The Liminal Agent: A New Model of Online Radicalisation?

In his recent essay, online extremism researcher Joshua Citarella sketches one of the new psycho-political cartographies of our time: a theory of how the internet no longer merely hosts extremism but actively incubates, mutates, and weaponizes it. His model of online radicalisation, one that emerges from self-directed isolation, deep cognitive immersion, and ideological bricolage, resonates profoundly with what Rise to Peace has identified as the domain of Liminal Warfare: the weaponization of thresholds, ambiguity, and incomplete identity in modern conflict spaces.

Increasingly, the traditional models of threat assessment borne from old threat matrix’s which privilege hierarchical organizations, clear ideological movements, and structured recruitment are inadequate to describe the contemporary threat landscape. In Citarella’s vision, the world of online radicalisation has irreparably changed. Radicalisation today is decentralized, asynchronous, memetic, and most importantly, liminal. It primarily happens in the unstable interzones between identity, ideology, and action.

Citarella’s Model

Citarella proposes that radicalisation, at least in the West, often begins not from prior ideological conviction, but from the condition of existential boredom, social/economic alienation, and exploration. A young person, often socially isolated and politically disenchanted, stumbles into online subcultures while seeking meaning, excitement, or community. They begin to scroll; into gaming forums, irony-poisoned meme pages, “political compass” esoterica, survivalist groups, and ideological echo chambers.

What matters is not a coherent doctrine, but the immersive ritual of searching itself. Platforms that favour algorithmic serendipity (TikTok, YouTube, Reddit) reinforce a pattern of escalating extremity, either through exposure to increasingly niche ideologies or by creating a pseudo-gamified environment where ideological commitment becomes performative currency. Politics becomes the hobby to end all hobbies. In this schema, most individuals never stabilize, instead drifting aimlessly and incoherently from one ideology to the next. They collage incompatible belief systems – eco-fascism one month, anarcho-primitivism the next, post-left accelerationism shortly after, creating an identity formation that is non-linear, recursive, and radically unstable. It is a process that could aptly be described as ‘liminal radicalisation’; the process of radicalisation itself is continuous and disaggregated, with no clear destination in mind.

The Political Economy of Alienation

What Joshua Citarella names as online radicalisation is, in fact, better understood as an emergent symptom of the wider economic decomposition and austerity that has driven radicalisation from the USA to Europe. Beneath the memetic ironies and aesthetic subcultures, beneath even the performative hatred, what one finds is a generation economically stranded and structurally abandoned. These are not natural ideologues – rather, they are young people who feel the burden of a collapsing horizon, where the prospect of an attainable middle-class life has disappeared as material circumstances decline.

In this sense, the online radicalisation pipeline is not ideological in its origins, but material. The typical subject is downwardly mobile, debt-strapped, and shut out of every traditional rite of social mobility: property, partnership, stability, meaning. Where civic institutions, societal inclusion and careers once were, they are confronted instead with deindustrialisation, economic alienation and precarity. Their beliefs are downstream from their estrangement. Liberal democracies, unable or unwilling to address the foundational material crises of our time in housing shortages, wage stagnation, job insecurity and the erosion of public life, have instead left a vacuum into which this new ecology has rushed. It is precisely this vacuum that provides such fertile ground for the blossoming of new, discordant political radicalisation amongst the disaffected online.

Radicalisation as Ritual, Not Recruitment

What Citarella outlines aligns precisely with what we at Rise to Peace conceptualize as the liminal domain of contemporary conflict. Liminality describes the in-between state: the adolescent undergoing a rite of passage, the refugee severed from homeland, the online user between algorithms and reality. In warfare, the liminal is where traditional rules of engagement dissolve, replaced by new architectures of influence, disorientation, and emotional capture. Crucially, Liminal Warfare weaponizes affect before ideology. It seeks to keep populations in a suspended state of insecurity, overstimulation, and yearning, thus rendering them perpetually vulnerable to new vectors of control, recruitment, or activation. Radicalization, under these conditions, is no longer a matter of persuasive argument or charismatic leadership, but rather the ambient result of prolonged cognitive dislocation.

The Liminal Agent

How can we position this new pipeline of online radicalisation?  Doing so requires designating a new actor in the matrix of terror and radicalisation: The Liminal Agent. These are individuals or small cells who do not adhere to conventional organizational structures, but whose radicalization journey makes them latent nodes of potential disruption.

They often exhibit the following features:

  • Non-linear ideological trajectories (far-right to eco-terrorism to esoteric nihilism within months).
  • Memetic accelerationism (using memes not merely as propaganda but as a form of psychological conditioning).
  • Fluid affiliations (no loyalty to any single group, cause, or doctrine).
  • Stochastic violence potential (low predictability of timing, targets, or methods).

Citarella’s model gives empirical substance to this theory. The emerging radical does not require recruitment, as they radicalize through participation. They do not need ideological discipline, as they need only the internet and its ideological input. This is a battlefield of perpetual pre-recruitment, where being “in play” is more important than belonging.

Implications for Counter-Radicalization

The classic counterterrorism model – disrupt leadership nodes, monitor recruitment pipelines, disrupt communication channels – struggles to address this reality. How do you intercept a process without a recruiter? How do you “deradicalize” someone who has never fully radicalized to begin with, but exists in a permanent state of cognitive threshold-crossing?

Such implications require three necessary shifts:

  1. Intervention at the Affective Level: Programs must target emotional needs (belonging, agency, recognition) rather than merely correcting disinformation or promoting tolerance.
  2. Narrative Counter-Liminality: Instead of offering fixed counter-narratives, interventions must provide adaptive narrative scaffolding; ways to help individuals navigate uncertainty without collapsing into extremism.
  3. Liminal Early Warning Systems: Indicators of drift (increased engagement with irony-laden extremist memes, withdrawal from non-digital communities, pattern acceleration) must be mapped and monitored, not just explicit pledges of allegiance.

This, however, represents only an intervention at the level of symptoms. The frameworks proposed here; narrative scaffolding, affective early warning systems, memetic analysis, can only help us insofar as they map the terrain of liminal radicalisation, but they cannot on their own treat its cause. What Citarella’s model ultimately reveals, and what we must refuse to obscure, is that online extremism today is less a question of ideology than of material infrastructure – social, economic, and psychological. It is not born from belief but from absence: the absence of economic security, of community, of a shared future. This absence collapses the very ideological architectures that once made radicalisation intelligible and coherent, and much more is required to be done and researched about this new pipeline of radicalisation that has emerged online if governments and civil society have any hope to limit the spread of its contagion.

Etienne Darcas, Counter-Terror Research Fellow and Media & Terror Program Lead, Rise to Peace

The Crisis in Cabo Delgado: A Familiar Road to Extremism

This is the second piece in a series examining the ongoing extremist threat in Mozambique.

Cabo Delgado, the northernmost region of Mozambique, has been plagued by a radical Islamist insurgency since 2017. But it is only in the last couple of months that the conflict has become a staple of the international news cycle. This relatively low-level insurgency has been carried out by Ahlu-Sunnah Wa-Jama (ASWJ), locally known as al-Shabaab (the youth).

The dramatic siege of Palma, where they terrorized a large district capital for four days in March, and the growing identification of ASWJ with the Islamic State, has prompted a recent whirlwind of pledges and policy responses from international actors.

Though next week’s piece will discuss the methods and missteps of the government and its foreign partners in handling the crisis, we must first understand this seemingly rag-tag group that has evoked such a mass mobilization of troops and resources from around the world.

Identities Along the Coast

Islam has a long history in Mozambique, dating to the 8th century when Muslim traders and conquerors began traversing much of the Indian Ocean, including East Africa. For centuries, Sufism, or mystic Islam, was dominant among Cabo’s Muslims. But the global expansion of traditionalist Salafism and Saudi-oriented Wahhabism in the 1950s and ‘60s produced greater antagonism towards older forms of Islam in Cabo. The new imams and cadres criticized Sufism for allegedly deviating from Islamic doctrine and being too accepting of Western vices and values. 

Three such mosques became staples of the community in Mocímboa da Praia, a district in Cabo Delgado. There, preachers and coastal youth were put in touch with the larger transnational network and ideology of Salafism. Particularly, the teachings of the late Sheikh Rogo. Rogo, sanctioned by the US and UN for supporting Somalia’s al-Shabab, sought the creation of an Islamic State. Upon his death, several of his students immigrated to Cabo. Even though the three mosques have since been shuttered by authorities, many of their adherents became foot soldiers for the nascent ASWJ.

But the at-risk youth who populate Cabo Delgado, are just as vulnerable to socioeconomic pressures as they are to the ideological. ASWJ’s mixture of fundamentalism and banditry offers a sense of belonging, alongside material gains to Cabo’s youth. These young people have been largely disengaged and disillusioned with Mozambican politics, living under the same party their whole lives, with very little economic opportunity even when a trove of natural gas is discovered right in their community.

Relative deprivation theory, elucidated in Ted Gurr’s 1970 classic Why Men Rebel, holds that social upheaval occurs when communities see opportunities that they can’t access. One then understands the path connecting long-abandoned youth to an insurgency eager for recruits.

Identities Exploited for Violence

The March 2021 siege of Palma, capital of Cabo’s northernmost district, can be seen as the culmination of four years of skirmishes and terror across the Mozambican-Tanzanian frontier. ASWJ’s structure and membership originally came from the three mosques in Mocímboa da Praia. It was there that they first declared war. Since their two-day occupation of Mocímboa da Praia in 2017, ASWJ has rapidly increased the scale and number of attacks. This was from 110 attacks between October 2017 and June 2019, to 357 in the first nine months of 2020 alone.

Similar economic woes and shared communal identities have also caused many Tanzanians to come across the border and fortify ASWJ’s numbers and resources. Adding to their momentum, in 2019 the Islamic State (IS), claimed ASWJ as a branch of its Central Africa Province. Consequently, observers have noted that ASWJ uses similar tactics to IS and sometimes waves its notorious black flag during raids.

In what seems like death by a thousand cuts, the people and infrastructure of Cabo Delgado have been bled dry by hit-and-run tactics and cruel, destructive violence. Over 4,000 have died and 600,000 have been displaced thus far. Consequently, the UN recently warned that almost one million people face severe hunger in the region.

Barely able to regain Palma, Mozambican forces will likely be unable to determine the death toll from this bold assault. As a result, the government believes it will take at least $114 million to rebuild Palma. Now the government, much like the Portuguese half a century ago, is left to deal with an insurgency in a region where outside involvement has rarely been constructive or peaceful, and guerrillas are able to sustain themselves for years on end.

A great deal of troops, guns, and finances will be siphoned into the area, but blind violence will likely be unable to dislodge the insurgency. This insurgency is dually rooted in the spiritual conceptions the people have of themselves and the very real experiences they live through every day. Only by understanding this can effective policy be made.

 

Can We Profile the “Classic Terrorist” in Europe’s Most Deadly Attacks?

Over the last 20 years, the increased presence of terrorism in Europe has prompted many attempts to tackle the causes of radicalisation. In doing so, social scientists, journalists and psychologists have invested time, money, and effort into identifying the people behind some of the deadliest attacks. Despite all efforts, profiling terrorists is still a challenge.

Attempts to categorise martyrdom terrorists according to a single common variable is more of a challenge than we may realise. Data regarding martyrdom terrorists assessed by Lewis Herrington revealed many inconsistencies in existing theories. This is surrounding demographics, age, education, and even religious devotion.

Extremist ideology, psychological explanations and statistics do not always match

Albert Bandura’s Social Learning Theory examines how environmental factors pair with cognitive factors to influence human learning and behaviour. According to the Social Learning Theory, the behaviour of a person is influenced by observational learning of environmental factors. Thus, a person learns their behaviour by observing and imitating the attitudes and emotional reactions of those around them. Social Learning Theory has also been used in attempts to understand where martyrdom terrorists learn their ways. This is often accompanied by an analysis of their upbringing, economic status, religious adherence etc.

This Theory could be applied to the 2012 Toulouse shooting targeting the Jewish community, which killed a teacher and three children during the morning school run. As Herrington recognises, the self-proclaimed jihadist Mohammad Merah who carried out the attack, grew up in a dysfunctional family involved in violence, substance abuse, neglect, and anti-Semitism. The dysfunctional family picture, sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar noted, was evident in most extremists he had interviewed in 2014.

While this is evident in extremists, the statistics for martyrdom terrorists yet again pose an inconsistent figure. 75% of martyrdom terrorists analysed by Herrington experienced a stable upbringing with loving parents.

Additionally, arguments that poverty or lack of education drive young men to commit acts of terrorism, fall short of empirical evidence. This once again highlights the challenges in combatting terrorism through effective policy change in a concentrated area of concern.

Commonalities between martyrdom terrorists

When analysing martyrdom terrorists in Europe, some commonalities were evident. The men who were analysed displayed a clear decline in mental health. Consequently, even if they been assessed as mentally healthy they often struggled with substance abuse. An additional variable identified was the breakdown of their personal relationships.

One theory suggests that the link between substance abuse and martyrdom terrorism is rooted in the fact that substance abuse is connected to a strong sense of shame in the Muslim community. Lewis Herrington’s study found that 74% of martyrdom terrorists developed their substance abuse before turning to Islamic extremism. The theory goes that those with a history of substance abuse found mainstream religion unappealing or uninviting. The members of these communities who experienced a similar past tended to be more inviting. However, they also tended to be more prone to extremism.

Moreover, men pursuing martyrdom terrorism in Europe were documented to have been radicalised from the age of 20. Consequently, the average age of terrorists at the time of their attack was 27.49. Men who displayed extremist tendencies in their adolescent years were less likely to be involved in terrorism in their 20s.

Recommendations

In an attempt to tackle radicalisation, European ministries should consider partnering and financing faith-based drug rehabilitation centres. Organisations which engage with the religious communities may be more effective in providing practical treatment for mental health-related issues and substance abuse in young men.

This in turn could help tackle the isolation many troubled men face, which enables extremist networks to exploit that vulnerability factor in potential recruits.

Additionally, it is recommended that media outlets in Europe proceed with reports on terrorist attacks with caution.  This may be dictated by how the analysis is conducted by journalists. Insight is vital in understanding recruitment methods and how to prevent this. However, empirical evidence must be taken into account before claims can be made. Thus, the immediacy of reporting, unfortunately, opens doors for the possibility of misleading claims. This may be likely regarding the ‘typical terrorist recruit’.

Generating a profile of a classic martyrdom terrorist before consulting experts could lead to a false picture being created that poverty, education and demographics are not just vulnerability factors, but sole characteristics of recruits.

Women’s Roles in Right-Wing Extremism in the United States

All around the world, local law enforcement’s failure to understand the gender dynamics of terrorist organizations has led to many vulnerabilities in people’s safety and security. In the United States, there continues to be more and more evidence being discovered that women are playing key roles in right-wing extremist movements. Fortunately, in recent years, our understanding of female terrorists has improved as more people study this reality and officials stop assuming that women lack the ability to carry out these attacks.

In research conducted by sociologists, Mehr Latif and Kathleen Blee, a list was compiled of the typical roles designated for women in white supremacist groups. The main role for them is to do the “mothering” of the group, both literally and figuratively. If women do not have a “mother” role for the group, another common role women have is as a “sex symbol” for the men. The least common role of the women in these groups is as actual fighters for the cause. Latif and Blee described their role as both providing sexual gratification to male members and participating in violence themselves. However, these roles were designated by far-rightist men. As a result, women’s roles in these groups today are evolving into new ones.

Domestic terror organizations, like many organizations around the world, understand that the best way to appeal to women is by exploiting their inherent altruism and desire to protect children. One of the ways that women are recruited to these far-right groups is through social media “influencers” who distribute propaganda and recruit new members to extremist causes. They often create “mom groups” or lifestyle blogs to reach people who might not otherwise be exposed to political or extremist rhetoric.

The most recent example of women playing roles in domestic acts of terror is from the January 6th insurrection. There was a large array of groups participating in this attack, women were engaged in all aspects and many engaging directly in the violence. One woman directly participating was Rachel Powell aka the “Pink Hat Lady” or “Bullhorn Lady.” She was caught smashing a window of the Capitol with a pipe and yelled instructions to other insurrectionists through a bullhorn. The FBI later raided her home and car only to find numerous “go bags” loaded with ammunition for her registered AK-47, shooting targets with written slogans like “guns don’t kill people, I do,” throwing stars, knives, lighters, zip ties, duct tape, rope, and a tarp. 

Two other women were arrested and charged, Dawn Bancroft and Diana Santos-Smith, after the FBI investigated a selfie video taken of the two inside the Capitol on Jan. 6. They claimed they were there “looking” for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi “to shoot her in the friggin’ brain.”

Despite all of this, law enforcement officials seem to be paying little attention to the unique role of women in advancing right-wing extremist ideas and has led to a situation in which we refuse to treat female terrorists with the same seriousness and concern with which we treat men. So far, just over 10 percent of federal charges related to the Capitol siege have been brought against women

However, after many studies and observations have been done about why women chose to join terrorist organizations, it seems officials still show little desire to learn about how different a women’s path to domestic terrorism is different from most men.

While more research is needed in regards to the ideological and gendered differences of radicalization, evidence shows that the motivation and process of radicalization looks very different for a 40-year-old American-born mother of eight than an isolated 18-year-old boy who feels like he has nothing to live for in the United States. 

For example, some women who committed acts of violence in the last year in the name of Q-Anon, have explicitly said they were motivated by a desire to protect children from supposed pedophilesResearch on why women join international terrorist groups shows they believe that participating in terrorism could be a way to acquire rights and status, especially in societies and cultures where they are otherwise denied equal treatment.

Scholars Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein found that “radicalized American women tend to commit the same types of crimes and have about the same success rate as radicalized men, yet they are less likely to be arrested and convicted for terrorism-related crimes, highlighting a discrepancy in treatment and leaving a security threat unaddressed.”

The U.S. government continues to underestimate the important roles women can play as perpetrators, mitigators, or targets of violent extremism. This means there will need to be continued research on the roles of these women, better ways to prevent recruitment, and how to spot the signs of a female perpetrator.  

 

Trends of 2020: What increased internet has meant for terrorism in Europe

The European Union, United Kingdom and Switzerland have had an unconventional year for identifying trends in terrorist activity. The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdowns, travel restrictions, and digitization of everyday life have posed difficulties for some terrorist groups and opportunities for others.

A Europol report on terrorism in Europe declared that in 2020, six EU member states experienced a total of 57 completed, foiled, or failed terrorist attacks. Taking the UK into account, the number increases to 119. Upon analysis of their data, Europol revealed that all completed jihadist attacks were committed by individuals supposedly acting alone. Three of the foiled attacks involved multiple actors or small groups. All the attackers in the UK and EU were male and typically aged between 18 and 33, and in only one case in Switzerland was the perpetrator a woman. The same report identifies right-wing extremist trends over the last three years. Findings depict similarities between Islamist terrorists and right-wing terrorists in terms of age and gender. Right-wing terror suspects are increasingly young in age, many of which are still minors at the time of their arrest. Right-wing suspects appear intricately connected to violent transnational organizations on the internet.

COVID-19 lockdown restrictions have vastly increased European citizens’ reliance on the internet for everyday tasks, both professional and recreational. Statista recently released data showing that 91% of EU households had internet access in 2020, reaching an all-time high. But with the increased access and usage of the internet comes the risk of it being used for malicious purposes, specifically for terrorist organizing. The quantity of propaganda produced by official ISIL media outlets reportedly decreased in 2020. Despite this, ISIL continues to use the internet to stay connected to potential attackers who align themselves with the same ideology. These connections have allowed ISIL to call for lone actors to commit terrorist attacks. The data from Europol’s 2020 report confirms that it was lone-actor attacks that comprised most of the “successful” terror attacks in 2020, while attacks planned in a group were typically prevented.

Their right-wing extremist counterparts have developed sophisticated methods of recruitment in the internet age, particularly over the last year. Right-wing terror suspects have developed communication strategies via gaming apps and chat servers typically used by gamers. Presumably to attract a younger demographic, right-wing extremists with links to terror suspects have diversified their internet use to include gaming platforms, messenger services, and social media. In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and vaccination programs, the Centre for Countering Digital Hate notes that Discord has been a vital tool for spreading disinformation and conspiracy theories involving racial hatred. In this case, strategies used in online games to reward progression have been translated to serve right-wing propaganda. Thus, points are awarded to the most active members of certain discord servers who can fabricate and promote conspiracy theories, often including antisemitic tropes involving Bill Gates. Virtual currency plays a key role in promoting the narrative of success and reward, and its ability to capture the interest of minors who are active in the virtual space.

Combating terrorist threats in Europe has always been a challenge on account of the sporadic nature of terrorists themselves. While the people behind the attacks may vary in socio-economic upbringing, religious affiliation and nationality, some similarities remain. Based on the commonalities, solutions to tackling internet-based strategies could be introduced. If the EU were to develop a common framework for disrupting and taking down radical groups online, it could find greater success in combating digital extremism. ISIL online networks on Telegram were taken down in November 2019, and they have since struggled to recreate networks to a similar degree.

Gender and age also give some insight for where to begin in diminishing future recruitment to ideology-based terrorism. While internet usage cannot be regulated, education can. Europe may benefit from the cooperation of educational institutions at all level in raising awareness of the dangers of online radicalization. Workshops, information posters, and seminars introducing the intricacies of radicalization would inform vulnerable students on the potential downfalls of internet consumption. This would create a clear understanding of modern conspiracy theories, where they come from and why they exist.

Additionally, understanding the meaning behind extremist imagery, symbols, numbers, phrases, and music (as well as how to report them on the internet) would increase awareness among otherwise distracted students consumed by online trends and activity.

Paired with the awareness commitment, the EU should set a budget meeting the needs of mental health services in schools to introduce spaces in which students may express their concerns. This in turn could curb their vulnerability to online extremist groups looking to recruit.