The Liminal Agent: A New Model of Online Radicalisation?

In his recent essay, online extremism researcher Joshua Citarella sketches one of the new psycho-political cartographies of our time: a theory of how the internet no longer merely hosts extremism but actively incubates, mutates, and weaponizes it. His model of online radicalisation, one that emerges from self-directed isolation, deep cognitive immersion, and ideological bricolage, resonates profoundly with what Rise to Peace has identified as the domain of Liminal Warfare: the weaponization of thresholds, ambiguity, and incomplete identity in modern conflict spaces.

Increasingly, the traditional models of threat assessment borne from old threat matrix’s which privilege hierarchical organizations, clear ideological movements, and structured recruitment are inadequate to describe the contemporary threat landscape. In Citarella’s vision, the world of online radicalisation has irreparably changed. Radicalisation today is decentralized, asynchronous, memetic, and most importantly, liminal. It primarily happens in the unstable interzones between identity, ideology, and action.

Citarella’s Model

Citarella proposes that radicalisation, at least in the West, often begins not from prior ideological conviction, but from the condition of existential boredom, social/economic alienation, and exploration. A young person, often socially isolated and politically disenchanted, stumbles into online subcultures while seeking meaning, excitement, or community. They begin to scroll; into gaming forums, irony-poisoned meme pages, “political compass” esoterica, survivalist groups, and ideological echo chambers.

What matters is not a coherent doctrine, but the immersive ritual of searching itself. Platforms that favour algorithmic serendipity (TikTok, YouTube, Reddit) reinforce a pattern of escalating extremity, either through exposure to increasingly niche ideologies or by creating a pseudo-gamified environment where ideological commitment becomes performative currency. Politics becomes the hobby to end all hobbies. In this schema, most individuals never stabilize, instead drifting aimlessly and incoherently from one ideology to the next. They collage incompatible belief systems – eco-fascism one month, anarcho-primitivism the next, post-left accelerationism shortly after, creating an identity formation that is non-linear, recursive, and radically unstable. It is a process that could aptly be described as ‘liminal radicalisation’; the process of radicalisation itself is continuous and disaggregated, with no clear destination in mind.

The Political Economy of Alienation

What Joshua Citarella names as online radicalisation is, in fact, better understood as an emergent symptom of the wider economic decomposition and austerity that has driven radicalisation from the USA to Europe. Beneath the memetic ironies and aesthetic subcultures, beneath even the performative hatred, what one finds is a generation economically stranded and structurally abandoned. These are not natural ideologues – rather, they are young people who feel the burden of a collapsing horizon, where the prospect of an attainable middle-class life has disappeared as material circumstances decline.

In this sense, the online radicalisation pipeline is not ideological in its origins, but material. The typical subject is downwardly mobile, debt-strapped, and shut out of every traditional rite of social mobility: property, partnership, stability, meaning. Where civic institutions, societal inclusion and careers once were, they are confronted instead with deindustrialisation, economic alienation and precarity. Their beliefs are downstream from their estrangement. Liberal democracies, unable or unwilling to address the foundational material crises of our time in housing shortages, wage stagnation, job insecurity and the erosion of public life, have instead left a vacuum into which this new ecology has rushed. It is precisely this vacuum that provides such fertile ground for the blossoming of new, discordant political radicalisation amongst the disaffected online.

Radicalisation as Ritual, Not Recruitment

What Citarella outlines aligns precisely with what we at Rise to Peace conceptualize as the liminal domain of contemporary conflict. Liminality describes the in-between state: the adolescent undergoing a rite of passage, the refugee severed from homeland, the online user between algorithms and reality. In warfare, the liminal is where traditional rules of engagement dissolve, replaced by new architectures of influence, disorientation, and emotional capture. Crucially, Liminal Warfare weaponizes affect before ideology. It seeks to keep populations in a suspended state of insecurity, overstimulation, and yearning, thus rendering them perpetually vulnerable to new vectors of control, recruitment, or activation. Radicalization, under these conditions, is no longer a matter of persuasive argument or charismatic leadership, but rather the ambient result of prolonged cognitive dislocation.

The Liminal Agent

How can we position this new pipeline of online radicalisation?  Doing so requires designating a new actor in the matrix of terror and radicalisation: The Liminal Agent. These are individuals or small cells who do not adhere to conventional organizational structures, but whose radicalization journey makes them latent nodes of potential disruption.

They often exhibit the following features:

  • Non-linear ideological trajectories (far-right to eco-terrorism to esoteric nihilism within months).
  • Memetic accelerationism (using memes not merely as propaganda but as a form of psychological conditioning).
  • Fluid affiliations (no loyalty to any single group, cause, or doctrine).
  • Stochastic violence potential (low predictability of timing, targets, or methods).

Citarella’s model gives empirical substance to this theory. The emerging radical does not require recruitment, as they radicalize through participation. They do not need ideological discipline, as they need only the internet and its ideological input. This is a battlefield of perpetual pre-recruitment, where being “in play” is more important than belonging.

Implications for Counter-Radicalization

The classic counterterrorism model – disrupt leadership nodes, monitor recruitment pipelines, disrupt communication channels – struggles to address this reality. How do you intercept a process without a recruiter? How do you “deradicalize” someone who has never fully radicalized to begin with, but exists in a permanent state of cognitive threshold-crossing?

Such implications require three necessary shifts:

  1. Intervention at the Affective Level: Programs must target emotional needs (belonging, agency, recognition) rather than merely correcting disinformation or promoting tolerance.
  2. Narrative Counter-Liminality: Instead of offering fixed counter-narratives, interventions must provide adaptive narrative scaffolding; ways to help individuals navigate uncertainty without collapsing into extremism.
  3. Liminal Early Warning Systems: Indicators of drift (increased engagement with irony-laden extremist memes, withdrawal from non-digital communities, pattern acceleration) must be mapped and monitored, not just explicit pledges of allegiance.

This, however, represents only an intervention at the level of symptoms. The frameworks proposed here; narrative scaffolding, affective early warning systems, memetic analysis, can only help us insofar as they map the terrain of liminal radicalisation, but they cannot on their own treat its cause. What Citarella’s model ultimately reveals, and what we must refuse to obscure, is that online extremism today is less a question of ideology than of material infrastructure – social, economic, and psychological. It is not born from belief but from absence: the absence of economic security, of community, of a shared future. This absence collapses the very ideological architectures that once made radicalisation intelligible and coherent, and much more is required to be done and researched about this new pipeline of radicalisation that has emerged online if governments and civil society have any hope to limit the spread of its contagion.

Etienne Darcas, Counter-Terror Research Fellow and Media & Terror Program Lead, Rise to Peace

Terrorism Southeast

Security and Counter-Terrorism Efforts in Southeast Asia

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI), a comprehensive study prepared by the Institute for Economics and Peace on the impact of terrorism in 163 countries, reports that since 2020, the Southasia region has recorded a higher fatality rate compared to other regions. According to GTI 2022, among Southeast Asian countries, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia top the list. On the other hand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos are least impacted by terrorism.

Although GTI is an ideal tool to assess the impact of terrorism on countries, the study is not without limitations. The countries are ranked based on four indicators: incidents, fatalities, injuries, and property damage. It means that the index relies only on the ensuing consequences of terrorism and fails to take into account the persisting threat of terrorism. For instance, according to the GTI 2022, Singapore is least impacted by terrorism. However, the Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2021, published by the Ministry of Home Affairs, acknowledges that the terrorism threat to Singapore remains high. The situation is similar to that of an active volcano. It means that a ‘zero score’ in GTI, as in the case of the majority of Southeast Asian countries, may not necessarily imply that the country is free from terrorism threats.

The terrorism activities reported in the Southeast Asia region reveal the changing dimension of international terrorism. In March 2021, a woman lone wolf attacker, inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), opened fire at the National Police Headquarters in Jakarta. In the Philippines, two women ISIL terrorists staged suicide bombings to avenge the death of their terrorist leader. Dr. Rommel C. Banlaoi, the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research chairman, warned of the increased active participation of women in terror attacks. Further, he stated that women also teach and encourage children to be their successors after martyrdom. The situations indicate the spread of female militancy in the region and the intergenerational succession of terrorism.

The Singapore ministry of home affairs cited self-radicalization, Islamist terrorism, and far-right extremism as a potential threat to its homeland security. The ministry confirms that within Southeast Asia, ISIL remains the primary terrorism threat actor. ISIL’s success in digitalization of radicalization has accelerated the spread of propaganda and lone wolf attacks in the region. The situation makes it challenging for law enforcement agencies to identify sleeper cells and prevent acts of terrorism.

The nexus between conflict and terrorism is apparent in Myanmar. Political turmoil fuelled violent conflict leading to terrorism has landed Myanmar on top of GTI 2022. Since the military coup in February 2021, there has been a significant rise in terrorist attacks, and the  Anti-junta armed groups are responsible for causing the majority of deaths. Terrorism continues to breed on push and pull factors or vulnerabilities born out of conflicts, such as political instability, violence, poverty, unemployment, forced displacement, and oppression.

Thailand continues to be a transit and facilitation hub for terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Hezbollah. The country is facing political instability, which impedes the government’s efforts to implement a counter-terrorism strategy. Further, Bangkok has become a hub for global organized crime syndicates. A report of the Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime confirms that organized crime syndicates are targeting Southeast Asia to expand operations, and the profits generated by such groups have reached unprecedented and dangerous levels. There exist a nexus between organized crime and terrorism. Organized crime facilitates terrorism and vice versa. Organized crime breeds in areas with political instability and a weak law enforcement system. Terrorism creates fertile ground for organized crime to breed. On the other hand, organized crime aids terrorist organizations in recruitment, funding, and logistics. In short, this nexus is capable of eroding regional security, as is the case in Southeast Asia.

An analysis of the counter-terrorism efforts made by Southeast Asian countries evidences the success of regional cooperation in overcoming the challenges and threats posed by evolving terrorism. A joint declaration of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN)  to counterterrorism strongly condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and declares terrorism as a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress, and prosperity. ASEAN has established a regional framework to control, prevent, and neutralize transnational crime. The ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism aims to strengthen mutual legal assistance, cooperation, and rehabilitative programs to combat terrorism.

At the national level, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia are pioneers in counter-terrorism efforts. Indonesia is effectively implementing the four pillars of the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy. It means that the country is making an effort to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, prevent and counter-terrorism, support member states and the UN to combat terrorism, and promote the rule of law and human rights. Indonesia has sought the support of the international comity in addressing the issues of terrorism financing and foreign terrorist fighters. The Singapore government has initiated the ‘SGSecure movement’ to empower its citizens to effectively identify radicalization signs and report suspicious activity. The programme is spread through educational institutions, civic societies, workplaces, etc. The government acknowledges the importance of people’s participation in countering self-radicalization and terrorism. Similarly, Malaysia has established specialized institutions, including the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT), to counter terrorism and extremism through partnerships for goals, capacity building, and research.

Varun VM, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow 

Mapuche

Difficulties in Defining Terrorism: The Case of the Mapuche in Chile and Argentina

The Mapuche conflict in Chile and Argentina has generated diverse reactions by the authorities of both countries. Some of the measures have been harshly criticized for employing counter-terrorism methods to resolve disputes with the Mapuche.

Some of the controversies include the use of the Anti-Terrorist Law by the Chilean government and the militarization of certain regions. The disputes with the indigenous Mapuche communities sparks a debate about what exactly terrorism is and how to combat it in South America.

The Mapuche Conflict

Some analysts point out that the current conflict between the Mapuche and the Chilean State originated in 1866 when the government determined that all territories south of the Biobío region became fiscal property. Eventually, the Chilean army entered the Mapuche territories and began the resettlement process from 1883 to 1930. This led to the reduction of the Mapuche’s territory from five million hectares to 500,000 hectares.

To this day, Mapuche communities persist in the region but have struggled to recover and maintain their ancestral territories in the Araucanía region, in southern Chile. Even though hundreds of indigenous Mapuche peacefully protest over their territories, some violent events have been registered in the region, especially in recent years.

In October and November 2021, episodes of violence were reported in the Araucanía region. One example includes a confrontation between the military and the Mapuche, resulting in three deaths, railway lines sabotaged, shootouts, and forest facilities set on fire. Additionally, a video of the group Weichan Auka Mapu (WAM) (Struggle for Ancestral Resistance) was broadcast, showing many armed individuals claiming the rights of the Mapuche.

Furthermore, in Argentina, similar events have occurred. In October 2021, Arabela Carreras, the governor of the Province of Río Negro, denounced that the organization Resistencia Ancestral Mapuche (RAM) committed terrorist acts in the region. The governor pointed out that there was an arson attack that endangered the lives of the area’s inhabitants. Likewise, Governor Carreras mentioned that the RAM organization is a belligerent group with international connections. For this reason, the governor asked for federal forces to intervene in the province.

These events have caused various journalists and analysts to point to the existence of “Mapuche Terrorism” in Argentina and Chile. Some researchers state that some events occurring in the Araucanía region are terrorism since they are serious crimes committed by ethnonationalist groups and are directed against owners and workers living in areas claimed as “ancestral property.” For this reason, researchers state that it is necessary to reinforce police capacities in the area.

However, other analysts believe there is no such thing as “Mapuche Terrorism.” because the conflict in southern Chile is historically due to unfulfilled political commitments by the State. They also mention that members of the community who choose to use force do not represent the entire Mapuche community. Therefore, they recommend that the Mapuche conflict not be approached exclusively from a military and police approach.

Even though the best intervention methods in the Mapuche conflict are still heavily debated, the Chilean and Argentinian governments have already taken measures regarding this situation.

The Anti-Terrorist Law and the Criminalization of the Mapuche

One of the Chilean government’s most questioned responses regarding the Mapuche conflict in Araucanía was the use of the Anti-Terrorist Law. The Anti-Terrorist Law was enacted during Pinochet’s regime in 1984. It has been amended several times and has even been invoked or attempted to be used against members of the Mapuche.

The Anti-Terrorist Law was invoked in 2013 against a Mapuche individual accused of committing arson in which two people died. In addition, in 2010, nine Mapuches were sentenced under the Anti-Terrorist Law and another 53 were prosecuted.

The use of the Anti-Terrorist Law continues to cause controversy even in recent years. In 2017, experts from the United Nations (UN) urged the Chilean government not to prosecute four Mapuche under the Anti-Terrorist Law for arson. The UN highlighted that the application of anti-terrorist legislation weakens the possibility for a fair trial and makes it less likely that the truth of what happened will come to light.

In addition, human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, have criticized the use of the Anti-Terrorist Law. Amnesty International presented a report pointing out that the application of the Anti-Terrorist Law in trials against Mapuche activists generates unfair processes without guarantees. Additionally, Amnesty International mentioned that one of the trials presents various irregularities and demonstrates discriminatory ways in which justice is applied against leaders of Indigenous peoples.

Argentinian journalists have mentioned that the Argentine press has played an important role in the criminalization of the Mapuche. As a result, public opinion leans in favor of measures such as the militarization of Mapuche territories.

Militarization

Another measure used in Mapuche territories is increased militarization. The Chilean government declared a state of emergency in four provinces. Members of the armed forces were deployed due to the escalation of violence. However, the military presence is rejected by human rights organizations and by the Mapuche community.

According to President Piñera, the emergency State of Exception and militarization are necessary to better confront terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime; in no case is increased militarization directed against peaceful citizens.

The measure came into force on October 12, 2021; however, it was extended until mid-November. The measure was applauded by certain sectors of the population, who argue that it is the best way to maintain order and security in the regions with a Mapuche population. Nevertheless, the detractors, part of the opposition and indigenous organizations, maintain that it only puts more tension on the dispute.

The Difficulty of Defining Terrorism

The case of the Mapuche conflict in Chile and Argentina is a clear example of the difficulties that arise when defining what is considered terrorism.  Moreover, it is also unclear how terrorism should be addressed, given that some measures can be detrimental in criminalizing vulnerable populations and infringing on human rights.

Although there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism and the ways to handle it, it is necessary to think of alternatives to guarantee public order without falling into excesses. However, this is a difficult task without a clear answer, yet.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Counter-terrorism

The Misuse of Counter-Terrorism: How Authoritarian States Repress Dissent

Within the past two decades, governments across the world have worked diligently to prevent large-scale terrorist attacks. Furthermore, when examining the current global state of counter-terrorism, it is evident that the counter-terrorism tools at the disposal of governments are the most effective they have ever been.

However, there has been a noticeable rise of governments detaining critics under the guise of counter-terrorism. To understand what can be done, we must understand what circumstances led to the rise of this worrying trend in recent years.

Origins of Contemporary Counter-Terrorism

Although counter-terrorism is not a new phenomenon, the modern way we conceptualize and practice it began after the September 11th attacks. The deaths of thousands of Americans on U.S. soil provided a wake-up call to the traditional agencies of our national security apparatus. These attacks provided the impetus for the creation of new agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, becoming the cornerstone of national security. In addition, the government passed the Patriot Act within the same year, giving newfound powers to agencies with a counter-terrorism focus.

The most infamous of these agencies which were given more authority to expand surveillance was the National Security Agency (NSA). The agency traces its heritage to the establishment of the Armed Forces Security Agency, which later became the agency it is today in 1952 to better coordinate communication intelligence (COMINT) across the government.

After the Cold War, the NSA was viewed similarly to other intelligence community agencies, as relics of a time where the USSR was our greatest threat. The agency was given a reinvigorated purpose in an era that had replaced the threat of Communism with the threat of terrorism.

Moreover, the United States shaped international counter-terrorism norms in the early years of the War on Terror.  A wide coalition of nations supported the U.S. decision to combat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. This became evident by the unanimous passage of Resolution 1386 of the UN Security Council, which established the International Security of Assistance Form (ISAF).

Counter-terrorism operations became apolitical among the states participating in the international system. The use of tools to conduct mass surveillance was also normalized as it was seen as necessary to combat terrorism. While the tools used to conduct counter-terrorism were seen as controversial, they were indicative of an attitude by the United States to fight terrorism by any means necessary.

Authoritarian “Counter-Terrorism”

As the War on Terror has progressed, many states adopted the norms and tools used by the United States. The progression of time has also led to more advanced technology being adopted each year by governments around the world. These conditions have allowed authoritarian states the unprecedented ability to spy upon their citizens, accessing their movements and online presence. They have used this information on those they consider dissidents to quell criticism against their regimes by having them recant statements made online.

In the most extreme of these cases, regimes have used the excuse of counter-terrorism to imprison their citizens whom they believe weaken their regime. Authoritarian states have consistently targeted journalists.

Authoritarian regimes survive by instilling fear within their state by ensuring any forms of dissent are met with harsh repercussions. In a healthy society, journalists act as a fourth estate that safeguards against government abuses. These imprisonments of journalists have occurred from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to as far as Myanmar. Such actions only delegitimize counter-terror operations which aim to defeat extremist organizations, such as ISIS.

What Can Be Done

It is important to note the current deficiencies existing in contemporary counter-terrorism when confronting this issue. The most pressing issue is the varying doctrines among states regarding how they combat terrorism. Several of these doctrines have developed primarily from military rules of engagement. Attitudes and norms have also molded theses from the War on Terror.

In order for reform to occur, there must be a codification of rules of engagement within international law. Such reforms would limit the scope of counter-terrorism operations to only extremist groups, which are widely agreed upon to be threats to international security. Deviation from these newly established norms would ensure that states will no longer be able to use counter-terrorism as a justification for their nefarious actions in a legal context.

 

Christopher Ynclan Jr., Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Congo

ISIS in the Congo: A Counter-Terrorism Perspective

With much attention spotlighting ISIS-K’s increased capabilities, little attention has been brought to their counterparts within Central Africa. Much like their counterparts in Central Asia, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) has increased its activities within Central Africa this year.

As ISCAP has carried out attacks, they have united the governments of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in combating them, despite their past differences. While ISIS has lost territory in the Middle East, it is evident that its affiliates remain salient threats to the regions they operate in, as well as international security as a whole.

Origins of ISCAP

The formation of the Islamic State in Central Africa traces back to ISIS’s ambitions to expand into Africa in late 2018. The first attacks in the region occurred one year later within the DRC. That same year, the group expanded operations into Mozambique, which cemented their threat to Central African security.

ISCAP has traditionally been composed of the Congo-based Allied Defence Forces (ADF) and fighters within Mozambique. In 2020, the Mozambique branch had conquered cities within Mozambique, which alarmed states within the region. This year, the branch within Mozambique has been the target of a multilateral offensive from a coalition of states, which has weakened their operational capacity compared to their previous success in 2020.

Growing Operational Capability

The ADF did not begin life as an exclusively Islamic militant organization, but rather as a rebel group seeking to oust the current Ugandan government. As the group went into remote regions of Uganda it began to change into the militant group it is today, recruiting disaffected Muslim youth.

The branch within the DRC has seen its capacity grow in 2021, as they have been attributed to an uptick of attacks within the country. They have also become increasingly brutal, demonstrated through released videos of beheadings as part of their propaganda. This is in light of this branch conducting over 20 attacks this year alone. Moreover, their attacks within Uganda have become indicative of an augmentation in their capabilities to harm the people of Central Africa. The most brazen of such attacks occurred on November 16th in which they bombed the capital of Uganda.

Ghosts of the Past

While both governments are interested in the defeat of ISCAP, relations between the DRC and Uganda have been fraught with tensions. These strained relations stem from the actions of the Ugandans during the Congo Wars, which ended in 2003. The Ugandans were found to violate the DRC’s sovereignty and were forced to pay reparations by the Hague.

As these wounds are still fresh in the minds of many within the DRC, skepticism of another Ugandan intervention underlies their thoughts. Despite these reservations, the government of the DRC has invited Ugandan troops into the country to aid in the fight against the insurgents.

A Roadmap for Peace

The fight against Islamic militants within Africa is not a new endeavor. However, it is important to note the evolution of such groups within Africa and their capabilities. More than 20 years ago, the United States’ embassy in Kenya was attacked by suicide bombers. Since that time, a small group, which at one point pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, captured large swathes of sovereign territory in the Levant, and created a network of global affiliates that carried out their own attacks. No longer are such groups content with attacking government symbols, such as an embassy, but rather they seek the prestige of carving out states from the territory of sovereign nations.

As this is Africa’s new reality, there are policy directives that should be considered to effectively address the current situation of the Congo. To effectively rout this group, it is imperative that a formalized dissemination of intelligence exist between states in the region. While the DRC and Uganda are engaged in combating the DRC-based branch, the Mozambique-based branch still can provide refuge to any escaping combatants to regain strength. Without such a coordinated effort, it is unlikely that ISCAP’s threat to Central African security will subside.

Secondly, a concrete timeline should exist detailing when Ugandan troops will be present and what they must abide by while in the DRC. Any such violation would be met with recourse similar to the previous deal given by the Hague.

The DRC has deemed that the Ugandans would be beneficial to combat ISCAP; however, any such breakdown of relations between the two would detrimentally impact security. Finally, the states of Central Africa must address the underlying conditions which have driven their Muslim youth to join ISIS affiliates.

 

Christopher Ynclan Jr., Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow