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The Afghan Future Looks Promising After Decisions at the Loya Jirga
 by Ahmad Mohibi

With Final Prisoner Release, Afghanistan Takes a Giant Step Toward Peace

Originally published at The Diplomat

At long last, the Afghan government and the Taliban are ready to start their long-delayed peace talks.

The Afghan Loya Jirga (grand assembly) approved the release of 400 Taliban prisoners on Sunday, and President Ashraf Ghani endorsed the decision. This hopefully paves the way for the intra-Afghan talks between Afghan delegates and the Taliban insurgency, aimed at ending the 19 years of war.

“I look forward to the intra-Afghan dialogues,” said Khalid Noor, the youngest member of the Afghan negotiating team. He added, “I believe it’s going to start in the next few days.”

On Monday, the Taliban and the Afghan government agreed on August 16 as the start date for the intra-Afghan dialogues. The 21 members of the Afghan negotiation team headed by Massoum Stanikzai (former chief of the National Directorate of Security) is likely to depart Afghanistan for Doha, Qatar once the prisoners are released — as early as tomorrow.

The 400 prisoners were the last of a group of 5,000 whose release was promised in the U.S.-Taliban peace deal, signed on February 29. The Afghan government was hesitant to release these last prisoners for various reasons, from a lack of presidential constitutional authority to a desire to hold the prisoners responsible for their actions as well as a need for leverage for the Afghan government after the U.S.-Taliban deal.

Read the full article on the website of The Diplomat

Ahmad Shah Mohibi is the Founder of Rise to Peace

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 by Cameron Hoffman

Personal Reflections on the Tragedy in Beirut

Editor’s Note: Rise to Peace Research Fellow Cameron Hoffman has a close connection with Beirut, Lebanon. He spoke with some of his friends that experienced the August 4th blast and they offered their candid insights. When placed into the context of political and state security, the explosion took on more meaning than just a tragedy. These are personal reflections that will hopefully lead to an enhanced interest in the Lebanese crisis in our readers.

On August 4, a massive explosion rocked the city of Beirut, Lebanon. Improper storage of 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate — an extremely explosive chemical that is found in fertilizers — ignited and caused a blast that left 135 people dead, over 5000 wounded, and displaced over 300,000. Damages are estimated to be approximately $ 15 billion USD.

This day hit very close to home as I spent my summers living in Beirut and still have friends there to this day. I spoke with them a day after the catastrophe only to learn that many members of the church I attended experienced extensive damage to their homes and one close friend is hospitalized after glass pierced his liver following the explosion. As well, the building of the church I attended (over 2.5 miles from the blast site) had its windows shattered into the sanctuary area (sitting area where pews are located). There is significant need for basic supplies like food and water.

Grief and pain turned to rage in the days following the explosion. It became increasingly clear that the accident was easily avoidable if it was not for the level of corruption and mismanagement typical of the Lebanese government. A growing number of e-mails and public court documents show that many government officials knew that the ammonium nitrate seized from a Russian vessel was improperly stored and extremely dangerous for over six years.

The Lebanese people blame the government for the disaster. My friend Moufid said that citizens can no longer tolerate the apathy, mismanagement and corruption any longer. Another friend, Jenny, stated that the protesters and people in general may be unsure of direct responsibility, but they are “fed up” with the whole system and want accountability. She offered that the explosion was merely a “cherry on top” of the deteriorating economic and political situation in Lebanon — a situation that drew millions into the streets before COVID-19 sent them back into their homes.

Indeed, this is a turning point for the Lebanese government. Popular calls for revolution continue to grow and French president Emmanuel Macron — who is overseeing French aid to Lebanon — berated the Lebanese political system as corrupt and in need of “deep change.” His trip to Beirut, and subsequent speeches, echoed the chants of hundreds of protesters that flocked in the streets. He called the explosion “a metaphor for Lebanon’s current crisis,” and said that Lebanon was in need of “a new political order.” Further, Macron stressed the need for an audit of the central bank. He expressed, “If there is no audit of the central bank, in a few months there will be no more imports and then there will be a lack of fuel and of food.”

Additionally, France is organizing an international conference to raise support and assistance for Lebanon, and all funds raised will be handled with “full transparency.” Macron stated that, “there will be no blank checks to a system that does not have the trust of its own people,” and that Lebanese leaders must provide “answers to freedom, reform, and anti-corruption.”

In asking Jenny what she thought was needed for Lebanon to recover she said, “we need new politicians. To start from scratch and remove the current structure and corruption. The people are not going to be fooled anymore, and the corrupt politicians need to be taken to court.” She is one of thousands of young adults who feel the same sentiment.

The event is undoubtedly catastrophic, but hopefully it will lead to changes that the Lebanese people desperately need and deserve. Moufid summarized his thoughts about the future, “We Lebanese are used to destruction and rebuilding again. I believe that God will use this [the explosion] in a way to help rebuild the economy. They will need to rebuild the port as its important to our economy, but we will come back.  It’s natural for us.”

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 by Arman Sidhu

Remittances: Reverberations for Conflict-Ridden Regions

Since the start of the 21st century, the world economy’s reliance on remittances has risen sharply as globalization enabled growth that created favorable incentives for migration through several emerging markets. Remittances, which refer to transfer payments made by foreign workers to their families back home, have benefitted both the likes of high-growth economies, like China and India, as well as weaker states that failed to attract investment due to incessant conflict and instability. In total, remittances (as a % of Gross Domestic Product) have increased by 105% since 1999, fueling household consumption and stepping in as a guarantor of financial security for vulnerable families located in fragile and/or underdeveloped states.

Yet, with lockdowns across the globe interrupting economic activity, the flow of remittances that sustain countries rife with crime, terrorism, and violence has been disrupted. As a result, countries with a high dependency on remittances will be forced to rely on the decisions made by foreign governments, of which they have no influence over. In addition, state-sponsored efforts to monitor and impose mandatory quarantines have disproportionately targeted migrants, limiting their movements, and in many cases, using the opportunity to impose draconian immigration reform to placate political aims.

As one example, Malaysia, which hosts nearly 5 million migrant workers (documented and undocumented), has been particularly aggressive in its COVID-19 response. As a popular destination for workers from a variety of South and East Asia countries, Malaysia’s raids of areas filled with migrants has attracted scrutiny. An Al-Jazeera documentary featuring the experiences of migrants was subsequently responded to with a police investigation of the journalists, followed by accusations of sedition and defamation. One migrant in particular who chose to share his experience with the Al-Jazeera journalists was the subject of a 2-week police manhunt that culminated in his arrest and planned deportation. Similar state-sponsored efforts targeting migrant workers have been cited in other popular migrant destinations like the United States, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Lebanon, among several others.

With migrants unable to earn, the potential economic reverberations will extend far beyond the borders of states that employ, and depend upon, migrant labor. Though several variables can be used to describe remittance-dependent economies, these countries tend to fall in one (or both) of the following categories:

  1. Countries that have struggled to industrialize, leading to a weak manufacturing base. This is often due to, or followed by poor job growth and a lack of diversification beyond the agricultural sector. Examples of such countries would include Tonga, Haiti, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
  2. Countries that are ridden with incessant conflict and chronic crime & terrorism. Such conditions drive the labor supply (particularly younger workers) to work abroad, either in nearby regional hubs or on other continents. Example countries in this category include Yemen, Palestine, South Sudan, and El Salvador.

Should remittance volumes continue to recede in the developing world, the consequences could be vast. Data compiled by the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), estimates that global remittances could drop by as much as $110 Billion USD, or 20% of the annual total. Sixty countries, ranging from low-income to middle-income, depend on remittances for at least 5% of their respective GDP. Furthermore, remittances are responsible for contributing tax revenue for governments, which in turn, provide funding for varied public services, many of which have become only more integral during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the absence of substantial foreign direct investment or multilateral aid, the timeline for recovery will last longest in the countries with the most acute needs. Though aid and investment remain vital sources of capital for low and middle-income countries, they are both dwarfed by the substantial inflows brought in by remittances. In the last year alone, remittances have accounted for $550 billion USD worth of funds in such countries.

Regardless of the circumstances, the consistent flow of remittances is vital for sustaining consumption and keeping businesses afloat in remittance-dependent countries. The inability to maintain remittances can result in cascading economic damage. A failure to induce job creation is one of the most oft-cited conditions that can foment, or accelerate, violence through spikes in crime and terrorism. Conflict hotspots in the Sahel region, Gulf region, East Africa, and South Asia are particularly vulnerable, given their outsized regional dependence on remittances to fulfill the most basic living standards.

To help pare the ripple effects that a drop in remittances would create, a handful of solutions could prove useful. First, governments with the capacity to enact stimulus efforts can indirectly assist migrant laborers. Stimulus programs can boost consumption, incentivizing companies that employ migrants to maintain their payrolls to meet market demand. Second, the costs associated with transferring funds across borders can amount between 7-10% in fees. State-led efforts to reduce these cross-border transfer fees ensures that more money reaches the intended recipient(s). Though efforts to establish a global compact are underway, more collaboration is required between those nations that send remittances, and those that receive them.

Ensuring that migrants are equipped with the tools needed to weather the pandemic is not just a humanitarian issue, but an economic one that sets the stage for a quicker post-pandemic transition. Businesses located in migrant-dependent economies, like those found in Southeast Asia and the Gulf region, will not be able to fulfill their workforce needs from domestic labor. Instead, these countries may find themselves competing for the very same migrants they turned away, delaying the opportunity for a global economic recovery.

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 by Cameron Hoffman

Civil Society Organizations as a Possible Structure for Recovery in Lebanon

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Lebanon experienced massive protests calling for a new government in response to declining economic opportunities amongst other issues. While lockdown measures have put these protests on pause, the core grievances remain. Its survival hinges on the ability of the government to address its citizens’ concerns.

However, the disconnect between the government and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that work to combat local issues and aid development puts the Lebanese government at a disadvantage.  To prevent Lebanon from collapsing and adding to the instability of the region a framework built on the cooperation of these two groups to create meaningful policy change must be established.

Lebanon has a long and large history when it comes to CSOs. CSOs in Lebanon are defined as organizations working to promote intra-sectarian cooperation, civic participation, and inclusion in the governance and political order in Lebanon. As of 2015, there were 1.3 CSOs for every 1000 people in Lebanon. Official records indicate that there are 8,311 registered organizations and many more loosely organized groups.  But while the number of CSOs is numerous, the effectiveness of CSOs is extremely limited is due to Lebanon’s political structure and the weak organizational capacity of CSOs.

CSOs are currently largely locked out of the policy creation process because of the Lebanese government’s structure of sectarianism.  This structure breeds tribalism and voting based on sect rather than allegiance to effective governance. Additionally, policymakers are uninterested in working with CSOs, and largely ignore the local issues for pandering to the sect of their constituents and engaging in party politics.

The internal organizational capacity of CSO’s are limited in two major ways. The first, is that accurate information on the group’s functions, membership, and influence is largely unavailable, which makes it difficult for donors to contribute. In fact, over 60% of Lebanese CSOs suffer from a lack of financial resources. The lack of resources leads to the inability to maintain full-time staff, operate offices, and other essential functions or successful organizations. The second is that over 41% of CSOs in Lebanon have problems maintaining volunteers. This makes larger community projects unachievable and limits the effectiveness of the CSO, but also its ability to influence policy through citizen pressure on policymakers.

To increase their effectiveness CSOs need to develop reliable information management, create robust strategic plans, keep volunteers engaged, and lastly, develop a relationship with the media. However, unless the government makes changes to cooperate with CSOs the changes CSOs need to make will not greatly increase their effectiveness.

The current “lockout” of CSOs from the policy making process is extremely harmful to maintaining Lebanon’s stability as it approaches a socio-economic collapse. If the crisis of a failed state is to be averted the government needs to include the CSOs to address the local issues that contribute to the larger grievances like the public health crisis (water pollution and poor healthcare) and economic fatigue (18% youth unemployment, low job creation, low wages, mismatch of the job market demands and skills earned in the education sector).

The risk of collapse is predicated on the elites of Lebanon exploiting the relatively liberal political atmosphere and absence of a welfare state to create informal dependency networks that preserve the status-quo.  The lack of cooperation between the government and CSOs allows extremist groups and parties like Hezbollah to use the same strategy to create their own dependency networks that supports the survival of these organizations and adds to the already heightened fragmentation without contributing to the overall well-being of citizens.

A lockout of CSOs from the policy process not only threatens the stability of the region, but will also lockout the inhabitants of Lebanon from experiencing real, and needed, change. Not only does the current Lebanese government need to learn and adapt, but the current situation provides a framework for other states in the region to learn a valuable lesson — failing to include CSOs in the policy making process may preserve the status-quo temporarily, but that it leads to a failure in good governance and eventually political upheaval.

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 by Jack Ryan

How Will COVID-19 Impact Efforts in Afghanistan?

It is often surmised that modern conflict is characterized by a steady decline in inter-state warfare and increased conflict perpetrated by illegal non-state actors. In the current context, assumptions about a post-COVID-19 world and conflict add to this discussion as it will present a range of unique challenges to the international community. More specifically, COVID-19 will prove to be another factor in the decline of inter-state warfare, but provide a unique opportunity for terror cells and other illegal sub-national organizations to extort at the same time.

Due to the vast economic measures directed to fight the virus domestically as well as funding to support individuals and businesses during mandated lockdown measures, states will have to reexamine their national budgets. Countries will struggle to maintain pre-COVID-19 military spending, especially as citizens’ concerns shift from international affairs to domestic issues.

One only needs to read Geoffrey Blainey’s The Causes of War to get a grasp of his accurate argument that optimism guides a nation’s decision to go to war. Nations have been more inclined to go to war when they are more optimistic of victory and all it takes is one actor’s pessimism to favor a peaceful outcome, even if it means acceptance of conditions that may be less than favorable. COVID-19 has reduced optimism in states around the world. For example, the United Kingdom’s furlough scheme is estimated to have cost the country £60 billion (approximately $76.1 billion USD) between March and July. As nations look to rebuild their coffers, military spending will inevitably fall and with it, public support for military activity abroad.

This leads to the question: what does this mean for Afghanistan and American military engagement in the country?

Firstly, the pandemic has resulted in reduced military activity. As noted in outside analysis, COVID-19 has “prompted the United States and its partners to pause wargaming exercises that are meant to reassure allies and bolster readiness to protect the health of its military members.”

Not only does the U.S. need to keep a close watch over its military spending, but it also needs to keep a closer watch over the health of its fighters. Sailors and soldiers in the field are among the most vulnerable because they are packed together. In addition, it has been noted that, “Ground campaigns in urban areas pose still greater dangers in pandemic times. Much recent ground combat has been in cities in poor countries with few or no public health resources, environments highly favorable to illness. Ground combat also usually produces prisoners, any of whom can be infected.”

Therefore, these factors will result in a growing trend of reluctance of countries to engage, especially those like the U.S. who have entered into conflicts under the banner of the responsibility to protect. This reluctance will also result from social pressures. It is easier for a state to promote counter-terrorism operations when its citizens believe they are directly at risk of becoming a victim of terror. On the other hand, expectations of governments shift when citizens are faced by other threats to their livelihood, such as a pandemic like COVID-19. Support for actions abroad will undoubtedly waver.

COVID-19 and the reaction from the international community will inevitably impact the Afghan government, which was characteristically fractious long before the pandemic. Afghanistan has long struggled with a subpar health care system and the pandemic has only reiterated these struggles. A 2015 study determined that, “For one in five people, a lack of access to health care had resulted in death among family members or close friends within the last year.” Further, the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan reports, “Afghanistan has a total of 35,526 confirmed cases of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) and 1,185 deaths attributed to the disease (Ministry of Public Health).”

The increasing number of cases and evident lack of access to appropriate health care facilities presents an even bigger challenge to a government already stretched thin by the ongoing conflict with the Taliban. President Ashraf Ghani’s government continues to pursue medical relief and stimulus packages including the allocation of “$86 million and then $158 million in the second phase to provide food to people across the country.” However, the critics fear the program will become riddled with corruption, a disease of its own within Afghan leadership. A free bread distribution program set up earlier in the year was found to be compromised by corruption.

Whilst the Afghan government battles corruption, a pandemic and wavering international support, the Taliban continue to launch attacks and publicly blame the Afghan government for the delay in the intra-Afghan peace process. Whilst the ongoing pandemic provides challenges to governments across the world it also provides a unique opportunity for terror organizations to take advantage of these pessimistic and economically weakened states.

As the government diverts security to hospitals as the number of patients rise by the day, the Taliban has taken advantage of the situation launching a range of attacks across the country in an attempt to gain an advantage over the Afghan government before peace talks begin.

Another pressing issue is that of prisons where thousands of Taliban fighters (as well as those of other groups) are incarcerated. It is common knowledge that prison conditions are favorable to the spread of disease. This will present an even greater challenge to a government already stretched thin on the ground.

Thus, it is integral that whilst the U.S. faces domestic pressure, they remain focused on their longest war. The US will need to accept responsibility for the situation in Afghanistan and continue its facilitation of intra-Afghan talks. Though the U.S. and other stakeholders will face increased pressure to reduce military activity in Afghanistan, continued support for the Afghanistan government, especially in the run up to peace talks, is essential. This is extremely important as the Taliban strive to gain any increased bargaining power over a weakened Afghan government.

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 by Jack Ryan

The Emergence of Sara Khitta in the Context of the US Involvement in Afghanistan

The period following the United States-Taliban agreement has provided an opportunity for the U.S. to examine its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) ethos and its impact on affected states, specifically Afghanistan. Operations on the ground have changed over this time and so have counter-efforts by the Taliban. It can be noted that the continued conflict in Afghanistan has led to the creation of a group of Taliban fighters known as the Sara Khitta (The Red Group) — an elite force created for the purpose of fighting a powerful adversary through the use of modern tactics and special weaponry.

The U.S. has seen many victories and losses since it began its operations in Afghanistan 18 years (or more precisely 6861 days as of July 20, 2020) ago. However, the legacy of its military intervention must be examined as matters surrounding troop withdrawal and abilities of the Afghan national army continue to be discussed. This is pertinent as Sara Khitta was formed with the specific mission to disrupt the actions of U.S. and Afghan forces.

Aristophanes, a playwright of ancient Athens, once said: “The wise learn many things from their enemies.” Whilst this may be stating the obvious, it is what foreign forces teach their adversaries that should be of more concern to the U.S. After nearly 7000 days of active involvement in Afghanistan, one can only assume that military tactics have been learned and inevitably exploited.

While the U.S. has always held greater firepower, large groups of semi-trained Taliban fighters have been lost during operations. As Mujib Mashal states in his article for the New York Times: “At times, the (Taliban) casualty rates went so high — losing up to hundreds of fighters a week as the Americans carried out an airstrike campaign in which they dropped nearly 27,000 bombs since 2013.” Therefore, the establishment of Sara Khitta demonstrated the need of the Taliban to strengthen their skills and firepower in the wake of these losses.

Sara Khitta have provided two major advantages to the Taliban. Firstly, the use of advanced weaponry and new tactics have “supposedly lowered Taliban casualties while allowing the group to capture large swaths of territory in Helmand”. Secondly, the force provides advantages to the Taliban propaganda campaign plastered across social media and recruitment pages.

For instance, a photo appeared earlier this year showing Ammar Ibn Yasir, the trainer of the Taliban’s Red Group, who is also known as “the Mujahideen of Mujahideen.” Photos such as this as well as others showing the unit performing various aspects of military training form the backbone of a media campaign designed to show the Taliban as a fighting force capable of taking on everyone — including a world superpower.

In addition to showing the glamour and capability of the Taliban’s fighters, the Sara Khitta social media campaign has focused on professionalism. For instance, there are photos that show fighters training in the snow flaunting full tactical gear. However, the unit is not just a photo opportunity. As Commander Murad disclosed to Reuters, “The Taliban ‘Red Unit’ are said to be equipped with advanced weaponry, including night vision scopes, 82mm rockets, heavy machine guns and U.S.-made assault rifles.”

Another aspect of Sara Khitta that has contributed to their success is the secrecy surrounding their group. Reports such as those mentioned previously touch on their weaponry, attacks and social media presence, but the Taliban has kept many details of this unit hidden from their media outlets and went as far as to forbid members from talking to the press. The U.S. military claimed it killed the head of the Taliban’s Red Unit during a strike in Helmand on Dec. 1, 2017. However, this has not drastically slowed their social media campaign and the propaganda value that this unit provides for the Taliban.

As the U.S. and the Afghan government continue on their respective journeys to create peace in Afghanistan, it is important that the U.S. considers its military legacy in the country and uphold the same responsibility to protect as it paves the way for intra-Afghan talks. Whilst fighting the Taliban, the U.S. provided the group with opportunities for growth and development (including the establishment of Sara Khitta) thus it is integral that both the U.S. and Afghan governments can appropriately counter these developments. This is essential in the transition to peace.

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 by Anja Apfel

Problems in the Way of Progress: Uncertain US Troop Withdrawal and New Challenges Facing the Afghan Peace Process

On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a peace agreement, widely referred to as the ‘Doha Deal’, which is considered to have provided a foundation upon which a more stable and prosperous Afghanistan can be built.

One of the primary tenets of the ‘Doha Deal’ focuses upon the gradual reduction of the remaining 12,000 US troops currently stationed in Afghanistan, with plans for an eventual full-withdrawal. Throughout the first half of 2020, the US has already significantly reduced the numbers of its troops in Afghanistan to 8600, therefore greatly surpassing the agreed upon reduction (as defined in the Doha Deal) to 12,000 remaining troops. However, whilst this major tenet of the deal has been accomplished seemingly with no major complications, the satisfying of other primary elements of the Doha Deal can be seen to have experienced various considerable setbacks.

Even days after the agreement was originally signed, the progress was largely overshadowed by issues arising from each constitutive party. The Afghan government immediately raised concerns regarding another of the deal’s primary components: the numbers and time-span of the agreed upon release of 5000 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government. These concerns regarding the prisoner swap have not only caused major problems in developing the peace process further in the last months, but the anticipated nation-wide reduction in violence (which was expected to arise as a direct result of the agreement) has also failed to occur.

Although there have been notable periods since the signing of the deal within which the violence between parties can be seen to have subsided (e.g. The Eid Ceasefire), the country has still experienced regular sparks of conflict. In fact, this conflict has escalated to such a point that, in mid-June 2020, the deadliest week for Afghan government forces in Afghanistan’s 19 years of conflict was recorded.

Alongside the multitude of issues which have arisen as a direct consequence of the Doha Deal’s signing, Afghanistan’s stabilization, and the progression of the Afghan Peace Process, has been largely stunted by the Afghan state’s attempted resistance to the global COVID-19 pandemic. With over 34,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 (14.07) and over 1000 deaths in Afghanistan alone, the resolution of the Doha Deal, and the progression of the Afghan Peace Process as a whole has been largely inhibited by the national prioritization of a new kind of challenge for the Afghan state.

However, aside from this aforementioned environment, which presents an array of complex new challenges and concerns for the Afghan government, trepidation surrounding the potential negative consequences of the US withdrawal of troops has retained focus in the midst of this climate. These concerns have especially been raised in relation to the remaining presence of various violent-extremist groups in Afghanistan, particularly Al-Qaeda. It has been argued that, without the support and presence of US troops, Afghanistan is vulnerable to both continued attacks from the Taliban itself and from the other aforementioned violent-extremist groups.

This concern is also not entirely unfounded as, despite the fact that under the Doha Deal the Taliban agreed to not allow extremist groups (Al-Qaeda in particular) to operate in Taliban controlled areas, recent information suggests that the Taliban has not been working towards challenging the presence of such groups. Therefore, a scenario in which violent extremist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, will re-establish/strengthen their footholds throughout Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan following the US withdrawal of troops is not inconceivable. In fact, a recent United Nations report specifically warned of the remaining active links between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. According to the report, “The Taliban regularly consulted with Al-Qaida during negotiations with the United States and offered guarantees that it would honor their historical ties.”

This information, as presented by the UN, clearly states that the Taliban is failing to fulfill this particular component of the peace deal, as they have seemingly failed to sever their bonds with Al-Qaeda. This perhaps consequently suggests that, upon acknowledging this continued relationship between the Taliban and violent extremist groups, the US will consider halting the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan until the Taliban has evidently severed such relationships, which would subsequently also fulfil one of the Taliban’s key commitments to the Doha Deal.

However, the decision of the US in this case not only depends on the actions of the Taliban, but also on US domestic interests. Some US officials are concerned that, regardless of the shortcomings of the Taliban in absolutely fulfilling their agreed upon components of the Doha Deal, all US troops are going to be withdrawn before the US presidential election in November 2020. This is a direct consequence of statements made by President Trump during his 2016 election campaign and throughout his ongoing 4-year administration, in which a full withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, prior to the on-coming 2020 presidential election, was promised.

Although these aforementioned challenges are obstructing progression of the Afghan Peace Process, there is hope for the change which the long-awaited intra-Afghan talks may bring for the dynamics of the implementation of the overarching peace deal. However, due to the interdependent nature upon which each of the constitutive parties’ commitments rely, it can be reasoned that until a greater degree of dedication to satisfying key components of the Doha Deal from each party is established, the intra-Afghan talks may fail to bring the long-awaited constructive solutions which they are hoped to result in.

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 by Arman Sidhu

Do Civilian Self-Defense Groups Help or Harm Counterterrorism Efforts?

After enduring what may be considered one of its most violent years, the West African nation of Burkina Faso has taken a new approach to countering the proliferation of armed insurgent groups that have traversed the country’s rural peripheries. Back in January, the country’s parliament sanctioned a program designed to equip and train civilian volunteers. Known as the “Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland Act”, the intent of the program is to deter and fend off the increasingly brazen attacks carried out by armed groups in remote areas, in addition to reducing the workload burdened by the country’s underfunded and overstretched military.

Although Burkina Faso’s decision to train and arm civilians is neither novel nor surprising, the program does call into question the broader implications surrounding safety, efficacy, and authority. As one of several countries located in the heart of the Sahel region that spans West Africa, Burkina Faso is not alone in its struggles to contain and combat violent extremist groups, many of which operate as affiliates of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda.

Instead, the relatively lawless and remote geographic setting of the Sahel has allowed armed groups to ravage the region with attacks, kidnappings, and the trafficking of humans, arms, and drugs. Such conditions led to the formation of the G5 Sahel, a joint force that includes the militaries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Mali. Established in 2014, the G5 Sahel has also received support and/or training primarily from France, which is currently engaged in the Sahel through an anti-insurgency campaign known as Operation Barkhane, and the United States, which has maintained a presence in the region for over 13 years.

Nevertheless, the decision to use civilian volunteers as an auxiliary to any military must be evaluated in the specific context of the conflict. These include assessing the following criteria: the quality of support & training given to the groups, and the level of state supervision and authority of said groups.

Quality of Support & Training

Throughout history, the use of state-sanctioned militias was designed to address shortcomings in the capacity of official forces, particularly in rural and remote communities. Militias offer a relatively cheaper solution for security and surveillance of the enemy. Though mandates vary, these groups typically do not participate in any offensive campaigns, and their tactical goals are confined to a specific geography.

Given the number of attacks that occur in Burkina Faso’s periphery (specifically its northernmost borders), civilian militias could be useful as a temporary deterrent to stave off enemy forces. However, mounting a successful defense normally necessitates a prompt response by professional forces, which must be located close enough to assume the reins from self-defense groups.

The sophistication of a fighting force, whether professional or amateur, is correlated to the quality of its resources, support, and training. Burkina Faso’s “Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland Act” accommodates just two weeks’ worth of training for civilians, coupled with basic armaments and communication equipment. Although Burkina Faso’s military expenditures (as % of GDP) have nearly doubled in the last few years, its professional forces remain outgunned and ill-equipped to confront the insurgents. Thus, the prospect of civilian forces, which receive a substantially smaller share of investment in training and equipment, repelling an attack are unlikely. In the absence of high-quality, rigorous training and nearby support from professional forces, civilian forces may only end up attracting more attention to themselves from insurgents, resulting in additional bloodshed, while decimating confidence in the civilian program.

Though successful civilian auxiliary forces exist and have proven instrumental in conflicts throughout Nigeria, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico, none of them have succeeded in a unilateral fashion. Rather, the success of such groups remains dependent on continuous improvement, capacity-building, and adequate linkages with professional forces.

State Supervision & Authority

Among the oft-cited issues regarding armed civilian forces is the level of accountability and control by state actors (i.e. police, military). In the case of Latin America, autodefensas have started out as autonomous vigilante groups, but eventually were absorbed into official designated police or military units. In the case of Mexico, negotiations between the autodefensas and the federal government have often been long drawn out. In states with poor security institutions that are perceived to be subject to graft, skepticism is likely to emerge and persist between civilians and the government. A well-defined command structure and lines of communication that incorporate voices from central and local authorities is often overlooked in this regard, but can be effective in a post-conflict transition.

Whether civilians arm themselves or procure arms through government mechanisms, there exists a need to ensure these empowered groups do not evolve into autonomous organizations that either perpetuate crimes they were designed to prevent, or begin to clash with other militias, insurgents, and official military forces. For countries with significant ethnic or religious divisions, the issue of oversight is even more imperative to ensure unity and alignment between self-defense groups and the military.

Like many post-colonial African states, Burkina Faso’s borders were drawn in haste, and not necessarily in consideration of the varied demographics of its population. With nearly 60 different ethnic groups, Burkina Faso is no stranger to ethnic-based violence. Given the fact that such groups often cluster geographically, the risk of a state-sponsored program evolving into raised militias that operate independent of any official chain-of-command remains significant. While the government has attempted to get in front of this issue by assuring checks of moral conduct and proper vetting of recruits will be implemented, disarmament and demobilization remains subjective and tricky in many instances.

Conclusion

In spite of their domestic or foreign support, the Sahel’s armies remain woefully inadequate in their fight against insurgent groups. The region’s infestation of militants has further been complicated by the droves of Islamist militants fleeing Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. As a result, the region has become a popular spot of refuge, while allowing transnational terrorist organizations to regroup.

Given West Africa’s proximity to Europe, and the lack of a formidable military to confront them, concerns of the Sahel evolving into a permanent safe haven and operational base have only risen in recent years. Containing the spread of these insurgent groups will require additional funding, equipment, and capacity for any and all participating forces. Evidence of further coalition-building, spearheaded by France, remains promising. The most effectual defense will require an alignment in objectives between foreign, national, and local forces.

– Arman Sidhu

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 by Arman Sidhu

Trade, Aid, and a Self-Reliant Afghan Economy

At first glance, a chart depicting Afghanistan’s annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures since 2001 could be characterized as a series of peaks and valleys. Though the imagery may be fitting with the country’s landscape, probes into why Afghanistan’s year-to-year growth is erratic necessitates a deeper look into the country’s trade practices, as well as the management and deployment of foreign aid.

While incessant conflict with the Taliban certainly plays a formidable role in deterring investment, it is far from the only ailment afflicting Afghanistan’s path toward economic independence. As one example, foreign aid still accounts for nearly 77% of the government’s budget, and that includes an assumption of a best-case scenario involving collected revenues.

Furthermore, Afghanistan’s increased engagement in global trade has yet to materialize any substantial capital investment, which is necessary for industrializing the economy and building a sufficient manufacturing base. The country’s trade deficit has also widened considerably in the last decade by nearly 25%.

Such conditions suggest that even in the event of successful intra-Afghan talks, the country’s development agenda will still rely heavily on substantial foreign aid inflows, with the World Bank estimating between $6-8 billion USD will be needed annually over the next several years. In order to best facilitate the use of that aid, both donors and the government will need to be selective in projects that incorporate broader participation from Afghans and put the country on proper footing for self-reliance.

To achieve this, Afghanistan’s economic policy will have to focus on three key prerequisites. These include an emphasis on export-led growth, diversification of trade partners and investors, and improvements toward tax revenue mobilization.

Export-Led Growth

Export-led growth is a strategy that concentrates on boosting the export potential of domestic businesses that specialize in certain goods and services. Assuming a comparative advantage for developing these certain products exists, the revenues and profits earned from exports are then to be reinvested in the country to expand production capacity and nurture the development of supporting industries. This method of economic policy was principally responsible for the rapid expansion of East Asian economies and remains in favor today among emerging markets across Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

For Afghanistan, exports have historically been limited to agricultural products (mainly fruits) but given the country’s vast reserves in minerals and natural resources, the opportunity for industrialization will be contingent upon proper management of the extractive sectors. The benefits would include the absorption of labor from agriculture as well as a diffusive investment that would support infrastructure projects and generate demand for businesses and employment across the manufacturing and services sectors.

In the past, several donor-led initiatives focused on the establishment of “resource corridors” have been put forth but have been shelved as a result of insecurity and dampened foreign investor sentiment on the country’s prospects. Nevertheless, should intra-Afghan talks prove fruitful in resolving the insecurity, it would clear the most significant obstacle for the extractive industries.

Diversification of Trade Partners and Investors

Currently, Afghanistan ranks 173rd out of 190 countries on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business, an index that uses indicators including the time required for permits and licenses, access to credit, and the enforcement of contracts, among other criteria to gauge the business/investor climate. As a result, inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country remains scarce and concentrated among a handful of nations, most of them neighbors. Afghanistan’s export destinations are in a similar position, with India and Pakistan accounting for a combined 75% of all Afghan exports. Imports are more diversified in terms of sourcing, but the trade imbalance has been costly in the absence of any progress on an import substitution strategy.

While the debate on the harmful effects of a trade deficit remains unresolved, curbing Afghanistan’s import reliance could help it bolster homegrown industries. Agricultural products and textiles makeup a significant portion of Afghan imports, yet domestic potential already exists in these sectors. Hence, these sectors, if prioritized, could rank among one of the simpler transitions available to the country’s economy.

The textile industry is also a common and vital source of employment for female labor and allowing wider participation by females can pay dividends by providing additional economic security for households, a boost in consumption, and accelerated growth via a larger labor pool for the country.

Ensuring quality over quantity in FDI is commonly overlooked by recipient nations, particularly those endowed with natural resources. Oft-cited criticism of foreign investor practices include employing or awarding contracts to the investing nation, with little to no benefit for the domestic workforce or businesses. Stipulating stringent quotas for the contracting and employment of Afghan businesses and nationals is a crucial tool that can be leveraged when vetting potential foreign partners.

Given Afghanistan’s strategic (and volatile) location, diversifying the country’s trade partners and investors remains in its best interests for long-term growth. This directly ties in with a balanced foreign policy based on non-alignment. Given the competing interests of regional hegemons like Russia, China, India, and Pakistan, the ability for Afghanistan to deftly balance external relations without committing to a single side ensures sovereignty and self-reliance.

Mobilization of Tax Revenue

At present, the shortfall between the Afghan government’s annual budget and its revenues stands at roughly $8.5 billion USD, which is covered by foreign aid. A gradual paring of that figure will necessitate a more efficient collection and allocation of tax revenues. In tandem with taxes, Afghanistan’s role as a transit hub for pipelines and infrastructure that transports resources (like natural gas) is another opportunity to improve revenues.

In a scenario where peace is established, ensuring that the Taliban’s arbitrary tax regime is dismantled in favor of a government collection system will be vital to increasing government revenues. In addition, the ability to safely access and incorporate swathes of Afghan territory under the government’s jurisdiction will present new opportunities to improve the fiscal situation of the government and locals. However, the notion of a “peace dividend” will not be without costs. As exhibited by US troop withdrawals throughout the Obama Administration, any additional drawdowns could once again trigger economic consequences for businesses that engage with or rely upon foreign forces.

It remains pertinent that the government learns to wean itself off of foreign aid and prove to its donors it is capable and sophisticated enough to budget and allocate aid funds efficiently. Doing so would contribute positively to what will be a long, but viable, route toward genuine independence and lasting stability.

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 by Cameron Hoffman

Do Cryptocurrencies Provide Opportunities for Terrorist Organizations?

Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies were once considered as fantasy rather than a viable method of exchanging goods and services, but today many companies — even countries like Saudi Arabia — have adopted forms of cryptocurrency. Even average citizens have embraced the use of Bitcoin in everyday transactions.

In Lebanon, where COVID-19 has exacerbated the economic crisis and caused drastic inflation, there has been a demand for cryptocurrency as a stable alternative to the Lebanese pound and a possible means to avoid government defaults. The Lebanese government has no regulatory laws regarding cryptocurrency, but has issued warnings against its use — the Lebanese Central Bank advocates for its use to be illegal. However, independent crypto-traders estimate the Lebanese population trades between one to five million USD a month using cryptocurrency.

As the utility of cryptocurrencies rise in countries like Lebanon, Hizballah and other terrorist organizations may adopt its use. Additionally, cryptocurrencies are coming under scrutiny lately for their perceived anonymity and how terrorist organizations could exploit the features of digital currency to bypass sanctions and current counter-terrorism finance initiatives. But what are the threats of cryptocurrency to counter-terrorism efforts, is there evidence of their use, and do they provide real utility over traditional finance methods to terrorist organizations?

Cryptocurrency offers terrorist organizations a possible route for anonymous, secure, and reliable streams of funding. They offer anonymity that hackers have used for years as a part of ransomware cyberattacks, as sending, receiving and converting money to Bitcoin does not require the use of a legal name or address. This feature, in combination with a virtual private network (VPN) to hide the user’s true Internet Protocol (IP) address, gives hackers and others anonymity in accessing funds that are not routed through banks.

Cryptocurrency, especially bitcoin, provides security of transfer through encryption and blockchain technologies that drastically limit the potential for hackers to steal funds or the recipients information. While reliability would depend on the donors to terrorist organizations, the characteristics of cryptocurrency provide some incentives to those donors.

The benefits are also incentivizing states to invest in cryptocurrency. Iran, facing economic pressure from US sanctions, has seen a surge in bitcoin popularity — much like Lebanon. While bitcoin is technically illegal in Iran the state is reassessing the ruling and is likely to change. Additionally, Iran is currently planning for the creation of a national Iranian cryptocurrency to bypass US sanctions and embargos.

Yet with all the positive aspects of cryptocurrencies, the evidence suggests that terrorist organizations are not using them on a large scale. Hamas uses some bitcoin but it uses far less cryptocurrency than the average for the civilian population of Gaza. And while Randa Slim (the Lebanese-American director of diplomacy programs for the Middle East institute) thinks that Hizballah has the most to gain from adopting bitcoin usage, there is no evidence to suggest they have begun using it.

The RAND Corporation has examined why non-state actors have not emphatically embraced cryptocurrencies, but subsequently issued a warning for future developments. RAND agrees that while there is an increasing need to understand the full potential of cryptocurrency exploitation by terrorist organizations, that concerns over the abilities of cryptocurrencies to enable terrorist organizations, have yet to materialize. This is because cryptocurrency does not yet provide additional benefit to the areas where terrorist organizations place the most importance in procuring funds than their traditional methods.

The table below (sourced from the RAND report) shows the levels of importance for the most common aspects of terrorist finance, of which security is of the most importance. While cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are relatively secure, RAND posits that current cryptocurrency options do not currently provide the security that these highly scrutinized organizations need. However, future improvements to bitcoin could make it appealing to terror organizations for the select use of fundraising.

RANDTABLE - Do Cryptocurrencies Provide Opportunities for Terrorist Organizations?

Source: Rand Corporation

As the economy evolves, and includes continually improving cryptocurrencies, so does the potential for terrorists to adopt the technology. Technological advancement cannot be prevented, but policy that creates regulation and oversight of cryptocurrencies with international cooperation of the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies are crucial steps towards preventing cryptocurrencies from enabling terrorist organizations.

– Cameron Hoffman

  • Clarification: According to Bitcoin vocabulary, it is acceptable to use an uppercase B when discussing the concept or network and a lowercase b to describe a unit of account. This is relevant to the textual differences in the above analysis.
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