by Cameron Hoffman

Personal Reflections on the Tragedy in Beirut

Editor’s Note: Rise to Peace Research Fellow Cameron Hoffman has a close connection with Beirut, Lebanon. He spoke with some of his friends that experienced the August 4th blast and they offered their candid insights. When placed into the context of political and state security, the explosion took on more meaning than just a tragedy. These are personal reflections that will hopefully lead to an enhanced interest in the Lebanese crisis in our readers.

On August 4, a massive explosion rocked the city of Beirut, Lebanon. Improper storage of 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate — an extremely explosive chemical that is found in fertilizers — ignited and caused a blast that left 135 people dead, over 5000 wounded, and displaced over 300,000. Damages are estimated to be approximately $ 15 billion USD.

This day hit very close to home as I spent my summers living in Beirut and still have friends there to this day. I spoke with them a day after the catastrophe only to learn that many members of the church I attended experienced extensive damage to their homes and one close friend is hospitalized after glass pierced his liver following the explosion. As well, the building of the church I attended (over 2.5 miles from the blast site) had its windows shattered into the sanctuary area (sitting area where pews are located). There is significant need for basic supplies like food and water.

Grief and pain turned to rage in the days following the explosion. It became increasingly clear that the accident was easily avoidable if it was not for the level of corruption and mismanagement typical of the Lebanese government. A growing number of e-mails and public court documents show that many government officials knew that the ammonium nitrate seized from a Russian vessel was improperly stored and extremely dangerous for over six years.

The Lebanese people blame the government for the disaster. My friend Moufid said that citizens can no longer tolerate the apathy, mismanagement and corruption any longer. Another friend, Jenny, stated that the protesters and people in general may be unsure of direct responsibility, but they are “fed up” with the whole system and want accountability. She offered that the explosion was merely a “cherry on top” of the deteriorating economic and political situation in Lebanon — a situation that drew millions into the streets before COVID-19 sent them back into their homes.

Indeed, this is a turning point for the Lebanese government. Popular calls for revolution continue to grow and French president Emmanuel Macron — who is overseeing French aid to Lebanon — berated the Lebanese political system as corrupt and in need of “deep change.” His trip to Beirut, and subsequent speeches, echoed the chants of hundreds of protesters that flocked in the streets. He called the explosion “a metaphor for Lebanon’s current crisis,” and said that Lebanon was in need of “a new political order.” Further, Macron stressed the need for an audit of the central bank. He expressed, “If there is no audit of the central bank, in a few months there will be no more imports and then there will be a lack of fuel and of food.”

Additionally, France is organizing an international conference to raise support and assistance for Lebanon, and all funds raised will be handled with “full transparency.” Macron stated that, “there will be no blank checks to a system that does not have the trust of its own people,” and that Lebanese leaders must provide “answers to freedom, reform, and anti-corruption.”

In asking Jenny what she thought was needed for Lebanon to recover she said, “we need new politicians. To start from scratch and remove the current structure and corruption. The people are not going to be fooled anymore, and the corrupt politicians need to be taken to court.” She is one of thousands of young adults who feel the same sentiment.

The event is undoubtedly catastrophic, but hopefully it will lead to changes that the Lebanese people desperately need and deserve. Moufid summarized his thoughts about the future, “We Lebanese are used to destruction and rebuilding again. I believe that God will use this [the explosion] in a way to help rebuild the economy. They will need to rebuild the port as its important to our economy, but we will come back.  It’s natural for us.”

Cameron Hoffman
risetopeace.org
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 by Arman Sidhu

Remittances: Reverberations for Conflict-Ridden Regions

Since the start of the 21st century, the world economy’s reliance on remittances has risen sharply as globalization enabled growth that created favorable incentives for migration through several emerging markets. Remittances, which refer to transfer payments made by foreign workers to their families back home, have benefitted both the likes of high-growth economies, like China and India, as well as weaker states that failed to attract investment due to incessant conflict and instability. In total, remittances (as a % of Gross Domestic Product) have increased by 105% since 1999, fueling household consumption and stepping in as a guarantor of financial security for vulnerable families located in fragile and/or underdeveloped states.

Yet, with lockdowns across the globe interrupting economic activity, the flow of remittances that sustain countries rife with crime, terrorism, and violence has been disrupted. As a result, countries with a high dependency on remittances will be forced to rely on the decisions made by foreign governments, of which they have no influence over. In addition, state-sponsored efforts to monitor and impose mandatory quarantines have disproportionately targeted migrants, limiting their movements, and in many cases, using the opportunity to impose draconian immigration reform to placate political aims.

As one example, Malaysia, which hosts nearly 5 million migrant workers (documented and undocumented), has been particularly aggressive in its COVID-19 response. As a popular destination for workers from a variety of South and East Asia countries, Malaysia’s raids of areas filled with migrants has attracted scrutiny. An Al-Jazeera documentary featuring the experiences of migrants was subsequently responded to with a police investigation of the journalists, followed by accusations of sedition and defamation. One migrant in particular who chose to share his experience with the Al-Jazeera journalists was the subject of a 2-week police manhunt that culminated in his arrest and planned deportation. Similar state-sponsored efforts targeting migrant workers have been cited in other popular migrant destinations like the United States, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Lebanon, among several others.

With migrants unable to earn, the potential economic reverberations will extend far beyond the borders of states that employ, and depend upon, migrant labor. Though several variables can be used to describe remittance-dependent economies, these countries tend to fall in one (or both) of the following categories:

  1. Countries that have struggled to industrialize, leading to a weak manufacturing base. This is often due to, or followed by poor job growth and a lack of diversification beyond the agricultural sector. Examples of such countries would include Tonga, Haiti, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
  2. Countries that are ridden with incessant conflict and chronic crime & terrorism. Such conditions drive the labor supply (particularly younger workers) to work abroad, either in nearby regional hubs or on other continents. Example countries in this category include Yemen, Palestine, South Sudan, and El Salvador.

Should remittance volumes continue to recede in the developing world, the consequences could be vast. Data compiled by the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), estimates that global remittances could drop by as much as $110 Billion USD, or 20% of the annual total. Sixty countries, ranging from low-income to middle-income, depend on remittances for at least 5% of their respective GDP. Furthermore, remittances are responsible for contributing tax revenue for governments, which in turn, provide funding for varied public services, many of which have become only more integral during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the absence of substantial foreign direct investment or multilateral aid, the timeline for recovery will last longest in the countries with the most acute needs. Though aid and investment remain vital sources of capital for low and middle-income countries, they are both dwarfed by the substantial inflows brought in by remittances. In the last year alone, remittances have accounted for $550 billion USD worth of funds in such countries.

Regardless of the circumstances, the consistent flow of remittances is vital for sustaining consumption and keeping businesses afloat in remittance-dependent countries. The inability to maintain remittances can result in cascading economic damage. A failure to induce job creation is one of the most oft-cited conditions that can foment, or accelerate, violence through spikes in crime and terrorism. Conflict hotspots in the Sahel region, Gulf region, East Africa, and South Asia are particularly vulnerable, given their outsized regional dependence on remittances to fulfill the most basic living standards.

To help pare the ripple effects that a drop in remittances would create, a handful of solutions could prove useful. First, governments with the capacity to enact stimulus efforts can indirectly assist migrant laborers. Stimulus programs can boost consumption, incentivizing companies that employ migrants to maintain their payrolls to meet market demand. Second, the costs associated with transferring funds across borders can amount between 7-10% in fees. State-led efforts to reduce these cross-border transfer fees ensures that more money reaches the intended recipient(s). Though efforts to establish a global compact are underway, more collaboration is required between those nations that send remittances, and those that receive them.

Ensuring that migrants are equipped with the tools needed to weather the pandemic is not just a humanitarian issue, but an economic one that sets the stage for a quicker post-pandemic transition. Businesses located in migrant-dependent economies, like those found in Southeast Asia and the Gulf region, will not be able to fulfill their workforce needs from domestic labor. Instead, these countries may find themselves competing for the very same migrants they turned away, delaying the opportunity for a global economic recovery.

Arman Sidhu
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 by Cameron Hoffman

Civil Society Organizations as a Possible Structure for Recovery in Lebanon

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Lebanon experienced massive protests calling for a new government in response to declining economic opportunities amongst other issues. While lockdown measures have put these protests on pause, the core grievances remain. Its survival hinges on the ability of the government to address its citizens’ concerns.

However, the disconnect between the government and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that work to combat local issues and aid development puts the Lebanese government at a disadvantage.  To prevent Lebanon from collapsing and adding to the instability of the region a framework built on the cooperation of these two groups to create meaningful policy change must be established.

Lebanon has a long and large history when it comes to CSOs. CSOs in Lebanon are defined as organizations working to promote intra-sectarian cooperation, civic participation, and inclusion in the governance and political order in Lebanon. As of 2015, there were 1.3 CSOs for every 1000 people in Lebanon. Official records indicate that there are 8,311 registered organizations and many more loosely organized groups.  But while the number of CSOs is numerous, the effectiveness of CSOs is extremely limited is due to Lebanon’s political structure and the weak organizational capacity of CSOs.

CSOs are currently largely locked out of the policy creation process because of the Lebanese government’s structure of sectarianism.  This structure breeds tribalism and voting based on sect rather than allegiance to effective governance. Additionally, policymakers are uninterested in working with CSOs, and largely ignore the local issues for pandering to the sect of their constituents and engaging in party politics.

The internal organizational capacity of CSO’s are limited in two major ways. The first, is that accurate information on the group’s functions, membership, and influence is largely unavailable, which makes it difficult for donors to contribute. In fact, over 60% of Lebanese CSOs suffer from a lack of financial resources. The lack of resources leads to the inability to maintain full-time staff, operate offices, and other essential functions or successful organizations. The second is that over 41% of CSOs in Lebanon have problems maintaining volunteers. This makes larger community projects unachievable and limits the effectiveness of the CSO, but also its ability to influence policy through citizen pressure on policymakers.

To increase their effectiveness CSOs need to develop reliable information management, create robust strategic plans, keep volunteers engaged, and lastly, develop a relationship with the media. However, unless the government makes changes to cooperate with CSOs the changes CSOs need to make will not greatly increase their effectiveness.

The current “lockout” of CSOs from the policy making process is extremely harmful to maintaining Lebanon’s stability as it approaches a socio-economic collapse. If the crisis of a failed state is to be averted the government needs to include the CSOs to address the local issues that contribute to the larger grievances like the public health crisis (water pollution and poor healthcare) and economic fatigue (18% youth unemployment, low job creation, low wages, mismatch of the job market demands and skills earned in the education sector).

The risk of collapse is predicated on the elites of Lebanon exploiting the relatively liberal political atmosphere and absence of a welfare state to create informal dependency networks that preserve the status-quo.  The lack of cooperation between the government and CSOs allows extremist groups and parties like Hezbollah to use the same strategy to create their own dependency networks that supports the survival of these organizations and adds to the already heightened fragmentation without contributing to the overall well-being of citizens.

A lockout of CSOs from the policy process not only threatens the stability of the region, but will also lockout the inhabitants of Lebanon from experiencing real, and needed, change. Not only does the current Lebanese government need to learn and adapt, but the current situation provides a framework for other states in the region to learn a valuable lesson — failing to include CSOs in the policy making process may preserve the status-quo temporarily, but that it leads to a failure in good governance and eventually political upheaval.

Cameron Hoffman
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 by Jack Ryan

How Will COVID-19 Impact Efforts in Afghanistan?

It is often surmised that modern conflict is characterized by a steady decline in inter-state warfare and increased conflict perpetrated by illegal non-state actors. In the current context, assumptions about a post-COVID-19 world and conflict add to this discussion as it will present a range of unique challenges to the international community. More specifically, COVID-19 will prove to be another factor in the decline of inter-state warfare, but provide a unique opportunity for terror cells and other illegal sub-national organizations to extort at the same time.

Due to the vast economic measures directed to fight the virus domestically as well as funding to support individuals and businesses during mandated lockdown measures, states will have to reexamine their national budgets. Countries will struggle to maintain pre-COVID-19 military spending, especially as citizens’ concerns shift from international affairs to domestic issues.

One only needs to read Geoffrey Blainey’s The Causes of War to get a grasp of his accurate argument that optimism guides a nation’s decision to go to war. Nations have been more inclined to go to war when they are more optimistic of victory and all it takes is one actor’s pessimism to favor a peaceful outcome, even if it means acceptance of conditions that may be less than favorable. COVID-19 has reduced optimism in states around the world. For example, the United Kingdom’s furlough scheme is estimated to have cost the country £60 billion (approximately $76.1 billion USD) between March and July. As nations look to rebuild their coffers, military spending will inevitably fall and with it, public support for military activity abroad.

This leads to the question: what does this mean for Afghanistan and American military engagement in the country?

Firstly, the pandemic has resulted in reduced military activity. As noted in outside analysis, COVID-19 has “prompted the United States and its partners to pause wargaming exercises that are meant to reassure allies and bolster readiness to protect the health of its military members.”

Not only does the U.S. need to keep a close watch over its military spending, but it also needs to keep a closer watch over the health of its fighters. Sailors and soldiers in the field are among the most vulnerable because they are packed together. In addition, it has been noted that, “Ground campaigns in urban areas pose still greater dangers in pandemic times. Much recent ground combat has been in cities in poor countries with few or no public health resources, environments highly favorable to illness. Ground combat also usually produces prisoners, any of whom can be infected.”

Therefore, these factors will result in a growing trend of reluctance of countries to engage, especially those like the U.S. who have entered into conflicts under the banner of the responsibility to protect. This reluctance will also result from social pressures. It is easier for a state to promote counter-terrorism operations when its citizens believe they are directly at risk of becoming a victim of terror. On the other hand, expectations of governments shift when citizens are faced by other threats to their livelihood, such as a pandemic like COVID-19. Support for actions abroad will undoubtedly waver.

COVID-19 and the reaction from the international community will inevitably impact the Afghan government, which was characteristically fractious long before the pandemic. Afghanistan has long struggled with a subpar health care system and the pandemic has only reiterated these struggles. A 2015 study determined that, “For one in five people, a lack of access to health care had resulted in death among family members or close friends within the last year.” Further, the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan reports, “Afghanistan has a total of 35,526 confirmed cases of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) and 1,185 deaths attributed to the disease (Ministry of Public Health).”

The increasing number of cases and evident lack of access to appropriate health care facilities presents an even bigger challenge to a government already stretched thin by the ongoing conflict with the Taliban. President Ashraf Ghani’s government continues to pursue medical relief and stimulus packages including the allocation of “$86 million and then $158 million in the second phase to provide food to people across the country.” However, the critics fear the program will become riddled with corruption, a disease of its own within Afghan leadership. A free bread distribution program set up earlier in the year was found to be compromised by corruption.

Whilst the Afghan government battles corruption, a pandemic and wavering international support, the Taliban continue to launch attacks and publicly blame the Afghan government for the delay in the intra-Afghan peace process. Whilst the ongoing pandemic provides challenges to governments across the world it also provides a unique opportunity for terror organizations to take advantage of these pessimistic and economically weakened states.

As the government diverts security to hospitals as the number of patients rise by the day, the Taliban has taken advantage of the situation launching a range of attacks across the country in an attempt to gain an advantage over the Afghan government before peace talks begin.

Another pressing issue is that of prisons where thousands of Taliban fighters (as well as those of other groups) are incarcerated. It is common knowledge that prison conditions are favorable to the spread of disease. This will present an even greater challenge to a government already stretched thin on the ground.

Thus, it is integral that whilst the U.S. faces domestic pressure, they remain focused on their longest war. The US will need to accept responsibility for the situation in Afghanistan and continue its facilitation of intra-Afghan talks. Though the U.S. and other stakeholders will face increased pressure to reduce military activity in Afghanistan, continued support for the Afghanistan government, especially in the run up to peace talks, is essential. This is extremely important as the Taliban strive to gain any increased bargaining power over a weakened Afghan government.

Jack Ryan
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 by Jack Ryan

The Emergence of Sara Khitta in the Context of the US Involvement in Afghanistan

The period following the United States-Taliban agreement has provided an opportunity for the U.S. to examine its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) ethos and its impact on affected states, specifically Afghanistan. Operations on the ground have changed over this time and so have counter-efforts by the Taliban. It can be noted that the continued conflict in Afghanistan has led to the creation of a group of Taliban fighters known as the Sara Khitta (The Red Group) — an elite force created for the purpose of fighting a powerful adversary through the use of modern tactics and special weaponry.

The U.S. has seen many victories and losses since it began its operations in Afghanistan 18 years (or more precisely 6861 days as of July 20, 2020) ago. However, the legacy of its military intervention must be examined as matters surrounding troop withdrawal and abilities of the Afghan national army continue to be discussed. This is pertinent as Sara Khitta was formed with the specific mission to disrupt the actions of U.S. and Afghan forces.

Aristophanes, a playwright of ancient Athens, once said: “The wise learn many things from their enemies.” Whilst this may be stating the obvious, it is what foreign forces teach their adversaries that should be of more concern to the U.S. After nearly 7000 days of active involvement in Afghanistan, one can only assume that military tactics have been learned and inevitably exploited.

While the U.S. has always held greater firepower, large groups of semi-trained Taliban fighters have been lost during operations. As Mujib Mashal states in his article for the New York Times: “At times, the (Taliban) casualty rates went so high — losing up to hundreds of fighters a week as the Americans carried out an airstrike campaign in which they dropped nearly 27,000 bombs since 2013.” Therefore, the establishment of Sara Khitta demonstrated the need of the Taliban to strengthen their skills and firepower in the wake of these losses.

Sara Khitta have provided two major advantages to the Taliban. Firstly, the use of advanced weaponry and new tactics have “supposedly lowered Taliban casualties while allowing the group to capture large swaths of territory in Helmand”. Secondly, the force provides advantages to the Taliban propaganda campaign plastered across social media and recruitment pages.

For instance, a photo appeared earlier this year showing Ammar Ibn Yasir, the trainer of the Taliban’s Red Group, who is also known as “the Mujahideen of Mujahideen.” Photos such as this as well as others showing the unit performing various aspects of military training form the backbone of a media campaign designed to show the Taliban as a fighting force capable of taking on everyone — including a world superpower.

In addition to showing the glamour and capability of the Taliban’s fighters, the Sara Khitta social media campaign has focused on professionalism. For instance, there are photos that show fighters training in the snow flaunting full tactical gear. However, the unit is not just a photo opportunity. As Commander Murad disclosed to Reuters, “The Taliban ‘Red Unit’ are said to be equipped with advanced weaponry, including night vision scopes, 82mm rockets, heavy machine guns and U.S.-made assault rifles.”

Another aspect of Sara Khitta that has contributed to their success is the secrecy surrounding their group. Reports such as those mentioned previously touch on their weaponry, attacks and social media presence, but the Taliban has kept many details of this unit hidden from their media outlets and went as far as to forbid members from talking to the press. The U.S. military claimed it killed the head of the Taliban’s Red Unit during a strike in Helmand on Dec. 1, 2017. However, this has not drastically slowed their social media campaign and the propaganda value that this unit provides for the Taliban.

As the U.S. and the Afghan government continue on their respective journeys to create peace in Afghanistan, it is important that the U.S. considers its military legacy in the country and uphold the same responsibility to protect as it paves the way for intra-Afghan talks. Whilst fighting the Taliban, the U.S. provided the group with opportunities for growth and development (including the establishment of Sara Khitta) thus it is integral that both the U.S. and Afghan governments can appropriately counter these developments. This is essential in the transition to peace.

Jack Ryan
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