by Zahar Hryniv

Contested Kashmir: A Critical Analysis and Possible Solutions

The attack against Indian forces which occurred on February 14 was the deadliest thus far in the Kashmiri insurgency. Image credit: Getty Images.

Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is one of the most militarized areas in the world. India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed, have fought three wars since their independence, two of which have been over J&K. The tensions began in 1947 after the two countries won independence from Britain. The second India-Pakistan war in 1965 followed, with the rise of the Jammu Kashmiri Liberation Front – a Kashmiri nationalist organization aiming to unite both the Pakistani- and Indian-administered regions of the territory. More recently, tensions between the two neighbours have flared due to a suicide bombing by an Islamist militant group known as Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), or Army of Muhammad, which killed forty Indian paramilitary operatives in the Indian-administered part of J&K. The same group also launched an attack on an Indian army base in Kashmir in 2016, prompting India’s military to cross the border and launch surgical air strikes into Pakistan.

For Pakistan, Islamist groups are a key leveraging tool against India. Undertaking a complete crackdown against these groups would therefore counter their interests. JeM, for example, continue to raise funds in Pakistan under different names, andMahmood Azhar initially founded JeM with generous support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. Although the Indian government has tried to have JeM’s leader blacklisted by the UN Security Council, these attempts have always been blocked by China. Pakistan has recently demanded more substantial evidence before they consider arresting Azhar, demonstrating clear noncooperation in the fight against JeM. The failure of Pakistan to actively counter terrorism in its administered regions has been a key issue for India, who claim that Pakistan must do more to curb terrorist activity.

The introduction of social media and cable news in both countries has further polarized public opinion surrounding the issue. Both sides use jingoistic nationalism to rile up support – creating new and influential public lobbies. For example, interrogation footage of the recently captured Indian pilot, Abhinandan Varthaman,  widely circulated on Whatsapp and was shown on nationalistic media outlets in India. Pakistan have also taken part in this information war by filming footage of the pilot saying how well he is being treated by his captors and how the Indian media “embellish the smallest thing, present it as if on fire, and people fall for it.”

The reason for such tension in Indian-administered territory is that most people within the territory do not want to be governed by India. Around sixty percent of its population is Muslim, making it the only state in India with a majority Muslim population. Moreover, high unemployment and human rights abuses by security forces have triggered protests against the authorities for over thirty years. Attacks in the region are carried out by the fedayeen (“those who sacrifice themselves”), and the last such attack on this scale was carried out in 2000 by a Birmingham-born man who was using the name Mohammad Bilal.

Going forward, how can ensuring short and long term peace work in practice? Throughout history, numerous UN resolutions have been introduced to try and resolve the conflict to no avail. Pakistan argues that J&K should be Pakistani because it is a majority -Muslim state. India argues that J&K should be a part of India because Kashmiris want to remain part of India (a claim which has not been proved). To paper over the cracks, both governments could agree to a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K.

In other words, a return to the status quo is the first substantive action that should be taken in the short-term. In light of the fact that people living near the LoC have started packing their bags to escape the conflict, a ceasefire will ensure confidence and trust can build between the two nations again. We have seen evidence pre-2003 of how Pakistan infiltrated terrorists into the region under the cover of shelling along the LoC, and if this ceasefire does not hold, Pakistan can do the same today. This step is therefore of paramount importance, but it requires dialogue and cooperation from both countries.

India’s ultimate goal is to dismantle terror outfits and the networks that support them. Hence, they must try to convince the international community to put more pressure on Pakistan to shut down its support for terrorism in J&K. For now, this seems unlikely. With the recent Indian air assault on a JeM camp in Balakot, the ongoing escalation in hostilities is counterintuitive to this goal. However, Pakistan’s release of an Indian pilot is one small step in the right direction. Most likely this is an empty gesture that does not cost Pakistan much at all, just like the “cosmetic measures” they undertook in 2003 to dismantle terror networks in the face of international pressure. This time, if this is to work, the international community must find a way to hold Pakistan to account.

From there, we build on. Over time, if we want real peace, public opinion must change. This is the responsibility of politicians, the media, and ultimately the people. However, the role of the media will be to promote balanced debate and turn away from the current nationalist sentiment so prevalent in Indian and Pakistani media.

Most militants in J&K are in fact homegrown youth, which adds another dimension to this issue. No longer can India solely blame Pakistan for providing weapons, explosives, and training militants in the region. India itself must now do more to support de-radicalisation in the area through engagement with civil society. The government of Jammu and Kashmir broke down last year as the ruling party in India, the BJP, ended its alliance with a Kashmiri regional party which left the territory to be ruled by the central government in New Delhi. In turn, this fosters more adverse sentiment from the people towards India. To establish stability, India must not directly rule but support a Kashmiri government that represents the people to help quell unrest and offer some sort of legitimacy. Pakistan must reciprocate. Both sides should put an effort to hold regional elections in J&K, offer political freedoms to the people, and end the disqualification of candidates based on their views.

A short-term, fragile peace is the most likely outcome for the region – albeit a welcome one considering the current situation. To build long-term stability, trust and confidence must exist between both sides. And this will take time.

Zahar Hryniv
in Asia / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by John Wilson

Who are Warren Christopher Clark and Zaid Abed al-Hamid?

Warren Christopher Clark (left) and Zaid Abed  al-Hamid (right) in SDF Custody.

In January 2019, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured a group of men who they state were seeking to launch attacks against civilians fleeing the small pockets of territory still under Islamic State control. The group consisted of men from around the globe, including Pakistan, Ireland, and the United States. Warren Christopher Clark and Zaid Abed al-Hamid, two of the men captured by SDF forces, were named and identified as American citizens by their captors on social media based on forms of identification on their persons. Clark, who goes by the kunya of Abu Mohammad al-Ameriki, has since been positively identified as an American from Texas. Al-Hamid, who now goes by Abu Zaid al-Ameriki, has a much less clear background.

Clark’s background has been explored and significant insight has been gained from Clark himself in videotaped interviews he participated in while in SDF custody. Clark is a former substitute teacher from the Houston metropolitan area. It is believed that Clark is 34 years of age. It has been confirmed that he graduated from University of Houston, where he majored in political science and minored in global business. After several years of being a substitute teacher, Clark began to watch videos of the Islamic State online. Curious, Clark was able to make contact with an Islamic State representative, sending them a resume and cover letter explaining his desire to teach English to children in the caliphate. Clark states that he is a convert to Islam, though it is unclear when he converted. After traveling to Syria via Turkey, Clark states that he never picked up arms for the caliphate. In interviews after he was captured, Clark stated that he did not regret joining the group, and even justified beheadings conducted by the group, comparing them to executions in the United States criminal justice system.

While questions remain about al-Hamid and his background, it is known that he is originally from Trinidad, where he was detained in 2011 for plotting to kill their prime minister. Beyond this, al-Hamid was featured in numerous Islamic State propaganda videos where he discusses converting to Islam and the struggles he faced practicing his religion there. Rumors have circulated that al-Hamid is a dual-US citizen. This has not been confirmed, but his use of al-Ameriki in his kunya suggests some background in the United States. When al-Hamid made his journey to the caliphate, he brought along his wife and multiple children. It is unclear if they are still alive.

Clark, who has been transferred to US custody and brought back to Texas, has since been indicted and charged with providing material support to the Islamic State. The indictment covers a period from 2011, when he first drew the attention of federal law enforcement officials for online activities pertaining to jihadists social media entities.

Early investigation into both Clark and al-Hamid has not resulted in substantial findings in terms of potential solutions for further countering violent extremist ideology. Both Clark and al-Hamid were converts to Islam. In both of their lives, it appears that there was or may have been a feeling of marginalization within society. Clark, despite having a formal education, could not find a full-time position teaching. Al-Hamid, in Islamic State propaganda videos, stated that he struggled practicing his faith in Trinidad and felt like an outsider. Both men appeared to have been at least partially influenced by online extremist sites.

The lessons learned thus far in both Clark and al-Hamid’s cases is limited. However, perceived or real marginalization appears to be an underlying factor in both cases respectfully. Time will dictate policy recommendations to prevent radicalization, but one cannot ignore the continuous appearance of marginalization in case studies of those who have become radicalized towards extremist ideologies.

John Wilson
risetopeace.org
in MENA / Rise to Peace blog / United States 0 comments
 by Rise to Peace

Boko Haram and Nigerian Instability

Since November, over 60,000 refugees have fled from Nigeria in fear of Boko Haram.   Image Source: IRIN

Boko Haram, or the Islamic State in West Africa, is a formally nonviolent militant organization based in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The group aims to “purify” Nigeria and other territories based on their own Salafist ideals. Clashes with the Nigerian government in 2009 over an investigation into the organization sparked a violent uprising, which has escalated in years since.

Decade Long Crisis

Boko Haram’s persistent insurgency in Nigeria has claimed tens of thousands of lives, and displaced millions since it began in 2009. It is estimated that about 35,000 individuals have been killed in the insurgency, making this conflict the region’s deadliest of all time.  The United Nations Refugee Agency claims that attacks across the Lake Chad Region have left over 2.5 million individuals displaced, including 250,000 individuals from Nigeria alone.

On February 5th, President Muhammadu Buhari declared that Boko Haram had been “decimated.”  He stated that his government had achieved enormous feats in the campaign against Boko Haram, and had reduced their criminal activity to a minimum.  While major military operations by the Nigerian military have been able to contain and significantly degrade the organizations territory, Boko Haram remains a major threat which has continued to devastate northeastern Nigeria. The continued attacks have limited Nigeria’s economic development, disrupted community life, destroyed infrastructure, and now pose a threat to the upcoming general elections.

Increased Severity of Attacks

Since November, a wave of renewed attacks has forced over 60,000 Nigerians to flee their homes and marked the highest level of disruption in over two years.  Attacks in recent months by Boko Haram have also become increasingly deadly. On November 18th of last year, Boko Haram infiltrated a military base in Metele of northeast Nigeria. They were able to overpower Nigerian troops, loot valuable military equipment, and allegedly kill over one hundred soldiers- essentially destroying the base.

Earlier this year, Boko Haram attacked the city of Rann in northeast Nigeria after the withdrawal of troops left the town vulnerable to attack. The town had been set up as a shelter area for the millions of individuals displaced in the conflict.  Around 9:00 am on January 28th, a group of Boko Haram fighters arrived to the town of Rann and set fire to the structures of the town in order to kill any displaced individuals still hiding.  According to Amnesty International, the attack killed 60 individuals, making it the deadliest confirmed Boko Haram attack to date.

Satellite image of Rann, Nigeria after the January 28th Boko Haram attacks.  The red coloring shows healthy vegetation, while the dark brown and black coloring shows areas heavily burned from the attack.  Image Source: CNES/Airbus and Amnesty International

Is Military Inadequacy is Causing Vulnerability?

In recent months, Boko Haram has been escalating attacks, building their arsenal, and shifting tactics in order to remain a threat to the Nigerian military.  As Boko Haram’s tactics have shifted away from conventional strategies- including increasingly sophisticated tactics such as the use of drones to track the military’s positions, the adaptation of foreign fighters, hiding within the local population, and the use of guerilla warfare tactics and infrastructural buildings- Nigerian forces have struggled to adequately adapt to new threats.

Nigeria’s defense strategy has left them increasingly vulnerable to attack. While Boko Haram’s attacks have been escalating, security in northern Nigeria has been deteriorating, and troops have been provided with inadequate weaponry and equipment.  Despite Nigeria’s large military defense budget, it appears as though troops have been pulled out of high-risk regions and left without sufficient weapons. Even further, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Sean McClure, the Nigerian military has not been able to adjust to the advancing threat of Boko Haram, and continues to rely on conventional warfare tactics.  Without a change in their military strategy, the Nigerian Army may not be able to defeat Boko Haram in the near future- and with elections soon approaching, many question how the next government can regain control of the country.

Rise to Peace
www.risetopeace.org
in Africa / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by John Wilson

Developing a Law Enforcement Model for Countering Violent Extremism

Ever since the first police departments were formed in the 1800s, there has been continuous debate over the appropriate model of policing to address criminal behavior and activities. The criminal threat, combined with the demands of an ever changing society, drive this debate and dictate the desired model for law enforcement to pursue. In recent decades, the community-oriented policing model has become increasingly popular and many police forces have implemented elements of it into their procedures. Community oriented policing is believed by many to have the potential to deter some level of criminal behavior, prior to it ever happening. In the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks and The Global War on Terror, intelligence-led policing has received strong levels of attention as many desire to see a more direct approach to addressing serious criminal threats. While debate rages on over the appropriate model for local law enforcement to use, it is worthwhile to question whether a hybrid model would be impactful. This is particularly true when assessing how to properly address and counter violent extremism, which has underlying issues that encompass an array of psychological, sociological, and criminological aspects.

To start the discussion, a brief explanation of both community-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing is required. Community oriented policing is a model of policing that emphasizes community problem solving through partnerships between the community and the local law enforcement agency. This usually is done in conjunction with a reorganization of the police force to diminish the barriers between the force and the local community.

Intelligence-led policing is based on both qualitative and quantitative data and intelligence, leading to directed police activities based on the evidence gathered. An example of this type of policing model would be to analyze data on burglaries in an area. Police can, with enough data collected, determine the time, days of the week, geographic tendencies, and method of entry used by the involved criminals. Forces can then make informed decisions and direct increased patrols during these times and in these areas in an effort to catch the criminals.

Countering violent extremism is related to countering terrorism, but is a distinct discipline. Countering violent extremism requires an understanding of the ideological, sociological, and psychological influences that lead individuals to develop extremist ideologies which leave them more likely to commit acts of violence.

By developing a comprehensive understanding of this process and the ideology itself, one can develop solutions to prevent the radicalization process, intervene in cases where the process has begun, or attempt to roll back the ideology of someone who has been radicalized. Punitive policing and criminal justice measures do little to prevent, intervene, or rehabilitate someone who has become radicalized or is vulnerable to radicalization; in fact, punitive approaches may make the situation worse.

Both models of policing mentioned above are accompanied by challenges unique to each one. For community oriented policing, law enforcement faces the struggle of a changing power dynamic as the community becomes increasingly involved. Further, especially when dealing with organized crime and even violent extremism, law enforcement must come to terms with working with former gang members or violent extremists in order to address the issues with the involved community.

In applying a hybrid policing model which blends community-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing, public perception is critical. On the surface of the model, the focus must be on community-oriented policing as this is critical to develop ties with communities, particularly those which are marginalized. The model must present itself as a grassroots movement whose priority is helping the community, not developing criminal cases to be prosecuted. Once established, relationships with the community will serve as the primary source of methods to prevent the radicalization process from ever starting. Those cases in which the process begins, it will likely be the community members who first become aware of the trend in the individual or group towards extremism. This will allow for proper intervention, preferably led by the community members but in conjunction with local law enforcement. Local law enforcement must not treat these individuals as terrorists, as this may further develop a sense of marginalization in the individual.

In cases that are further along in the radicalization process, these community relationships will also foster intelligence collection efforts for law enforcement. A community that feels valued and important is much more likely to provide information to local police services. Through this intelligence, police can direct strategies to monitor individuals or groups. These strategies must involve other applicable jurisdictions and there must be adequate dissemination of intelligence products to all agencies involved.

However, law enforcement should be careful during this process. Overt surveillance may lead the community as a whole to feel as if the police are working against them. Another area of concern is that once intelligence is developed about an individual or group, strict protocols must be implemented and followed to ensure complete privacy rights of the individual. Being labeled as a ‘terrorist’ before one is even confirmed to be an extremist may lead further marginalization and eventually to full-on extremism.

This hybrid model is meant to be implemented by state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. For this reason, it is highly dependent upon support from state policymakers who understand the strategy and support it to their utmost ability. While this discussion was a very simplistic and brief explanation of the reasoning for, and basic procedures of, this type of hybrid model, it serves as introductory post towards implementing this model of policing.

 

 

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional and Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

John Wilson
risetopeace.org
in Rise to Peace blog / United States 0 comments
 by Sakhi Naimzada

Intra-Afghan Peace Talks in the Absence of Afghan Government

Members of each delegation in Moscow beside Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Image credit: Sergei Karpukhin/Reuters.

Afghanistan has a long history of participating in local and international conferences on peace. The Bonn Conference was the start of a series of other conferences on peace and stability hosted in Afghanistan. The Afghan government has put together or at least sent a delegation to myriad conferences to gain international support for their peace efforts with opposition groups in the country.

Despite this trend, the last Moscow Peace talks were held in Russia without the presence of an Afghan government delegation. Organized by an Afghan-Russian Association, the conference took place six days after successful talks between the US and the Taliban occurred in Doha, according to US Special envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad. The Taliban refused any direct conversation with the Afghan government, but agreed to sit down with delegations from the United Sates, India, Pakistan, China, and prominent Afghan political figures including Hanif Attmar- a favorite to take over as president in the upcoming presidential elections- to talk peace. In the meantime, the Afghan government, the main absentee of the conference, called them traitors and urgently called for direct talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

After two days of negotiations in Moscow, an agreement was reached. The Taliban, accusing the Kabul government of being an “American puppet”, asked for a withdrawal of American forces from the country, the release of detainees, and the inclusion of the principle of Islamic Religion in the constitution. Former president Hamid Karzai, leading the Afghan delegation, declared the talks a “big achievement” that would bring peace and stability in an “Afghanistan free of foreign forces”. Current Afghan President Ashraf Ghani declared the Afghan delegation in Moscow illegitimate to represent Afghanistan in the conference.

Russia has been a low-key player in Afghan affairs since the beginning of the War on Terror. The Russian government, concerned about  security in the Central Asia, keeps a close eye on Afghanistan. The latest peace talk in Moscow was a step by Russia towards taking a major role in influencing Afghan governmental affairs, and sets precedent for future Russian involvement in Afghanistan.

Seeing the Taliban sitting at the table with decades-old political enemies to talk peace is the long-awaited desire of all Afghans, but it certainly poses risks. The Taliban went to Moscow demanding what seems to be the return of the Taliban regime of the 1990s, the withdrawal of foreign forces, Sharia Law, and no sign of womens’ appearance within the government. The Afghan delegation, on the other hand, was comprised mainly of political figures who fought on the front lines of the fight against the Taliban. Thanks to differences  between these two parties and the disparity in their motivations for negotiating, the fear is that an agreement between them would be more of a political move to grasp power in Kabul than a long-term solution for peace.

Sakhi Naimzada
in EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA / MENA / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments