by Cameron Cassar

Brazilian Prison Gangs: Message Delivered

Source: The Washington Post/Alex Gomes/AP

Author: Cameron Cassar

The newly elected right wing president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, had just been newly inaugurated when he had to deal with his first security crisis; terrorism attacks led by prison gangs in the Brazilian state of Ceara. The attacks have been centered on the capital of Ceara, Fortaleza, which is a metropolitan home to about 4 million Brazilians. These attacks have destroyed homes, businesses, modes of transportation, and has left many residents stuck in their homes due to threats of violence.

All of these attacks have been motivated by a desire to get the Brazilian government to end the practice of segregating gang factions in the Brazilian prison system. This goes completely against Bolsonaro and his ideologies. In fact, a major point of his political platform was that he vowed to enact strong policies to combat crime in Brazil. These policies include military takeovers in crime ridden Brazilian cities and shoot to kill policies for violent criminals.

This current wave of violence in Brazil shares many similarities to the wave of violence led by Pablo Escobar and the Medellin Cartel during their reign of narcoterrorism in Colombia. However, while the Brazilian prison gangs have opted to mainly use violence, the Medellin Cartel not only committed violence to instill fear in lawmakers in Colombia, but they also bribed police officers to turn a blind eye towards their criminal activities. Importantly, both of these organizations have used “violent lobbying” tactics to scare lawmakers into implementing policies that benefit them. Pablo Escobar wanted to get rid of extradition while the Brazilian gangs want to eliminate desegregation in prisons. The gang leaders want to end the prison reform which includes ending the separation of rival gang members and the blocking of cell phone service in the prisons.

These reforms would hinder the effect of the gang leaders who are locked up inside of the prison by disconnecting them from the outside world, which gives them the chance to coordinate their attacks. However, many gang leaders do not want desegregation in the prisons because they fear for their safety amongst the other prisoners who are often times rival gang members with a personal vendetta against one another. Incidentally, the violent lobbying of the gangs has united them in an unusual alliance due to the “common enemy”. The First Capital Command and the Red Command, two of the biggest gangs in the area have already formed a pact and there are plenty more that will be formed as the conflict ensues.

Brazil has the third highest prison population behind China and the US (of course). The problem is that President Bolsonaro wants to be even tougher on crime, which will result in even more Brazilians being sent to prison. Some of the policies he wants to implement include lowering the age of criminal responsibility from age 18 to age 16, which will only increase the number of Brazilians in the prison system. More Brazilians in the Brazilian prison system will not help reform the broken prison system. If anything, the country needs less prisoners so they can focus on improving the conditions in the prisons due to the overcrowding. The point of prison is to rehabilitate the prisoners so they can be reintegrated into society when they are released, but a prison in bad condition and ran by the prisoners instead of the guards is not suitable for rehabilitation.

President Bolsonaro must now deal with the crisis that has begun to unfold in his country. However, many members of the left saw this wave of terror coming. As Renato Roseno of the Socialism and Liberty Party stated, “This crisis was entirely predictable, we were sitting on a barrel of gunpowder and it just needed someone to light the fuse”. It is now up to him to decide if he will counter these actions, if he will send in foreign help, will peacekeeping troops be deployed, and will he still be able to stick to his tough on crime policy? It will be interesting to see how Bolsonaro deals with his first major crisis as a president. Will he be able to stick to his hard right policies or will he be pressured to renege on the promises that got him elected as president in the first place?

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 by Shannon Howley

Colombia: Prospects for Peace

Last week, Rodrigo Cadete, one of the leaders of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) dissident group, died in a military operation in the southern Caqueta region. The Colombian military claims responsibility for his death, along with the death of nine other militants. According to BBC News, Colombian Defense Minister Guillermo Botero said Cadete had been working to unite the group. “had been trying to unite some of the 1,700 members of the FARC.” On January 17th, there was a deadly car bombing at a Bogota police academy. The car bomb was claimed by Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN). The bomb left 21 military personnel dead, and 68 injured.
These attacks inform growing fears of a return to civil conflict in Colombia. Terrorism in Colombia is not new, since 1964 the country has been involved in a 52-year armed conflict involving the government and rebels, militant groups, and drug cartels. Although, following the historic peace agreement between FARC and the government, in September 2016, fears were temporarily allayed about ongoing civil strife in the country. As part of the deal, FARC members turned in their weapons and ammunition. The United Nations supervised the disarmament and demobilization of FARC rebels. In fact, after the agreement, arms-related fatalities in Colombia dropped from 3,000 a year to only 78.
Despite these signs of progress, the ELN has filled in for FARC to become the country’s largest guerilla group. The ELN has been responsible for deadly bombings, kidnappings, drug production, and extortion. Their goal is to overthrow the government to install a communist alternative. The death of Cadete demonstrates that the FARC may also not be completely irrelevant following the peace agreement. The Los Angeles Times reported that the ELN added about 1,000 former FARC rebels to its group, which now numbers about 2,500
. There are concerns that the January bomb attack will stall any opportunity for a peace deal with the ELN. President Ivan Duque had expressed his unwillingness to negotiate with the group until they ceased criminal activity and released people they had kidnapped. Nonetheless, continued engagement and discussion are important components in resolving terrorism. The Colombian government and the ELN militia must mutually understand and recognize the demands on each side; it’s also important for awareness and acknowledgement of the motivations for groups like FARC and the ELN. If the government can address the reasons these groups are using acts of terror, then it can better provide alternatives and solutions for these rebel groups acts of terror. For example, in the 2016 negotiations the government promised to create “transition zones” for the FARC rebels, as it was designed to integrate them into Colombian society, and provide reeducation, health care, and other social services. Although, there are criticisms that the government is failing to fulfill its obligations to provide these services. They have stalled in their provision of health services and drinkable water to former militants, which this risks collapsing the 2016 peace deal, and foreclosing future potential for an agreement with FARC. Thus, the government should guarantee and follow its commitment to the 2016 peace deal, and expand the framework for those negotiations to the ELN rebels.
Overall, violence in Colombia has decreased significantly since 2016, but the conflict is not over. The 2016 FARC agreement demonstrated that when both the government and the rebel groups come to the table to discuss their concerns and their primary goals, that concessions can be made, and progress can be agreed upon. Therefore, inclusion of the ELN in a peace agreement, and continued negotiation is important to strengthen the response to recent acts of terrorism. The civil war was a deep-seated conflict, therefore, solutions to the violence won’t be quick or easy, but continued negotiation between the government and ELN can begin to resolve the violence.
Sources

Colombia Farc: Dissident leader Rodrigo Cadete killed in military operation (2019, February 3rd). Retrieved February 10th 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47106730
After 21 die in a bombing, Colombians fear a resurgence of terror (2019, January 18th). Retrieved February 10th 2019, from https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-colombia-bombing-20190118-story.html

Violence and killings haven’t stopped in Colombia despite landmark peace deal (2019, February 6th). Retrieved February 11th 2018, from https://theconversation.com/violence-and-killings-havent-stopped-in-colombia-despite-landmark-peace-deal-111232.

Human rights workers are getting killed in Colombia. Here’s what could help save the peace (2019, February 11th). Retrieved February 11th 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/02/11/human-rights-workers-are-getting-killed-in-colombia-heres-what-could-help-save-the-peace/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3e410247c891.

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 by Billy Baker

Old Crisis Sparks Anew: The Bogota Car Bombing

Source: The Tico Times (2019) 

Author: Billy Baker

Colombia has a bloody history of political violence (La Violencia, FARC, ELN). But after the peace agreement with FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in 2016 and the peace talks with ELN (National Liberation Army), many thought that this would be the end of the bloodshed.

That was until January 17th, 2019, when a vehicle drove into the National Police Academy in Bogota, Colombia. The truck, armed with explosives, sped into the facility until hitting a wall. This triggered the detonation, killing 21 people (including the driver) and injuring 68 others. This marked the deadliest attack in 16 years.

Shortly after the bombing, ELN members in Colombia claimed responsibility for the attack. This has stalled peace talks currently being held in Cuba, although ELN chief negotiator, Pablo Beltran, has denied involvement in the attack. Colombian President Ivan Duque is now calling for the Cuban government to arrest and extradite the ELN negotiators in the country.

The Cuban government has responded by stating that they will follow the previously agreed protocol for a break in the dialogue. The protocol for this situation allows ELN negotiators to travel back to Colombia through Venezuela in a safe manner. It also requires the Colombian military not to engage any identified rebel strongholds for a 72-hour period during their return.

So what does this mean for the future? This single attack has damaged prospects for peace between ELN and the Colombian government, with the possibility of bringing back an escalation of widespread violence that Colombia has not experienced for years. This is unfortunately a possibility for a variety of reasons (low popularity for President Márquez, widespread disgust against ELN’s attack, need to respond to the attack).

It is necessary for the Colombian government to respond to the violence and crime that ELN has committed over the years. Along with the attack in Bogota, ELN has committed numerous attacks since peace talks began. Peace talks have proved difficult due to the group’s decentralized structure. This most recent attack by ELN has caused uncertainty about the future of political violence in Colombia.

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 by Rise to Peace

Afghanistan: Results of the Moscow talks with Taliban

Taliban representatives at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation / Sergei Savostyanov / TASS

Earlier this week, Channel News USA discussed how the Taliban and Afghan government held talks in Moscow regarding women’s rights, a new Islamic Constitution, and the exit of the United States from the war-stricken country.

The meeting was headed by former president Hamid Karzai, Afghan politicians consulted with Taliban members to reach an agreement on how to reach long-lasting peace. The New York Times noted that Afghan politicians wanted to focus on keeping the rewards from the past twenty years, whereas the Taliban mostly discussed how they know believe that women should be given more rights, such as the right to work and education. Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, who heads the Taliban delegation, discloses to the reporters that the talks went successfully.

“We agreed on many points and I am hopeful that in future, we can succeed more further, and finally we can reach a solution. We can find complete peace in Afghanistan.” 

The Afghan delegation consisted mostly of former Mujahideen political leaders, elites, members from political parties, and current members Parliament. There were only two women in the entire delegation.

Afghans expressed on different kinds of social media that this delegation does not necessarily accurately represent Afghanistan. However, Afghan politician Atta Muhammad Noor stated that the participants of the delegation viewed themselves to be more representative of Afghanistan than the current government.

The National discusses how in the end, there was a joint declaration formed that addressed “removal of foreign forces, the release of Taliban prisoners and removal of Taliban leaders from a UN blacklist.”

However, even though the talks seemed to have helped make progress with current issues, Afghan civilians and political commentators feel that the talks have actually harmed chances of long-term peace, while also giving Taliban insurgents an advantage with their negotiations with the United States.

Although such talks had not happened in the past due to fear of disapproval from the United States, there is still debate on whether the current talks were successful. Hekmatullah Azamy, deputy director at Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, believes that the Moscow talks greatly increased the insurgents’ influence and advantage.

“The Taliban had made military progress in the last year, but with this meeting, they have also gained certain political status and legitimacy, in terms of local diplomacy,” he said.

“To see them recognized by the Afghan political elite should worry the government because in some ways it brings the Taliban mainstream. The next time they sit with the US, the Taliban can say confidently that the Afghan people don’t have a problem with them. This will affect the Afghan government.”

Mr. Azamy also believes that the president has been handling these talks diplomatically, as Mr. Ghani offered the Taliban to open an office inside of Afghanistan, even though the insurgents quickly declined the offer. Overall, a majority of civilians have reacted by criticizing the absence of government during the talks and the lack of accurate representation. Afghans fear that there will be the return of communism and mujahideen if American forces leave the country.

Ultimately, holding these talks in Moscow in the first place was a good step in the right direction. Beginning negotiations will help in producing solutions that work for both parties, while also benefiting the citizens. Mr. Karzai should have presented a more diverse and representative delegation, in order to prove to civilians that these talks are to help them, too.

Additionally, the Afghan government, specifically the president, should have been present at the talks, since the Afghan government is such a crucial part in bringing peace to the country, and the government itself plays a major role in the country.

Lastly, more talks should be held in the future, possibly with the involvement of the United States, since the role that America plays in Afghanistan’s long-term peace is of concern to citizens and politicians.

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 by Rise to Peace

The Mosul of Southeast Asia? Countering Extremism in the Philippines

Filipino and American forces shaking hands in September 2017. Image Credit: Cpl. Robert Sweet, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

The recent tension between the Philippines’ security forces and Islamic separatists has exposed the cultural, economic, and military inefficiencies of the central government in countering terrorism. Strengthening cooperation with the United States will help the government tackle these issues more effectively, helping them solve some of the coordination and collective action problems which currently plague their operations. By briefly covering the history of the conflict, stating who the major extremist groups are, and examining how they act, this article shall propose recommendations that can promote further cooperation to counter extremism, encourage more cultural and religious cohesion in civil society, and help break up the revenue-generating activities of terrorist groups in the Philippines.

The church bombing in Jolo on January 27th 2019, which killed twenty people, highlights the recent flare-up in tensions between Catholics and jihadist groups in the Mindanao region. This attack came just days after a referendum of autonomy was held in the area where the majority of citizens voted to approve the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. The referendum was part of a deal between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – an organisation that has been fighting for independence for decades.

The country has been a victim of these attacks before, all claimed by ISIL and its affiliates. On August 28th, 2018, an improvised explosive device (IED) tore through a festival in Isulan in the same region as the church bombings. On July 31, 2018, a bomb exploded in a van at a security checkpoint on the southern island of Basilan, killing ten and wounding eight. In 2017 a group of pro-Islamic State (IS) jihadists captured and held part of the city of Marawi in the province of Lanao del Sur.

Historically, the security and police forces of the Philippines have failed to deal with extremist groups active in the South Philippines such as Abu Sayyaf/ISIL, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The source of tension dates back to Islamist militancy in the 1970s, while groups such as ISIL relative newcomers to the region. IS, however, has yet to acknowledge the Philippines as an official wilayat, or franchise.

Despite this, dozens of groups in the Philippines claim allegiance to IS. They have even aided the Maute group – an ISIL affiliate – in seizing strategic parts of the city of Marawi on the 23rd May 2017 in a standoff with government security forces- causing 1,100 fighter and civilian deaths and the displacement of 400,000 people. The conflict subsided with the government’s evacuation of residents in the city and the subsequent bombing campaign. The execution of the two main jihadist leaders in the Philippines, Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute, ended the conflict but also created a hotbed for extremist activities that further destabilized the region. The Filipino military alone is ill-equipped to deal with these types of insurgent groups, facing a lack of capacity, poor coordination, and geographic obstacles in its struggle to fight extremism. Although one hundred US military advisers were on the field, in addition to US and Australian intelligence support, their combined strength was not enough to stop a credible, potent jihadist threat.

Marawi map.png

Map displaying the location of Marawi. Image Credit: BBC.

In 2015, the US ended the campaign of Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, which was formerly the largest counter-terrorism operation in Southeast Asia. Research shows that the presence of US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to train and equip, advise and assist, and contribute to civil/military information operations helped reduce the level of support for terror groups. The presence of US SOFs also improved the tactical and operational efficiency of the Philippines Security Forces. With an average presence of 600 SOF present in the Philippines between 2001-2014, this number has now plummeted by more than half. The latest news reported the US would increase the number of SOFs to 261 in joint military operations with Filipino security forces. In 2019, uncertainty surrounding the American presence in the Middle East also holds implications for the American presence in the Philippines, potentially threatening their battle against internal extremist forces. With planned withdrawals from Syria and Afghanistan and an overall laissez-faire approach to US military presence around the world, it is unclear whether the US will maintain or increase cooperation with the Philippines in areas such as counter-terrorism, maritime security, and humanitarian aid.

US presence in the region makes a significant difference. Recommendations to improve counter-terrorism strategies include targeted US involvement in maritime security to prevent IS-affiliated groups such as Abu Sayyaf from carrying out kidnap-for-ransom operations on ships going through the South China Sea. As of 2016, the group has raised around $7 million from kidnapping operations, using this money to finance further extremist activities. Maritime security can prevent these groups from conducting successful kidnappings and have a positive impact by helping the Philippines combat other internal challenges. For this cooperative relationship to operate well, the government must also form stronger partnerships with Malaysia and Indonesia to encourage intelligence sharing and patrolling of sea lanes, which they have already carried out through trilateral patrols. Moreover, strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and Australia can help only with the US acting as a facilitator and leader on this front. Without this guidance, counter-terrorism strategies are much less effective. Careful communication and constructive cooperation might even help in convincing the US to re-establish its Joint Operations Task Force – Philippines to contain a potential rising terror threat.

For the IS, the Siege of Marawi was a propaganda victory which enabled them to extrapolate a local conflict into a larger Muslim-Christian sectarian war. Being able to hold the largest city in the southern region of the Philippines gave the group legitimacy in jihadist circles and enabled the recruitment of more foreign fighters from Indonesia and Malaysia. As a result, this development has lead to fears that the Philippines will become a hub for terrorists fleeing places where ISIL have lost ground, such as Iraq and Syria.

To counter this threat, the Filipino government must not only use military means, but religious and cultural ones as well. Research by DAI published in August 2018 showed how marginalization and discrimination were stronger predictors of violent extremism than poverty, social conflict, or corruption. The government of the Philippines should therefore strengthen its cooperation with civil society groups on the ground and encourage the development of more cohesive communities. The government has already put in place a policy that would include Muslims in the military. This can lead to more support from the local community, especially in the Mindanao region, and help create room for dialogue. Further policies, such as encouraging millenials with influential social media presence to spread the message of peace or strengthening the government’s deradicalisation programme, can go a long way to help bridge the differences within civil society and marginalized religious communities.

Dialogue can also be a constructive tool at the international level. A balanced tone must be struck, and Duterte must abandon the use of nationalist and inflammatory rhetoric against the presence of US troops. Effective diplomacy can encourage the American government to strengthen their relationship with the Philippines through continued humanitarian aid, technical military assistance, and engagement with local government, civil society, and ASEAN through Congressional delegations and non-governmental organisations. Efforts such as the adoption of the Langkawi Declaration on the Global Movements of Moderates in 2015, pushing for a more moderate political environment within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are steps in the right direction.

The Philippines must also follow up on lessons learned from training with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Anti-Money Laundering Council to closely monitor the economic maneuvers of domestic extremist groups. It is already a member of the Asia Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering and is no longer subject to its monitoring process. However, the IS have been funding smaller extremist groups, including the Maute Group, which now engages in looting, kidnapping, and the illegal drug trade to finance their activities. As Duterte’s disastrous war on drugs has shown, it is wise to use means other than military force to combat illegal activities. To combat this problem, the US should not only strengthen trade cooperation with the Philippines, but also play an active role in setting up stable financial architecture in the region to counteract more illicit money-laundering operations, such as those by North Korea.

In order to tackle these extremist elements, the United States must increase its role in maintaining security in the region. Not only will this require action from the government of the US, but also NGOs, charities, private citizens, and Congressional influence are necessary to promote humanitarian aid and cooperation with civil society in the Philippines. Larger military and technical assistance will help promote maritime security and counter-terrorism on the ground. And finally, positioning as an economic power in southeast Asia will help both the US and the Philippines cut terrorist funding whilst at the same time developing a stable architecture and sphere of influence that could repel terrorist activities.

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