Shopping for Identity: The Ideological Incoherence of the Palm Springs Suicide Bomber

Yesterday morning, on the 18th of May, the world awoke to news of yet another act of directed violence. In Palm Springs, a suicide bomber targeted a fertility clinic. The attacker himself was the only fatality, though several others were injured, and neither were the IVF tubes and stored eggs damaged.

This was an attack that, at first glance, seemed unmoored from the recognizable patterns of modern terrorism. There was no manifesto signed by a well-known extremist group, no invocation of a nationalist or religious cause, nor even the faintest echo of those familiar dogmas that once animated the lone-wolf terrorist. Instead, what emerged was a bewildering “FAQ” page, posted online and paired with a live-streamed recording of the attack itself. Here, in plain, affectless language, the perpetrator offered up a word-salad of ideology: radical veganism, anti-natalism, negative utilitarianism, pro-mortalism, abolitionist anarchism, antinatalism, and a militant, almost parodic atheism. The list goes on.

What sense are we to make of this ideological jumble? What does it mean when the violence of the age comes not dressed in the colors of a recognizable banner, but in the patchwork of borrowed slogans, philosophical fragments, and internet subcultures?

This is not merely the story of one individual’s descent into violence. It is symptomatic of a structural transformation in the spirit of terrorism itself, where a collapse of grand ideological narratives and their replacement by an unstable bricolage has been assembled from the debris of the internet’s endless marketplace of identity and meaning.

The Online Bricolage: Shopping for Identity

The perpetrator of the Palm Springs attack, 25-year-old Guy Edward Bartkus, was, in many ways, a digital everyman. Their manifesto, if it can be called that, reads less like the political declarations of yesterday’s radicals than the notes of a terminally online user searching, desperately, for a sense of ontological anchoring. In a series of FAQs, which won’t be linked here due to the sensitivities around linking terrorist manifestos, he describes himself as a “promortalist” – a label so esoteric that its explanation requires several hyperlinks and a backup YouTube channel in case the original is taken down. He rails against procreation, the “disease of life,” and invokes negative utilitarianism: a philosophical stance that seeks to minimize suffering even at the cost of extinguishing sentient life itself.

But there is no program here, no positive vision of the future, no collective struggle to be waged. There isn’t even a group upon which to make of himself a martyr for the cause. Instead, the logic of the attack is both hyper-individual and terminally abstract; a move to end suffering by ending the sufferer, and to make a spectacle of annihilation not for glory, but for the dissemination of a set of viral ideas.

In the flurry of online commentary that followed, users dissected his influences: veganism, antinatalism, anti-sexuality, abolitionist anarchism and depressive nihilism. Each school is a world unto itself, yet the perpetrator stitches them together as one might assemble a playlist: “a subreddit for antinatalists and vegan abolitionists,” “a support group for vegans struggling with the trance-like collusion with a dystopian world,” “a forum for antinatalists who also endorse negative utilitarianism.”

One is struck not by the logic but by the sheer multiplicity of reference points, but rather its desperate attempt to construct identity in a void.

From Coherent Movements to Stochastic Agents

For most of the twentieth century, terrorism made itself intelligible through frameworks of ideology: anarchism, fascism, ethno-nationalism, religious millenarianism. The violence, however abhorrent, was readable as the means to a political end. Even the lone wolf was a shadow cast by a larger collective; a product of radical milieus, underground cells, or ideological vanguards. The ‘Propaganda of the Deed’ , exalting political assassinations and bombings, aimed to create the “spirit of revolt” in the people by demonstrating the state was not omnipotent and by offering hope to the downtrodden, and also to expand support for anarchist movements as the state grew more repressive in its response. Terrorism had a language through which politics could be interpreted.

But as Joshua Citarella and others have argued, the internet has changed the conditions of radicalization. It has created new pipelines, new liminal spaces where ideological cross-contamination is not just possible but inevitable. The online actor is always one or two clicks away from a radically different worldview; the boundary between philosophies has dissolved into a swirling pool of hashtags, subreddits, Discord servers, and algorithmic suggestions. In this case, it bears investigating what kind of Discord pseudo-life Bartkus led, and if it contained aspects of what is now coming to be understood as a kind of ultra-modern cult, whereby the use of a specific Discord server creates a set of experiences that are not dissimilar to that of a cult.

What emerges here is not the coherent soldier of a movement, but a stochastic terrorist, an individual shaped by the logic of networks, whose motives are not intelligible through the usual typologies. The Palm Springs attacker is the perfect emblem of this transformation. His FAQ page is not a call to arms but a set of hyperlinks, each one a doorway to a digital subculture that bleeds into the next, each one an index of the platform’s endless “choose your own adventure” approach to ideology.

The logic of stochastic terrorism, as Citarella notes, is that of the “event” rather than the movement. It is unpredictable, non-linear, and marked by a jarring incoherence.

Blurred Boundaries

In his final answer to “what finally put you over the edge?”, the perpetrator does not mention politics, nor policy, but the suicide of a close friend. The story is intensely personal, marked by loss, isolation, and the sense of apocalypse. He confesses to never having related to someone so much, and speculates that if one died, the other would soon follow. The boundaries between personal grief, online subculture, and philosophical abstraction are blurred.

What is most telling is not the content of his ideology, but its shape: fractured, contradictory, and deeply liminal. This is not the act of a true believer, but of a subject for whom identity is endlessly shopped for, sampled, discarded, and then remixed, over and over, in the online market place of ideas. Each community offers a fleeting promise of meaning, and each, ultimately, fails to deliver.

The attack, then, is not merely an act of violence but a kind of anti-ritual: the attempt to inscribe oneself into history through negation, to become visible in a world where identity has become an endless act of self-curation.

The Age of Ideological Liquidity

What, finally, can be said of the Palm Springs suicide bomber? He is not the product of a single doctrine, but of the collapse of doctrine itself. In his manifesto, there are echoes of older forms – nihilism, anarchism and millenarian despair. But what dominates is the sense of wandering through a labyrinth of philosophical options, none of which can finally ground the self or provide a coherent cause.

This is the new face of stochastic terror: liminal, ideologically unstable, marked by an “aesthetic” of extremity rather than a logic of action. The attack on the fertility clinic is not simply an act of violence, but a symptom of the collapse of ideological boundaries in the digital age. It represents a world in which the terrorist, no less than the ordinary user, shops endlessly for a sense of meaning in a marketplace where every position is temporary, every commitment provisional, and every act of violence another attempt to break through the noise.

As we confront the challenges of the coming years, it is not enough to ask what these actors believe. We must ask how they come to believe at all, and what it means to be radicalized in a world where the only stable identity is that of the self searching, endlessly, for itself.

By Etienne Darcas, Counter-Terror Research Fellow and Media & Terror Program Lead, Rise to Peace

From Propaganda to Playbook: The Lasting Media Template of ISIS


Though the Islamic State, or ISIS, has long lost its territorial grip, the influence of its digital propaganda machine endures. At the height of its power, ISIS pioneered a sophisticated media strategy that transformed how terrorist organisations project influence, prioritising decentralisation, visual coherence, and emotional resonance to attract supporters and instil fear on a global scale. This communications model, while not unique to ISIS, has left a lasting imprint on the media operations of other jihadist movements. Recognising these patterns is not simply an exercise in retrospective analysis. As contemporary terrorist groups adopt similar techniques, understanding the architecture of ISIS’s media playbook offers a critical lens for identifying emerging threats. When narratives follow familiar contours, counterrorism efforts can respond not only to what is said, but to how and why it is said.

Platforms and Content

The Islamic State’s media strategy leveraged a range of platforms, including Telegram, X (previously Twitter), Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok. These platforms were crucial for spreading ISIS propaganda and recruiting new members, particularly among disenfranchised youth. Telegram, in particular, allowed ISIS to maintain encrypted communication and distribute a variety of content to its followers while evading censorship. TikTok, on the other hand, attracted a younger demographic, providing an avenue to disseminate short-form video that combined violent imagery with messages promoting martyrdom and jihad. An example of this can be seen in the case of L. Walby, a 19-year-old convert from Kent, UK, who posted ISIS propaganda videos on such platforms. According to the BBC, Walby, who had over 1.500 followers on TikTok and more than 10.000 likes on his posts, explained that he had ‘joined the trend’. This reflects a wider trend seen across social media where individuals, often younger, become part of an online subculture that glorifies extremism and terrorism. The videos Walby posted included graphic footage of combat scenes, executions, and martyrdom, aimed at normalising violence and encouraging others to embrace jihad.

Additionally, the Islamic State leveraged dedicated media outlets, such as Amaq News Agency and Al-Hayat Media Centre, to distribute its propaganda. These platforms produced high-quality content that reinforced ISIS’s ideological narrative. For instance, Amaq News Agency was central to ISIS’s communication strategy, offering real-time updates on operations and attacks, often glorifying these actions as part of a larger struggle against the West; while Dabiq was a digital magazine published in several languages, aimed at inspiring Muslim youth globally, urging them to join the caliphate. It presented a vision of a utopian Islamic state, promising a sense of belonging and purpose for those who joined. The strategic goal behind ISIS’s media framework has three key components: recruitment, intimidation, and legitimacy. The use of social media platforms was central to the group’s recruitment efforts, offering a sense of camaraderie and ideological purity to individuals who felt disconnected or marginalised. Intimidation was another key goal, These graphic materials were intended to instil fear and signal the group’s ruthless commitment to its cause. Finally, by producing highly polished, professional content in multiple languages and through diverse channels, ISIS sought to legitimise itself as the vanguard of a global Islamic struggle, rather than merely a terrorist group. This pattern is not isolated, and it highlights the potential for counterterrorism efforts to focus on identifying and disrupting the digital activities of such groups.

The Spread of a Template

The Islamic State’s digital blueprint has had a lasting impact well beyond its core territory, and its media strategy has served as a model for several jihadist groups operating in Syria, Afghanistan and parts of Africa. These groups have adapted and reinterpreted ISIS’s template to suit local contexts, but the core elements remain recognisable: strong branding, glorified portrayals of martyrdom, and the strategic use of social media to project legitimacy and reach a global audience. 

In northern Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) offers one of the clearest examples of aesthetic and narrative imitation. While distancing itself from ISIS ideologically, HTS has adopted similar media tactics to rebrand itself as a legitimate governing actor. Under the leadership of al-Jolani, the group has curated a public image centred on moderation and local governance. Its videos often show Jolani engaging with civilians, attending religious events, and meeting with local leaders; an imagery designed to soften perception and attract external legitimacy. This media campaign has included calculated outreach to Western audience, most notably through Jolani’s 2021 appearance on PBS Frontline. The visual polish and messaging coherence evoke the same media discipline pioneered by ISIS, albeit directed at different political ends.  

In contrast, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), in Afghanistan, has pushed the model further. Following the Taliban’s return to power, ISKP has doubled down on online propaganda, using AI tools to produce and disseminate multilingual content through its media arm, Al-Azaim Foundation. These efforts aim to radicalise, recruit, and assert the group’s ideological purity in contrast to its rivals. Similarly, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel has utilised media to bolster its narrative of religious legitimacy. Though seemly technologically less advanced, JNIM has borrowed from ISIS’s approach to visual propaganda, including footage of attacks and the imposition of conservative Islamic law in controlled areas.  

Lastly, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), born from Boko Haram’s allegiance to ISIS, has closely followed the ISIS model in both tone and technique. Between 2016 and 2020, it released over 100 videos, often showing executions, attacks, and hostage situations. ISWAP has also made use of platforms like Telegram, YouTube, X, and encrypted messaging apps to distribute content, echoing ISIS’s emphasis on platform diversification and digital security.

Digital Arms Race

As jihadist groups have grown more agile in their use of digital platforms, states, institutions, and technology companies have scrambled to catch up; often reacting rather than anticipating. In the European Union, new legislation mandates that internet platforms remove terrorist content within one hour of a removal order, while specialised bodies like the EU Internet Referral Unit and the Radicalisation Awareness Network work to identify extremist narratives and support member states in mitigation. In the US, the Global Engagement Centre (GEC) has adopted a more decentralised approach, collaborating with community actors, former extremists, and religious leaders to deliver counter-narratives and build resilience in targeted communities. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, responses have largely followed a top-down securitised model, where state policies prioritise regime stability and ideological control. Here, counterterrorism strategies often blur the lines between legitimate dissent and violent extremism, creating a restrictive media environment that can inadvertently drive extremist narratives underground rather than dismantling them. Yet despite these developments, jihadist media strategies remain highly resilient. A constant cat-and-mouse dynamic characterises the digital battlefield: as content is removed from mainstream platforms, extremist groups shift to encrypted apps, decentralised networks, and cloud-based repositories. The adaptive use of language, hashtags, and platform migration techniques ensures that even as specific content is taken down, the propaganda architecture remains largely intact. Groups like ISKP and ISWAP not only pre-empt takedowns but often exploit the takedown process itself to frame narratives of persecution and legitimacy.

This enduring adaptability reveals a critical oversight in counterterrorism policy: the tendency to view jihadist propaganda as peripheral rather than central to insurgent strategy. The influence of ISIS’s model: high-impact visuals, multilingual messaging, and decentralised media production, remains visible across successor groups, even in regions with limited connectivity or state presence. This digital legacy matters precisely because it has become a strategic blueprint. Its methods are easily replicated, widely disseminated, and difficult to erase. Graphic content, algorithmic optimisation, and culturally tailored messaging can be deployed by both major organisations and lone actors, allowing terrorist ideology to persist and mutate even in the absence of territorial control. 

Ultimately, a reactive approach to extremist content moderation is no longer sufficient. What is needed is a proactive, systemic understanding of jihadist media strategy; one that anticipates its evolution, counters its appeal, and treats the information space not as an auxiliary front, but as a core battleground in contemporary terrorism. 

Charlotte Soulé, Rise to Peace Contributor and Masters of International War Studies student at University College Dublin


The Liminal Agent: A New Model of Online Radicalisation?

In his recent essay, online extremism researcher Joshua Citarella sketches one of the new psycho-political cartographies of our time: a theory of how the internet no longer merely hosts extremism but actively incubates, mutates, and weaponizes it. His model of online radicalisation, one that emerges from self-directed isolation, deep cognitive immersion, and ideological bricolage, resonates profoundly with what Rise to Peace has identified as the domain of Liminal Warfare: the weaponization of thresholds, ambiguity, and incomplete identity in modern conflict spaces.

Increasingly, the traditional models of threat assessment borne from old threat matrix’s which privilege hierarchical organizations, clear ideological movements, and structured recruitment are inadequate to describe the contemporary threat landscape. In Citarella’s vision, the world of online radicalisation has irreparably changed. Radicalisation today is decentralized, asynchronous, memetic, and most importantly, liminal. It primarily happens in the unstable interzones between identity, ideology, and action.

Citarella’s Model

Citarella proposes that radicalisation, at least in the West, often begins not from prior ideological conviction, but from the condition of existential boredom, social/economic alienation, and exploration. A young person, often socially isolated and politically disenchanted, stumbles into online subcultures while seeking meaning, excitement, or community. They begin to scroll; into gaming forums, irony-poisoned meme pages, “political compass” esoterica, survivalist groups, and ideological echo chambers.

What matters is not a coherent doctrine, but the immersive ritual of searching itself. Platforms that favour algorithmic serendipity (TikTok, YouTube, Reddit) reinforce a pattern of escalating extremity, either through exposure to increasingly niche ideologies or by creating a pseudo-gamified environment where ideological commitment becomes performative currency. Politics becomes the hobby to end all hobbies. In this schema, most individuals never stabilize, instead drifting aimlessly and incoherently from one ideology to the next. They collage incompatible belief systems – eco-fascism one month, anarcho-primitivism the next, post-left accelerationism shortly after, creating an identity formation that is non-linear, recursive, and radically unstable. It is a process that could aptly be described as ‘liminal radicalisation’; the process of radicalisation itself is continuous and disaggregated, with no clear destination in mind.

The Political Economy of Alienation

What Joshua Citarella names as online radicalisation is, in fact, better understood as an emergent symptom of the wider economic decomposition and austerity that has driven radicalisation from the USA to Europe. Beneath the memetic ironies and aesthetic subcultures, beneath even the performative hatred, what one finds is a generation economically stranded and structurally abandoned. These are not natural ideologues – rather, they are young people who feel the burden of a collapsing horizon, where the prospect of an attainable middle-class life has disappeared as material circumstances decline.

In this sense, the online radicalisation pipeline is not ideological in its origins, but material. The typical subject is downwardly mobile, debt-strapped, and shut out of every traditional rite of social mobility: property, partnership, stability, meaning. Where civic institutions, societal inclusion and careers once were, they are confronted instead with deindustrialisation, economic alienation and precarity. Their beliefs are downstream from their estrangement. Liberal democracies, unable or unwilling to address the foundational material crises of our time in housing shortages, wage stagnation, job insecurity and the erosion of public life, have instead left a vacuum into which this new ecology has rushed. It is precisely this vacuum that provides such fertile ground for the blossoming of new, discordant political radicalisation amongst the disaffected online.

Radicalisation as Ritual, Not Recruitment

What Citarella outlines aligns precisely with what we at Rise to Peace conceptualize as the liminal domain of contemporary conflict. Liminality describes the in-between state: the adolescent undergoing a rite of passage, the refugee severed from homeland, the online user between algorithms and reality. In warfare, the liminal is where traditional rules of engagement dissolve, replaced by new architectures of influence, disorientation, and emotional capture. Crucially, Liminal Warfare weaponizes affect before ideology. It seeks to keep populations in a suspended state of insecurity, overstimulation, and yearning, thus rendering them perpetually vulnerable to new vectors of control, recruitment, or activation. Radicalization, under these conditions, is no longer a matter of persuasive argument or charismatic leadership, but rather the ambient result of prolonged cognitive dislocation.

The Liminal Agent

How can we position this new pipeline of online radicalisation?  Doing so requires designating a new actor in the matrix of terror and radicalisation: The Liminal Agent. These are individuals or small cells who do not adhere to conventional organizational structures, but whose radicalization journey makes them latent nodes of potential disruption.

They often exhibit the following features:

  • Non-linear ideological trajectories (far-right to eco-terrorism to esoteric nihilism within months).
  • Memetic accelerationism (using memes not merely as propaganda but as a form of psychological conditioning).
  • Fluid affiliations (no loyalty to any single group, cause, or doctrine).
  • Stochastic violence potential (low predictability of timing, targets, or methods).

Citarella’s model gives empirical substance to this theory. The emerging radical does not require recruitment, as they radicalize through participation. They do not need ideological discipline, as they need only the internet and its ideological input. This is a battlefield of perpetual pre-recruitment, where being “in play” is more important than belonging.

Implications for Counter-Radicalization

The classic counterterrorism model – disrupt leadership nodes, monitor recruitment pipelines, disrupt communication channels – struggles to address this reality. How do you intercept a process without a recruiter? How do you “deradicalize” someone who has never fully radicalized to begin with, but exists in a permanent state of cognitive threshold-crossing?

Such implications require three necessary shifts:

  1. Intervention at the Affective Level: Programs must target emotional needs (belonging, agency, recognition) rather than merely correcting disinformation or promoting tolerance.
  2. Narrative Counter-Liminality: Instead of offering fixed counter-narratives, interventions must provide adaptive narrative scaffolding; ways to help individuals navigate uncertainty without collapsing into extremism.
  3. Liminal Early Warning Systems: Indicators of drift (increased engagement with irony-laden extremist memes, withdrawal from non-digital communities, pattern acceleration) must be mapped and monitored, not just explicit pledges of allegiance.

This, however, represents only an intervention at the level of symptoms. The frameworks proposed here; narrative scaffolding, affective early warning systems, memetic analysis, can only help us insofar as they map the terrain of liminal radicalisation, but they cannot on their own treat its cause. What Citarella’s model ultimately reveals, and what we must refuse to obscure, is that online extremism today is less a question of ideology than of material infrastructure – social, economic, and psychological. It is not born from belief but from absence: the absence of economic security, of community, of a shared future. This absence collapses the very ideological architectures that once made radicalisation intelligible and coherent, and much more is required to be done and researched about this new pipeline of radicalisation that has emerged online if governments and civil society have any hope to limit the spread of its contagion.

Etienne Darcas, Counter-Terror Research Fellow and Media & Terror Program Lead, Rise to Peace

Tradwives with a New Voice: Reframing Femininity in a Polarized Digital Age.

The ‘Tradwife’ (traditional wife) movement in the United States operates as a digital phenomenon that promotes a return to conventional gender roles, where women embrace domesticity, submission to a male partner, and a homemaker lifestyle as empowering choices. In contrast, Afghan women face traditional roles enforced through legal and political structures. These two models of gender normativity illustrate how context transforms meaning. While American tradwives present their lifestyle as a revival of femininity, Afghan women live a reality of restricted agency, silenced discourse, and structural resistance. This comparison exposes key differences between performative and imposed domesticity.

The tradwife phenomenon fits squarely within the logic of liminal warfare; a form of modern terrorism that Rise to Peace is exploring and which relies not only on direct violence but on gray zones of information warfare, identity manipulation, and narrative control. When co-opted by far-right extremists, tradwife content becomes a digital vehicle for radicalization, as modern terrorism increasingly leverages aestheticized content and algorithmic exposure to draw individuals into ideologically extreme spaces. Tradwife influencers, especially those aligned with alt-right ideologies, repurposing everyday imagery as a subtle vehicle for radicalization.

Reclaiming Choice or Reinforcing Hierarchy?

American tradwives often frame domestic roles as a form of empowerment and resistance to feminism. Deem (2023) notes that many in this movement adopt the label “feminine, not feminist,” positioning themselves in opposition to gender equality discourse. Llanera (2023) argues that this framing aligns with alt-right ideologies that use idealized femininity to reinforce patriarchal structures.

In Afghanistan, gender roles are not a matter of personal identity but the result of coercive state control. Since the return of Taliban rule, multiple international bodies, such as Human Rights Watch and UN Women, have issued alerts highlighting the institutionalized oppression of Afghan women, ranging from bans on education to exclusion from public life. These reports illustrate how domesticity becomes a condition of survival, not a personal or ideological stance.

Social Media as a Battleground

Tradwife content spreads rapidly through algorithm-driven platforms like Instagram and TikTok. Bail et al. (2018) demonstrate that exposure to polarized views intensifies ideological divides, creating echo chambers that prevent people from being exposed to information that contradicts their pre-existing beliefs. Tradwife influencers benefit from this structure by distributing emotionally charged, aesthetically appealing content that builds loyal followings.

This mirrors the mechanics of liminal warfare. Terrorist movements now use soft-entry tactics, ranging from memes, nostalgia, and lifestyle aesthetics to lower cognitive defenses and normalize extremist ideologies. Tradwife narratives foster a sense of comfort and tradition while quietly pushing audiences toward radical worldviews.

Meanwhile, Afghan women are largely excluded from these digital arenas. Internet access remains limited and heavily monitored, especially for women and girls. The same platforms that enable Western women to craft their identities and project narratives are unavailable to those whose lives are tightly controlled by state power.

Radicalization vs. Silencing

Simpson (2024) found that the #tradwife trend shaped women’s political identities during a U.S. election year. What appears as an innocuous embrace of femininity often operates as an entry point to far-right ideology. Sitler-Elbel (2021) describes the pathway from “Swiffers to Swastikas” as deliberately structured through content ecosystems and influencer networks.

This pathway aligns with what Rise to Peace calls the new economy of terror, where ideology is consumed through clicks and shares. In this model, tradwife content becomes a vector for extremism masked in nostalgia and moral certainty. Afghan women, in contrast, face ideological control through state power, not social media. Their silencing is institutional and physical—not algorithmic. They do not choose submission; it is enforced.

Narcissism, Echo Chambers, and Violence

Marzochi and Balieiro (2021) describe the tradwife phenomenon as a product of political narcissism. Carefully curated content reinforces a feedback loop that isolates creators from criticism and sustains ideological rigidity.

In Afghanistan, the echo chamber is real but systemic. Gender segregation enforces physical and social separation, upheld by legal and religious codes. While Western women struggle with digital misrepresentation, Afghan women confront state-sanctioned erasure.

Feminist Resistance in Two Worlds

Some American tradwife influencers are attempting to distance themselves from regressive ideologies. Sykes and Hopner (2024) show how tradwife influencers mobilize domestic aesthetics and traditional femininity to subtly reinforce far-right ideologies, often without overt political messaging but still embedded within ethnonationalist values.

Afghan women resist under far more dangerous conditions. Many have built underground education networks, engaged in international advocacy, or organized in secrecy. Their goal is not to redefine femininity within neoliberal frameworks, but to reclaim basic rights and visibility.

Gender Roles as Tools in Liminal Warfare

The concept of the traditional wife cannot be separated from its political and technological context. In the United States, the tradwife identity is voluntary, aesthetic, and digitally enabled. In Afghanistan, it is a product of authoritarian control.

Yet both can function as instruments in liminal warfare. As the team at Rise to Peace has explained, extremist movements no longer rely solely on violence. They weaponize stories, visuals, and identities to push ideological agendas. Tradwife content when linked to far-right ideologies becomes a tool for this subtle but powerful form of radicalization.

Peacebuilding strategies must recognize how gender, culture, and digital ecosystems interact across borders. Empowerment narratives deserve scrutiny. In some cases, choice is real. In others, it is manufactured. And in many, it is absent entirely.

Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder and Director of Counterterrorism, Rise to Peace
Giana Romo B, Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Pope Francis Jorge Mario Bergoglio reigned as Pope Francis from 2013 to 2025.

In Loving Memory of Pope Francis

In Loving Memory of Pope Francis by Public Relations R2P

A Leader of Compassion and Humility

Today, the world mourns the loss of a beacon of hope and love, Pope Francis. Known for his deep compassion and unwavering commitment to social justice, Pope Francis touched the lives of millions around the globe. His dedication to the poor and marginalized set an example for us all, reminding us of the power of love and empathy.

A Legacy of Unity

Pope Francis was not just a leader of the Catholic Church, but a unifier across religions and cultures. His efforts to foster dialogue and understanding among different faiths will always be remembered as a cornerstone of his papacy. He believed in the strength of unity and the beauty of diversity.

Remembering His Words

“The true strength of a nation is not measured by how many powerful weapons it possesses, but by how it treats its weakest members.”

These words from Pope Francis will continue to inspire and guide us in the pursuit of a kinder, more inclusive world.

A Call to Action

Let us honor Pope Francis’s memory by continuing his work: advocating for peace, justice, and compassion. May we all strive to walk the path he paved with humility and grace.

Join us in celebrating a life devoted to love and service. Rest in peace, Pope Francis. Your legacy will continue to light our way.

The Terrorist in the Feed: Understanding the New Economy of Terror



We no longer fight wars. We stream them.

Modern conflict has shifted shape—not merely in weaponry or geography, but in feeling. Increasingly, the battlefield is a narrative. And those who wage war in its shadowed corners, be they jihadists, lone wolves, and foreign proxies, understand this all too well.

This is the essence of liminal warfare, a term crystallized by counterinsurgency expert Dr. David Kilcullen to describe forms of conflict that operate beneath the threshold of conventional war. These are battles fought not in declared theatres, but in the informational fog between peace and open violence. In this liminal zone, war is unclaimed, unattributed, and asymmetric. It’s not about the territory you hold but the attention you hijack. A new generation of terrorists have demonstrated that they have embraced this dynamic.

Liminal warfare is not new—but its tools are. Today’s insurgents, terrorists, and hybrid actors do not merely fight to kill; they fight to be seen, and more crucially, to be shared. Mass media, especially the digital, mobile, algorithmic kind, has become both battlefield and weapon. The meme, the livestream, the viral clip: these are no longer collateral to political violence; they are constitutive of it.

The Logic of ISIS’ Aestheticized Violence

One of the most chilling expressions of this was the Islamic State’s digital campaign of aestheticized brutality from 2013 – 2017.

The function of ISIS’ execution videos, such as the killings of James Foley and Steven Sotloff, functioned not merely as propaganda or deterrence, but as performative acts of sovereignty. These carefully scripted spectacles converted individual acts of death into visual dramas of humiliation, vengeance, and legitimacy. The hostages’ orange jumpsuits evoked Guantánamo; their scripted confessions accused America of its own crimes; and their beheadings, conspicuously edited offscreen, invited a visceral audience ritual of suspense, complicity, and horror.

ISIS wasn’t just killing. It was staging sovereignty, casting itself as the new arbiter of life and death in a post-Westphalian, digitally mediated Caliphate. Understanding this, and not inscribing our own western logic, is the key to understanding the alternate logic of modern terror groups. The goal wasn’t just recruitment or terror, though it achieved both. The goal was inversion; to symbolically emasculate the West, to portray the United States not as a hegemon, but as a paper tiger—impotent, criminal, and absurd. Here, what mattered was not the battlefield, but the framing.

The Weaponization of Attention

Scholars have coined the term ‘digital time’ to describe the accelerated, affective temporality in which these videos circulated. The endless, on-demand replay of brutal images collapses the space between event and response. It forces the viewer to begin ‘thinking less and feeling more’, and in doing so, becomes the default mode of online engagement with such groups.

And therein lies the mechanism of modern terror: not just killing, but curating the spectacle of killing; not just shock, but ritualized viewing that creates emotional publics, radicalized identities, and new interpretive communities. The audience becomes part of the performance. This is no longer about mass armies but mass network effects.

The Liminal Mode of Terror

Here, Kilcullen’s concept of liminal warfare becomes key to understanding this phenomenon. Liminal actors—ISIS, stochastic terrorists, proxy saboteurs—thrive in ambiguity. Their violence is often deniable, asymmetric, and decentralized. What ties it together is its ritualistic, media-first logic. Whether it’s the Christchurch shooter livestreaming a massacre like a Twitch streamer, or a domestic extremist posting manifestos as memetic call-to-arms, the pattern holds – violence as virality. Strategy becomes spectacle. Kill counts are tallied in retweets.

In doing so, traditional models of counterterrorism falter. Attribution is obscured and culpability is diluted, leading to the public being saturated by such violent content. The algorithms, indifferent to moral weight, deliver content with the same mechanical efficiency—whether it’s a makeup tutorial or a martyrdom video. In some cases, such content may even be boosted, a concept called ‘Algorithmic Radicalisation’ as its virality attracts attention to online platforms.

We are no longer asking, “Who pulled the trigger?” We are asking, “Who edited the video?”

Toward a New Counter-Terror Methodology

If liminal warfare is the new mode of terrorism, then narrative pre-emption, not just military deterrence, must become part of our strategic response.

The task ahead is twofold:
1. Mapping digital rituals of violence, not merely the actors or ideologies. Understanding how spectacle functions, how it recruits, humiliates, and inverts.
2. Disrupting narrative architectures before they congeal. This means developing counter-narratives that are not only informative but symbolically potent—ones that break the spell of spectacle rather than amplify it through sterile denunciation.

It also means cultivating new forms of public literacy: helping audiences discern the symbolic grammar of online violence, the scripts beneath the shock and the roles we are invited to play. To recognize liminal warfare is to understand that the first strike is often not a bullet but a clip. A viral video. A miscaptioned meme. A livestreamed grievance – these make us, the viewers, both aggregators and multipliers of the terrorist message.

The challenge of our age is not merely defending against the kinetic aftershocks of radicalization. It is recognizing that the war has already begun, perhaps not simply on the battlefield, but in social media and message boards. If sovereignty used to be exercised through territory, today it is often first exercised through screens.

And if we wish to protect what remains of peace, we must learn to read the image like a battlefield—because for many of our enemies, that is exactly what it is.

By Etienne Darcas, Research Fellow, Rise to Peace.

Turkish police face demonstrators in Istanbul during clashes after opposition arrest

The Two Faces of Türkiye: Chaos erupts as Erdoğan’s rival İmamoğlu, is detained — here’s why it matters.

I see Türkiye’s politics as a tug-of-war between two camps. On one side, the AK Party, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since 2003 — first as prime minister (March 14, 2003) and then president (August 28, 2014) — pushes an Ottoman-inspired, religious and world vision. On the other, the CHP, rooted in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s secular, Western-leaning legacy, leans nationalist, wary of immigration, and critical of foreign spending. Ekrem İmamoğlu, the detained Istanbul mayor, is the CHP’s latest rising star.

A History of Coups — and Blood

Türkiye’s democracy has been rocked by six major military coup attempts since 1923. The most recent hit on July 15, 2016, when rogue soldiers attacked the government, killed at least 241 Turkish citizens, and bombed parliament. Erdoğan survived, crushed the coup, and unleashed a massive crackdown during a state of emergency (July 20, 2016–July 19, 2018). Thousands — rivals, critics, and alleged “traitors” — were arrested or purged. That violent night still echoes: anyone accused of betrayal faces a harsh reckoning.

The Latest Flashpoint

On March 19, 2025, İmamoğlu’s arrest threw Türkiye into chaos. He’s a popular CHP figure polls pegged as Erdoğan’s biggest threat in a presidential race. The charges — corruption and alleged terrorist links — dropped just before the CHP’s primary (set for March 23, 2025). Is he guilty? I don’t know — maybe he’s corrupt, maybe he sided with shady terrorist groups, or maybe Erdoğan’s just neutralizing a rival. What’s undeniable is the pattern: since 2016, Erdoğan’s sidelined opponents with arrests, whether for corruption, “terrorism,” or technicalities (like voiding İmamoğlu’s degree on March 18, 2025, barring him from running).

Chaos Unleashed

The fallout’s been explosive. Clashes erupted in Istanbul on March 19–20, 2025, as İmamoğlu’s supporters defied a protest ban (March 19–23, 2025). The Turkish lira crashed to 42 against the dollar on March 19, 2025, before settling at 38 by March 20, 2025. Social media — X, YouTube, Instagram — got throttled nationwide (March 19, 2025). Türkiye’s at a breaking point: Erdoğan’s clinging to power amid economic ruin and unrest, while the CHP pushes back.

Whether İmamoğlu’s a victim or a crook, this fits Erdoğan’s playbook since those tanks rolled in 2016.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan vs. Ekrem İmamoğlu

Why It Matters

Türkiye’s teetering between past promises — of democracy, stability — and a present defined by power struggles. The 2016 coup scarred the nation, but the scars keep reopening. Is this arrest justice or suppression? Either way, the stakes are sky-high, and the world’s watching.

A Personal Note

I visit Türkiye all the time — it’s a beautiful country with the best food and incredible hospitality. The people are amazing. I just pray for peace. I don’t care who runs the place — they know what’s best for them — but coming from a war-torn background, I’ve seen how war and division bring nothing good to anyone.

Ahmad Shah Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace.

Mohammad Sharifullah, alleged to be a co-conspirator in the murder of American soldiers at Abbey Gate in Afghanistan, was apprehended and extradited Tuesday. @FBIDirectorKash via X.com ISIS-K

Terrorist Arrested. The System That Made Him Still Thrives.

On March 5, 2025, President Donald Trump announced the arrest of Mohammad Sharifullah, also known as “Jafar,” an ISIS-K operative linked to the August 26, 2021, bombing at Kabul’s Abbey Gate that killed 13 U.S. service members and more than 170 Afghan civilians. While this arrest is a critical counterterrorism success, it also reinforces a long-standing truth: Pakistan remains deeply entangled with the militant networks that continue to threaten regional and global security.

Sharifullah’s Capture: A Joint Intelligence Operation

Sharifullah was apprehended near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border by a Pakistani intelligence unit, acting on CIA intelligence. Once in custody, he was transferred to U.S. authorities and now faces prosecution in Washington, D.C. According to the Department of Justice, he admitted during an FBI interview on March 2, 2025, that he helped prepare for the Abbey Gate suicide bombing by scouting the area and planning the attack route to avoid detection.

This arrest confirms what counterterrorism analysts have long argued: the Afghanistan-Pakistan border remains a lawless corridor exploited by terror groups. Sharifullah’s presence in this zone is no coincidence—it’s part of a broader pattern enabled by decades of strategic tolerance and facilitation of extremists by the Pakistani state.

Former CIA officer Sarah Adams, who led investigations into terrorist threats including Benghazi: Know Thy Enemy, has publicly questioned the U.S. narrative. She stated that while Sharifullah met ISIS-K leaders the week of the bombing, his role was minor—delivering messages, not planning attacks.

“My biggest concern is that Sharifullah—someone so low-level—is being treated like a Bin Laden… Our government is treating him like a high-value target when he’s not.”

ISI and the Militant Ecosystem

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has a decades-long history of nurturing militant proxies. The Haqqani Network—a group responsible for high-profile attacks including assaults on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul—has been called a “veritable arm” of the ISI by Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Despite banning the Haqqani Network in 2015 after pressure from then-Secretary of State John Kerry, Pakistan never dismantled its infrastructure. Instead, the network continued operations and today has deep ties with the Taliban government in Kabul.

Sharifullah’s affiliation with ISIS-K does not make Pakistan’s role any less central. In fact, ISIS-K was founded in 2015 by disaffected members of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other regional militants—many of whom were trained, funded, or sheltered within Pakistani borders. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center have both highlighted how ISIS-K exploits ungoverned spaces in the border region to plan, recruit, and launch attacks.

A Pattern of Duplicity

The Sharifullah case fits into a broader pattern of Pakistan playing both sides. While accepting billions in U.S. counterterrorism aid—$33 billion between 2002 and 2018—Pakistan continued to shelter and empower groups responsible for attacks on American forces and Afghan civilians. Osama bin Laden lived in Abbottabad for years, just a short drive from Pakistan’s military academy, before being killed by U.S. Navy SEALs in 2011.

President Trump was among the few U.S. leaders who openly called out Pakistan’s duplicity. In a January 2018 tweet, he declared that the U.S. had given Pakistan “more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years,” and received “nothing but lies and deceit” in return. Later that month, the Trump administration suspended $300 million in military aid due to Pakistan’s failure to take “decisive action” against terrorist groups targeting American forces.

Pakistan’s Continued Challenges

Despite various military operations and counterterrorism laws, Pakistan has failed to eliminate safe havens for militants. Groups like the TTP and ISIS-K remain active, resilient, and capable of launching deadly attacks. The United States Institute of Peace notes that while Pakistan backs the Afghan Taliban, the Taliban continues to shelter the TTP—Pakistan’s own internal threat. The irony is deadly: Islamabad enables the very forces that later turn their guns on Pakistani soil.

Conclusion: More Than One Arrest

Mohammad Sharifullah’s arrest is a milestone, but it cannot be viewed in isolation. It is a symptom of a deeper, systemic issue: Pakistan’s long-standing entanglement with jihadist groups. Until that nexus is broken—through pressure, sanctions, and diplomatic accountability—the threat will persist.

True justice for the victims of the Kabul airport bombing requires more than prosecution. It demands that the U.S. and its allies confront the uncomfortable reality of Pakistan’s terror infrastructure. Only by dismantling the pipeline that produces men like Sharifullah can regional and global security be assured.

Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021—with direct support and safe harbor from Pakistan—Afghanistan has once again descended into authoritarian rule and extremism. The regime’s hardline enforcement of Sharia law has erased decades of progress, banning women from schools, workplaces, and public life. These actions have turned Afghanistan into a pariah state—isolated, oppressive, and increasingly unstable.

More critically, Afghanistan is once again becoming a haven for terrorist groups. ISIS-K, Al-Qaeda, and other extremist networks now operate freely under the Taliban’s watch, raising alarms across global intelligence communities. The arrest of Mohammad Sharifullah, the ISIS-K operative behind the Abbey Gate bombing, is a grim reminder: the threat did not end with the U.S. withdrawal—it evolved and embedded itself deeper into a region historically used to harbor and export terror.

America must not repeat the mistake of turning its back on Afghanistan. U.S. disengagement in the 1990s gave terrorists space to plan 9/11. Today, the risk is just as real. One captured terrorist does not absolve Pakistan, nor does it make the Taliban a partner. These actors have long played both sides—sheltering extremists while leveraging diplomacy for legitimacy.

Terrorists cannot be allies. The United States must be clear-eyed and firm: there can be no recognition of the Taliban and no trust extended to Pakistan simply because they handed over one operative. The stakes are too high. Afghanistan’s collapse into extremism threatens not just the region—but the security of the world. Not again. Not on our watch.


About the Author
Ahmad Shah Mohibi is the Founder of Rise to Peace and Director of Counterterrorism. He is a former U.S. advisor who supported U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Washington. He authored Inside the Mindset of Terrorists, a chapter in NATO’s Enduring Mission: Security in a Changing World, and has written more than 100 articles, including a landmark report on ISIS-K.
X: @ahmadsmohibi

Digital Extremism

Digital Extremism

The world has been evolving each day, and by that, society is quickly adapting and changing its means of communication. Not so long ago, people would send letters to get in contact with friends and family that lived in other cities or states but now, talking to loved ones is easier, as staying in touch through social media is a reality. Although the use of these platforms improved many things in the modern world, they have also been used for bad purposes such as digital extremism. 

In this sense, social media platforms have been essential in recruiting new members for radical and extremist groups. At the beginning of digital extremism, the primary source for jihad propaganda was found in terrorist websites with mostly Arabic content with little information available in English. However, extremists started to use more interactive and western forms of social media, such as YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc. These platforms are specially utilized due to the anonymity they provide for the user, which for terrorists is the main priority, because of the greater protection they can get from law enforcement personnel. 

An example of the use of social media for online radicalization is Facebook, the largest social media site in the world. On Facebook people can create secret groups and add whoever they want to them, which can be used as a valuable tool to attract like-minded radicals to a cause. Also, the use of violent images can attract people’s curiosity toward propaganda. In addition to that, links in more moderate and sympathizer pages can direct the user to more hard-line propaganda pages that contain more information on extremism, such as data on jihad or white supremacist extremism with details on how the reader can become a member or prepare to conduct an attack. 

With the benefits that the use of social media generates for extremist recruiters, it is easy to acknowledge that research indicates that 90 percent of terrorist activity on the internet takes place using some type of social networking tool. The easiness that using the online spread of terrorism creates is deeply connected to the simpleness of uploading videos from smartphones or computers because radicals can actively do it wherever and whenever they want to and with the use of VPN, making it difficult to track their activity. Nevertheless, it is essential to recognize that the shift towards social media forums does not make jihad websites obsolete, because links provided in social media forums are usually redirected to these traditional sites, where important propaganda or practical information is available.

In essence, the diversification of social media, the growth of closed social media platforms, and the proliferation of anonymity among extremist propaganda pose new challenges to law enforcement agencies and intelligence services that seek to track and limit the activities of extremists that make the use of digital platforms. To contain the recruitment of young people, for example, the school plays an important role in addressing the issue, by talking to students and making sure that kids, teenagers, and young adults understand the danger of accessing certain links and talking to strangers online. Education is key to preventing this type of extremism to keep occurring and tackling the problem at its core, in the recruitment of new members.

Luiza Fernandes, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow.

Climate Change Fueled Eco-Terrorism: The Nexus Explained

We are sinking”: A Speech from the Sea

Tuvalu’s foreign minister Simon Kofe addressed the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) knee-deep in the sea to remind the world about climate emergencies and make world leaders realize the plight of residents of sinking island states. Although rising sea levels and climate change triggered by global warming are global threats, they may have minimal and reversible effects on some states. In contrast, other states may be disproportionately affected by climate change’s devastating impact, thereby making them early victims of climate change. For instance, the Small Island Developing States (SIDS)[1], a designation given by the United Nations to a group of 38 UN member states and 20 non-UN member states facing comparable sustainable development challenges, are on the verge of sinking due to the warming of the ocean and melting of land ice. The situation is alarming as it places them on the frontline of climate change and the survival of their statehood and population is at stake. The residents of sinking island states are exposed to unique social, economic, and environmental vulnerabilities. It is essential to brief on the vulnerabilities caused by climate change to formulate a theoretical framework to establish the link between climate change and violent extremism.

Climate Change Vulnerability

Climate change detrimentally affects a region’s ecosystem and directly disturbs the social and economic lives of people. First, unpredictable changes in weather conditions disrupt the agricultural cycle. Second, such regions are prone to natural calamities. Third, residents’ livelihood, especially those relying on fisheries, agriculture, and livelihood, is severely affected, thereby widening economic inequality. Fourth, food scarcity and poverty rates will uncontrollably spike, leading to intergenerational malnourishment and inequality. Fifth, climate change induces forced migration and displacement. Sixth, climate change disproportionately affects women as caregivers making them vulnerable to natural calamities such as floods and drought. Also, data indicate that eighty percent of the victims of forced displacement due to climate change are women[2]. Seventh, climate anxiety weakens the resilience capacities of people, and it erodes their faith in government, thereby causing political instability. Eighth, a study by the Harvard Kennedy School indicated that rising temperature and criminal behavior are intrinsically related, and the former positively influences the latter[3]. Ninth, climate skepticism, misinformation, lack of climate literacy, and awareness cause delusion; Consequently, delays public participation in combating climate change. Tenth, climate change disrupts the effective implementation of sustainable development goals.  The list is not exhaustive, and the author believes that the unknown vulnerabilities of climate change outnumber the known ones.

The Nexus Explained in Light of the ‘Black Hole Theory’

The nexus between violent extremism and climate change is becoming more apparent. An area severely affected by climate change breeds vulnerabilities, making it fertile ground for radicalization and violent extremism to flourish. The problem evolves into a vicious cycle, with climate change breeding violent extremism and vice versa. Theoretically, this nexus can be explained in light of the black hole theory. Previously this theory was applied to explain the nexus between organized crime and terrorism. In the context of climate change, ‘black hole’ refers to the points of convergence between violent extremism and climate change vulnerabilities. It means areas severely affected by climate change become ‘black holes’ for violent extremism to breed.

The United Nations Development Programme’s report on the rise of violent extremism in the ‘lake chad basin’ in the Central African region portrays the nexus between violent extremism and climate crisis[4]. Similarly, a severe drought followed by food insecurity in Yemen allowed AQAP, Al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch, to capitalize on rising poverty to recruit members[5].

Eco-Terrorism Fueled by Climate Crisis

Eco-terrorism or eco-extremism, an extreme version of the radical environmentalism movement, stems from the non-conformist view of ecocentrism. According to this, it is anthropogenic activities that are responsible for environmental degradation. Hence the disaffected members believe that it is imperative to stop humankind by any means from damaging the environment. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines eco-terrorism as “the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally oriented, subnational group of environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature.[6]

The tactics used for eco-terrorism may range from tree spiking to arson and monkeywrenching. For instance, in 1989, John P. Blount, a member of an environmental extremist group called Earth First, was convicted for tree spiking in Idaho’s Clearwater National Forest. According to the FBI, tree spiking is an act of terrorism aimed at sabotaging expensive logging equipment and severely harming the workmen[7]. In another instance, the FBI reported on an arson case that was aimed at spreading terror in the ‘seattle luxury houses.’ The suspects left a protest sign titled “Built green? Nope black!” at the crime scene[8]. The tactics used by the disaffected members of eco-terrorism make them different from other eco-centric communities.

Radicalization to Eco-Terrorism

Climate change-affected areas are fragile to numerous vulnerabilities, and extremist groups capitalize on these vulnerabilities to radicalize the population. Such groups induce violent extremist views in individuals by using the following tactics:

  •   You are bearing someone else’s burden: Disinformation about climate change is the tool used to spread eco-terrorism. The object is to create hatred against individuals and entities involved in large infrastructural projects. The recruits are misled to believe that the climate change-related disadvantages they face are due to projects that take a toll on the natural environment.
  •   Concern for future generation: Fear and insecurity about the future is induced in the minds of individuals. They are misinformed that if they fail to act, the survival of their future generations will be at stake, and their entire race will be forever wiped off from the face of Earth.
  •   Fear of forced displacement: The victims of climate change are made to believe that they will be deprived of shelter, livelihood, and quality of life. Further, forced displacement would split the population, and eventually, they will be in a situation of statelessness.
  •   Earth destroyers are set free: The victims of climate change are made aware of the weak criminal law regime against ecocide. They are disinformed that the environmental offenders are left unpunished, and hence they have to punish those who escape the law. The Seattle arsenal attack is an example of this.
  •   Take arms for Earth: This stage is the last phase of radicalization and the beginning of eco-terrorism. It induces a sense of negative responsibility on individuals and makes them believe that failure to prevent environmental degradation would make them equally culpable as the offender.

Conclusion

Former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson expressed his concern that climate change could fuel extremism and form a potential threat to global security[9]. This global threat requires a global response, with international organizations, governments (at all levels), the private sector, and other think tanks working cooperatively and collaboratively to combat this version of violent extremism. Hence, the international and national legal regime on climate change must be strengthened. It must include effective implementation of sustainable development goals that will stall climate-induced vulnerabilities and combat violent extremism from taking root. In addition, specific climate action needs to be strengthened, such as enforcing penal law on ecocide, promoting climate literacy and resilience-building programs, ensuring active participation of women and youth in combating climate change and setting up deradicalization institutes.

[1] United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing

Countries and Small Island Developing States, “About Small Island Developing State”, available at, https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/about-small-island-developing-states, last accessed on July 23, 2022.

[2] United Nations Development Programme. (2015). Resource guide on gender and climate change. available at https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/Resource.pdf, last accessed on October 04, 2022

[3] Harvard Kennedy School. (2012). Crime Weather and Climate Change. available at https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/ranson_2012-8.FINAL.pdf, last accessed on October 03, 2022

[4] United Nations Geneva. (2021). Lake Chad Basin: “Fighting Terrorism, ‘decisive test’ on biggest challenges of our time. available at https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2021/11/lake-chad-basin-fighting-terrorism-decisive-test-biggest-challenges-our, last accessed on October 04, 2022.

[5] Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies. (2012). “Yemen and Al-Qaida”. available at, https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Yemen_and_al-Qaeda.aspx last accessed on October 24, 2022.

[6] Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2002). Eco-terrorism. available at https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/the-threat-of-eco terrorism#:~:text=The%20FBI%20defines%20eco-terrorism%20as%20the%20use%20or,beyond%20the%20target%2C%20often%20of%20a%20symbolic%20nature., last accessed on October 01, 2022.

[7] ibid

[8] Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2008). The Seattle Eco-terrorism investigation. available at https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/march/seattlearson_030408.html, last accessed on October 02, 2022.

[9] Reuters. (2021). Johnson says climate change could fuel extremism. available at  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i77BoB-tINw, last accessed on October 03, 2022. 

Varun VM, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow.