AI-generated image depicting the Pakistan–Taliban conflict, showing armed fighters facing off against a backdrop of smoke, fire, and national flags. The scene symbolizes escalating cross-border tensions and instability. February 27, 2026.

Pakistan vs. the Taliban: The Monster Comes Home

Pakistan’s defense minister just called the current Afghanistan–Pakistan fighting “open war.” That’s not a headline. That’s an admission that the old arrangement is dead: sponsor versus client has turned into state versus state, and the border is about to punish ordinary people again.

None of this is new. It’s the final act of a play Pakistan’s security establishment has been staging for decades—using Afghanistan as strategic depth, treating militants as assets, and calling the blowback “bad luck” when it arrives.

Step one: build the pipeline

In the 1980s, the anti-Soviet jihad was backed through a covert pipeline that ran through Pakistan’s ISI. That war produced fighters, networks, money routes, and a whole culture of armed politics that did not disappear when the Soviets left.

When the Cold War moved on, Afghanistan didn’t get peace. It got a battlefield full of factions and patrons—each side claiming faith and nation while shelling cities and carving power. That chaos didn’t just “happen.” It was fueled.

Step two: stir the civil war, then pretend to be the firefighter

The 1990s were not a clean chapter. Afghan mujahideen factions turned their guns on each other, Kabul bled, and regional actors kept picking favorites. Pakistan didn’t just watch from the fence. It played the game—again.

Then came the “solution” Pakistan helped usher in: the Taliban.

The Taliban formed in the early 1990s, drawing from networks of former anti-Soviet fighters, in the wreckage of a broken state and a civil war.

And when the Taliban took power in the 1996, Pakistan wasn’t neutral. During the Taliban’s 1996–2001 rule, only three governments recognized them: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

That’s not “neighborly concern.” That’s ownership.

Step three: keep feeding the baby

Here’s the part Pakistani officials hate hearing out loud: the relationship wasn’t just political. Human Rights Watch documented Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in terms that aren’t vague—soliciting funds, bankrolling operations, arranging training, recruiting manpower, planning/directing offensives, facilitating shipments of ammunition and fuel, and even reports suggesting direct combat support at times.

That’s not hospitality. That’s a supply chain.

After 2001, the Taliban were knocked down—then they kept regenerating. The sanctuary story became a pattern for years, including persistent reporting and analysis around Taliban leadership nodes operating from inside Pakistan, often described under the “Quetta Shura” label.

Pakistan’s script stayed the same:

  • “We have influence.”
  • “We have no control.” Both can’t be true—especially when the outcome stayed consistent for two decades.

The bill Afghanistan paid: blood, not opinions

This isn’t about who “feels” right. The numbers are there.

UN-documented civilian harm in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2020 totaled more than 100,000 civilian casualties—killed and wounded. Year after year, civilians ate the cost of insurgency tactics, IEDs, suicide attacks, assassinations, and counter-warfare that never protected the public the way it promised.

And the Taliban don’t get to wash their hands by pointing at everyone else. Pakistan may have helped build the environment, but the Taliban chose to become what they became—an engine of coercion that treated civilian life like a bargaining chip.

2011: Abbottabad didn’t help Pakistan’s credibility

Pakistan can deny prior knowledge all day. But the fact is simple: Osama bin Laden was found and killed in Abbottabad in 2011, and Pakistan publicly denied it knew beforehand. That event didn’t just raise eyebrows; it permanently damaged the credibility of every “we didn’t know” claim that came after.

2021: the victory mood gave it away

When Afghanistan fell in August 2021, Pakistan’s posture didn’t look like a worried neighbor. It looked like a side that believed it had won something.

In early September 2021, Pakistan’s ISI chief Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed flew to Kabul while the Taliban were consolidating power; Reuters reported Pakistani officials saying he could help the Taliban reorganize. The image and the timing said more than any denial ever could.

2026: sponsor to enemy — and civilians will pay first

Now we’re here. Pakistan says the Taliban are enabling militants who hit Pakistan; the Taliban deny responsibility and accuse Pakistan of exporting blame. Pakistan has struck Taliban targets, including in major Afghan cities; the Taliban have retaliated, including with drones, and both sides are trading claims that are hard to independently verify in the fog of escalation.

This is Pakistan’s Indominus rex moment—the Jurassic World creature that was engineered, fed, displayed like a trophy… until it broke containment and started hunting on its own terms.

Pakistan built a monster. The Taliban grew into it. Now Pakistan is angry that its “spoiled baby” has teeth.

Call it fate, call it consequences, call it moral accounting—whatever language you prefer. But it fits the pattern: you raise proxies long enough, you eventually fight them.

What must happen next

If this turns into a sustained war, it won’t “solve terrorism.” It will expand it. It will harden militants on both sides and trap border communities in a permanent loop of displacement, revenge, and recruitment.

Here’s what must happen — clean and specific:

1) The world must not recognize the Taliban. No legitimacy for an extreme regime that bans girls from education and rules through fear. This is non-negotiable.

2) Pakistan must stop striking Afghan cities. No airstrikes on major population centers. When cities become targets, civilian deaths stop being “collateral” and become policy.

3) India must end its proxy games in Afghanistan. Stop using Afghan soil as a pressure point against Pakistan. Afghanistan cannot be turned into a battlefield for someone else’s rivalry.

4) Start real Afghan peace talks — now. The international community, led by the United States and President Trump, must restart a serious political track (Doha or a Doha-style process) for Afghan reconciliation.

That means everyone at the table: Afghan leaders in exile, leaders inside the country, all ethnicities and factions, the Northern Alliance legacy figures, civil society voices — and yes, the Taliban too — because a settlement without them is fantasy, and war is not a solution.

5) Build one outcome: an inclusive democratic system. A legitimate government that represents all Afghans, protects rights, and ends monopoly rule. Afghans have paid in blood for 45 years. Enough.

Speeches won’t fix this. Posturing won’t fix this. Only a political deal will.







Ahmad Shah Mohibi (WarGuy)
Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace and Director of Counterterrorism, served as a U.S. advisor in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and later supported national security initiatives in Washington, D.C.
Sexual repression of Afghan women: a Taliban’s state-building strategy

Sexual Repression of Afghan Women: a Taliban’s State-Building Strategy

“Women’s security in the home is a reflection of the security in the country. If women cannot be safe at home, they’re not safe at all. And if women are not safe, then no one is safe,” Lina Abi Rafeh wrote.  

In just a year, Afghan women have lost most of the rights they had fought for over the last two decades. Women cannot study past primary school, can no longer work unless they are nurses or teachers, and are constrained to the domestic sphere as their support systems collapse. Reports show that most women’s shelters have stopped taking in new women as they are forced to operate in total secrecy or have been shut down completely, including the Ministry for Women’s Affairs

But what do all these restrictions have in common? They are making women “prisoners in their own home,” as Human Rights Watch stated, and are symptomatic of one of the Taliban’s state-building strategies: utilization of sexual capital. 

The Taliban, who rose back to power in August 2021, are rooting their state-building strategy in the private, the intimate, and the goal of destroying and reshaping women’s identities through strict, gendered, and repressive norms.

School curricula have been modified to focus more on religious studies and norms. “They dictate what women must wear, how they should travel, workplace segregation by sex, and even what kind of cell phones women should have. They enforce these rules through intimidation and inspections,” Human Rights Watch said.

The Taliban enforce a collective identity based on common –and imposed– norms and morals (women’s rights but “within Islamic law”). They are institutionalizing repression, or in other words, ideals of feminine purity, through the Ministry for Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which replaced the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. 

The regulations focus on women’s bodies and most importantly relate to the Muslimwoman archetype coined by Fatima Mernissi. Characterized by modesty, chastity, and motherhood, this identity being forced upon women is primordial in creating collective cohesion in a context of local division and conflict. 

“State building is the insurgent’s central goal,” Stathis Kalyvas, author of The Logic of Violence in Civil War, writes. And as a proto-state –in a perpetual power struggle with domestic and international actors– the Taliban ultimately strives for control and will enter people’s homes to exert that control. Controlling sexual capital, or the way women dress, if they’re allowed to wear makeup, and refusing them any support for sexual violence, is merely a reflection of how the Taliban use the intimate to impose its state. 

Over the last year, the Taliban freed more than 3 000 prisoners, many of whom are perpetrators of gender-based violence. For women who were abused by their husbands, members of their families, or their communities, this means further insecurity and a reduction of their allocated space in society. 

“We don’t leave our home much,” a government worker told Human Rights Watch. “When we leave, we leave with a mahram [male guardian]. Some things like sanitary pads must be purchased by women themselves, but it’s hard to do it with a man accompanying us. …Women can’t take transport, they either must go out with a mahram or walk. They should walk with burqa, no heels, no makeup.”

By locking women into roles of mothers and wives, the Taliban seek to use their sexual capital to breed new generations of individuals who belong to a definitive collective identity.  

Furthermore, this increased polarization between the righteous Muslimwoman and the glorious militant man further brings the Taliban culture of political extremism and violence into the home. These norms already have –and will continue– to lead to increased domestic violence and sexual violence. It is a perpetual cycle; locking women in their homes, making them more prone to domestic and sexual violence and patriarchy-rooted masculinity, which serves the Taliban’s collective identity and thus, its state. 

Overall, there should be a greater focus on gendered analyses of Taliban state-building to better understand the group’s motive and strategy, going beyond the sole ideological and religious factors. In doing so, the long-term implications of a forced collective identity will be revealed and provide insight into the future for Afghan women in society.

Emma Beilouny, Counter-Terrorism Fellow

Women's Rights

Afghan Elders’ Meeting Ends with No Mention of Women’s Rights

Last week, a three-day gathering of 3,000 male ethnic and Afghan religious leaders ended.  Led by the Taliban’s rarely seen leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada, the meeting was aimed to discuss the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan and form greater unity among leadership. After many reneged promises on women’s rights in the previous months, this meeting was another opportunity to declare the Taliban’s stance.  However, it ended with no mention of the future of women in Afghanistan.  The Taliban’s silence solidifies their position on women’s rights, a stance that will continue to isolate them from the world. This meeting indicates that, in the next few months, the humanitarian and economic crisis in Afghanistan will only deepen.

Limited Earthquake Aid Shows the World’s Staunch Commitment to Human Rights

Last week, one of the most devastating earthquakes hit Afghanistan, killing more than one thousand individuals and injuring thousands more.  In the wake of such an event, usually millions of dollars of long-term aid would flood the nation to assist in rebuilding efforts and ease the effects of the disaster.  However, human rights abuses by the Taliban have prevented money for long-term development from entering Afghanistan. Further, billions of Afghan reserves remain frozen overseas until the Taliban show a commitment to women’s rights.  Without a change of stance from the Taliban, this money will remain completely unavailable. Last week’s gathering concluded with no mention of the future of women, indicating no end to the sanctions that devastate Afghanistan.

The Taliban’s Rhetoric Emphasizes Afghanistan’s Independence and Isolation

In a speech during the three-day gathering, the Taliban’s leader reportedly said, “Thank God, we are now an independent country. [Foreigners] should not give us their orders, it is our system, and we have our own decisions.” He also emphasized that overseas aid will not help develop Afghanistan but only make them dependent on foreign money.

The Taliban’s rhetoric seemingly points toward a future of continued isolation in Afghanistan.  This expression also proves, at least in the near term, that the Taliban will not fold to the intense economic and international pressures to change their stance.  Afghans will likely suffer with no end in sight and a regime that is unlikely to compromise.

Looking Forward

Until human rights are honored, the world will remain unable to aid Afghanistan’s development.  The economy will continue its freefall, and the Afghan people will suffer the brunt of these pressures. The Taliban have been clear in their desire for independence; however, they continue to resemble an insurgency group and have yet to prove their ability to rule effectively.

The U.S. and western countries should continue to demand human rights as a precursor to discussions. However, humanitarian aid should not be sanctioned or blocked to ease the current crisis and disaster relief processes.

 

Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Earthquake

Earthquake in Afghanistan: How Environmental Challenges Threaten Peace

On June 22, at around 1:30 am local time, one of the deadliest earthquakes in Afghanistan’s history struck eastern provinces, killing more than 1,000 people and wounding 1,600. Most homes, hospitals, and buildings in the region are poorly built, which has led to massive infrastructure damage by the earthquake. Even before the Taliban’s rule, emergency response resources were stretched thin. The de facto ruler’s strained relationship with the international community will likely complicate aid efforts. This is another deadly example of Afghanistan’s ecology’s threat to peace prospects in the region. This threat is greatest from natural disasters, water shortages, and climate change.

Natural Disasters

The June 22 earthquake comes amidst an ongoing economic and humanitarian crisis, with half of Afghanistan’s population facing acute hunger. Sadly, natural disasters are not uncommon in Afghanistan. The country is highly prone to intense and frequent disasters due to its location. The most common include earthquakes, flooding, avalanches, landslides, and droughts. In the past 40 years, more than nine million people have been affected, and 20,000 have been lost due to natural disasters.

The effects of these events have profound consequences beyond the loss of life. Natural disasters in Afghanistan continue to hinder peace and development processes. Already pressed for resources, it is unlikely that destroyed infrastructure will have the material means to be rebuilt. Disasters also can lead to higher rates of terrorism in subsequent years. Before the current earthquake, ISIS-K has ramped up attacks against the Taliban. This disaster provides a dangerous opportunity for them, as the de facto ruler’s attention is divided.

Water Shortages

Afghanistan has long suffered from severe water shortages. Nearly 80% of the population relies on farming or animals for income. During Afghanistan’s history, multiple insurgencies have been fought over access to water for agricultural purposes. Today, some estimate that more than 70% of Kabul’s citizens do not have access to safe drinking water. Worse, a study by  John Hopkins University indicates that the demand for water in Kabul will increase by 600% in the next four decades.

As Afghanistan’s population grows rapidly and water becomes scarcer, crisis and conflict over water may grow more desperate. The country does have water resources it is not using; however, weak governance prevents effective utilization of those resources. Tensions over water also loom large in regional politics, making diplomacy an essential tool in resolving this issue. Lastly, water has previously been used as a weapon, with Taliban forces blockading water to farmer’s land. As conditions continue to spiral into desperation, water may again be weaponized. If done, this could prove to be the source of escalation and dispute.

Environmental Degradation

Finally, environmental degradation and changing climatic patterns pose a significant threat to Afghanistan. The country will be disproportionately affected by a change in climate and is entirely unequipped to deal with it. This factor serves as a long-term threat multiplier, worsening the country’s existent poverty and problems. Due to its long-term nature and the government’s inability to cope with the current crisis, it is likely to go unchecked, significantly increasing all ecological threats to the region in coming years.

 

Rise to Peace Author, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Sikh

The Islamic State Claims a Deadly Explosion of a Sikh Temple in Kabul

On the morning of June 18th, a bomb exploded during an attack at a Sikh prayer place in Kabul while 30 people were inside, killing one worshipper, a Taliban member, and two unidentified attackers. The prayer site was renowned as the capital’s only and final remaining place of worship for Sikhs. The next day, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack. Community leaders reportedly claimed that about 140 Sikhs remained in the predominately Muslim Afghanistan in the late twentieth century, down from 100,000 in the 1970s.

According to a Taliban spokesman, the assailants attempted to operate a vehicle filled with explosives into the area, but it exploded before they reached their target. Despite the fact that the attack had concluded, the Taliban, who took control of Afghanistan last year, declared that a clearance campaign was continuing.

Since the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan, the country has been subjected to ongoing attacks by the Islamic State, a rival Sunni Muslim extremist group. On the one hand, the Taliban had promised and guaranteed the community’s ability to remain in Afghanistan and practice their religion. Yet, hundreds more have fled to India in the last year due to unprecedented and cruel attacks.

The local branch of the Islamic State announced the attack was in reprisal for insults directed at the Prophet Mohammed. The announcement was made on an affiliated Telegram channel by the Islamic State. The blast on Saturday was widely derided as one of the spates of attacks targeting minorities, with Pakistan’s government expressing “serious concern” over the “current wave of terrorist attacks on places of worship in Afghanistan.” The United Nations mission in Afghanistan said minorities in the country deserve protection, and India’s President, Narendra Modi, expressed shock over the attack on Twitter.

Who are the Sikhs?

Many Hindus and Sikhs have fled to neighboring countries, particularly India, during the civil war that emerged after the pro-Soviet regime fell in 1992. Before the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, Sikhs were a small religious minority in the predominantly Muslim country, with only roughly 300 families. According to community members and the media, many have now fled. The Sikhs, like many other religious minorities in Afghanistan, have been a perennial target of violence. The Islamic State also claimed responsibility for a 2020 attack in Kabul that killed 25 people. In 2016, it was thought that there was no future for Sikhs, Shias, and other Muslim minorities in Afghanistan.

To blend in with the population, most Afghan Sikhs and Hindus adopted Afghan traditions. Sometimes religious minorities converse in public in Pashto or Dari, Afghanistan’s constitutional languages, but solely use Punjabi at home. Despite their desire to live in peace at home, it appears that the Islamic State will continue to carry out modest to severe blows and attacks.

As external threats infect its populace in the next few months, the Taliban’s security mechanisms will be put to the test. In comparison to their initial rule in the 1990s, when they violently suppressed the Hazaras and other ethnic groups, the Taliban have positioned themselves as more moderate since seizing power. The Taliban promise to safeguard them to gain international acclaim for their acceptance of Afghanistan’s minorities. But how far can this go, and how effective is the security measure, particularly in the Taliban government, where eyewitnesses claim the Taliban also committed human rights violations?

 

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow