by Josephine Neulen

What Becomes of Returning ISIS Fighters?


Graphic from the Washington Post[1]

Since the Islamic State’s collapse in Syria and Iraq, returning jihadists pose a problem to countries that don’t know how to handle the risk they present. While most are imprisoned, some are being rehabilitated. The rehabilitation process is costly and long and it raises questions about how to deal with radicalized individuals and avoid additional radicalization and violence[2].

Solutions for de-radicalizing jihadists and their children are hardly one-size-fits-all. Especially when the people in question were not directly involved in attacks or violence, but could still radicalize others. While most countries have addressed the problem of returnees in their respective criminal justice systems, some critics have been vocal about potential negative ramifications.

In an interview with I.R.I.N. (Integrated Regional Information Networks), the father of a radicalized Kosovan fighter states that steep jail sentences will not help returnees, but rather encourage more people to become radicalized[3]. That may be true. By punishing returnees harshly, states run the risk of giving extremist groups more reasons to feel antagonized and persecuted, which they, in turn, could use in their rhetoric when radicalizing others.

The problem is that there are limited options for such people. While de-radicalization programs exist, they are costly and must be tailored to each individual. The programs work if done properly, but with approximately 5,600 fighters returning home, it is difficult, if not impossible, to accommodate so many at-risk people[4].

That said, mass incarceration does not eliminate the problem in the long run. A radicalized person needs to create a new identity and life purpose that does not revolve around violence. Therefore, a fusion of de-radicalization programs and incarceration might be the most efficient, realistic option for most states.

[1] Meko, Tim. Analysis | Islamic State fighters returning home. (Feb 22,2018.). Retrieved March 6, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-fighters/
[2] Meko, Tim. Analysis | Islamic State fighters returning home. (Feb 22,2018.). Retrieved March 6, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-fighters/
[3]Nianias, Helen. Lessons from Kosovo? How a European hotbed of Islamist extremism deals with returning fighters. (2018, March 2). https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2018/03/02/lessons-kosovo-how-european-hotbed-islamist-extremism-deals-returning-fighters
[4]  Meko, Tim. Analysis | Islamic State fighters returning home. (Feb 22,2018.). Retrieved March 6, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-fighters/

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 by Maya Norman

An Organizational Tactic or a Volunteer’s Catharsis: Is Suicide Terrorism Strategic for All Parties Involved?


© Copyright Glomacs

Many mistakenly believe that suicide terrorism is an act undertaken by the most deranged in a group of deranged people. Others contend that suicide terrorism is irrational, counterproductive, and plain crazy. Prominent scholars have proven otherwise — suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic. The details are calculated, from the logistics of the act to how it will advance the group’s cause. Where strategy is less conspicuous, however, is in the individual’s motivation. Individuals often engage in suicide terror to salve deeply-harbored rage or to exact revenge. Robert Pape, a leading academic on the topic, focuses on the strategic logic of suicide terror in terms of the organization as a whole. While this perspective does not invalidate Pape’s thesis, I contend that it is vital to distinguish the group’s strategy from the individual’s incentive. Pape’s dismissal of the individual’s motive weakens an otherwise sound analysis.

In his article The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Robert Pape argues that suicide terrorism is not, despite common misconceptions, attributable to religious indoctrination or psychological predispositions. Rather, he argues that suicide attacks are intended to achieve political goals. Namely, they intend to coerce a target government to change policy, to mobilize additional recruits and to generate financial support. Often, terrorist organizations want to end foreign occupations in their homeland. The threat of indiscriminate, collective punishment is built into the attack’s design to coerce a government to withdraw state military forces.

It may be difficult for the average person to understand suicide terror, but in the context of traditional battlefield norms, it becomes clearer. Louise Richardson, the author of the book What Terrorists Want, argues that suicide terrorism is logical. Martyring oneself to kill others is consonant with warrior behavior throughout history. Soldiers engage in risky, albeit highly rewarding plans. They are aware that death is a possibility. Patriotism is reason enough for soldiers to sacrifice their lives. After all, 105 countries, the United States included, have robust militaries despite lacking enforced military conscription. In the context of traditional war, such notions are associated with valor. Yet a suicide bomber is written off as crazy. Like any group engaged in warfare, terror strategists choose tactics that benefit the organization, and the cause, the most. Per Pape and Richardson both, terror organizations continue using suicide as a tactic because it works.

Suicide terror campaigns are performed with specific nationalistic goals in mind. Ergo, organizational use of such attacks is part of a strategy, not random violence carried out by the mentally ill. The overarching goal is to coerce troop withdrawal from terrorists’ homelands. But the dedication to organizational strategy in the attack’s every level lends credence to Pape’s thesis. Organizations that use suicide terror, for example, consider the target and the timing carefully to maximize coercive effects.

Suicide terrorists target democracies because they are perceived as vulnerable to collective punishment. Terror organizations strategically attack states that are limited in their ability to respond. Democracies have checks and balances. Byzantine political channels must be navigated before responding to attacks with military force. Whereas authoritarian states lack such inhibitions and can respond with ferocity.

Terrorist leaders are strategic at macro and micro levels. In addition to carefully choosing their target country and timing, they diligently select the individual for the mission. Terror strategists choose a psychologically sound member and train, supervise, and encourage that person. The advent of female suicide bombers indicates organizations are shifting tactics in response to counter-terror efforts. The upsurge in female attackers in Iraq coincided with security forces’ improved ability to detect and impede male attackers.  Leaders take advantage of traditional female apparel, which often consists of a floor-length abaya. Devices strapped to a female’s body are harder to detect given all that fabric. Due to religious and cultural austerity, police guards rarely search women.

I am sympathetic to Pape’s thesis, but it is too broad and errs in its parochial view of the phenomenon from the perspective of the terrorist organization. His dismissal of a suicide bomber’s personal motives is short-sighted. Pape argues that “…although study of the personal characteristics of suicide attackers may someday help identify individual terrorist organizations [that] are likely to recruit…the vast spread of suicide terrorism over the last two decades suggests that there may not be a single profile.” While this is valid, Pape fails to see that examining the personal characteristics of the suicide bomber has worth beyond the likelihood of identifying them in advance. Other authors have noted that suicide terrorists are often motivated by revenge and glory. Richardson embraces much of Pape’s thesis, but her discussion of individual motivation helps to fill in Pape’s analytic gaps.

While Pape grazes individual motivation in suicide terror, he focuses on characteristics bombers lack, rather than traits they possess. He posits that suicide bombers are generally neither fanatical nor extremely religious. It is worth emphasizing, however, that suicide bombers often act for personal reasons and not of accord with the group’s cause. Richardson touches on the motive variance between leaders and volunteers. She points out, “When leaders of terrorist groups speak of suicide attacks, they are hard-nosed and tactical. When volunteers speak of suicide attacks, they are emotional and excited.”

The individual yearning for martyrdom, regardless of underlying motivations, benefits terror strategists since they need members who are willing to die. According to Pape, the strategic logic of suicide terrorism revolves around the advancement of a group’s nationalist agenda and the symbiotic phenomenon of attackers killing out of hatred for an occupation in their homeland. One would-be suicide bomber stated, “I know we are fighting against the Americans and they are the occupation. We are doing it for God’s sake. We are doing it as jihad.”  Women, in particular, find motivation in response to their inferior social status. Because many women live in isolated communities controlled by extremists, knowing that a suicide attack will give them an identity is a driving factor.

Pape uses the absence of a terrorist profile as justification to ignore individual motivations in favor of a broader thesis.  Theses such as Pape’s are innocuous in academia. But in the policy world, his failure to examine personal motivations could prove consequential.

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 by John Sims

Terrorism or Just Terror: When Horror Springs From Within


© Lisa Marie Pane/AP, The Atlantic

Alyssa Alhadeff. Scott Beigel. Martin Duque Anguiano. Nicholas Dworet. Aaron Feis. Jamie Guttenberg. Chris Hixon. Luke Hoyer. Cara Loughran. Gina Montalto. Joaquin Oliver. Alaina Petty.  Meadow Pollack. Helena Ramsay. Alex Schachter. Carmen Schentrup. Peter Wang.

These are the names of the Parkland victims. They were students, teachers, and coaches. They had dreams, hopes, and ambitions. They were all lost too soon and they must all be remembered.

The Parkland victims are the latest in an all-too familiar-cycle of events in the United States.  There have been twenty-five major school shootings since the Columbine massacre in 1999.  American children harbor ever-present fears of school shootings, parents anxiously await calls from loved ones, and the United States remains paralyzed.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3xoVCJOoB8

But is it terrorism? The Federal Bureau of Investigation distinguishes two major forms of terrorism: international and domestic. International terrorism is that which is committed by an individual or group, inspired by or associated with a designated foreign terrorist organization or state. Alternatively, domestic terrorism is that which is perpetrated by an individual or group inspired by or associated with domestic political, religious, social, racial, or environmental ideas. Pared down, terrorism is a tactic. It is employed in the pursuit of a political goal to generate fear and intimidation in a specific population.

School shootings bear many of terrorism’s hallmarks.  Certainly, they are designed to stoke fear and intimidation.  Their target populations are schools and the individuals who attend them: children, teachers, and administrators.  However, school shooters are not typically motivated by political goals. They are not ordinarily tied to underlying terrorist causes like religious, racial, or social issues. Consequently, most school shootings are not considered terrorism.

We’ve learned that dozens of people in the Parkland shooter’s orbit, prior to the attack, reported him to authorities as a troubled person. Shortly after the shooting, rumors surfaced that the shooter had ties to a white supremacist group.  However, as of this writing, the Parkland shooter’s motivations remain unclear.

What would make a school shooting terrorism and not just terrifying? If we learn that the Parkland shooter entered the school to kill students in the name of a white supremacist idea, then Parkland could rightfully be called terrorism.  If he was motivated by religious or social grievances, Parkland could be described as terrorism. However, absent such verifiable motivations, labeling the attack and others like it domestic terrorism is far from a slam-dunk.  This remains true, despite a consensus that the attack was a consummately terrifying act perpetrated against the Parkland students and administrators as well as the psyches of students, teachers, and parents across our country.

Fear is ever-present, we are warned that violent, religious zealots can strike anywhere, anytime. We’re no longer safe on our streets; vehicles can be used as weapons of war.  Churches and synagogues are no longer sacrosanct oases from our daily lives, let alone violence if gunmen are bent on bringing terror through the doors.  Places we used to associate with leisure – movie theaters, outdoor concerts, schools – have lost the veneer of security. We are told if we see something, say something – anything suspicious must be pointed out.

More must be done to prevent school shootings.  Regardless of what we call the events or the motivations of perpetrators, more must be done.  We must see improvements in school safety, improved mental health awareness and access, and additional, achievable gun safety measures.  America’s children are being conditioned to expect school shootings. Drills, meant to teach students how to remain safe if the unconscionable occurs, are a new focus of the classroom experience. But the drills themselves instill the student body with fear and trepidation.

Apparently, if the United States cannot see an act of violence through the lens of international terror, then little gets done.  9/11 made the United States rethink airport security. Anthrax letters sent to Congress inspired the implementation of thorough mail-screening measures. Laptops were briefly banned [JS2] on U.S. airlines after it was discovered that they could be weaponized by terrorists. Yet, school shootings persist without sensible changes.

The generation advancing through our school system now has been initiated in blood and war. The post 9/11 generation was born into a world of ubiquitous terror, it is their normal. War, violence, both occur daily. Our youth are bombarded with reports of tragic events at home and abroad. The bad actors are known by all. It cannot be lost on these children that their lives are radically different from those of their parents, the latter of whom did not experience similar fears of school shootings on a day-to-day basis.

In closing, and at the risk of seeming contradictory, school shootings are less prevalent than appears to be the case and they do not inflate the level of daily gun violence in the United States. The difference is that each horrible act is inflicted en masse on an innocent, vital segment of our population. The children in school now will be our workers and leaders tomorrow.  We cannot allow these horrors to continually be inflicted on them without expecting a traumatized population to emerge.

 

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 by Austin Ludolph

Terrorism in Africa: Will Tillerson Tip the Scale?

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson traveled to meet with leaders of five African nations this week. He is there to strengthen U.S.-African ties and discuss security and counterterrorism. The countries he will be visiting include Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Chad, and Nigeria. Certainly, his trip will also see him mending fences with leaders in the wake of President Trump’s “sh*thole countries” comment. That notwithstanding, Secretary Tillerson is in Africa to check in on counterterrorism efforts.

© Jeremiah Wakaya Secretary Tillerson’s plane touches down at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. He is received by Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Monica Juma and U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Robert Godec.

Secretary Tillerson will be, “…visiting nations engaged in battling Islamist terrorism, including Djibouti, home to Camp Lemonnier, America’s largest and most vital African military base,” [1]. Countries most steeped in conflict with prominent terrorist groups al-Shabaab and Boko Haram will command the bulk of the secretary’s time. Tillerson spoke at George Mason University hours before leaving for Africa. He provided the rationale for choosing the five countries, explaining that the United States has key prospects, troops, interests, and allies in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Chad, and Nigeria. Doubtless, he will be visiting Ethiopia which,“…is a close U.S. ally in its counterterrorism operations in East Africa, notably against al-Shabab,” [1].

© Austin Ludolph Before his departure for Africa, Secretary Tillerson discusses security, economic welfare, and counterterrorism with George Mason University’s President, Ángel Cabrera 

Tillerson gives an impression of equanimity, praising, “…the role the African Union and G5 Sahel Group have taken on the security and counterterrorism front.” Tillerson pledged, “…$60 million from the U.S. to the G5 security force,” this year. [2] Trump’s feelings may differ. His, “…latest budget proposal in February slashed spending for Africa by 37%, down $3.1 billion from current levels,” [3]. Time will tell how the trip affects counterterrorism and security measures in Africa. As you read these words, imagine Mr. Tillerson trying to repair this:

http://abcn.ws/2G5Yh71

Sources:

1. https://www.dailyrepublic.com/wires/tillerson-arrives-in-africa-with-a-narrow-mission-counterterrorism/
2. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/06/politics/tillerson-africa-challenges/index.html
3.http://abcnews.go.com/International/tillerson-cleaning-trumps-derogatory-comments-day-africa-trip/story?id=53609344

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 by Rise to Peace

Jihadist Violence in Burkina Faso

Twin terrorist attacks targeting Burkina Faso’s army headquarters and the French embassy shook the country’s capital, Ouagadougou on March 2nd (Associated Press). The attacks were conducted by two groups of men, each with 4 to 5 people, and left 30 dead (including nine perpetrators) and 85 wounded. According to the International Crisis Group, “The attacks represent an alarming escalation for Burkina Faso in terms of organization, lethality of armaments and length of engagement,” (BBC). Symbolic locations in the capital were chosen as they represent power and authority to terrorist groups throughout the region. The attacks have heightened concerns about Burkina Faso’s increased jihadist violence.

The attacks appeared to be coordinated. One set of men drove to the army headquarters’ main entrance. Using a rocket-propelled grenade they made their way through the front gate. Inside the complex, a second vehicle packed with explosives hurtled toward the headquarters’ main building, at which point it detonated, causing damage not only to the building but also to the infrastructure surrounding it. The attackers then opened fire on military personnel near the main building’s courtyard. Reports have been confirmed by French and Burkinabe forces. Measures have been taken to heighten security around the complex but more measures are in order to secure additional terrorist targets throughout the country.

A group of attackers tried to enter the French embassy but were repelled. They then shifted positions, encircling the embassy and exchanging fire with Burkinabe security forces.  Burkinabe forces were supported by French military personnel, who in turn, had been deployed by helicopter around the building. The ensuing gunfight lasted several hours. French support was crucial to the local security force’s defense. According to a French military source, “Burkinabé forces were crushed at the beginning. We helped them,” (Depagne). According to Rinaldo Depagne, West Africa Program Director at The International Crisis Group, despite that Burkinabe forces were unable to counter the assailants on their own, “…compared to the previous two attacks in Ouagadougou in 2016 and 2017, the response time and organization of the reaction seem slightly improved.” Burkinabe security forces would benefit from additional training from international forces in the area in order to be more effective should a similar attack unfold in the future.

AFP PHOTO / Ahmed OUOBA (Photo credit AHMED OUOBA/AFP/Getty Images)

Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin claimed responsibility for the attack the next day, March 3rd.  JNIM, or, translated to English: The Group to Support Muslims and Islam, aka GSIM, is an al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel region, comprised of formerly disparate jihadist groups including Ansar Eddine, al-Mourabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front. JNIM’s leader, Iyad ag Ghali, said the attack was retaliation for French military airstrikes on February 14th. During that attack, a number of JNIM’s leaders, including the deputy of Mourabitoun, al-Hassan al-Ansari, and Malick ag Wanasnat, an ag Ghali confidant, were killed. That mission was part of an increased effort by Malian armed forces (FAMA) working closely with French counter-terrorism, aka The Barkhane, in support of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Burkina Faso has experienced a spate of terrorist attacks since experiencing a coup in 2015. Notably, in January 2016, 30 people were killed in the capital by an attack claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). On August 13th, 2017 jihadists shot up a Turkish restaurant in the capital killing 19 and wounding 25. Areas in the country’s north, along its border with its unstable neighbor, Mali, have also seen jihadist violence. Many of the attacks have been conducted by Ansarul Islam, a local Islamist group with working ties to jihadist organizations in Mali.

Burkina Faso’s security forces deteriorated following the departure of President Blaise Compaoré in October 2014, rendering them incapable of repelling attacks like those on March 2nd. According to Burkinabe sources, the army has become disorganized. The Presidential Security Regiment (RSP), Burkinabe’s special forces, were dismantled and have not been replaced since the president left. According to the International Crisis Group, “Intelligence gathering appears to be weak, judging by the failure to detect or disrupt the major attacks that happened on Friday. Two teams totaling at least eight men were able to cross the city center carrying heavy weapons and driving a car full of explosives without being spotted,” (Depagne). Burkinabé authorities suspect members of their own army leaked vital information, aiding the attackers. Military attaches under President Compaore’s leadership, including spymaster Gilbert Diendéré, had been in charge of a comprehensive, international intelligence network that was quite effective. Key counterterrorism structures have not been replaced since their departure.

Steps have been taken to operationalize the G5 Sahel Joint Force, supported by France plus Burkina Faso and four of its neighbors. Military officials claim task force meetings were in progress when the attacks occurred. The attacks, in fact, may have been aimed at discouraging the mobilization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

Failure to address security challenges in Burkina Faso could lead to the intensification of an already complex regional conflict. The international community, including organizations like the United Nations, should cooperate to prevent the country from falling further into violence and instability. Cooperation to implement such efforts and foster stability in the region has worked in the past. It can work today and in the future as well.

Sources:

  1. Depagne, Renaldo. “Burkina Faso’s Alarming Escalation of Jihadist Violence.” Crisis Group, ICG, 7 Mar. 2018, www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/burkina-fasos-alarming-escalation-jihadist-violence.
  2. “Burkina Faso Attack: French Embassy Targeted in Ouagadougou.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Mar. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43257453.
  3. Press, Associated. “Burkina Faso Authorities Arrest 8 after Jihadist Attacks.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 6 Mar. 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-authorities-arrest-8-after-jihadist-attacks/2018/03/06/6dd16370-2164-11e8-946c-9420060cb7bd_story.html?utm_term=.85043c6874e5.

 

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