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The Prison Environment and Its Role in Radicalization

In the last few years, several terrorist incidents in Europe have raised serious concerns about prison radicalization and the effectiveness of programs meant to counter it as well as de-radicalize individuals. For instance, the United Kingdom presents a number of cases where terrorists were radicalized while incarcerated or failed to be de-radicalized during their sentences.

The stabbing of two people in south London a month ago is a notable example as it involved an ex-offender convicted of Islamist terrorism related offences. A similar incident is the case of the London Bridge attacker who had been released from prison about one year prior to stabbing and killing two people in November 2019. The fact that the attacker in the second case underwent de-radicalization programs throughout 8 years of incarceration is particularly worrying and raises doubts about the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy.

There is also the case of the March 2017 Westminster attack carried out by a Briton who was previously convicted for non-terrorism related offences and is said to have been radicalized in prison. Moreover, some of the members of the 2004 Madrid attacks, the so-called shoe-bomber, and the person behind the 2005 failed attacks in London, are all believed to have become radicalized whilst incarcerated. It is therefore apparent that prison radicalization is not a new phenomenon, but rather a trend that can be reasonably explained by reasons why a person turns towards violence, or even worse, terrorism.

One of the key reasons why individuals resort to terrorism is the fact that they feel alienated and marginalized. Terrorist recruiters are often charismatic leaders that take advantage of the vulnerable situation of some people to introduce an extreme ideology and provide a sense of belonging. After succeeding in gaining their trust, it is easier to manipulate radicalized individuals and the process of radicalization may enter its final stage — the active involvement in violent acts.

Inmates are often isolated from society and many of them are open to alternative life-concepts and ideologies. Feeling alienated and frustrated, such prisoners are susceptible to radicalization and recruitment to terrorism. The sense of belonging to a group consisted of other like-minded people gives meaning to their life. Those people share the same radical ideas and they are fully committed to fight for a common cause using also violent means.

Moreover, increased levels of violence in prisons sometimes contributes to radicalization. In prisons, especially over-crowded ones, assaults on prisoners or staff are more likely to take place. There are numerous incidents where corrections officers have been attacked by prisoners and this is sometimes compounded with inadequate training of officers to challenge such behaviors. The risk posed to the safety of the prison staff gives extremists the space needed to radicalize inmates almost unimpeded.

In an attempt to prevent the proliferation of such extremist ideologies in prisons, it has been suggested that convicted terrorist should be isolated from the rest of the prison population. A number of separated wings especially for terrorists and extremists have been opened within prisons not only in the UK, but also in the Netherlands, the United States, Australia, the Philippines and elsewhere. However, there are studies which have shown that isolation has the opposite effect, namely to reinforce extremist beliefs. Sentencing is a related matter and often discussed in the matter of convicted terrorists that go on to commit similar offences after their release. Having said that, isolation and extended sentences intensify the problem as these variables only infuriate extremists.

Preventing dangerous extremists from radicalizing their fellow inmates is fundamental to the safe functioning of prisons and proper de-radicalization of prisoners before their release is essential to public protection. It is apparent that de-radicalization and disengagement programs need to be better funded and properly executed. Without an effective de-radicalization method, tougher sentences on terrorist related convictions will only delay, rather than prevent, future attacks.

Terrorism

Energy Industry: The Sector Most Affected by Terrorism

In recent weeks, a number of oil and gas facilities in Syria were struck by a series of terrorist attacks carried out by drones. This is unfortunately not the first time that this has happened as the energy sector remains a major interest of terrorist and insurgent groups operating in the region.

In regard to energy supplies, Syria is significant in the eastern Mediterranean as it was found to possess the largest proven reserves of crude oil in the region. The oil and gas industry as a whole has always been a major source of income for the country as it accounted for approximately one-fourth of government revenues. In the pre-war period, Syria was one of the major producers and exporters of petroleum supplies. Indeed, the production of crude oil before 2011, amounted to around 400,000 barrels per day, half of which were exported.

There is currently a major conflict of interests between the United States, Russia, Iran and Turkey regarding the control of the Syrian oil and gas fields. In this context, numerous attacks on Syrian energy infrastructures have been carried out either by state or non-state actors, resulting in the Syrian government losing control of key oil fields. Indeed, such attacks have far-reaching consequences for the county’s economy. The Syrian oil and gas production have undoubtedly experienced a dramatic drop since the civil war erupted. It has essentially undergone a steep fall of approximately 95%, thus forcing the Syrian government to start importing oil.

The energy industry became a legitimate target of terrorist groups in the 1990s and it is the sector most affected by terrorism at a global level. Syria is not the only example of this kind. Oil industries in Nigeria, Colombia and Venezuela are considered to have been affected by terrorism in some sense. Research has shown that in regions with high-level tensions, such as Syria, the possibilities of a terrorist attack against energy infrastructures are higher. The incentive behind such an attack may be to cause a great deal of damage in order to attract media attention, to put pressure on the relevant government or to obtain control over the energy resources.

There are numerous militant or terrorist groups seeking to exploit sources of energy and natural resources. A prime example is the Islamic State whose funding strategy included the conquering of territory rich in oil and gas. Indeed, the Islamic State heavily relied on the oil-producing areas it controlled; the exploitation of such territories reaped huge profits, making the Islamic State the wealthiest terrorist organization that ever existed. They used these profits not only to fund its terrorist activity but also to buy weapons and to recruit new members. Economic incentives played a key role in many fighters’ decision to join the group. Therefore, the protection of energy facilities in conflict zones and counter-terrorism operations is vital so that they do not fall into the wrong hands.

The energy sector is particularly important for states that largely depend on in thus social well-being depends on its proper functioning. An attack against energy infrastructure by hostile states or terrorists causes serious disruption and problems to societies as well as places national security at risk. It is therefore essential to ensure the security and safety of energy infrastructure anywhere in the world, but especially in unstable countries with fragile security. This could be achieved by working together with organizations that are specialized in energy security responsible for carrying out risk, threat and vulnerability assessments. This, in addition to developing new detection technology in preventing terrorist attacks, will help to enhance forecasting and rapid response capabilities for the protection of energy infrastructure to promote peace and security globally.

How Terrorist Organizations Could Exploit the Idlib Crisis

The Russian-led offensive in the Idlib province has already displaced at least 800, 000 people in three months. Many of them have been displaced multiple times during the Syrian Civil War and are now fleeing towards Turkey, seeking refuge in camps on the closed border. In addition to the grave humanitarian crisis it prompted, the campaign gives terrorist organizations an opportunity to exploit the current situation.

There are fears that Daesh could take advantage of the chaos to regain some of its strength, which is something that occurred in northeast Syria after the Turkish offensive last October. Although the Idlib province does not face the challenge of keeping thousands of Daesh members in prisons and camps, there are fighters, who relocated to the region from other areas of Syria, as well as Daesh linked groups. Despite little concern that the group would be able to seize territory compared to what it once held, it was still able to mobilize thousands of members and it is in possession of a considerable sum of money, making it a potent security risk. In addition, there are other groups present in the region, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which could exploit the crisis in different ways.

Terrorist groups could take advantage of the new refugee wave and head for Turkey. Idlib is home to around 3 million people and Turkey, which already hosts the largest refugee population in the world, is afraid of the new refugee influx. President Erdogan stated that Turkey will not carry such burden on its own and that all European countries will feel the negative impact of this pressure.

Besides the possibility of thousands of refugees pouring in both Turkey and Europe, there is a risk of terrorists and foreign fighters joining the wave and travelling back home or elsewhere. Syria has been known for attracting a huge number of foreign fighters who pose a security risk to their home countries. Although Turkey sealed its border, diplomats say that the country will not be able to prevent all the people from crossing to its territory. Moreover, as the offensive is continuing and the territory under rebel control is shrinking, there is a question of what will happen if advance of the operation is not halted. But, even if terrorists were not able to enter Turkey, they could benefit from their presence in refugee camps.

Refugee camps on the Turkish borders might become a hotbed of radicalization and a pool for recruitment. The majority of people fleeing to refugee camps are women and children. With a lack of security, terrorists are met with ideal conditions to spread their ideology to children, often lacking proper education, and arguably more susceptible than adults. However, as many people fled the fighting multiple times, their grievances could be exploited more easily than before, pushing them closer to the decision to join an armed group. Furthermore, refugees are living in dire conditions and poverty therefore becoming a member of an organization might be the only way to provide for their family. All in all, terrorists might take advantage of people’s situation in refugee camps in a number of ways.

As there are thousands of fighters, it is highly unlikely that the Syrian army will be able to eliminate or capture all of them. Thus, some of the terrorists might decide to hide in the camps with the aim of surviving the government’s operation and launching terrorist attacks in the future.

Currently, the only possible solution to the crisis seems to be a stop to the government offensive and a resort to diplomacy. At the same time, this scenario seems unlikely. Turkey stated that the situation will not be solved until Syrian forces withdraw. Soon after, the Syrian army consolidated control of Aleppo and pledged to eradicate all militant groups. A Turkish delegation visited Moscow on February 17 to engage in ongoing talks; however, efforts to broker a lasting ceasefire have failed in past weeks. Therefore, prospects for stoppage of the offensive and a relief to the crisis look rather dim.

Yemen

Strikes Against Terrorist Leaders in Yemen Have Little Impact on Peace Efforts

Last week, the White House confirmed that a United States missile strike killed the top Al-Qaeda leader in Yemen While the assassination of Qasim al-Raymi, the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) official eliminated a terrorist whose roots stretch beyond 9/11, it is unlikely that it will impact violence in the country or the overall effectiveness of the terrorist group.

Reporting from several sources recount that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) tracked al-Raymi and executed an unmanned drone strike against him — the second drone attack against the leadership of a US-government classified terrorist group. In recent years, his leadership was even characterized as detrimental to the AQAP’s operations and a successor, likely the reported external operations leader Khalid Batarfi, could provide the group with a sense of renewal.

Nonetheless, operations to neutralize AQAP leadership remains an ineffective way to combat the cyclical violence in Yemen. Fighting between separatist and government forces compound to create an atmosphere that breeds instability and terrorist groups like the AQAP. Prior to al-Raymi’s death, a soldier and a civilian were killed in an ambush linked to the AQAP whilst fighting between the two groups in Yemen’s civil war resulted in the loss of over 100 lives at a military training base around the same time.

American counterterrorism efforts have a long and complex history in Yemen. Since 9/11, the US has utilized everything from drone strikes, surveillance and special operations in the country. The outbreak of the Yemeni civil war in 2011 did not compel the US to shift their tactics or move towards their stated mission to “build the capacity of the local government forces, working by, with, and through these partners to accomplish our common counterterrorism objectives” in a way that proliferates the least amount of violence.

Civilians and ground forces in the Yemeni conflict face the brunt of the lack of policy development. Streets and hospitals are encompassed in the dangerous warzone. These types of situations allow terrorist groups like the AQAP to find a safe haven as those engaged in counter efforts on the ground are preoccupied with daily missile exchanges and the problematic task of sourcing enough medical supplies to treat the wounded.

The United States has suffered the consequences of its lack of amended counterterrorism policy in Yemen too. For instance, the AQAP claimed responsibility for the terror attack on the Pensacola Naval Air Station. It is evident that the war in Yemen pushed all of the players in the conflict to new levels of violent action.

The US needs to participate in peace efforts to deal with terrorism in Yemen. By leaving peace talks to the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, the power imbalance of the negotiating bodies propagate mistrust and devolve into violence. With seasoned diplomats, extensive experience in peace negotiation and a relationship on both sides of the conflict, the US has tools at its disposal to bring peace to Yemen while making the world a safer place for everyone in the process.

From Violence to Politics: Will the Taliban Become a Political Party?

The Taliban has rejected engaging in negotiations many times, but President Ghani’s proposal to fully recognize the group as a legal political party in 2018 was a turning point. Terrorist organizations change and many have proven to have the ability to engage in politics. Organizations like Hezbollah or the Irish Republican Army (IRA) changed strategy and came to prioritize politics over violence for advancing their agenda. Perhaps the Taliban too is showing signs of transforming into a political party?

Tapping into politics does not necessarily mean letting go of violence. Estimated to have around 60,000 full-time fighters, the Taliban’s territorial reach does not show signs of pull back. They retain the ability to conduct high-profile urban attacks, demonstrate considerable tactical capabilities, and their attacks have become more effective in the third quarter of 2019.

As security expert Audrey Kurth Cronin points out, many groups that engaged in politics have maintained violent activities. Hezbollah became a fully-fledged political party shortly after the signing of the Ta’if peace agreement in 1989, but like the Taliban showed no signs of slowing down militarily.  Although it has been running in elections since 1992 and has become one of the most important players in the parliament, Hezbollah has not disarmed like other militias in Lebanon. Similarly, the Taliban are unlikely to commit fully to politics.

Perhaps becoming political could be a means to an end. Conflict negotiations are built on the assumption that parties want the conflict to end. However, in the case of the Taliban this is not clear. United States officials assess that the Taliban does not pose an existential threat to the Afghan government at the moment, but signal that the dynamic can change if the US alters its deployments in Afghanistan.

Negotiations could be a vehicle for the Taliban to force US troops out of Afghanistan, so they could defeat the government and other local rivals in order to reinstate the Islamic Emirate by force. Similarly, Hezbollah’s military capacity competes with that of the government of Lebanon, and both analysts and governments have argued the group’s political activity has only been means to their continuous anti-Israel terror campaign.

Engagement in politics could also feature Taliban radical splinters, which may carry on the terrorist campaign. The Taliban may not be a very fragmented organization under the leadership of Haibatullah Akhundzada, but disagreements within the group could occur if the Taliban and the Afghan government strike a deal. Radical factions could be dissatisfied with concessions made during negotiations and carry on terrorist attacks despite opposition from Taliban leadership.

The IRA is such a case – when the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 granted the formation of an Irish Free State, the organization split. The pro-treaty faction grew into the army of the Irish Free State. The anti-treaty faction – under the leadership of Eamon de Valera — carried on the terrorist campaign. Although until the Good Friday Agreement of 1996 the IRA featured multiple radical splinters that carried on terrorist attacks, the factions also engaged in politics, some growing into the most important political parties in Ireland (such as Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein).

Whether the Taliban transforms into a political party is also a regional bid. The creation of the Taliban was catalyzed by Pakistani influence.  Numerous reports have indicated that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency was involved in the creation of the Taliban, and still supports the insurgency as a matter of official policy to contain the influence in Afghanistan of its rival India.  Similarly, Hezbollah surfaced when Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps arrived in Lebanon to provide support for pro-Iranian Shiite militias against Israel, and the political party has been depicted as an outpost of Iranian influence.

Several lessons can be drawn from the experience of the Hezbollah and the IRA’s changeover to politics.

  • A comprehensive strategy for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the Taliban should be formulated. Although the Ta’if agreement called for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, and so did several United Nations Security Council Resolutions, Hezbollah expanded its military power and did not show signs of integrating into the Lebanese Armed Forces.
  • A plan for moderating Taliban aims for Islamist government is necessary, as they will most likely seek reinstating Islamist rule in Afghanistan. In comparison, Hezbollah’s engagement in politics has been granted by the group’s receptiveness to political pluralism – “we are committed to Islam but unwilling to impose it by force”.
  • Any deals should contain areas of deliberate strategic ambiguity to minimize Taliban factionalization. The Good Friday Agreement was ambiguous enough to enable participants to describe the accord in terms that were palatable to their constituents, and so should be any agreement between domestic parties in Afghanistan.
  • The role of third-party states is crucial. In Lebanon, success and failure of conflict regulation depends on the maintenance of positive exogenous pressures, and Syrian and Iranian interests affected the trajectory of Hezbollah. Similarly, the interests of Pakistan must be considered as a key element of any potential Taliban engagement in politics.

Consequences of the Ongoing Offensive in Idlib

Without the attention it once attracted, the Syrian civil war not only continues, but has even escalated in past weeks due to the ongoing offensive in the last rebel-held province of Idlib. However, what might be perceived as a final push for victory by Bashar Assad’s regime and its allies will most likely bring yet another humanitarian crisis and further destabilize the war-torn country.

In late 2018, Russia and Turkey brokered a deal that was supposed to create a demilitarized buffer zone around the province to mitigate the crisis. Turkey is a key supporter of Syrian rebel groups and thus an important actor in the Idlib region; however, the rebels and Syrian regime continued low-intensity clashes even after the deal was reached. The Syrian Army renewed its offensive with daily airstrikes in December 2019. This offensive is ongoing despite efforts to broker a ceasefire in the beginning of January.

idlibmap 640x476 - Consequences of the Ongoing Offensive in Idlib

(Source: The Guardian)

Idlib province is home to approximately 3 million civilians and an estimated tens of thousands of fighters, therefore, the potential for an increase in internally displaced persons and a refugee influx to Turkey is significant. For example, at least 350,000 civilians have left the province for Turkey since the renewed offensive. In addition, half a million people fled before the offensive started due to fears of the attacks and sought safety in refugee camps on the Turkish border.

Such a wave of refugees may not only cause problems for Turkey, but for European countries as well. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan already threatened the European Union that he would “open the gates” to Europe if Turkey does not receive additional aid to manage the crisis. With more refugees pouring into Turkey as a result of the offensive, Erdoğan might use these developments to put more pressure on the EU.

Moreover, airstrikes have killed dozens of civilians in the past days and weeks. Additionally, the airstrikes left a number of villages in ruins, targeted hospitals and schools. Such actions inflict further damage on the country and its infrastructure resulting in a more expensive, difficult and longer post-war reconstruction in the future.

Besides civilians, the question of rebel fighters present in the province remains. Due to their large estimated numbers, it is improbable that all of them will be killed or captured, therefore, these fighters could pose a security threat in the future. Syria and Iraq have attracted thousands of foreign fighters in the past who could potentially carry out terrorist attacks across the world were they to travel back home or elsewhere. Conversely, they could remain in Syria to continue terrorist activities and make the transition towards peace more difficult.

The Idlib offensive might bring the Syrian civil war closer to an end than ever before, however, the consequences would be severe. Attacks are already taking a toll on civilian lives and exacerbating a relentless humanitarian crisis as hundreds of thousands flee the province. Nevertheless, Assad seems determined to regain control of the entire country. It is a fair assumption that the offensive will mark yet another grim milestone in the 9-year Syrian civil war.

New ISIL Leader Officially Named and Confirmed

It was recently officially confirmed by two intelligence services that Amir Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi is the new head of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Prior to the reveal of his identity, Al-Salbi was known as Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi: a name implying that he is of Qurayshi descent and thus legitimizes his role as a new ‘caliph’.

Early Years and ISIL Roots

Al-Salbi — alias Hajji ‘Abdallah — was born in the small northwestern Iraqi city Tal Afar; a city once under Al-Qaeda control from 2004 to 2006 and a subsequent strategic base for the Islamic State. He graduated with a degree in Sharia law from the University of Mosul, was a religious scholar in al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and is believed to be a founding member of ISIL.

Like most of the Islamic State’s leading fighters, he is a former officer who had served under Saddam Hussein and played a prominent role in the fight against the United States and its allies. In 2004, he was captured by American troops for associations with al-Qaeda and placed in Camp Bucca detention center where he met al-Baghdadi.

It was only natural that al-Baghdadi took advantage of his period of detention to indoctrinate as many inmates as possible and set up a common vision, namely the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Within Camp Bucca, Baghdadi created a network of hardline fighters that he destined for positions of leadership in the Islamic State.

The new ‘caliph’, nicknamed as the ‘Professor’, is one of those fighters connected with Baghdadi and adopted his unwavering commitment to the Islamic State. He appears to have led many of their international operations and he is considered to have played a decisive role in the enslavement of thousands of Yazidi women and children, as well as the murder of an equal number of Yazidi men in Iraq, started in 2014.

Current Situation

Although the succession of Baghdadi by al-Salbi was only recently confirmed, he is likely to have taken over the day-to-day operations of the terrorist organisation well before the former’s death. Being wounded and suffering from a chronic illness, al-Baghdadi had already designated a successor since last August. During that time, the Rewards for Justice Program (RFJ) of the US Department of State announced a reward up to $5 million for information regarding al-Salbi, placing him on the list with the most wanted terrorists. There is no doubt that he will be an efficient leader that will attempt to reinvigorate the Islamic State. What remains to be seen is whether he will be as inspiring as his predecessor who had been admittedly very successful in recruiting fighters from all around the world and inciting them to fight for a common cause.

Recent discussions around its new leader indicate that the Islamic State is indeed regenerating and confirms fears about a possible re-emergence. The situation both in Iraq and Syria has created a favourable environment for ISIL to rebuild its strengths and organise its operations. This is certainly not a simple task without any territory under their control, however, regional instability has disrupted security and reduced the effectiveness of the security services.

If tensions and conflict are not addressed soon, intelligence gathering will be extremely challenging, and attempts to prevent the Islamic State from breaking their imprisoned fighters out and retaking territory will be even less likely to be successful. Consequently, prisons where IS fighters are held should be properly guarded, in order to avoid a mass break out, and a particular attention must be focused on monitoring desert regions around the Iraq-Syria border, and other areas which are beyond the control of the central government.

Rise to Peace