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November 7, 2018November 7, 2018 by Roberto Malta

Jair Bolsonaro and Violence in Brazil

Jair Bolsonaro – Brazil’s recently elected president. (Credit AP)

On Sunday, Brazilians elected Jair Bolsonaro as their thirty-eighth president.

Bolsonaro has been described by the New York Times as the most extreme leader to ever have been elected in Latin America history. Bolsonaro has expressed radical views towards minorities, he is in favor of the war on drugs, and has promised to facilitate easier access to guns to create a vigilantism system. Bolsonaro’s populist bid gave him the support of more than half of Brazilian electors who were fed up with high rates of criminality, corruption scandals, and deep economic recessions.

But how does the election of Bolsonaro relate to violent extremism? Brazil’s main cities, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, have extremely high rates of criminality, including over sixty thousand murders yearly nationwide. Drug trafficking is also common, as these factions benefit from the absence of the state to create their own institutions and support the marginalized sectors of the Brazilian population. Some of the dominant gangs include the Comando Vermelho, in Rio de Janeiro, and the Primeiro Comando da Capital, in Sao Paulo. Many incursions have been organized in the past against them by the state or federal government, using the regular police, elite officers (such as the BOPE or ROTA), and even the Army. In other stances, the state has negotiated a truce with the drug traffickers to host events, such as the World Cup and the Olympic Games, or to win an election, such as when Lionel Brizola allied itself with drug traffickers of Rio de Janeiro.

Brazil continues to wage war against drug trafficking and countless lives are lost every day.

Bolsonaro has spoken frequently against the decriminalization of drugs, even though he argued his government would tolerate the medicinal use of marijuana. Bolsonaro, as a former Army Captain, is in favor of a more aggressive approach by the police with one of his most popular quotes being, “A good criminal is a dead one”. Bolsonaro has also, both in the past and during the campaign trail, defended torture and killing by the armed forces to fight drug traffickers, insurgents, and even politicians. In 1999, he called for the death of Congress and the then president Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

Brazil has suffered for many years from drug traffickers and the failure of the state to tend to the more marginalized sectors of society, including afro-Brazilians and the poorer parts of the population. On a previous piece, it was discussed how this problem led to the torture and death of investigative journalist Tim Lopes. Most politicians have approached this problem with violence and armed counter-attacks. Some Brazilian cities have had success focusing on the community, improving the police training to tackle this issue, and investing in education. Now, with the election of Bolsonaro, these improvements are likely to be in jeopardy, as a national policy based on criminalization and the war on drugs is likely to be created.

2018 11 07 Roberto Pic 2 300x211 - Jair Bolsonaro and Violence in Brazil

Brazilian protests against corruption and violence (Credit AP)

The election of Bolsonaro is a frightening moment for Brazil.

Bolsonaro is undoubtedly a populist leader who propagates authoritarian notions. His actions are likely to be disastrous for the country and only produce more violence. It is imperative that the international community condemns any attempts of Bolsonaro to exacerbate the failing War on Drugs. Moreover, the Brazilian governors and mayors must be even more assertive on investing in community-based approaches, police training, and education to effectively reduce criminality and drug trafficking.

~ Roberto Malta is a Brazilian born, George Mason University student pursuing a B.A. in Global Affairs, with minors in History and Economics.

November 1, 2018November 2, 2018 by Kristine Olsen

A look at Saudi Arabia in light of recent events and moving forward

President Donald Trump shakes hands with Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan during a meeting with leaders at the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit, at the King Abdulaziz Conference Center, Sunday, May 21, 2017, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Trump will use the nation that is home to Islam’s holiest site as a backdrop to call for Muslim unity in the fight against terrorism Sunday, as he works to build relationships with Arab leaders.AP Photo/Evan Vucci

Last Monday I attended the Inaugural Annual Gulf International Conference in Washington D.C. where Saudi-American journalist Jamal Khashoggi was scheduled to speak on the importance of a free press.

However, over the weekend, Khashoggi disappeared while visiting the Saudi Embassy in Istanbul. On Monday while at the conference, the official word was that the Saudi government had no knowledge of the situation but would examine it closely.

At the conference, Khashoggi’s presence and spirit were palpable, but most participants believed Khashoggi was murdered for speaking out against the regime’s reign of terror in Yemen. Since the conference, the Saudi government’s position has shifted from denial to assertions that the journalist died in a fist-fight during interrogation.

It is no coincidence that the President of the United States took his inaugural international trip to Saudi Arabia, while predecessors chose neighboring countries like Canada or Mexico.

President Trump voiced his friendship with the Kingdom while still on the campaign trail, and continued his support from the beginning of his presidency, making it clear that he wanted a strong diplomatic and economic relationship with the Saudi government.

Although President Trump espoused the importance of a strategic partnership with the Saudis as a way to stabilize the region, many have questioned his motivation. In 2001, he sold the entire 45th floor of Trump World Tower to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for $4.5 million. It is this relationship that many believe has, at least partly, clouded his judgment. Trump spent the week supporting the Crown Prince and King, claiming they denied involvement and pledged to investigate and hold accountable those who killed
Jamal Khashoggi.

The U.S. has a complicated relationship with Saudi Arabia and the death of Jamal Khashoggi makes it even more complex.

The Saudis invest heavily in the U.S. economy and have traded in excess of $23 billion per year. However, the Saudi government is also said to have economic ties to terrorist organizations, not to mention an abysmal human rights record. The U.S. government has repeatedly overlooked both the terror funding and human rights violations.

The current administration is said to have even greater motivation to overlook human rights issues. The president’s son-in-law and Senior Policy Advisor to the Middle East, Jared Kushner has close relations with the Crown Prince. Additionally, the U.S. has secured a multi-million dollar arms deal, which the President touts as a boom for defense jobs (this remains to confirmed).

Complicating the relationship and U.S. response is the fact that Khashoggi was a U.S. resident who wrote for the Washington Post, but not a U.S. citizen, justifying a more hands-off approach from the President.

At the conference, congressmen, journalists, and retired ambassadors resoundingly supported punitive action by the U.S. against the Saudi regime. Many speakers shamed President Trump and called for the United States to cut diplomatic ties with the Saudis, enact sanctions, and put human rights ahead of arms deals. The consensus was that continuing to support the Saudi regime after such a blatant act of violence designed to silence a critic called into question not just the ethics of Saudi Arabia, but also the ethics and values of the U.S.

Would the U.S. put an arms deal ahead of human rights, knowing that the arms would be used in the Saudi’s campaign against the people of Yemen? One week after the conference, the truth regarding Khashoggi’s disappearance is beginning to emerge, and a clearer picture of the Saudi regime is coming into focus.

One week ago, the Saudi government denied any involvement in Khashoggi’s death, and today they reiterate their denial of their role in attacks on civilian targets in Yemen. There is undisputed evidence
that the Saudis were involved in Khashoggi’s death and that of many civilians in Yemen, yet the regime continues to stall, deflect, lie, and justify their actions, while the U.S. and international community look the other way.

It is time to shine the light clearly on the Saudi government’s actions and stop their terroristic activities and human right abuses.

It is time to hold them accountable for their military campaign in Yemen, the financial support of terror groups such as the Taliban and Hamas, and the death of Jamal Khashoggi. No doubt, a sustainable solution that puts human rights ahead of violence is going to be a difficult solution to implement. But if we put an arms deal first, worsening the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, disrespecting basic freedoms, then we are complicit.

October 31, 2018November 1, 2018 by Roberto Malta

Can Colombia Legitimize its Coca Trade?

BusinessInsider.com The wrapped fingers of a raspachin worker who collects coca leaves, during the harvest on a small coca farm in Guaviare province, Colombia. REUTERS/John Vizcaino

For the past century, Colombia has been embroiled in an intense war on drugs which has created a steady state of violent conflict within the country, and little impact on long-term production or drug use. This war has largely been financed by the United States. Complicating the drug war is another long-standing conflict with leftist guerrillas who have control of territory with a high density of coca plants. This piece will focus on the problems of the Colombian approach to the war on drugs and how it can be adapted into more workable solutions in the future.

At the height of their power, the drug cartels controlled Colombia, with Pablo Escobar becoming the 7th richest person in the world.

They supplied 80% of the global cocaine market. Much of the demand for cocaine came from the U.S., prompting the U.S. government and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to take action. They then sent money, supplies, and even agents to Colombia as a way to disrupt the drug production, and distribution to North America. Through a long and bloody process, which included murder, arrests, and extradition requests, the DEA and Colombian government were able to dismantle the drug cartels in Colombia.

Unfortunately, this only partially resolved the sourcing issue and did nothing to address the demand issue. While the DEA and Colombian government were able to curb the cartels’ flow of drugs from Colombia to the U.S., other sources stepped in and continued the supply. Thus, the actions of the DEA did nothing to address the demand for cocaine in the U.S. The DEA and Colombian government were also ineffective in transitioning out of the drug war and providing an environment in which those previously involved in the drug trade could otherwise make a living. There were many promises by the Colombian government to help the farmers replace their coca crops with legal commodities, unfortunately, the help never came. The government failed to adequately support these farmers with seeds and other farming assistance, so the farmers quickly went back to cultivating the coca crops. The farmers needed to support their families, and no alternatives were offered. An example of that is Wilmer Ovalle, a young man that is taking over his father’s coca cultivation in the absence of state support for other crops. Ovalle knows that with the coca crop he will have a steady income and the drug trade will go on, even if large cartels have been broken up. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/18/colombia-united-nations-assembly-war-on-drugs)

In an effort to diminish the supply, the DEA ran fumigation operations in which they used agricultural planes to spray herbicide over the Colombian countryside killing the cocaine crops.

Similar to the violent oppression of the cartels, the spraying forced the growers to adapt, and many moved deeper into territory controlled by the guerrillas. Ovalle’s father moved their family plantations to Colombian natural reserves, where the fumigations were prohibited. The farmers cut down trees and planted their coca in the Colombian tropical forest, exacerbating deforestation issues.

There was a glimmer of hope for Colombia with the accession to power of Juan Manuel Santos, who promised a more community-based approach to the drug war, as well as signing a peace deal with the FARC guerrillas, which includes a workable, sustainable solution to the illicit drug business. However, like too many things in Colombia, the policy rhetoric often differs from practice and implementation, thus the war on drugs continues. With the political damage following the failures of the FARC peace deal, Santos had to leave office and was replaced by his opposition.

In order to stop the unnecessary violence and suffering from this two-front conflict, Colombia must dedicate itself to a community-based approach.

One which helps farmers shift their production from coca to food and other crops which are profitable. The government needs to help the farmers make the transition as part of a post-conflict solution which places farmers at the center of the solution. Historically, farmers have shown willingness to cooperate, as they are concerned with the violence perpetuated by illicit drug trade as well as health impacts of coca farming. However, the government must show the political will to follow through and help the farmers. This might require farming support, subsidies, or tax incentives until the farmers are able to produce a significant yield of legal crops which can support their families and communities. The international community must also act to condemn the war on drugs, assist with community-based post-conflict practices, and look for other sustainable solutions to this conflict. The war on drugs failed miserably for both Colombia and the U.S., as production rates and prices for coca remain strong, as does drug use in the U.S.

~ Roberto Malta is a Brazilian born, George Mason University student pursuing a B.A. in Global Affairs, with minors in History and Economics

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October 31, 2018October 31, 2018 by Kate Kleinle

A Brief History of Soviet Support for Terrorism

AP telegraph.co.uk Pilot Juergen Schumann sits in the doorway of a Lufthansa plane in Dubai on Oct. 15, 1977, prior to being murdered by Red Army Faction leaders.

The reign of terror the Soviet Union inflicted upon its citizens is well-documented, but what’s less well-known is the impact it had abroad.

Though it brutally crushed protest movements within its borders, the Soviet Union actively funded terrorist separatist groups across the globe. To undermine governments outside the Eastern Bloc, they provided leftist terror cells worldwide with arms, equipment, and connections to higher-level government operatives able to organize and connect terrorists across continents.

In Germany, the Red Army Faction and the 2nd June Movement were two such groups. In Italy, the Red Brigades were aided similarly.

Each of these groups received Soviet equipment and training, sometimes directly from the Soviet government and sometimes through Soviet-allied governments such as Cuba. These governments and groups then worked to further disseminate weapons across the globe, leading to a diaspora of Soviet equipment among left-wing governments and radical groups.

One place the Soviet support was particularly successful in breeding terror was Palestine.

Soviet support of the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s airplane hijacking campaign led to an exponential expansion of its scale: in the early 1960s, there was an average of five hijackings a year, but with Soviet support, the PLO was able to hijack 82 aircraft in 1969 alone. Soviet support was so successful that the KGB’s General Alexander Sakharovsky bragged that, “Airplane hijacking is my own invention.” During this time, the scale of the conflict increased significantly, tensions heightened between Israel and Palestine, and radicals were given a platform which they retain to this day — hearkening back to the Soviet training, financing, and organization which initiated the campaign of violence.

The story of Soviet support for terrorism is a cautionary tale.

Many Soviet-backed organizations remained potent for years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and many remain active to this day. Regardless of the regime behind them, state-sponsored terrorist organisations take on lives of their own and may present threats for decades — which is why it is puzzling that countries with huge diplomatic clout, such as the United States and Canada, still turn a blind eye to the role state sponsorship plays in facilitating terror across the Middle East. It’s time to apply the lessons we learned from the Soviets and crack down on the funding Saudi Arabia, Iran, and others funnel to extremists. If not, the radical organizations they support will likely outlive us all.

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October 29, 2018October 29, 2018 by Unzila Qureshi

Muslim Democracy

London – Hoda al-Husseini

While the term contains the word Muslim, Muslim democracy seeks neither to reform or build theocracies, but rather to incorporate Islamic ideals into democracies in Muslim majority countries.

Muslim democracy as a concept is being practiced by Islamist groups which aspire to political relevance without revolutionary goals. Violence is an issue that determines whether a group is relevant to the Muslim democracy discussion, in that groups must have an attitude of deterrence as regards violence.

While an unfavorable position on violence is a vital aspect of Muslim democratic status, it is not the only aspect.

Other characteristics that determine how an Islamist group would fair in a democratic setting include its attitude toward minorities, political pluralism, and whether they believe religious authorities should have veto power in the political processes.

While all these elements are germane to determining a Muslim democracy’s potential, gauging how successful Muslim democracies are is less clear-cut.

Muslim leaders can claim an affinity for democracy while behaving in ways that tell a different story. The best way then, to gauge a Muslim democracy’s status is to determine how internally democratic a given group is. Until political freedom exists in a community, none of the aforementioned amounts to much. If there is no political freedom, then there is no incentive for political parties or leaders to explain themselves and their views on issues. A democratic process wherein any group can engage is essential in determining a group’s legitimacy. The case studies in Muslim Democracy are Turkey’s AKP party and the IAF in Jordan.

The AKP, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, has been in power since 2001 and has seen three free and fair elections. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire midwifed the Turkish Republic, which was founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The “Kemalist Ideology” was a secularist ideology based on rapid modernization. This ideology was based on the glorification of pre-Islamic Turkey, and it endeavored to eliminate the Islamic traditionalism that had been a part of Ottoman rule. However, the Kemalist Ideology never gained traction with the rural masses, yielding many Islamic and Kurdish rebellions.

The AKP was created by the reformist wing of the Islamist Refah Party, after recognizing no openly Islamist party would gain momentum in Turkey.

AKP succeeded in a landslide in 2002 with 34% of the vote and 2/3 of the seats. The success can be attributed to the rise of the new conservative provincial classes, as well as the AKP being labeled as a conservative democracy. AKP embraced minority and human rights, democracy and demilitarization instead of orientation to the Muslim world. The adoption of a neoliberal fiscal policy brought about a Turkish economic boom, and a focus on issues like health care, housing credits, student grants, and infrastructure.

While AKP rose to power espousing a secular ideology, it later used its popular mandate to implement more Islamist policies, such as banning adultery in 2004 and reintroducing headscarves in universities. In 2008, the government launched investigations of the military based on secret deep state paranoia.

In 2010, alleged coup plans were revealed resulting in the arrest of army officers. The Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had gained newfound confidence at this point which resulting in more Islamist reforms like upgrading flight attendant uniforms to ones in accord with Islamic teachings. The regime also took a more authoritarian tone: censoring the internet, issuing new press laws, and shutting down anti-AKP protests. While the AKP initially inspired optimism as a democratic model and seemed to be moving in the right direction, the absence of a significant, effective opposition has allowed it to veer closer to authoritarianism.

The Islamic Action Front (IAF), established in 1945, started as a charitable organization advocating religious awareness and practice.

It had built and maintained a close and cooperative relationship with the government before entering politics in 1989. Later known as the IAF, the Islamist bloc emerged as the single largest political fraction in the 1989 elections. In the 1990s when there was nothing uniting the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists with the regime after the secularists and nationalists had been sidelined, they looked to curb the political influence of the Islamists.

By this point, the Islamists were more vocal in their opposition to the regime, and the regime had become wary of pro-Palestinian youths groups emerging from the Muslim Brotherhood. The electoral reforms of 1993 were seen as driven to disadvantage Islamists and the Islamic Action Front was created by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Islamists were shut out of the political system after opposing the 1995 peace deal with Israel and boycotting the 1997 election. The IAF contested the parliamentary elections in 2003 after King Abdullah postponed elections in 2001 to gerrymander. The IAF participated in the 2016 elections, winning 16 out of 130 seats after boycotting elections in 2010 and 2013.

Within the IAF, the question now is how to participate and attain its goals, not whether to participate or not. Islamism, as used by the IAF, can be seen as loyal opposition to the liberal autocracy of Jordan, and the potential for greater tension between the Islamists and the state has been predicted.

While both of these case studies fulfill requirements about opposing violence, they prove that a political environment that allows for open competition and free political processes is prerequisite for Islamist ideals to thrive in a democratic environment.

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