By James Calderon – Rise to Peace Contributor

Abstract: This paper analyzes the evolution of jihadist media strategies through a comparative analysis of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). While al-Qaeda relied on centralized, ideologically driven messaging, ISIS transformed extremist communication by exploiting social media, high-quality visuals, and decentralized online networks. These shifts reflect how terrorist organizations adapt to technological change and generational trends. The study also examines the emerging role of artificial intelligence (AI) as both a tool and a threat by enabling extremist groups to produce propaganda and disinformation while also providing counterterrorism agencies new capabilities for detection and prevention. The paper concludes that terrorism’s future battles will be fought increasingly in digital spaces, requiring adaptive and tech-driven counterstrategies.

James Calderon is a graduate student at Columbia University, where he is pursuing a Master of International Affairs with a concentration in international security and diplomacy. His work explores authoritarianism, terrorism, and security dynamics in the Middle East. Professionally, he brings extensive experience in research and writing, having held diverse internships and roles in the U.S. Department of State, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the House of Representatives, and several research institutions. He earned his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Global Studies, with a minor in Public Relations, from Marist University, where his undergraduate thesis analyzed radicalization in French and Italian Muslim communities.

I. Historical Context and Introduction  

In 1998, Osama Bin Laden established al-Qaeda out of a network of veterans from the American-backed Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union.^[1] At this time, the main objective of al-Qaeda was to support Islamist causes in conflicts throughout the world. Following the 1991 Gulf War, due to the Saudi decision to host American troops, the United States was made al-Qaeda’s number one target.^[2] Shortly later, Osama Bin Laden would leave his native Saudi Arabia to Sudan and then to Afghanistan where Taliban leadership offered refuge. Prior to September 11, al-Qaeda carried out the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. In 1999, the American government designated al-Qaeda as a foreign terrorist organization.³

In response to the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, Jordanian national Abu Musab al-Zarqawi founded Tawhid wal Jihad (which translates to “Monotheism and Holy War”).^[3] Zarqawi later pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and renamed his organization to al-Qaeda in Iraq.^[4] Zarqawi wished to establish a civil war between Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims, and ultimately establish a caliphate.^[5] Al-Qaeda is Sunni however considers Shia Muslims to be “associates”. In contrast, Zarqawi was much more extreme in his views and called for the killing of Shias. In fact, al-Qaeda considered Zarqawi to be too radical and as such, their relations would be strained. 

In 2006, Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike. Abu Ayyub al-Masri would take over and rename the organization the Islamic State of Iraq. Seven years later, in 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi expanded operations into Syria and the organization adopted its current name of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS.^[6] 

Jihadist groups have long used media as a tool of asymmetric warfare in order to project power, spread ideology, and influence global audiences without conventional military strength. For groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, media plays a key role in recruitment, legitimizing actions, deterring enemies, and controlling the narrative. While both organizations share ideological roots, their media strategies differ sharply. These differences reveal contrasting goals, structures, and generational outlooks. ISIS’s media model, in particular, marks a major shift where digital propaganda is turned into a core weapon.       

II. Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategy

Ayman al-Zawahari, Osama Bin Laden’s successor, once stated that, “We [al-Qaeda] are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our people”.^[7]  However, Al-Qaeda’s media strategy was not existent at the time of the organization’s creation. Once such a strategy became implemented, the focus was on long form and ideologically dense messaging. In the first phase (1988-2000) of al-Qaeda’s media strategy, the organization was not overtly active in distributing literature. Instead, the majority of efforts were centered around the personality-cult of Osama Bin Laden and little was done in order to reach out to new members.^[8] As such, predominantly those who already sympathized with the organization’s cause viewed their material. It was not until Bin Laden realized the value in international television interviews that he was able to further promote himself and the organization’s ideals.

In the second phase (September 11, 2001 to mid 2000s), al-Qaeda was able to capitalize on media exposure from the September 11 attacks and international search for Bin Laden to promote their cause. Moreover, the group gained popularity and search topics on the internet increased. This could be indicative of radicalization as Inspire, an al-Qaeda affiliated magazine, gained traction online as well.^[9] This period was also marked by growing decentralization where propaganda began to feature senior members from all over the world in order to maintain high interest and international al-Qaeda cells as well as individual militants were highlighted.  Finally, in the third phase (late 2000s to present), the organization has begun to rely more exclusively on the internet and social media in order to distribute propaganda with the intention to mobilize Western Muslims against their governments.^[10] Due to a greater amount of media being released by all jihadist groups, al-Qaeda began to receive less media attention. In order to counteract this trend, the organization has relied on tech savvy young adults to disperse propaganda. This has resulted in al-Qaeda affiliated media to become more influential in the eyes of a youth.^[11]

Yet despite efforts to modernize, al-Qaeda’s communication strategy remained rooted in ideological depth rather than visual immediacy. Its top-down structure and reliance on traditional formats limited its ability to compete in an increasingly intense digital environment. It was in this evolving media landscape that ISIS emerged, an organization that would not only inherit al-Qaeda’s ideological framework but also revolutionize how terrorism communicates and recruits through the power of social media and cinematic production.

III. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s Media Strategy

Building upon, but ultimately surpassing, al-Qaeda’s early propaganda model, ISIS developed a media machine unlike any previous terrorist organization. For instance, the organization operates two divisions that are dedicated to propaganda: Al Hayat Media, focused on recruiting and painting an idyllic future, and Mu’assassat al-Furqan which focuses on spreading fear.^[12] ISIS places special emphasis on its propaganda workers which is reflected in their monthly income being higher than those of a traditional soldier.^[13]

Additionally, several Westerners rank towards the top of ISIS’s propaganda machine. Investigations indicate that an American and a German have played key roles in Al-Hayat Media.¹⁵ With this foreign talent, ISIS has much more media capability than al-Qaeda as they distribute high-quality and length propaganda movies. 

There are three major areas of innovation regarding ISIS’s media strategy: global dissemination of threat, decentralized messaging, and the development of new software.^[14]  Social media allows sympathizers to disseminate their propaganda much more efficiently. At al-Qaeda’s peak, their videos could only air through Al-Jazeera or very specific websites. Today, ISIS sympathizers utilize social media where, for example, they can take over threads on unrelated topics. A strong case study can be seen in the 2014 World Cup where ISIS users tagged their tweets with “#brazil_2014” which gave them access to a network of users that were only browsing for soccer updates. 

With their decentralized structure and many sympathizers living in the West, there are as many as 3,000 users that can produce nearly 100,000 tweets each day.¹⁷ Due to this volume, it is incredibly difficult for governments to keep up. This approach differs from terror groups of the past who needed to rely on rigid structures to distribute propaganda. In contrast, due to technological advancement, ISIS is able to create a flexible system that is consistently being updated. 

Regarding software, ISIS developed an app called “Dawn of Glad Tidings” which allows users to post tweets without any manual input. Propaganda officials design the tweets and the app coordinates them based on a timing mechanism in order to avoid detection by algorithms.^[15] Experts state that this app was responsible for up to almost 40,000 tweets in one day as ISIS fought in Mosul.^[16] With the creation of this app, ISIS continued to produce content online even while sympathizers were away from their phones.

IV. Comparative Analysis

The evolution from al-Qaeda’s media strategy to that of the Islamic State marks a significant transformation in jihadist communication. Both organizations recognize media as an indispensable weapon of war, yet they deploy it in fundamentally different ways. As stated before, al-Qaeda’s media operations emerged in an earlier era defined by limited access to mass communication, where propaganda was largely ideologically dense and leader-centric.

Al-Qaeda’s strategy centered on persuasion through authority. Its messaging relied on theological legitimacy, charismatic leadership, and appeals to collective grievance. 

ISIS, by contrast, was born into a fully globalized, networked environment and therefore treated media not as a supporting instrument but as its own battlefield. Prioritizing accessibility and emotional immediacy over ideological depth, ISIS used high-definition video, social media platforms, and interactive apps in order to invite participation and immersion. This allows sympathizers to become both consumers and ultimately producers of propaganda.

The generational divide between the two organizations is equally significant. Al-Qaeda’s content reflected a 20th-century communication style through lengthy lectures, manifestos, and statements designed for an audience of already committed followers. ISIS, however, tailored its messaging to a younger, tech savvy demographic already accustomed to visual media and instant engagement. The result was a form of propaganda that resembled entertainment as much as extremist ideology. This shift in communication and media indicates a turning point in jihadist media strategy, demonstrating how applying technological advancement to propaganda can turn a message into a broader movement.

V. From Digital Propaganda to Artificial Intelligence

As illustrated, al-Qaeda and ISIS’s media strategy differ as ISIS was able to capitalize on the technological advancement of the time. ISIS’s success online exposes serious challenges in countering extremist propaganda. Decentralized content moves much faster than traditional information operations can keep up, making disruption difficult. The group’s digital strategy shows how insurgents can dominate the narrative without necessarily holding any physical territory. This adaptability underscores how effectively extremist groups leverage emerging technologies to advance their agendas. 

As the digital landscape continues to evolve, artificial intelligence (AI) has emerged as the next frontier, with terrorist organizations increasingly seeking to exploit its growing capabilities for propaganda, recruitment, and influence operations. As generative AI has been making tremendous progress, terrorist organizations are increasingly interested in exploiting and using it to their advantage.

Specifically, generative AI uses machine learning in order to generate new content, text, images, audio, and multifunctional simulations.^[17] The difference between generative AI and other forms of AI is that the former is able to develop new outputs instead of just predicting and categorizing.^[18] Examples of generative AI can be seen in ChatGPT, Google Gemini, Bing Image Creator, Microsoft VALL-E, and various other programs.

The use of artificial intelligence in radicalization and extremism is already taking place as groups such as al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and ISIS are already employing these tools. In the United Kingdom, a nineteen year old was arrested as he plotted to assassinate Queen Elizabeth II. Investigations later found that he exchanged approximately 5,000 messages with an AI chatbot during his radicalization.^[19] 

In an article published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, potential uses of AI by terrorist organizations include propaganda, interactive recruitment, automated attacks, social media exploitation, and cyber attacks.^[20] Furthermore, the use of such tools by terrorist organizations fall into five categories:

1. Polarizing or emotional content
2. Disinformation or misinformation 
3. Recruitment 
4. Tactical learning 
5. Attack planning.²⁴

Real world examples can be seen through ISIS and Hamas. Firstly, ISIS has applied generative AI to translating propaganda messaging into languages such as Arabic, English, and Indonesian.^[21]

Regarding Hamas, the terrorist organization has used generative AI in order to leak altered images with hopes of instigating more violence and spreading misinformation about what is happening in Gaza. Reports indicate that Hamas has manipulated already tragic images of injured young people and babies in order to create more chaos and disturbing content.^[22]

Additionally, generative AI has been used in order to spread images and videos of Israeli soldiers wearing diapers with the aim of undermining the Israel Defense Forces, IDF, and spreading misinformation.^[23]

However, artificial intelligence also provides new interesting methods in counterterrorism. Firstly, it could be used to counter propaganda and in deradicalization. AI tools could automatically detect and remove extremist content from social platforms thus curbing the spread of terrorist propaganda. AI could also support deradicalization programs by identifying at-risk individuals and analyzing their online behavior. 

Furthermore, through predictive analytics- analyzing patterns in historical data, social media presences, and other intelligence sources- AI may possess the capability to predict potential terrorist attacks.^[24] 

VI.  The Reconfiguration of Counterterrorism in Digital Spaces

In today’s world, as extremist propaganda has migrated onto digital platforms, the responsibility for counterterrorism has increasingly become shared between governments and private enterprises. This shift has elevated technology companies into necessary security actors, while states are compelled to adapt to a fragmented and contested digital environment.

Platforms such as Meta, Google, and X (formerly Twitter) now function as intermediaries in contemporary counterterrorism and counterradicalization efforts. By hosting, amplifying, or suppressing content, they shape the informational conditions under which radicalization and mobilization occur. Content moderation on these platforms relies primarily on automated governance tools, including hashtag technologies, image recognition, and natural language processing models designed to detect extremist material.^[25] Compared to earlier approaches, these systems are significantly more proactive and have reduced large-scale dissemination. However, in doing so, platforms have increasingly assumed the role of de facto security providers, concentrating substantial counterterrorism responsibility within non-governmental entities.             

Governments, in turn, have responded by integrating digital tools into their counterterrorism practices. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) methods, such as social media analysis, now complement more traditional intelligence practices, enabling extremist networks and potential radicalization to be monitored more accurately and in real time. At the same time, states have expanded strategic communication efforts aimed at challenging extremist narratives.

Strategically, counter-messaging encompasses a spectrum of approaches, ranging from disruption-oriented efforts that seek to delegitimize extremist claims to persuasion-oriented initiatives that promote alternative identities and social pathways. The latter frequently relies on non-state messengers, such as former extremists or community leaders, to enhance credibility and reach.

Despite these efforts, counter-narratives face significant structural constraints. Extremist propaganda often gains traction through emotional intensity, while state-produced messaging frequently lacks credibility in contexts marked by institutional distrust. As a result, counter-messaging remains disadvantaged within digital attention economies where emotional affect is often valued more highly than factual accuracy.

Taken together, these dynamics suggest that it is unrealistic for digital counterterrorism to eliminate extremist content entirely. Instead, its primary function is to contest the visibility, legitimacy, and narrative power of such content. Authority in the digital space is fragmented among social media platforms, states, and non-state actors, resulting in the emergence of a decentralized model of security governance.

VII. Conclusion

The progression from al-Qaeda’s traditional propaganda to ISIS’s digital media empire highlights how extremist groups rapidly adapt to technological change. While al-Qaeda relied on centralized, ideologically dense messaging, ISIS transformed media into a decentralized, participatory battlefield that redefined online radicalization.

As artificial intelligence becomes the newest technological frontier, terrorist organizations are already beginning to exploit its capabilities for propaganda, recruitment, and disinformation. Yet, AI also offers valuable tools for counterterrorism such as enabling faster detection, deradicalization efforts, and predictive analysis.

The evolution from al-Qaeda to ISIS to AI-driven extremism underscores that future conflicts will be fought not only on physical ground but also across digital and algorithmic spaces. Counterterrorism strategies must evolve accordingly to meet the speed and complexity of this new information war.

Bibliography

Earnhardt, Rebecca L. “Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategy: Internet Self- Radicalization and

Counter-Radicalization Policies.” Virginia Commonwealth University, 2014.

https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=wilder_pubs

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Gerstel, Dylan. “Isis and Innovative Propaganda.” Swarthmore College. Accessed July 17, 2025.

https://works.swarthmore.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=swarthmoreirjo urnal.

Gongane, Vaishali U, Mousami  V Munot, and Alwin  D Anuse. “Detection and Moderation of Detrimental Content on Social Media Platforms: Current Status and Future Directions.” Soc Netw Anal Min, 2022. 

Hassan, Hassan. “The True Origins of Isis.” The Atlantic, January 7, 2019.

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/isis-origins-anbari-zarqawi/577030/.

Jetter, Michael. “The Inadvertent Consequences of Al-Qaeda News Coverage.” European

Economic Review, August 16, 2019. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0014292119301448.

Mathur, Priyank, Clara Broekaert, and Colin P. Clarke. “The Radicalization (and Counter-Radicalization) Potential of Artificial Intelligence.” ICCT, May 1, 2024.

https://icct.nl/publication/radicalization-and-counter-radicalization-potential-artificial-inte lligence. 

Nelu, Clarisa. “Exploitation of Generative AI by Terrorist Groups.” ICCT, June 10, 2024. https://icct.nl/publication/exploitation-generative-ai-terrorist-groups. 

Saltman, Erin Marie, and Charlie Winter. “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern

Jihadism,” 2014.

Siegel, Daniel. “AI Jihad: Deciphering Hamas, al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s Generative AI

Digital Arsenal.” GNET, November 14, 2024. https://gnet-research.org/2024/02/19/ai-jihad-deciphering-hamas-al-qaeda-and-islamic-sta tes-generative-ai-digital-arsenal/. 

Thomas, Clayton. “Al Qaeda: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy .” Congressional

Research Service, May 6, 2024. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11854.

Weimann, Gabriel, Alexander T. Pack, Rachel Sulciner, Joelle Scheinin, Gal Rapaport, and David Diaz. “Generating Terror: The Risks of Generative AI Exploitation.” Combating

Terrorism Center at West Point, January 19, 2024. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/generating-terror-the-risks-of-generative-ai-exploitation/. 

Weinman, Edward. “Inside Isis.” Connecticut College. Accessed July 16, 2025.

https://www.conncoll.edu/news/cc-magazine/past-issues/2016-issues/fall-2016/inside-isis

/. 

---

[1] Clayton Thomas, “Al Qaeda: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy ,” Congressional Research Service, May 6, 2024, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11854.

[2] Ibid. ³ Ibid.

[3] Edward Weinman, “Inside Isis,” Connecticut College, accessed July 16, 2025, https://www.conncoll.edu/news/cc-magazine/past-issues/2016-issues/fall-2016/inside-isis/.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Hassan Hassan, “The True Origins of Isis,” The Atlantic, January 7, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/isis-origins-anbari-zarqawi/577030/.

[6] Edward Weinman, “Inside Isis,” Connecticut College, accessed July 16, 2025, https://www.conncoll.edu/news/cc-magazine/past-issues/2016-issues/fall-2016/inside-isis/.

[7] Rebecca L Earnhardt, “Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategy: Internet Self- Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization Policies,” Virginia Commonwealth University, 2014, https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=wilder_pubs.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Michael Jetter, “The Inadvertent Consequences of Al-Qaeda News Coverage,” European Economic Review, August 16, 2019, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0014292119301448.

[10] Rebecca L Earnhardt, “Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategy: Internet Self- Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization Policies,” Virginia Commonwealth University, 2014, https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=wilder_pubs.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Dylan Gerstel, “Isis and Innovative Propaganda,” Swarthmore College, accessed July 17, 2025, https://works.swarthmore.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=swarthmoreirjournal.

[13] Ibid. ¹⁵ Ibid.

[14] Erin Marie Saltman and Charlie Winter, “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism,” 2014. ¹⁷ Dylan Gerstel, “Isis and Innovative Propaganda,” Swarthmore College, accessed July 17, 2025, https://works.swarthmore.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=swarthmoreirjournal.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Clarisa Nelu, “Exploitation of Generative AI by Terrorist Groups,” ICCT, June 10, 2024, https://icct.nl/publication/exploitation-generative-ai-terrorist-groups.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Priyank Mathur, Clara Broekaert, and Colin P. Clarke, “The Radicalization (and Counter-Radicalization) Potential of Artificial Intelligence,” ICCT, May 1, 2024, https://icct.nl/publication/radicalization-and-counter-radicalization-potential-artificial-intelligence.

[20] Gabriel Weimann et al., “Generating Terror: The Risks of Generative AI Exploitation,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 19, 2024, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/generating-terror-the-risks-of-generative-ai-exploitation/. ²⁴ Ibid.

[21] Clarisa Nelu, “Exploitation of Generative AI by Terrorist Groups,” ICCT, June 10, 2024, https://icct.nl/publication/exploitation-generative-ai-terrorist-groups.

[22] Daniel Siegel, “AI Jihad: Deciphering Hamas, al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s Generative AI Digital Arsenal,” GNET, November 14, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/02/19/ai-jihad-deciphering-hamas-al-qaeda-and-islamic-states-generative-ai-digital-arsenal/.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Clarisa Nelu, “Exploitation of Generative AI by Terrorist Groups,” ICCT, June 10, 2024, https://icct.nl/publication/exploitation-generative-ai-terrorist-groups.

[25] Vaishali U Gongane, Mousami  V Munot, and Alwin  D Anuse, “Detection and Moderation of Detrimental Content on Social Media Platforms: Current Status and Future Directions,” Soc Netw Anal Min, 2022.

By Izzy Knaus – Rise to Peace Fellow

The eruption of open conflict in Operation Epic Fury between Iran, the United States, and Israel in early 2026 marks the definitive end of years of covert confrontation and proxy skirmishing. The joint campaign–designed to cripple Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities–has shifted the regional security order toward direct state-on-state warfare not seen in decades. With the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the disarray of his succession council, Tehran faces its gravest internal instability since 1979.

The war has transformed Iran from a shadow orchestrator of proxy forces into the central battlefield of Middle Eastern power politics. Competing factions within the Islamic Republic—reformists, hardline clerics, and the Revolutionary Guard—are struggling to preserve their influence under relentless bombardment and economic isolation. The question of succession is rapidly blending into a struggle for regime survival.

The conflict’s secondary effects are already global. Energy markets remain volatile as attacks, blockades, and tanker disruptions push oil and gas prices higher, testing European and Asian economies. Maritime insecurity in the Strait of Hormuz has resurrected old debates about global energy dependence and naval projection. Meanwhile, diplomatic fractures have widened within NATO and the EU–some states backing U.S. force projection, others condemning unilateral escalation.

Regionally, the war’s geography now spans Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gulf–blurring lines between fronts and proxies. Israeli offensives along the Lebanese border, combined with Iranian missile and drone strikes across the Middle East, herald a return to full-spectrum warfare that could redraw red lines across the entire region. China’s mediation attempts and Turkey’s NATO entanglement underscore how rapidly this conflict could globalize.

In effect, what began as a U.S.-Israeli operation to preempt Iran’s nuclear capability is evolving into a contest over the post-Iran regional order: whether the Islamic Republic’s collapse produces fragmentation, a military-led continuity regime, or an unpredictable revolutionary outcome. However the battlefield map shifts, the strategic reality is now set–Iran is not just a player, but the epicenter of a regional system in violent transition.

Proxies and the “Axis of Resistance” in Active Combat

Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” functions as a decentralized, Tehran-orchestrated network designed to exert pressure on adversaries through synchronized proxy actions, rather than direct confrontation. This structure links disparate groups—Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi Shiite militias, and Yemen’s Houthis—into a cohesive strategy that amplifies Iran’s reach while minimizing risks to its core territory.
Historically, Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack initiated a multi-front escalation, with Hezbollah’s rocket barrages from Lebanon, Iraqi militia drone strikes on U.S. bases, and Houthi interdictions of Red Sea shipping forming interconnected pressure points. These operations share Iranian-supplied weapons, training, and command signals, creating a “ring of fire” around Israel and U.S. interests that forces resource diversion and diplomatic strain.

Following U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran in late February 2026, Tehran most likely issued direct activation orders to its proxies, transitioning from opportunistic harassment to coordinated retaliation. Houthi attacks on U.S.-aligned shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden intensified immediately, using Iranian ballistic missiles and drones to target tankers and naval assets, in lockstep with Hezbollah ground incursions in Lebanon and Iraqi militia assaults on Gulf bases.

This synchronization reveals the Axis’s true nature: not independent actors, but extensions of IRGC-Quds Force operations, calibrated to exploit geographic depth and impose asymmetric costs. Even as proxies face degradation–Hamas decimated in Gaza, Hezbollah strained by Israeli offensives–the network’s resilience lies in its redundancy, ensuring persistent threats to maritime trade, energy flows, and regional stability.

The Axis endures as a model of hybrid warfare, blending militia swarms with missile/drone barrages to contest superior conventional forces. Direct hits on Iran have not dismantled it; instead, they’ve spurred adaptive escalation, with proxies absorbing losses to maintain pressure on Israel, the U.S., and Gulf states. This dynamic locks the conflict into a protracted, multi-domain struggle, where proxy activation remains Tehran’s primary tool for survival and retaliation.
Regime Survival vs. Regime Change

The ongoing war has crystallized into an existential contest for Iran’s leadership, pitting the theocratic regime’s desperate bid for survival against explicit U.S. and Israeli objectives to destabilize or topple it. After decapitation strikes and relentless targeting of command structures, Tehran’s rulers face not just external bombardment but internal repression on a massive scale–thousands arrested, internet blackouts enforced, and dissent crushed to prevent uprisings amid economic collapse and daily casualties.

U.S. President Trump and Israeli leaders have escalated rhetoric with overt appeals to the Iranian people, urging them to “rise up against the oppressors” and promising support for a post-regime future. This marks a doctrinal shift from containment to regime change, framing the conflict as
liberation from 47 years of clerical rule, with military operations now prioritizing disruption of IRGC loyalty and economic lifelines.

Yet regime failure carries profound dangers: a fragmented power vacuum could spawn warlordism, ethnic separatism in Baluchistan or Kurdistan, and uncontrolled nuclear remnants. Iran’s proxy network–Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi militias–might splinter without central funding, triggering uncontrolled adventurism or realignments with Russia and China. This precarious dynamic underscores the war’s high stakes: victory for one side risks chaos for the region.

Scenarios: How This War Ends

Three endgames shape the Iran conflict’s trajectory, each balancing military outcomes, internal dynamics, and global stakes, with direct bearing on terrorism, regional power balances, and pathways to sustainable peace in line with long-term peacebuilding priorities.

Scenario 1: Negotiated De-escalation

Tehran’s temporary leadership, battered by strikes and economic strangulation, signals readiness for talks after 4-6 weeks via backchannels in Qatar or Oman, offering verifiable nuclear dismantlement, IRGC proxy drawdowns in Yemen and Iraq, and ballistic missile caps for partial sanctions relief and Gulf-funded reconstruction. U.S.-Israeli operations wind down under UN monitoring, stabilizing oil flows. Terrorism ebbs as cash-strapped Hezbollah and Houthis scale back, enabling a Gulf-Arab détente that sidelines Iranian influence. Regionally, a humbled regime reinforces deterrence without upheaval, though hardliner resurgence risks renewed proxy games. For peacebuilding, this opens modest space for civil society and women’s rights reforms, fostering a pragmatic Iran less export-oriented in its ideology, if external aid prioritizes inclusive governance over vengeance.

Scenario 2: Messy Regime Change

Sustained decapitation, urban unrest, and IRGC defections precipitate collapse within 2-4 months, echoing 1979’s revolutionary fervor or a praetorian coup, birthing a fragmented transition council amid ethnic revolts in Kurdistan, Baluchistan, and Khuzestan. External powers–U.S. airlifts to moderates, Saudi backing for Sunnis–fill the vacuum, but proxy implosion unleashes rogue Houthi salvos and Iraqi militia terror cells targeting Gulf targets. Terrorism spikes short-term, fracturing the regional order into proxy-free zones (Gulf, Levant) versus chaos belts, with Turkey and Pakistan eyeing border gains. Peace prospects hinge on rapid federation and diaspora return: a decentralized Iran could demilitarize, curb radical export, and integrate economically, aligning with Rise to Peace ideals through empowered local institutions—yet state failure risks a Somalia-style quagmire.

Scenario 3: Prolonged Attrition War

Iran’s asymmetric depth–missile stockpiles, proxy rings, Russian S-400s, Chinese drones–prolongs fighting into 2027+, with Hormuz chokepoints, Red Sea blockades, and Hezbollah attrition grinding U.S. resolve amid domestic war fatigue. Proxy escalation amplifies terrorism via drone swarms on European refineries and militia raids on Jordan, eroding U.S.-centric order as NATO splinters and BRICS exploits energy chaos. Regionally, stalemate entrenches militarized frontiers, emboldening authoritarian playbooks globally. Post-war Iran, if any, emerges as a fortress state under military rule, isolated and vengeful, with peacebuilding near-impossible without exhaustive Marshall Plan-scale aid; sustained diplomacy must preempt this by bolstering moderates early, averting a cycle of enmity that poisons generations.

Rise to Peace’s Questions for the U.S. Intelligence Community

• How should the U.S. and its allies prioritize between eliminating Iran’s remaining nuclear materials and mapping what is left of its advanced missile and drone capabilities after Operation Epic Fury?
• What safeguards are needed to prevent unsecured or partially destroyed nuclear infrastructure from becoming a proliferation risk if the regime collapses or fractures?
  Civilian protection and urban unrest
• As mass protests, mourning gatherings, and street mobilization surge after Khamenei’s death, what tools can the U.S. intelligence community use to track civilian movements in real time without enabling or causing mass casualty events?
• How should civilian-protection imperatives shape targeting decisions when Iran’s security forces deliberately embed among protestors and dense urban populations?
  IRGC and proxy networks
• With the IRGC and the “Axis of Resistance” now in open, synchronized combat, what kinds of network mapping (supply chains, financial flows, command hierarchies) are most urgent to rapidly degrade Iran’s capacity to wage a regional campaign?
• How can U.S. and partner intelligence best distinguish between Iran-directed proxy operations and more autonomous militia behavior as Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis absorb heavy losses?
  Leadership succession and regime futures
• In an unstable succession environment after Khamenei, how should analysts prioritize profiling potential future Supreme Leaders and IRGC power brokers, and what indicators would signal a shift toward either hardline consolidation or messy regime change?
• What are the most responsible ways for outside powers to influence Iran’s leadership trajectory without triggering a wider civil war or state collapse?
  Great-power and regional involvement
• Given reported Russian intelligence and materiel support to Tehran, how should U.S. planners weigh the risk of escalation with Moscow against the need to cut off Iran’s external lifelines?
• How might Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and other regional actors recalibrate their strategies if the conflict evolves into a prolonged war of attrition rather than quick regime change or negotiated de‑escalation?
  U.S.-Israel coordination and new security architectures
• What forms of intelligence sharing with Israel are most likely to reduce civilian harm in Lebanon and Iran while still neutralizing Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed forces?
• Could emerging partnerships with non-state or sub-state actors such as the Kurdistan Region form the backbone of a new regional security architecture after the Iran war, and what long-term risks would such alignments carry?
  Strategic endgames and peacebuilding
• Across the three endgames—negotiated de‑escalation, messy regime change, or prolonged attrition—which outcome would best align with long-term goals of constraining proxy violence, stabilizing governance, and protecting civilians, and why?
• What specific questions should the U.S. intelligence community be asking now to ensure that today’s targeting and alliance choices do not foreclose tomorrow’s opportunities for peace and regional reconciliation?
  
  Iran is not just another crisis hotspot but the hinge of a wider systemic transition in the Middle East, where choices made in the coming months will reverberate across energy markets, alliance structures, and global norms on the use of force. Whether the conflict ends in negotiated de‑escalation, messy regime change, or prolonged attrition, the stakes extend far beyond Tehran: stabilizing postwar governance, constraining proxy violence, and protecting civilians will determine if this war yields a more secure regional order or locks the world into a new era of chronic instability.

By Izzy Knaus – Rise to Peace Fellow

What better day to kickstart our Women, Peace, and Security Monthly Spotlight Series here at Rise to Peace than International Women’s Day! At Rise to Peace, we are proud to dedicate this initiative to honoring women who have shaped–and continue to shape–the global security landscape. This first feature, The Analyst Who Saw Bin Laden Coming, highlights one trailblazing counterterrorism professional who has broken barriers and led efforts to counter violent extremism across the world. Her story reminds us that inclusive security is not only a matter of justice but also a matter of effectiveness: when women lead, peace and resilience follow.

Meet Gina Bennett, retired CIA analyst of almost 35 years who spent her entire career in the counterterrorism mission. Within days of graduating from the University of Virginia with a degree in economics and foreign affairs, she had hit the ground running with a summer externship at the State Department in Washington DC. Over the course of her summer, the woman who ran the office took notice of Bennett and her work ethic, sat her down, and said, “Gina, you need to get a job in intelligence. You have more potential than this.” So, Bennett applied for a 24/7 terrorism watch officer position in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. This is where she realized: once you see inside the counterterrorism mission, “there’s no going back”. 

 Seeing the Threat Before Others: Bin Laden and the CT Mission

When Bennett first stepped onto the 24/7 terrorism watch floor at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), she entered a world in flux: the Cold War was ending, foreign fighters were dispersing from Afghanistan, and the terrorist threat was beginning to morph into something transnational and harder to define. From that vantage point, she began tracking a relatively obscure financier referred to as “Abu Abdullah,” who was quietly channeling money, supplies, and manpower to a growing network of militant jihadist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

By August 1993, Bennett had pulled these threads together into a now‑famous INR memo, “The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and Dangerous.” In it, she warned that the same support networks that had “funneled money, supplies, and manpower to supplement the Afghan mujahidin” were now “contributing experienced fighters to militant Islamic groups worldwide,” and that these “wandering mujahidin” could surprise the United States with violence far from traditional battlefields. At a time when Osama bin Laden’s name had barely appeared in Western media, Bennett explicitly flagged him–under his own name–as a particularly significant private donor whose religious zeal and financial largesse made him central to this emerging threat.

Her early warning did not come from a single “smoking gun” but from methodical pattern recognition across regions as different and distinct as Chechnya, Kashmir, the Philippines, and North Africa. From her desk in Foggy Bottom, she watched veterans of the anti‑Soviet jihad reappear in conflict after conflict, and recognized the contours of a global movement rather than isolated local insurgencies. In the mid‑1990s, she moved to the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, bringing with her this broad survey understanding of terrorism and geopolitics that would underpin decades of work in the counterterrorism mission and later contributions to high‑level assessments on global terrorism trends. That combination of strategic perspective and granular pattern‑tracking would become a hallmark of her career.

Rethinking Security in a Changing Terrorism Landscape

Gina Bennett’s nearly 35 years in counterterrorism have led her to reject the comforting fiction that peace simply arrives when war or threats recede. Instead, she argues that “peace is not the absence of war” and “security is not the absence of threats,” but the result of “extremely hard work, constant, persistent, never‑ending work” to sustain democratic institutions, human dignity, and social resilience. In her view, a country can be physically “safe” under many forms of government–even authoritarian or theocratic–but it is not truly secure if its core ideals, rights, and civic life are hollowed out, a perspective that aligns with her long-standing call to expand U.S. security thinking beyond a narrow focus on attacks to include the health of democracy itself.

This redefinition of security is inseparable from the evolution of the terrorism landscape she has witnessed from the late Cold War to today. Bennett began her career amid state-centered, relatively predictable threats, then watched power diffuse to non‑state actors like al‑Qaeda and finally into a hybrid era where state and non‑state networks blend, often anonymously and over long time horizons. In that context, the familiar “mowing the grass” metaphor–striking terrorist groups as they rebuild–captures only a fraction of the challenge: neutralizing visible cells does not address the deeper social, psychological, and institutional vulnerabilities that allow threats to regenerate.

Bennett contends that traditional, male‑dominated security thinking has privileged the visible, public sphere of force and deterrence while discounting the less visible “private sphere” work–care, cohesion, community resilience–that actually underpins long‑term security. She sees women’s perspectives as essential not merely for representation but for expanding what counts as security knowledge, bringing in human security concerns like freedom from fear, want, and indignity and highlighting how peace is built in homes, schools, and communities as much as in command centers. In practice, this has meant elevating cognitive styles often associated with women–pattern recognition, sensitivity to anomalies, and attention to nonverbal and emotional cues–which she argues are evolutionarily honed skills well suited to detecting emergent, ambiguous threats that cannot simply be “nuked” because their actors or contours are not yet fully known.

Across federal counterterrorism work, Bennett has seen a gradual but meaningful shift toward valuing this broader, more inclusive understanding of security and analysis. Agencies increasingly recognize that anticipating complex, networked threats requires diverse minds, humility, and a willingness to question assumptions, not just kinetic capacity or technical collection. For Bennett, this evolution brings national security closer to how families actually function—drawing on multiple ways of identifying and solving problems—and it reinforces her core message to the next generation of women in intelligence: your skepticism, subtlety, and so‑called “soft” skills are in fact hard‑won evolutionary assets, and they are indispensable to the never‑ending work of building and protecting peace.

Gender, Evolutionary Skills, and Why Women See Threats Differently

From Hunter‑Gatherers to Today’s Intel World

Bennett entered a counterterrorism field expecting male dominance in personnel but was struck by its deeper imprint on thinking itself: an assumption that security means neutralizing external threats, ignoring the internal work of sustaining communities. She traces this to the dawn of settled civilization, when human security was divided into public “hunter” domains (politics, defense) and private “gatherer” ones (care, cohesion), with security discourse centering only the former. Traditional theories, written mostly by men unfamiliar with gathering and caretaking, thus overlook how these roles have secured human thriving for millennia–a gap the Women, Peace, and Security agenda seeks to close.

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Evolutionary and Neurobiological Skills

Drawing on neurobiologist Louann Brizendine’s work in The Female Brain, Bennett argues that gendered brain differences reflect evolutionary pressures from distinct threats and roles. Women’s larger frontal lobes and hippocampi enable superior pattern recognition, memory, nonverbal cue detection, and anomaly spotting–skills honed over millions of years for survival in childrearing and community contexts. “Not every threat shows up like a missile,” she notes; men excel at tracking overt motion, but women can more clearly perceive the “fuzzy little dots” in subtle, emerging pictures. 

In counterterrorism, these “evolutionary skills” prove vital for identifying psychological vulnerabilities, hidden networks, and low‑signal threats like those in today’s hybrid landscape. Bennett credits them for her own early bin Laden warnings and observes that intelligence has evolved to better appreciate such capabilities, though early on women’s insights were often dismissed as novel or unproven.

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Kahneman, Cognitive Bias, and “Imposter Syndrome”

Imposter syndrome plagues many women in intelligence, but Bennett reframes it as a symptom of a deeper issue: arrogance, particularly the male tendency toward overconfidence. In a conversation with Nobel economist Daniel Kahneman, author of Thinking, Fast and Slow, she probed whether men and women face different cognitive biases. Kahneman acknowledged he hadn’t studied gender explicitly but rejected simplistic views of women’s “intuitive” decision-making, noting instead that women continually question their own thinking rather than locking into premature certainty–a trait that makes them superior in fields like intelligence analysis.

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This self‑questioning, often mislabeled as indecision, is actually rigorous critical thinking that guards against bias and drives innovation. For young counterterrorism professionals, Bennett’s lesson is clear: embrace doubt as a superpower, especially in your first 5-10 years when fresh questioning challenges stale expertise and advances the mission. Arrogance, by contrast, blinds analysts to emerging realities, underscoring why diverse perspectives are essential.

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Advice for the Next Generation of Women in CT and Intelligence

Own your career trajectory: heed Ambassador Peter Burleigh’s wisdom to Gina–“Don’t let anyone else be in charge of your career”–and actively seek mentors who amplify your unique strengths. Reframe imposter syndrome as anti‑arrogance training; your instinct to question is critical thinking that elevates analysis and avoids blind spots. Insist on calling pattern recognition and emotional intelligence “evolutionary skills,” not soft ones–they are mission‑essential in ambiguous threat environments. ​

Gina Bennett’s trailblazing career–from her 1993 bin Laden warning to her ongoing teaching and advocacy at Girl Security–embodies the Women, Peace, and Security imperative: women’s evolutionary skills, critical questioning, and human‑centered lens are not add‑ons but force multipliers for effective counterterrorism. Her insistence that security is built through persistent, inclusive work challenges us to redefine peace beyond binaries, securing not just territory but ideals and dignity. This International Women’s Day launch of Rise to Peace’s Monthly Spotlight Series is just the beginning–stay tuned for more. 

By Giana Romo – Rise to Peace Fellow

In contemporary Europe, “security” as a notion has become a speech act. Public narratives have become a defining force in how the continent understands safety, belonging, and vulnerability. Political discourse and media framings no longer merely reflect security conditions. They actively construct what counts as a threat, who belongs within the political community, and whose freedoms are considered expendable.

As a result, European security governance increasingly operates through the symbolic and discursive management of social fears. To understand these dynamics, we must look at the intersection of three dimensions: Securitization, Human Security, and Social Cohesion.

Key Insights: The Three Intersecting Dimensions

Securitization (The Construction of Threats): Based on the Copenhagen School, securitization occurs when political actors elevate an issue from ordinary politics to an “existential threat.” In Europe, this is most visible in the “security–migration nexus,” where cross-border movement is reframed as “hybrid warfare,” justifying extraordinary measures that bypass normal democratic debate.

Human Security (Lived Vulnerability): While states focus on territorial protection, the human security lens reveals the cost to individuals (Liotta & Owen). When religious expression or migration is labeled a threat, it legitimizes surveillance and discrimination. The result is a loss of dignity and heightened vulnerability for marginalized communities (Chebel d’Appollonia 2015).

Social Cohesion (The Politics of Belonging): Security narratives often redraw the boundaries of the “political community” (Friedkin 2004). By constructing minorities as an “enemy within,” these narratives erode mutual trust and fuel the “integration paradox”—where younger generations of immigrants, perceiving systemic exclusion, lose faith in democratic institutions.

Illustrative Episodes: From Sweden to Central Europe

The 2023 Quran-burnings in Sweden illustrate how symbolic acts are elevated into national security crises. While protected as free speech, these acts were reframed by international and domestic actors as threats to diplomatic stability and NATO accession. This discursive shift prioritized geopolitical reputation over the human security of Sweden’s Muslim community, who reported a tangible increase in fear and social exclusion.

Central Europe (2021): Migration as Hybrid Pressure During the Belarus–EU border crisis, vulnerable individuals were rhetorically transformed into “tools of coercion.” By framing migration as a “hybrid attack” (Sari 2023) states justified the suspension of asylum guarantees and conducted pushbacks in freezing temperatures. This “politics of fear” prioritized national resilience over human rights, deepening the “us versus them” dichotomy (Polezhaeva 2024).

Germany (2024–2025): The Securitization of the “Stadtbild” Recent German discourse regarding the Stadtbild (cityscape) reveals a shift toward identity-based security. By framing the visible presence of “non-ethnic Germans” as a threat to social order, political leaders align with transatlantic narratives that view multiculturalism as destabilizing. This constructs demographic diversity itself as a security problem to be managed.

Rethinking European Governance

The integrated lens reveals that European security is sustained by a triad of narratives, practices, and social effects. This reinterpretation challenges the assumption that security is merely about border protection or counter-terrorism. Instead, it suggests that Europe increasingly governs through fear (fears of identity loss and cultural fragmentation).

For the European democratic project to remain resilient, security must be moved beyond “emergency politics” and elite-centric speech acts (Floyd 2016). We must recognize that when we securitize identity, we don’t just protect the state; we actively destabilize the social fabric. A more inclusive framework is required, one that recognizes silence, marginalized voices, and the human right to feel secure within one’s own community.

By Charlotte Soulé – Rise to Peace Fellow

Diplomatic relations between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Holy See, formally established in 1994, represent a distinctive case of engagement between a Muslim-majority monarchy and a transnational Christian authority. While such relations are frequently framed in terms of interfaith dialogue or symbolic gestures of coexistence, their political significance extends beyond ceremonial diplomacy. Jordan occupies a singular position in the region, as it is both a Muslim state whose ruling dynasty derives legitimacy from descent from the Prophet Muhammad and a recognised custodian of Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem. The Holy See, by contrast, exercises influence not through material power but through moral authority and global religious networks. The sustained and publicly visible interaction between these two actors, therefore, raises a broader question concerning the role of religion in contemporary diplomacy.

Religion and Faith-Based Diplomacy

Understanding the diplomatic engagement between Jordan and the Holy See requires a conceptual lens that recognises religion as both a normative and socially embedded force. Religion cannot be reduced to personal belief or ritual practice; it shapes the behaviour of political actors and can influence entire populations, including those who do not identify as religious. In the context of diplomacy, this influence is operationalised through faith-based diplomacy, a practice distinguished not by coercive or material power but by its ethical claims to reconciliation, justice, and the restoration of political order disrupted by conflict or injustice. Such diplomacy derives credibility from perceived moral neutrality and its association with widely recognised ethical principles within a religious tradition.

It is important, however, to avoid essentialising religion or assuming that one political or institutional interpretation represents the entirety of a tradition. Diplomatic gestures, such as interfaith dialogue or papal visits, are ethically framed performances designed to project legitimacy rather than reflections of all religious actors within a society. This perspective enables a critical analysis of Jordan-Vatican relations, demonstrating how Jordan leverages the Vatican’s transnational moral authority to reinforce both domestic religious legitimacy and international prestige. By viewing religion as both normative and strategically mobilised, the complex interplay between faith, diplomacy and political authority becomes visible.

Domestic Religious Architecture and Hashemite Legitimacy 

The Hashemite monarchy’s legitimacy is closely intertwined with its management of religious pluralism, particularly regarding the Christian minority within Jordan. Christian communities are legally recognised and operate within structured ecclesiastical jurisdictions, which regulate communal boundaries and spheres of autonomy. This institutionalised pluralism ensures that Christians can maintain religious and social practices while remaining integrated within the broader framework of state governance. Such arrangements reinforce the monarchy’s self-presentation as a guarantor of coexistence, signalling both domestic inclusivity and stability to international observers.

Beyond institutional structures, the monarchy derives symbolic authority from its Hashemite lineage, which claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad, and from its custodianship of key Islamic and Christian holy sites, particularly in Jerusalem. These dual responsibilities position Jordan as a unique interlocutor between Muslim and Christian actors in the region. Interfaith initiatives promoted by the monarchy, including public statements and participation in religious commemorations, further consolidate this legitimacy by demonstrating active engagement with multiple faith communities. Jordan’s engagement with the Vatican provides an outward projection of this domestic model. The exhibition “Jordan: Dawn of Christianity”, hosted in the Vatican to commemorate thirty years of bilateral relations, exemplifies how domestic religious heritage is mobilised as a form of cultural diplomacy. Similarly, public celebrations of papal visits and pilgrimage sites such as the Baptism Site highlight the state’s active role in preserving Christian heritage. Together, these practices demonstrate that religious diplomacy is credible precisely because it rests upon a domestically structured and state-managed model of pluralism, rather than on rhetorical claims alone. By embedding religious protection within legal, institutional, and symbolic frameworks, Jordan constructs a narrative of coexistence that can be credibly communicated to transnational partners, enhancing both domestic authority and international prestige.

The Holy See as a Faith-Based Diplomatic Actor 

The Holy See operates as a unique diplomatic actor, exercising influence primarily through moral authority rather than material or military power. Its engagement in Jordan exemplifies faith-based diplomacy, where ethical claims to reconciliation, peace, and the protection of religious communities are central to diplomatic practice. Pilgrimages to sites such as Bethany Beyond the Jordan serve not only religious purposes but also diplomatic ones, projecting messages of interfaith cooperation and regional stability. By participating in these events, the Vatican reinforces its transnational role as a moral actor and validates Jordan’s custodial responsibilities for sacred sites. Papal visits further institutionalise this moral and diplomatic engagement. The Jubilee pilgrimage of 2000 by Pope John Paul II highlighted Jordan’s position as a site of interreligious coexistence, while more recent visits by Pope Francis have emphasised regional peace and the protection of Christian minorities. These visits function as performative diplomacy, symbolically linking the Vatican’s ethical authority with Jordan’s domestic and international narratives of moderation and stability. 

High-level meetings and public statements by Vatican officials, including those by Cardinal Parolin, further demonstrate the Holy See’s strategic engagement with Jordan. These interactions emphasise mutual commitments to the preservation of holy sites and the promotion of peace, reinforcing Jordan’s international legitimacy as a moderate and stabilising actor in the Middle East. Through these mechanisms, the Vatican’s diplomatic influence complements and amplifies Jordan’s own religious and political authority, illustrating the mutually reinforcing nature of faith-based diplomacy in the bilateral relationship.

Interpreting Religious Diplomacy 

The preceding analysis illustrates that Jordan–Vatican relations operate at the intersection of domestic legitimacy, transnational moral authority, and strategic diplomacy. Jordan’s domestic religious architecture, with legally recognised Christian communities and structured communal boundaries, provides a foundation of credibility upon which international engagement can be built. By projecting this pluralism externally through exhibitions and the preservation of pilgrimage sites, the monarchy converts domestic institutional arrangements into diplomatic capital. This demonstrates that religious diplomacy is effective only when grounded in tangible domestic structures rather than symbolic claims alone.

Simultaneously, the Vatican leverages its moral authority to reinforce Jordan’s position as a stabilising actor in the region. Pilgrimages, papal visits, and high-level meetings act as performative instruments, signalling ethical legitimacy while enhancing the visibility of Jordan’s custodial role over sacred sites. The reciprocal nature of these interactions underscores that faith-based diplomacy is mutually constitutive: Jordan benefits from an association with a globally recognised ethical authority, while the Vatican secures a reliable partner in advancing interfaith and peace-oriented objectives.

At a conceptual level, this dynamic illustrates the dual character of religious diplomacy. It is both normative, grounded in ethical claims and the promotion of coexistence, and strategic, serving state interests in legitimacy, soft power, and international positioning. Crucially, this reflection underscores that the credibility of religious diplomacy depends on the alignment between domestic institutional reality and transnational ethical projection; where this alignment is strong, as in Jordan, faith-based diplomacy becomes a potent tool of statecraft.

Strategic Boundaries and Instrumentalisation  

While Jordan’s religious diplomacy projects an image of interfaith coexistence, it operates within clearly defined political boundaries. Christian communal autonomy is institutionalised but regulated, ensuring that pluralism aligns with state interests and does not challenge monarchical authority. Similarly, engagement with the Vatican is selective and strategic: bilateral initiatives emphasise shared ethical claims, protection of holy sites, and regional stability, while sensitive geopolitical issues, such as the status of Jerusalem, are managed cautiously.

This duality demonstrates that religious diplomacy is both normative and instrumental. Ethical and moral narratives are employed to enhance legitimacy and soft power, yet they coexist with pragmatic considerations of security and political influence. The credibility of these efforts relies on the alignment between domestic institutional reality and transnational ethical projection, highlighting the calculated nature of faith-based diplomacy in advancing Jordan’s broader political objectives.

Ultimately, the relationship between Jordan and the Holy See illustrates that religion remains a consequential dimension of contemporary diplomacy rather than a residual or purely symbolic element of statecraft. By embedding religious pluralism within domestic legal and institutional frameworks while simultaneously projecting a narrative of interfaith stewardship abroad, the Hashemite monarchy has positioned itself as both a national guardian of coexistence and a credible international interlocutor. Engagement with the Vatican consolidates this positioning by linking Jordan’s custodial claims and interfaith initiatives to a globally recognised moral authority, thereby enhancing its soft power and diplomatic visibility. Yet the effectiveness of this strategy depends upon careful calibration: religious diplomacy must remain sufficiently authentic to retain credibility while sufficiently controlled to safeguard political stability. In this balance between ethical projection and strategic management lies the enduring significance of Jordan–Holy See relations, revealing faith-based diplomacy as a deliberate and adaptive instrument of legitimacy in an increasingly complex regional environment.