and many of these former members now play crucial roles in the country’s peace process. Indeed, the FARC has been succeeded by a legal, registered political party, and many of the guerilla group’s former commanders now serve as prominent politicians. However, under the FARC’s designation as a foreign terrorist organization, U.S. officials were prohibited from meeting or working with former FARC militants and were unable to fund important peace-building programs, such as a formerly FARC-led campaign to destroy land mines across the country. Mr. Blinken’s statement said that delisting the FARC would allow the United States to “better support implementation of the 2016 accord, including by working with demobilized combatants.”

Preserving the Peace Process

The United States’ decision to redesignate the FARC comes at a pivotal point in the peace process. The Colombian government’s promise to tackle poverty in rural regions was at the heart of the peace accord, but experts are increasingly warning that these efforts are moving too slowly. As of 2020, just 4% of the deal’s rural reform measures are complete and security experts warn that the slow implementation of the promised reforms risk undermining the trust of rural communities and the return of armed conflict.

Colombia is already seeing a worrying surge in mass violence directed at rural communities. The government has been slow to seize control of the territory once held by the FARC, and a number of violent criminal organizations have moved in. The measures of the peace agreement, including the establishment of a national transitional justice court, threaten these groups’ illegal operations, and mass killings are increasingly used to let civilians know the high cost of supporting the deal.

Colombia’s peace process is at a precarious point. Five years have passed since the signing of the 2016 accord, but the peace remains delicate. The State Department’s decision to remove the FARC from its list of terrorist organizations will allow the U.S. to increase its support for the implementation of the 2016 deal by working alongside former members of the FARC and funding important peace-building programs across the country.

However, this alone will not be enough to secure the long-term success of the peace process. Colombia must accelerate the rollout of its rural development program. These promises were central to the peace deal, and failure to honor them will deeply damage the trust of rural communities, exacerbating the same frustrations that fueled the conflict for decades. Colombia must also work to protect communities from violent criminal organizations, providing rural Colombians the security to participate in a democratic society and supporting the efforts of the country’s transitional justice court.

The 2016 peace agreement gave Colombia the chance to move beyond its violent past, but its success is not yet guaranteed. The United States should continue to work with its Colombian partners to advance the cause of peace. The removal of the FARC from its terrorist list is an important step, but the U.S. must remain cognizant of the broader threats to the peace process. It should work with those in the government and those on the ground in rural Colombia to restore trust, promote economic development, and prevent the influx of armed criminal groups.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Haiti

Kidnappings in Haiti Terrorize the Nation

In recent weeks, two collective kidnappings have been registered in Haiti. After the death of President Jovenel Moïse, Haiti has suffered a wave of crimes and kidnappings throughout the country, which have severely affected the local population.

The situation in Haiti is critical. Despite the fact that two hostages were released a few days ago, insecurity terrorizes the country and the Central American region.

Background

Haiti is currently recovering from the political crisis generated by the assassination of its president, Jovenel Moïse, and from an earthquake in August. In addition, the Haitian State does not have the capacity to effectively address these problems and the increased violence. In fact, the Haitian Armed Forces have not been able to control the territory and prevent the proliferation of armed gangs.

The power of the Haitian criminal gangs can be evidenced in situations such as the blocking of the country’s fuel supply. After Moïse’s death, gangs such as G9 and Family blocked Terminal Varreux, the country’s largest oil terminal. This blockade restricted access to fuel across the country to destabilize the government, impact the nation’s electricity grid, and threaten citizens’ lives and wellbeing. The gangs are so powerful that the blockade only ended due to a truce between the G9 and Family and the local government.

Overall, security and public order in Haiti are worrisome. An estimated 165 gang factions operate in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and these gangs have carried out numerous kidnappings in 2021 alone.

The Kidnappings

The first mass kidnapping occurred on October 16th, when 17 members (12 adults and five children) of a U.S.-based missionary group were kidnapped by the 400 Mawozo gang, which controls the Croix-des-Bouquets area east of Port-au-Prince. According to authorities, the missionaries were kidnapped when en route to visit an orphanage and carry out humanitarian aid. The gang has demanded a $17 million ransom, $1 million per hostage.

In addition, on November 21st 2 of the 17 kidnapped missionaries were released. However, only after FBI agents, Haitian authorities, and the anti-kidnapping unit of the national police negotiated with the kidnappers for more than one month.

The second mass kidnapping occurred on November 23rd, when an armed gang kidnapped 15 passengers from a bus in northwestern Haiti. Authorities have indicated that the gang is asking for a large sum of money to release the hostages, although the exact ransom amount remains unknown.

As of late, the number of kidnappings in Haiti has increased exponentially. So far in 2021, nearly 800 kidnappings have been reported in Haiti. In fact, The Center for Analysis and Research in Human Rights (CARDH) notes that at least 782 kidnappings were reported this year, up until October 16th, compared to 796 cases in all of 2020, without taking into account unregistered cases.

What’s Next for Haiti?

Due to the weak presence and lack of territorial control by the Haitian State, the power of the gangs, the criminal governance in certain areas of the country, the increased crime rate, the difficult economic climate, and mounting social tensions, crimes, such as mass kidnappings, are likely to persist.

Public order and security will only stabilize once security forces, such as the Haitian National Police, are reinforced and improved, allowing them to effectively confront the gangs and regain control of the country. Furthermore, after the death of President Moïse, political power needs to be reorganized to effectively address the ongoing security challenges.

For this reason, the country has experienced events such as the new Haitian cabinet, which will be made up of members of the opposition, the impending delivery of 19 police vehicles and protective equipment to the Haitian police by the United States, and more actions by the armed forces to restore order. These planned actions and events are expected to reduce violent crimes, such as kidnappings, and improve security conditions, throughout Haiti.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Otoniel

The Capture of Colombia’s Most Wanted Man Ignites a Series of Terrorist Attacks and Violence

Dairo Antonio Usuga, better known as Otoniel and the leader of one of Colombia’s most feared narco-terrorist organizations, was captured on October 23.  Otoniel is the head of the Clan del Golfo or the Gulf Clan, an armed terrorist and drug trafficking group that poses a serious threat to the Colombian State.

Colombian authorities captured Otoniel, however, his capture generated retaliation from the Gulf Clan against the Colombian security forces. In recent days, armed forces members have suffered terrorist attacks in revenge for Otoniel’s capture.  Additionally, this event will likely start a wave of violence between the factions of the organization as they seek to seize power.

BACKGROUND

The Gulf Clan is a drug trafficking organization that stems from the demobilization of paramilitary forces. They currently operate in areas such as the Gulf of Urabá and the departments of Antioquia and Chocó. It is estimated that the group currently has about 6,000 troops and is present in more than 211 municipalities throughout the Colombian territory. Their primary income comes from illicit drug trafficking and illegal mining.

The financial power of this organization has allowed them to increase military capabilities, expand into new territories, strengthen alliances with other criminal groups and grow their income. Today, the Gulf Clan presents one of the most significant barriers to the stability and security in many of Colombia’s territories.

Consequently, the strengthening of the Gulf Clan in recent years represents a rising threat to the Colombian State and the civilian population.  As a result, the Gulf Clan will continue its narco-terrorist activities until action is taken against them.  While Otoniel’s capture is a major blow to the organization, there is still much work to be done to defeat it.

OTONIEL’S CAPTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

After several months of tracking and intelligence, Otoniel was captured in Antioquia, a rural area in the municipality of Turbo. His capture created a power vacuum in the Gulf Clan, so it is to be expected that there will be internal disputes for control of the organization, mainly among its mid-level leaders.

However, the most worrying implications of Otoniel’s capture are the current retaliations his organization is taking against the Colombian military.  On October 26, army soldiers were attacked by members of the Gulf Clan in the department of Antioquia with explosives and gunfire. In the terrorist attack, three soldiers were killed and three others were wounded.

A few hours later, another military platoon was ambushed by the Clan, leaving one soldier dead and another wounded.

For this reason, it is feasible to affirm that retaliations against the Colombian armed forces will continue in the coming days. It is also highly likely that an increase in homicides and displaced persons will result from disputes within the organization’s factions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the demanding public order and security situation in Antioquia, which will likely escalate, in the short term it is recommended that the Colombian State deploy more troops in the area. This is necessary as greater territorial control is required, and operational results are needed to reduce regional violence.

On the other hand, in the medium and long term, more effective intervention strategies are needed against this narco-terrorist group due to the risk level it represents. From an operational and tactical perspective, it is necessary to attack its sources of financing, such as illicit crops, strengthen intelligence capabilities to anticipate terrorist attacks, and prevent this organization from forcibly recruiting young people from vulnerable populations.

Finally, in terms of public policy, it is necessary to improve the living conditions of the populations in areas such as the Urabá region of Antioquia.  This can be achieved through the generation of formal employment, the provision of public goods and services, and an improvement in the health and education systems. In other words, comprehensive state action is required to guarantee security, but also better living conditions, so risk factors, such as the emergence and strengthening of these groups, disappear or are considerably reduced.

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Hezbollah and the Terror-Crime Nexus

Image Credits: Foreign Policy illustration and Getty Images

As the US security apparatus continues to publicly focus on Iran’s expansion in the Middle East, it has done little to actively address the threat posed from Iran’s favorite proxy, Hezbollah, on the southern border. Hezbollah has been known to operate international money laundering and drug trafficking operations via Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico for years. These operations, other than, notably, the Lebanese Canadian Bank case, have most often been prosecuted as drug-related crimes, rather than crimes of terrorism.

Hezbollah’s drug enterprise is not separate from its terrorist activity. Hezbollah, as directed by Iran, began engaging in the drug trade from its inception in the 1980’s, “for Satan—America and the Jews. If we cannot kill them with guns, so we will kill them with drugs.” As such, the American strategy of prosecuting drug crimes connected to Hezbollah as just that, rather than as crimes of terror shows a fundamental misunderstanding of Hezbollah’s motives.

According to a 2018 CDC study, cocaine was involved in 19.4% of drug overdose deaths in 2016— cocaine which has often made its way into the US via Hezbollah channels. In recent years, the spike in prescription drug related deaths has led the Trump administration to declare a national emergency. The opioid epidemic has at least partially driven the decline in US life expectancy, and opioid overdose victims are often found to have also taken cocaine.

The CDC study claims that in 2016 alone, more than 10,000 Americans died from drug overdoses involving cocaine; that number is more than three times the amount of Americans that died in 9/11. When you take into account the stated goal of Hezbollah to use drugs as weapons to neutralize its enemies, one wonders why the American government has yet to address this activity with the same severity as it does traditional acts of terror.

There is a law on the books that could have been used to prosecute this enterprise: the United States enacted a federal terror financing statute in 1994 after 1993’s World Trade Center bombing, under which entities can be prosecuted for knowingly providing “material support or resources” to another entity to conduct terror operations.

While money laundering can often remove the evidence needed to prosecute terror financing under the 1993 statue, the proof uncovered by the Project Cassandra task force directly ties the drug trafficking funds to Hezbollah. However, up until now, the failure to do so appears to be political, as the Obama administration allegedly did not want to engender bad faith during the Iran deal negotiations.

This has resulted in severe immediate threats to US homeland security. In May, a New York court indicted Ali Kourani, a naturalized US citizen and Hezbollah operative who allegedly attempted to identify Israeli targets in New York and obtain information on John F. Kennedy International Airport security protocols. Prior to setting up shop in New York, Kourani was previously involved with a dealership in Michigan that sold used cars to Benin; it is not unlikely this business was part of the network of used car dealerships used to launder Hezbollah’s drug profits.

Even as the United States aims to keep tensions away from its soil by announcing its intent to establish a military coalition to protect commercial shipping vessels in the waters surrounding Yemen and Iran, it leaves its doorstep unguarded by failing to take direct action against these networks.

Now that the current administration has pulled out of the deal, and is faced with rising tensions from Iran, the next move should be to go after Hezbollah’s crime-terror infrastructure under terror financing laws. Project Cassandra amassed the evidence; the Trump administration should use it to protect US citizens and put pressure on Iran.

Women of the Irish Republican Army: Powerful or Powerless?

Photographer: Colman Doyle took during the time of the ‘Troubles’ in West Belfast 1970s

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is a paramilitary organization that has operated out of Ireland since 1917. There have been many versions of the IRA throughout time such as the ‘OLD IRA’ and the ‘REAL IRA’ however the focus of the group has mostly remained the same, which is that the whole of Ireland should be an independent republic free from British rule.

The focus of the group has mostly remained the same, which is that the whole of Ireland should be an independent republic free from British rule.

In 1969, the IRA was determined to see the British withdrawal from Northern Ireland but with a differing of opinion, the IRA split into two separate wings: officials and provisionals. Officials used their efforts to gain independence through peaceful action, while the provisionals used violence and extremism to make its agenda known.

This division on part of the provisionals resulted in an estimated 1,800 deaths, which included more than 500 civilians. As the Provisional IRA and other paramilitary organizations continued on what can only be described as a violent path, the British Army in the meantime retaliated which eventually marked the time known as the “Troubles” which affected Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for almost 30 years.

Women have been known to participate in many roles within the IRA. During the 1970s many women were compelled to join in some capacity as the resistance within the community helped to politicize them.

While many of these roles have involved protests and civil rights matters a number of women became known for their roles as combatants during the time of the troubles. This is an interesting development in paramilitary organizations as women were not often included in these physically violent positions.

The IRA stands as a departure in the traditional roles women hold in terrorism and changes the narrative of how they are viewed. This shift in the structure of terrorist groups raises the question of why the change in dynamics and what does it mean for how the group operates.

Does the addition of women to the group make it stronger or vulnerable? There is a tendency in research and in situations where female terrorists are actively observed to view them as victims instead of perpetrators despite overwhelming evidence to suggest otherwise.

There is a tendency in research and in situations where female terrorists are actively observed to view them as victims instead of perpetrators despite overwhelming evidence to suggest otherwise.

Societal norms and constructs have added to a preconceived notion that women are naturally more peaceful and less violent than men but it is naïve to allow this belief to distort the reality that women are active players in terrorism and are not to be overlooked. In fact, it could be argued that they are more dangerous than men in the sense they can use their femininity and this false image to mislead and conceal their violent agendas from others. A key member of the IRA and a prime example of this shift in gendered terrorism is Dolores Price.

In fact, it could be argued that they [women] are more dangerous than men in the sense they can use their femininity and this false image to mislead and conceal their violent agendas from others.

Dolores Price joined the Provisional IRA in the 1970s along with her sister Marian Price. During her time in the IRA, Price was known for her extreme devotion to the cause and her inherently violent nature.

Price was involved with some of the IRA’s most devastating crimes: In 1973 she participated in a car bombing at the Old Bailey in London injuring over 200 people and killing one.

Price and her sister were arrested shortly after the bombing. Originally the sentence was life imprisonment, however, their sentences were eventually brought down to 20 years. Price only served seven years for her role and participation in the bombing. While in prison Price went on a hunger strike in order to be moved to a different prison in Northern Ireland.

Other members of the IRA imprisoned for the bombing joined the hunger strike and it went on for 208 days due to the prisoners being fed forcefully by prison officers in order to keep them alive. The force-feeding was abruptly brought to an end when another member of the strike died.

Price began to resent and blame Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams for the ordering of the abduction and murder of the most high profile victim of the IRA. Price revealed that she was given the order of taking Jean McConville- a mother to 10 children, across the border where she was heinously murdered and buried by the IRA.

Price also made the accusation that Adams was responsible for the creation of a covert unit in Belfast that was used to push out informants of the IRA who were supplying information to defense agencies. Adams, who helped shape the Northern Ireland peace process, denies any knowledge of such. Price continued to be involved with political issues up until the 1990s.

Price also noted that she and her sister were fearful due to threats from other members of the IRA and the political party Sinn Féin after she made allegations against them publicly. Price died in January 2013 after being found in her home in Dublin from a suspected toxic illness due to mixing the medication.

Dolores Price’s role in the IRA raises the issue that is central to the women in extremism program- what motivates a woman to become involved in a terrorist organization and what it looks like compared to the experience of a man.

There is a certain attractiveness for men to join a terrorist organization in terms of the sexualization and allure of violence but there is little to suggest that women do not join for the same reasons.

In this case, we can only theorize about why Price joined the IRA but a lot can be deduced from her actions and involvement.

In an effort to understand more about the motivations of women in terrorist organizations there is a need to explore the attraction of power and loyalty to men in the community as factors for involvement.

Power and attraction are some of the most common reasons for the justification of violence.

Dolores Prices involvement in the IRA should pose as a reminder that combatant women can have a bigger influence in terrorism than men and should not be expected to be less militant or less dangerous due to their gender.