Colombia After FARC

Leftist rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia patrol a roadway near to San Vicente de Caguan in January 1999. The conflict with the FARC has killed nearly a quarter million people.
JOSE GOMEZ/REUTERS

The 21st-century has been one of the more peaceful epochs in human history. People are bombarded with violent images and tragic news, but this century has borne witness to dramatic peace. Rampant violence defined epochs from Pax Romana to the Middle Ages through the Napoleonic Era.

World Wars and the Cold War marred the 20th-century. In this century, international wars have diminished. And in the shadows, violence has oriented to non-state actors and civil conflicts. The young 21st-century saw the end of two conflicts which had lasted for decades: the Korean War and the Colombian Civil War between FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the government. This piece, in keeping with themes regarding Latin America, will discuss outcomes of the Colombian peace deal.

The Peace Accord in Colombia was signed on November 24th, 2016 and it won incumbent Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos a Nobel Peace Prize. Talks had developed over four years, beginning in Oslo, Norway and Havana, Cuba in 2012. In the short-term, the peace-talks resulted in disarming many FARC members, a decrease in violence, and a more coordinated political system wherein FARC has legitimate representation. More than 12,000 former combatants have pledged to return to society. Businesses such as Coca-Cola and Cemex have agree to hire former insurgents and run re-integation programs. The internal displacement rate has been reduced by a multiple of 30, and casualties have dropped from 3,000 at the beginning of the peace accords, to 10 at the end.

The death toll has climbed to more 120 human rights defenders in 2017 alone.

We can rightfully call this a success. But Colombia’s situation remains touch-and-go at best. When FARC agreed to the deal, other insurgent groups increased their presence, particularly in the countryside. Small groups such as the National Liberation Army (FNL), refused to negotiate with the government and remain active in such areas. Said groups have filled the power vacuum left when the government failed to extend its presence to areas where FARC controlled territory.

The struggle for control has led to conflicts between the smaller groups and the local population. Unfortunately, native, afro-Colombians, and human rights defenders have suffered disproportionately. Consequently, such populations are protesting peace accord details and urging the Colombian government to step in. The death toll has climbed to more 120 human rights defenders in 2017 alone.

The Santos government earned criticism when it failed to bring the peace deal before a plebiscite, and instead presented it to the Colombian Congress.

Another challenge lies in understanding the proposed agrarian reforms. Land rights have been at the heart of the Colombian conflict since the 1950s. FARC often loomed in the jungles so companies could not grab land belonging to indigenous communities. Newly elected president, Ivan Duque Marquez, sees the land restitution part of the Peace Accord as an attempt to bring socialism to Colombia. However, Marquez and his party have opposed the Peace Accord since the start.

Former FARC guerrillas Nasly Rodriguez and Gregory Villarraga – shown at a Bogota art gallery with their baby daughter — are among the many families who have had to adapt to new jobs and lives after the rebel group’s demobilization last year. CARLOS VILLALON/THE GLOBE AND MAIL

Given Venezuela’s turmoil, many rightfully fear that socialism will take Colombia down the same path. Finally, the Santos government earned criticism when it failed to bring the peace deal before a plebiscite, and instead presented it to the Colombian Congress.

The situation in Colombia reminds us that peace is not achieved by signing papers. Rather, it’s earned through sustained hard work, dialogue, and mutual trust. Making peace is a delicate process that requires more than stopping armed conflicts. Creating a sustainable peace requires political will and follow-through, working within existing institutional structures, and coordinating with civil society organizations.

Santos failed to exercise the requisite will and follow-through. He did not promptly increase the State’s presence in conflict zones. Additionally, the government failed to act in the interests of marginalized and vulnerable populations. It failed to provide indigenous and poor, rural farmers with necessary aid. Finally, there was a failure of proper public consultation, which is vital for democracy. Other nations should learn from Colombia’s mistakes, and the next peace process, wherever it occurs, should be a model of inclusivity, transparency, and be approved of by its population. Political will should carry the day from conflict zone to reconstruction.  


Roberto Malta is a Brazilian born, George Mason University student pursuing a B.A. in Global Affairs, with minors in History and Economics.

Lingering Consequences of the Paraguayan War

One of Latin America’s darkest periods began in 1865 — around the time that the American Civil War was drawing to a close — but its wounds still have not healed. The mid-19th century Paraguayan War saw its namesake on one side and a triple alliance of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay on the other. Latin America looked quite different then. It has long been a place in flux politically, economically, and geographically speaking. But, this conflict altered rudimental perceptions of the continent. Its scars in South America run deep.

In 1862, just three years before the start of the war, Solano Lopez became the country’s second president.

In 1865 Argentina was a newly independent nation. It won its independence in an 1810 war with Spain led by Jose de San Martin. Uruguay was part of Argentina, as part of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, which was then conquered by Brazil and became independent in 1824. This, at the conclusion of Brazil and Argentina’s war for it. Brazil gained its independence from Portugal in 1822 but kept its royal family as it became an Empire. It often intervened in the domestic affairs of its South American neighbors.

Paraguay of today versus Paraguay of 150 years ago is a study in contrasts. It became independent from Spain in 1811. It instituted a military junta to control the country. Paraguay developed an economy, arguably becoming the most advanced South America country at the time. It used British support and know-how to develop industry and improve infrastructure. In 1862, just three years before the start of the war, Solano Lopez became the country’s second president.

Wikipedia: Brazilian Soldiers at the end of the war, including Corporal Chico Diabo (sitting down, third from left), who killed Paraguayan dictator Solano Lopez.

Paraguay like its 19th-century industrialized society peers needed access to production inputs, labor, and ports from which it could ship products. As a landlocked country, Paraguay’s only choice to gain access to the sea was to expand. Thus, Lopez started his expansionist plan and in 1865 attacked Brazil and Argentina with great success. The two attacked nations organized a joint war effort, and with Uruguay, created the Triple Alliance. Initially, the commander of their armies was Argentinian President Bartolome Mitre.

Brazil and Argentina annexed considerable portions of Paraguayan territory in the peace treaty following the end of the war.

Wikipedia: Battle of Riachuelo by Victor Meirelles, the turning point of the Paraguayan War

During the war’s first phase Paraguay was on the offensive. In February 1867 Mitre stepped down as the allied commander. He was replaced by Brazilian Army commander Luis Alves de Lima e Silva, aka the Duke of Caxias. Caxias was nominated Brazilian commander in October of the previous year. His first command halted the Brazilian army’s advance. Thereafter, he completely reorganized and restructured the allied military. Consequently, when he restarted the offensive in July 1867, the allied forces won one victory after another. This momentum allowed them to take Asunción, Paraguay’s capital, in January of 1869, defeating the Paraguayan forces. With the war seemingly won, Caxias — who was old and tired — relinquished his command of the allied war effort.

The Triple Alliance governments were unsatisfied and continued the war. They nominated the Count D’Eu, Brazilian Emperor Peter II’s son-in-law, to command their military forces. While Lopez refused to surrender, his resistance didn’t amount to much. With the army depleted, women, children and the wounded were left to fight on. What followed is one of the darkest moments in Brazilian history. Argentina and Uruguay decimated the Paraguayan population and destroyed the country. Brazil and Argentina annexed considerable portions of Paraguayan territory in the peace treaty following the end of the war.

This conflict altered rudimental perceptions of the continent.

The effect on Paraguay cannot be overstated. The most harrowing statistics indicate that 60% of Paraguay’s population, and 90% of its men, fell victim to combat, disease, or starvation. Paraguay was set back decades in its development and industrialization. This lag remains responsible for current economic and social problems.

The war is infrequently discussed outside of South America, but it’s a terrible chapter which reshaped its power balance ever after. Paraguay struggles with criminality, bootleggers, and drug traffickers to this day. It is poorer and less developed than its neighbors. It’s a lesson in the comprehension of a nation’s struggle. Often undermining characteristics result from occurrences decades or even centuries in the past. It is a vital reminder to keep human rights in the fore, and not forget its victims, lest they reoccur. Meanwhile, the wounds are far from healed, Paraguay may never recover fully, and it resurfaces often in relations between the four countries.


Roberto Malta, is a Brazilian born, George Mason University student pursuing a B.A. in Global Affairs, with minors in History and Economics.

Brazilian Elections

There is a growing uneasiness among Brazilians against Bolsonaro, who has expressed nostalgia for Brazil’s military dictatorship [Amanda Perobelli/Reuters]

Last Monday, October 8th, 2018, saw the first round of Brazilian general elections. Paraphrasing one of the presidential candidates, Joao Amoedo, what was supposed to be an election of hope, quickly became an election of fear.

The country is enduring the worst economic crisis of the 21st century, as well as a political crisis, with many leaders being jailed for corruption.

The astonishing rise of far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro completely changed the political landscape of Brazil. Since 1994 the only parties to win a presidential election had been the Brazilian Social-Democracy party (PSDB), with former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso winning two terms, and the worker’s party (PT), with Luis Inacio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff winning two terms each.

The current president, Michel Temer, took office following Roussef’s impeachment. With his approval in the single digits, it was too low for him to even consider running for president.

Brazil nearly escaped the 2007 recession without a scratch because its economy is based mostly on the export of commodities like soy. However, as prices dropped, the Brazilian economy felt shock-waves. An economy that had been thriving suddenly was no longer. And its people were horrified by the succession of corruption scandals publicized by the media and federal police.

Brazil is hardly immune to processes affecting the rest of the world. This is especially regarding the rise of extremist, right-wing candidates. This has played out in Europe, Asia, and even the United States. Jair Bolsonaro represents the Brazilian iteration of this phenomenon. Bolsonaro, a former Army captain and longtime representative who defends easier access to guns and a tougher stand on criminality, has been known to proclaim that the only good criminal is a dead criminal.

Opposing him in the run-off is Fernando Haddad, former Education Minister and former Sao Paulo mayor who was decisively voted out two years ago. Haddad is a member of PT, which has been involved in corruption scandals. Much of its old guard is jailed, including Lula, or gone turncoat on their colleagues in exchange for reduced sentences. Politically, his proposals are left-leaning and he would continue the social programs started under Cardoso’s government and amplified by Lula, albeit in a worse economic context.

On one side, there is a career politician who pines to return to brutal military dictatorship and makes claims that are dangerous to minorities. On the other side is a young politician intending to apply the same social reforms that worked when the country was economically prosperous.

Parallels can be traced to the American presidential election two years ago. Donald Trump was elected even though he was opposed by the media and never held political office. Bolsonaro is also seen as an outsider. But he has been in politics since he left the Army, and he has little to no accomplishments to show it. Haddad is closer to the figure of Hillary Clinton. He is relatively new to the executive field, but he represents the succession of Lula’s ideals. Lula has been in politics since before the re-democratization of Brazil in 1985.

Most alarmingly, Bolsonaro frequently defends the Brazilian military dictatorship of 1964-1985. He often praises torturers, and he favors minority repression. Brazil is a relatively young and fragile democracy. A shock like this could prove a mortal wound. Poland and Hungary show the effects of extreme-right governments on democracies. In the former, the image of Lech Walesa, one of the leaders of the democratic process in the 1980’s, is constantly attacked. Civil and political rights are suppressed.

Democracy is under attack the world over more than any time since the Cold War. Brazilians can stop it from reaching their country again.

In summary, democracy and its institutions in Brazil are at stake. On one side, there is a career politician who pines to return to brutal military dictatorship. This is someone who makes claims that are dangerous to minorities. On the other side is a young politician intending to apply the same social reforms that worked when the country was economically prosperous. This, while his party is involved in numerous corruption scandals. Paraphrasing Mario Vargas-Llosa, this is like choosing between Cancer and AIDS. However, as humans living in a western society, democracy and human rights should come before all else.

October 28th will see the run-off that pits Bolsonaro against Haddad. The hope is in the next 20 days Haddad will change his plans and appeal to moderate Brazilians. And these Brazilians will accept a worker’s party under a coalition government plan to oppose Bolsonaro’s authoritarianism and populism.

Democracy is under attack the world over more than any time since the Cold War. Brazilians can stop it from reaching their country again. They can opt to preserve its institutions and respect for all of its people. All we can do is hope that they do so.

-Roberto Malta is a Brazilian born George Mason University student pursuing a B.A. in Global Affairs, with minors in History and Economics.

Counter Terrorism Strategy in Waziristan

WANA, PAKISTAN, Photo by John Moore/Getty Images

In recent months, Waziristan has been awash in terror attacks since the Pakistani military began new operations in the region. Ostensibly, the offensive is meant to root out TPP fighters, but physical action typically only treats the symptoms of the disease and not the cause. Without getting to the root of the problem, violent terrorism of this sort will generate here again and again.

Examine, for instance, an incident on April 27, 2018, in which a wedding in Waziristan was attacked and four people were killed, with dozens more injured. Reports are unclear who was responsible, the perpetrators identified simply as militants. Another source asserts that the TPP claimed responsibility for previous attacks, but not this one specifically. Disturbing a sacred, social rite like a wedding is significant on an anthropological level. There are many factors that allowed this to happen. They all signify that terrorist activity has become normalized, even occurring around such community activities.

Terrorist organizations tap into local sentiments to recruit on individual and community levels

Any viable solution to counter terrorism must treat it long-term, and it must learn to do so by studying how terrorism became so virulent in the first place. This is not an isolated phenomenon, working independently of other systems in place. It is part of the place and people in such a way that groups like TPP can use local systems of thought to get their way. This is evident in how terrorists recruit individuals as well as sway policies and politicians to their agenda. There is a deeper phenomenon at play, and the only way to counter it is to study it and determine what makes it work.

Obviously, religion ties in deeply with TPP and similar organizations’ activities. Experts have documented how organizations use Islam to recruit fighters and operatives and, more importantly, maintain their dedication. Terrorist organizations are canny this way because they tap into local sentiments to recruit on an individual and community level. There is a heady mix of patriotism, freedom-fighting, rebellion against Western influence and authority, anger, and religious cause. They use all of these things not to convince people that what they are doing is right, but rather to make them fear it would be wrong not to support them. This is a huge part of why these groups keep growing. Beyond the regular scare tactics (i.e. forcing people to do their bidding under threat of injury or worse), using culture and religion to legitimize themselves means that their idea will never die.

Changing how we talk about terrorists is cost-effective: it takes little to do, but it has long-term effects on how they are treated and thought of

Terrorists take advantage of cultural and religious tensions to further their agenda and legitimize violence. Therefore, a way to counter them is to delegitimize their cultural and religious agency. In terms of policy, Pakistan’s government and media can do this easily. Change the discussion. Any engagement with or treatment of terrorists should identify them as violent criminals, not “Islamic extremists” or “insurgents.” These terms provide legitimacy in the most dangerous of ways. Destroy their legitimacy to combat them. Cut all their links with any local dynamic.

This solution is straight-forward and possibly effective. Changing how we talk about terrorists is cost-effective. It takes little to do, and it has long-term effects on how terrorists are treated and thought of in public and private. Terrorism is a threat to millions of lives. Not the least in vulnerable rural communities. As such, Pakistan must use every weapon it has, including its words.

From there, such policies can extend to even more conspicuous efforts. Ones such as delegitimizing terrorist ideas in schools, in mosques, religious classes, in public and online forums. Leverage local systems of thought and action to do this, the same way that terrorists spread their ideas. Use these means not to normalize violence, but to normalize peace.

An Overview of SE Asian Extremism: Thailand

One of the regions people don’t usually think of related to extremism is Southeast Asia.  Yet, extremism is prevalent there, and like many other types of extremism, it is rooted in religious and ethnic challenges.  In this series of articles, I will provide an overview of extremism in Southeast Asia, starting with Thailand.

When people talk about Thailand, they often think about peaceful beaches, Buddhism, and even rice fields. Although these images are real,  Thailand is a religious and ethnically diverse country, which has led to some security challenges, particularly in Southern Thailand.

By the 1990s, more violent organizations like Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Patani were founded and vying for power

According to the US State Department, 10% of the Thai population is Muslim, with most of the Thai Muslims living in Southern Thailand.  Starting in the 1990s, the 3 provinces in southern Thailand—Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, experienced violent ethnic and religious insurgency, with tensions escalating in recent years.  These 3 provinces are predominately Malay Muslims residents, who share a different religious culture than the rest of Thailand. Beyond religion, the Pattani province was originally an independent Sultanate, conquered by Thailand in the 1700s, creating long-standing political tension.  

The historical, religious, and ethnic tensions between Malays and Thai were further heightened as Southern Thailand was left behind in economic development creating yet another division. Separatist groups from all three provinces share one goal —an Islamic Malay state centered in Patani.  

The 1960s saw the founding of the Malay separatist movement in Thailand, with the National Revolution Front and the Patani United Liberation Organization.  These early organizations were peaceful groups that sought Patani independence. However, as the situation on the ground remained difficult for the people in Southern Thailand, the organizations became more extreme. By the 1990s, more violent organizations like Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Patani were founded. In no time flat, they were competing for power. Although these organizations were new and relatively weak compared to the earlier organizations, they chose to launch terrorist attacks to quickly build their profile and relative power.  

In the beginning, the attacks were all targeted toward Thai government officials, police, teachers, and other establishment individuals.  However, starting in 2004, the violence escalated, with a January armory raid in which 364 weapons were stolen.  Many of the weapons were M16 rifles. Later that year, separatist groups attacked 11 military and police facilities in southern Thailand to steal additional weapons.  During this time, the extremist organizations also attacked the Buddhist population in the Southern provinces, killing two elder monks in Yala. Additionally, from June 27 to July 5, 2004, five bomb attacks destroyed Buddhist-owned rubber plantations in Yala.  These extremist groups were purposefully driving tensions and divisions between Malays and Thais in the region.

Starting in 2004, there was a rising number of attacks and casualties

The violence continues today. According to ACLED, there were already 72 incidents in 2018.  In September this year, attackers hit an army patrol in Pattani, killing two soldiers and wounding  four others.  While earlier in the year in Yala, separatists launched a bomb attack on a market, killing 3 and injuring 24. These endless attacks lead to high casualties and continued distrust across religious and ethnic lines.  According to the Bangkok Post, from 2004 to 2015, extremist insurgency groups killed more than 6,500 people, with Muslims the majority of those killed.

There are three trends that suggest rising conflict in the region. First, the number and intensity of violent attacks are increasing. The extremist groups have become more experienced with attack tactics, and thus more deadly. Under the attacks in the 1990s, the separatists were limited in scope.  However, as noted, starting in 2004, there was a rising number of attacks and casualties. The groups became more sophisticated and knew where the weak points of the government were and where they could most easily obtain weapons. The attacks on military facilities in 2004 is direct proof.  

The proposal included the introduction of Islamic law in the region, teaching Malay in school, and providing more religious freedom

Second, the groups were becoming more connected with other outside extremist organizations in Southeast Asia, such as Jemaah Islamiyah. These groups provided training, tactical, and financial support. Officials believe Jemaah Islamiyah is behind some of the attacks. Additionally, the groups have become more extreme in ideology. The separatist groups initially did not target other religions, but have moved beyond that mandate and have since 2004 targeted Buddhist temples, and even monks.  

In response to the increasing violence, the Thai government has offered some solutions. In 2006, the National Reconciliation Commission, led by Anand Panyarachun, proposed a solution to the Southern insurgency.  The proposal included the introduction of Islamic law in the region, teaching Malay in school, and providing more religious freedom. However, the Thai government rejected it. Prem Tinsulanonda, council member and former minister, said, “We cannot accept that [proposal] as we are Thai. The country is Thai and the language is Thai… We have to be proud to be Thai and have the Thai language as the sole national language.”  

Currently, the 4th Army of Thailand is in the region and in charge of security, with more than 25,000 troops under their command. Outside of military presence, the Thai government has also tried to create a more inclusive policy to reduce violence. For example, the Thai government explained that the white in the national flag is not simply a representation of Buddhism, but a representation of all religions. Also, broadcast TV shows images of Malay people.  More officially, peace talks between separatists and the Thai government began in 2013. Supporting these talks and the peace process, the Thai government also promoted a community-based program to reduce violence, which focused on the power of neighborhoods to report violent actions. The program has allowed for faster response to such violence.

The separatist’s goal remains the formation of a sovereign Southern Thailand. The Thai government has welcomed talks under the structure of the current Thai constitution. Thus, an independent Southern Thailand is still far away.