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Ukraine

Resisting Russia: Ukraine on the Verge of a Far-Right Insurgency

An unclassified U.S. intelligence document, first reported on December 3rd by The Washington Post, revealed that Russia is planning a massive military offensive against Ukraine as soon as early 2022, involving up to 175,000 troops.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly expressed concern regarding NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. In 2008, NATO, an American-led military alliance, promised membership to Ukraine. Russia saw this offer as a threat to its borders and an intrusion into its sphere of influence. Whilst Ukraine is still working to meet the admission criteria for NATO membership, the U.S. has declared an “ironclad commitment” to Ukraine’s security. The current crisis has provoked fears of an escalating war on European soil.

Should Russia enact its planned offensive, Ukraine’s military would quickly fall. “If Russia really wants to unleash its conventional capabilities, they could inflict massive damage in a very short period of time,” said Robert Lee, a Russian military expert at King’s College, London. “They can devastate the Ukrainian military in the east really quickly, within the first 30-40 minutes.”

In 2014, when Russian troops seized the Crimean Peninsula, Russian-backed separatists launched a takeover of Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. Ukraine’s military was unable to mount an effective resistance, and volunteer brigades took up arms to defeat the separatists. Eight years later, Ukrainian military officials have begun to speak of how they could mobilise a similar guerilla resistance of irregular military units to counter Russian occupation. One senior military official has stated that, if all else should fail, the Ukrainian military would simply open its weapon depots and allow the Ukrainian people to arm themselves.

Extremism within Ukraine’s Security Forces

The increasing possibility of a counter-Russian guerilla insurgency prompts further analysis of the ideologies of the armed units and volunteer battalions already operating within the country, and who would likely play a key role in such a resistance. Indeed, these groups have already been referred to as “Ukraine’s most potent and reliable force on the battlefield.”

Whilst many of these groups officially fall under the command of the Ukrainian government, they are far from a conventional military force, with many of them retaining their own distinct identity and command structure. The loyalty of these groups to the current government is far from certain, and some volunteer battalions have even been accused of war crimes.

The Azov movement was among the 30-odd volunteer units that helped defeat the takeover of the Donbas region by Russian-backed forces in 2014. Since then, Azov has become one of the most powerful militias in Ukraine. Whilst the group has sought to downplay its more extreme elements, Azov’s ideology of far-right ultranationalism is hard to deny. The group’s logo is a mirrored Wolfsangel, a symbol used by Nazi Germany, and most widely known as an emblem of the SS division Das Reich.

The group’s members openly espouse white supremacist and fascist ideology. Many of them have links to other neo-Nazi groups and have been accused of targeting minorities in Azov-controlled territory. The group’s first commander, Andriy Biketsky, stated in 2010 that Ukraine’s national mission was to “lead the white races of the world in a final crusade… against Semite-led untermenschen [subhumans].” The group has already been accused of numerous human rights violations and war crimes, including mass looting, torture, and rape.

Groups like Azov are central to Ukraine’s expanding prominence as a major international hub for far-right extremism. Azov’s online recruitment strategy has helped establish a cult-like global following of fascists and white supremacists and has contributed to a flow of more than 17,000 foreign fighters who have come to Ukraine since 2015. This flow of foreign nationals is motivated by the allure of fighting alongside other far-right extremists. Many of them see Ukraine as a training ground to develop combat skills which they can bring home.

Security experts warn that Ukraine is radicalizing far-right foreign fighters in the same way as Syria has with Islamist extremists, creating an international network of combat-trained extremists. “I believe Europe is in great danger” says Alberto Testa, an expert on far-right radicalization at the University of West London. Testa describes Ukraine as a staging ground for a “white jihad struggle” where extremists can “train for what some would call racial holy war.”

The United States’ “Ironclad Commitment”

The prominence of far-right extremist groups within Ukraine introduces substantial complexity to the United States’ security commitment. Should Russia’s planned offensive occur, the Ukrainian military would quickly fall, and a grassroots insurgency of armed units and volunteer battalions would rapidly emerge as the country’s most effective resistance.

Far-right ultranationalist units, such as Azov, would likely be among the strongest elements of this insurgency, as they were during the 2014 campaign against Russian-backed separatists. The guerilla tactics led by these units would likely represent the country’s greatest weapon. Indeed, these tactics represent “Ukraine’s best deterrent against Putin’s invasion force,” according to counter-insurgency specialist Thomas X. Hannes.

So far, the U.S. has attempted to distance itself from the extremist elements of Ukraine’s security forces. It has sought to prevent military assistance from reaching Azov. The State Department has branded Azov’s political and paramilitary offshoots as “nationalist hate groups.” However, should Ukraine face the offensive described in intelligence reports, then these elements would be central to the country’s counter-Russian effort.  The U.S. would need to make a difficult choice: does its “ironclad commitment” to Ukraine’s sovereignty justify support for far-right extremists?

Conclusions

The situation in Ukraine represents years of diplomatic failure. The international community’s inability to resolve the Ukraine crisis has fueled violence and extremism within the country’s borders, and beyond. The conflict has turned Ukraine into a violent training ground for fascists and white supremacists, creating a global network of combat-trained extremists ready to wage racial holy war. The crisis also has the potential of igniting a terrifying, and possibly catastrophic, global conflict.

The United States and Russia should work urgently to prevent the possibility of armed conflict and propose a solution for the crisis in Ukraine. The security and prosperity of the Ukrainian people should be central to any peace-seeking effort in Eastern Europe. If NATO and Russia are to co-exist peacefully, then they must work together to build mutual trust, challenge hatred, and serve the cause of peace.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Congo

ISIS in the Congo: A Counter-Terrorism Perspective

With much attention spotlighting ISIS-K’s increased capabilities, little attention has been brought to their counterparts within Central Africa. Much like their counterparts in Central Asia, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) has increased its activities within Central Africa this year.

As ISCAP has carried out attacks, they have united the governments of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in combating them, despite their past differences. While ISIS has lost territory in the Middle East, it is evident that its affiliates remain salient threats to the regions they operate in, as well as international security as a whole.

Origins of ISCAP

The formation of the Islamic State in Central Africa traces back to ISIS’s ambitions to expand into Africa in late 2018. The first attacks in the region occurred one year later within the DRC. That same year, the group expanded operations into Mozambique, which cemented their threat to Central African security.

ISCAP has traditionally been composed of the Congo-based Allied Defence Forces (ADF) and fighters within Mozambique. In 2020, the Mozambique branch had conquered cities within Mozambique, which alarmed states within the region. This year, the branch within Mozambique has been the target of a multilateral offensive from a coalition of states, which has weakened their operational capacity compared to their previous success in 2020.

Growing Operational Capability

The ADF did not begin life as an exclusively Islamic militant organization, but rather as a rebel group seeking to oust the current Ugandan government. As the group went into remote regions of Uganda it began to change into the militant group it is today, recruiting disaffected Muslim youth.

The branch within the DRC has seen its capacity grow in 2021, as they have been attributed to an uptick of attacks within the country. They have also become increasingly brutal, demonstrated through released videos of beheadings as part of their propaganda. This is in light of this branch conducting over 20 attacks this year alone. Moreover, their attacks within Uganda have become indicative of an augmentation in their capabilities to harm the people of Central Africa. The most brazen of such attacks occurred on November 16th in which they bombed the capital of Uganda.

Ghosts of the Past

While both governments are interested in the defeat of ISCAP, relations between the DRC and Uganda have been fraught with tensions. These strained relations stem from the actions of the Ugandans during the Congo Wars, which ended in 2003. The Ugandans were found to violate the DRC’s sovereignty and were forced to pay reparations by the Hague.

As these wounds are still fresh in the minds of many within the DRC, skepticism of another Ugandan intervention underlies their thoughts. Despite these reservations, the government of the DRC has invited Ugandan troops into the country to aid in the fight against the insurgents.

A Roadmap for Peace

The fight against Islamic militants within Africa is not a new endeavor. However, it is important to note the evolution of such groups within Africa and their capabilities. More than 20 years ago, the United States’ embassy in Kenya was attacked by suicide bombers. Since that time, a small group, which at one point pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, captured large swathes of sovereign territory in the Levant, and created a network of global affiliates that carried out their own attacks. No longer are such groups content with attacking government symbols, such as an embassy, but rather they seek the prestige of carving out states from the territory of sovereign nations.

As this is Africa’s new reality, there are policy directives that should be considered to effectively address the current situation of the Congo. To effectively rout this group, it is imperative that a formalized dissemination of intelligence exist between states in the region. While the DRC and Uganda are engaged in combating the DRC-based branch, the Mozambique-based branch still can provide refuge to any escaping combatants to regain strength. Without such a coordinated effort, it is unlikely that ISCAP’s threat to Central African security will subside.

Secondly, a concrete timeline should exist detailing when Ugandan troops will be present and what they must abide by while in the DRC. Any such violation would be met with recourse similar to the previous deal given by the Hague.

The DRC has deemed that the Ugandans would be beneficial to combat ISCAP; however, any such breakdown of relations between the two would detrimentally impact security. Finally, the states of Central Africa must address the underlying conditions which have driven their Muslim youth to join ISIS affiliates.

 

Christopher Ynclan Jr., Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s Tentacles Threaten Latin America

Hezbollah, also known as Hizbullah, is a Lebanon-based Shia terrorist organization. Its creation dates back to 1982, after the Israeli intervention in Lebanon. Since its foundation, Hezbollah has participated in several terrorist attacks against civilians in the Middle East.

For instance, Hezbollah militants carried out the 1983 suicide truck bombings against the U.S embassy and Marine Barracks in Beirut, the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, the kidnappings of Israeli soldiers in 2006, and the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005.

The Middle East is Hezbollah’s main geographical area of influence. Moreover, Hezbollah has participated in the Lebanese government since 1992, was involved in the Syrian Civil War through the use of militants to support the Bashar Al-Assad Regime, and is backed by Iran in its anti-Israeli and anti-Western activities.

However, Hezbollah’s activities and influence are not restricted to the Middle East.  Their presence has been reported in several areas throughout Latin America, and it is probable that Hezbollah’s tentacles will continue to spread in the southern zone of South America.

Historical Background of Hezbollah’s Presence in Latin America

Hezbollah’s presence in Latin America dates back to the group’s foundation. An essential factor in the establishment of Hezbollah cells was the flow of Lebanese migrants arriving at the Tri-Border Area (TBA) connecting Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay during the 1960s and 1970s. The multi-generational diaspora and zones that facilitated trade for Lebanese migrants enabled Hezbollah militants to infiltrate the subcontinent and carry out their activities.

After Hezbollah was officially founded in 1982, Latin American cells began cooperating with Iranian personnel to commit terrorist attacks in Argentina. For instance, Hezbollah used a car bomb against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 23 people. Furthermore, Hezbollah allegedly participated in the terrorist attack against the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), a Jewish center in Buenos Aires, where 85 people died.

Venezuela, a Safe Haven for Hezbollah’s Criminal Activities

Once Hezbollah’s presence in the Tri-Border area was consolidated, this terrorist organization found a safe haven to carry out its illicit activities. When Hugo Chávez took power in 1999, a relationship began between the regime and Hezbollah, allowing Hezbollah to build a vast network to carry out illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and smuggling.

In fact, Hezbollah established a crime structure in Venezuela that operates through compartmentalized, familial clans, such as Nassereddine, Saleh y Rada, that embed into the regime-controlled illicit economy and the regime’s political apparatus and bureaucracy. Hezbollah has control in zones such as Margarita Island, where they operate freely.

The advantage for Hezbollah operating in an area with so many facilities and where the current government is a close ally is that the terrorist group receives billions of dollars annually, mainly from drug and arms trafficking. However, Hezbollah’s main source of income is the funding it receives from Iran, which is also a close strategic ally of Venezuela.

Hezbollah’s Presence in Other Latin American Countries

Hezbollah has a strong presence in the countries comprising the Tri-Border Area. Activities such as counterfeiting and drug trafficking have been identified in Puerto Iguazú, Foz do Iguaçu, and Ciudad del Este in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.  The authorities found that Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, a Hezbollah militant from this zone, has sent more than $50 million to Hezbollah since 1995.

Hezbollah’s activities and presence have also been identified in Colombia.  The Colombian Intelligence Services has detected enterprises and commercial platforms that operate as money laundering centers. Furthermore, counterfeiting networks were identified in Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Maicao.

In addition, Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) converged to cooperate with crimes such as drug trafficking, which is the most profitable source of funding for both groups. The FARC specialized in cocaine trafficking and production, while Hezbollah specialized in money laundering, thus creating a nexus between crime and terrorism.

Finally, Hezbollah is establishing itself in an area known as the New Tri-Border Area, which is comprised of northern Chile (Arica and Iquique), southern Peru (Tacna and Puno), and Bolivia (from El Alto to the Iranian Embassy in La Paz).

In Chile, Hezbollah seeks to take advantage of its ports and indoctrinate young people to join its cause. In Bolivia, Hezbollah seeks to increase its presence by taking advantage of its poor diplomatic relations with the United States. Finally, in Peru, Hezbollah seeks to profit from cocaine production, again facilitating the crime-terror nexus.

What Should be Done?

Hezbollah’s presence in Latin America illustrates how the region’s crime-terror nexus is a significant security threat. Factors such as little state control in border areas, strategic routes to traffic weapons and drugs, money laundering, and support from regimes, such as Iran and Venezuela, have allowed Hezbollah to transform into a wealthy terrorist organization with a considerable presence in Latin America.

In order to reduce the power and influence of Hezbollah in the region, the United States has implemented financial sanctions against the group. However, sanctions are not enough to reduce the activities and income of this organization.

Thus, it is necessary to improve cooperation among Latin American countries, implement more effective legal instruments against money laundering and terrorist financing, increase security in the Tri-Border Area, and continue efforts to cut off Hezbollah’s tentacles in Latin America.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Bosnia

Powder Keg of the Pandemic: Exploring the Ongoing Situation in Bosnia

Since the start of the pandemic there have been many worrying trends within global affairs. Among these have been the deteriorating relations between global powers and a stark contrast between the allocation of vaccines of affluent nations with that of the globe’s poorest nations. Additionally, there exists a dire crisis within the Balkans, which has been critically overlooked. Renewed ethnic tensions within Bosnia and Herzegovina are threatening the integrity of its governing institutions.

The Bosnian War has largely defined the small Balkan nation, which ravaged the country in the late 1990s. The conflict shaped the governance in the country, with the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords splitting the nation into ethnic divisions with the Serbs residing in Republika Srpska and the Muslim Bosniaks as well as Croats residing in the rest of the country.

As a result of the ethnic divisions which plagued the country, the government was organized into a tripartite presidency allowing a representative of each major ethnic group to have their voice heard in policy matters. This measure was intended to ease tensions between Bosnia’s ethnic groups, as they feared that an opposing group could marginalize them if given the sole monopoly on power.

The Current Crisis

The current crisis stems from Bosnian Serb politician Milorad Dodik espousing irredentist rhetoric about leaving key institutions. Among these talking points include withdrawing from the military of Bosnia, which reignited sore memories of atrocities committed by Serbian paramilitary groups during the Bosnian War. His actions were also emboldened by nefarious regional actors who simply seek to weaken the integrity of Bosnia’s institutions at the expense of the nation’s citizens. A renewed conflict along ethnic lines would lead to a loss of economic progress made since 1995 and a humanitarian crisis.

Mounting Tensions

Prior to the pandemic, there were clear signs of political gridlock in the country surrounding several key issues. One such issue, which has become emblematic of gridlock among the major ethnic groups, is that of NATO membership.

Russia has used the separatist aims of the minority Croat party (Croatian Democratic Union) and the Bosnian Serb party (Alliance of Independent Social-democrats) to influence the ascension of Bosnia to key continental institutions, which would weaken their foothold in the Balkans. Russia has long viewed itself as a brother-Slavic nation to Serbia and came to its defense in the First World War. It now capitalizes on this historical relationship to only further its political aims at the expense of smaller states. It has long been a sphere of influence in which it sees as vital to its security.

Policy Recommendations

To reduce the possibility of armed conflict between Bosnia’s major ethnic groups, the United States and Europe need to take action. The actions of Milorad Dodik have been caused by the reduction of credible deterrence and concrete assurances of bringing Bosnia into the fold of key European institutions. The scope of Operation Althea needs to be expanded with Bosnia to send a credible deterrence to nations seeking to interfere in the country’s internal affairs. Chief among the most salient atrocities of the Bosnian War is the Srebrenica massacre, which resulted in the deaths of 8,000 Bosniaks left behind by a United Nations force bereft of deterrence.

Second, the United States and European Union should introduce sanction regimes in concert on individuals who seek to engage in continued separatist rhetoric while in an official capacity of the Bosnian government.

Third, the European Union should reengage with Bosnia to encourage permanent reform within the governance of the country, to be more inclusive of the ethnic minorities within the nation, as well as provide tangible timeframes for Bosnia to join European institutions.

A Region to Be Heeded

Historically, the Balkans have long been a source of conflict, ranging from the Balkan Wars of the 1910s to the Yugoslav Wars of the late 1990s. With a region that has produced devastating crises to international security, it is important for the aforementioned policies to be implemented to avoid igniting the powder keg of Europe.

In present conditions, the presence of COVID-19 only serves to exacerbate a potential humanitarian disaster, should armed conflict arise. Such a disaster would also serve to impede a pandemic response with larger powers backing their preferred factions rather than coordinate global public health efforts such as COVAX.

 

Chris Ynclan, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

FARC

FARC Removed from Terrorist List – What’s Next for Colombia’s Peace Process?

On November 30th the United States announced plans to remove the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) from its list of foreign terrorist organizations. The decision to redesignate the terrorist status of the former guerrilla group follows the signing of a peace deal between the Colombian government and the FARC in 2016.  In a statement following the announcement, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the FARC “no longer exists as a unified organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or has the capability or intent to do so.”

Background

The FARC was founded in 1964 by a group of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in response to anti-communist repression across Colombia. The group waged a half-century war to overthrow the government, funding its operations through extortion, taxation, kidnappings, illegal mining, and the drug trade. At its height, the FARC counted 20,000 men and women under its command, controlled around 70% of Colombia’s coca crop, and generated well over 1 billion dollars in annual income.

The conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government represented the longest-running war in the western hemisphere, having cost the lives of over 220,000 people and displacing over five million civilians. After decades of meetings and negotiations, Colombia’s 2016 peace accord was signed. The deal was celebrated as one of the most all-encompassing peace agreements in modern history. The FARC agreed to demobilize, and the Colombian government promised to address poverty and inequality across the country’s rural regions.

Why is the FARC Being Removed from the Terrorist List?

The State Department’s decision to revoke the FARC’s terrorist designation comes five years into the deal’s 15-year time frame and represents the United States’ continued support for the country’s peace process. Whilst the move has been criticized by some U.S. politicians, including a number of senior Republicans, many Colombians have lauded it as a necessary step that will allow the United States to play a more central role in the country’s peace-building efforts.

Since the signing of the 2016 peace deal, 13,000 former FARC combatants have laid down their arms, and many of these former members now play crucial roles in the country’s peace process. Indeed, the FARC has been succeeded by a legal, registered political party, and many of the guerilla group’s former commanders now serve as prominent politicians. However, under the FARC’s designation as a foreign terrorist organization, U.S. officials were prohibited from meeting or working with former FARC militants and were unable to fund important peace-building programs, such as a formerly FARC-led campaign to destroy land mines across the country. Mr. Blinken’s statement said that delisting the FARC would allow the United States to “better support implementation of the 2016 accord, including by working with demobilized combatants.”

Preserving the Peace Process

The United States’ decision to redesignate the FARC comes at a pivotal point in the peace process. The Colombian government’s promise to tackle poverty in rural regions was at the heart of the peace accord, but experts are increasingly warning that these efforts are moving too slowly. As of 2020, just 4% of the deal’s rural reform measures are complete and security experts warn that the slow implementation of the promised reforms risk undermining the trust of rural communities and the return of armed conflict.

Colombia is already seeing a worrying surge in mass violence directed at rural communities. The government has been slow to seize control of the territory once held by the FARC, and a number of violent criminal organizations have moved in. The measures of the peace agreement, including the establishment of a national transitional justice court, threaten these groups’ illegal operations, and mass killings are increasingly used to let civilians know the high cost of supporting the deal.

Colombia’s peace process is at a precarious point. Five years have passed since the signing of the 2016 accord, but the peace remains delicate. The State Department’s decision to remove the FARC from its list of terrorist organizations will allow the U.S. to increase its support for the implementation of the 2016 deal by working alongside former members of the FARC and funding important peace-building programs across the country.

However, this alone will not be enough to secure the long-term success of the peace process. Colombia must accelerate the rollout of its rural development program. These promises were central to the peace deal, and failure to honor them will deeply damage the trust of rural communities, exacerbating the same frustrations that fueled the conflict for decades. Colombia must also work to protect communities from violent criminal organizations, providing rural Colombians the security to participate in a democratic society and supporting the efforts of the country’s transitional justice court.

The 2016 peace agreement gave Colombia the chance to move beyond its violent past, but its success is not yet guaranteed. The United States should continue to work with its Colombian partners to advance the cause of peace. The removal of the FARC from its terrorist list is an important step, but the U.S. must remain cognizant of the broader threats to the peace process. It should work with those in the government and those on the ground in rural Colombia to restore trust, promote economic development, and prevent the influx of armed criminal groups.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Haiti

Kidnappings in Haiti Terrorize the Nation

In recent weeks, two collective kidnappings have been registered in Haiti. After the death of President Jovenel Moïse, Haiti has suffered a wave of crimes and kidnappings throughout the country, which have severely affected the local population.

The situation in Haiti is critical. Despite the fact that two hostages were released a few days ago, insecurity terrorizes the country and the Central American region.

Background

Haiti is currently recovering from the political crisis generated by the assassination of its president, Jovenel Moïse, and from an earthquake in August. In addition, the Haitian State does not have the capacity to effectively address these problems and the increased violence. In fact, the Haitian Armed Forces have not been able to control the territory and prevent the proliferation of armed gangs.

The power of the Haitian criminal gangs can be evidenced in situations such as the blocking of the country’s fuel supply. After Moïse’s death, gangs such as G9 and Family blocked Terminal Varreux, the country’s largest oil terminal. This blockade restricted access to fuel across the country to destabilize the government, impact the nation’s electricity grid, and threaten citizens’ lives and wellbeing. The gangs are so powerful that the blockade only ended due to a truce between the G9 and Family and the local government.

Overall, security and public order in Haiti are worrisome. An estimated 165 gang factions operate in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and these gangs have carried out numerous kidnappings in 2021 alone.

The Kidnappings

The first mass kidnapping occurred on October 16th, when 17 members (12 adults and five children) of a U.S.-based missionary group were kidnapped by the 400 Mawozo gang, which controls the Croix-des-Bouquets area east of Port-au-Prince. According to authorities, the missionaries were kidnapped when en route to visit an orphanage and carry out humanitarian aid. The gang has demanded a $17 million ransom, $1 million per hostage.

In addition, on November 21st 2 of the 17 kidnapped missionaries were released. However, only after FBI agents, Haitian authorities, and the anti-kidnapping unit of the national police negotiated with the kidnappers for more than one month.

The second mass kidnapping occurred on November 23rd, when an armed gang kidnapped 15 passengers from a bus in northwestern Haiti. Authorities have indicated that the gang is asking for a large sum of money to release the hostages, although the exact ransom amount remains unknown.

As of late, the number of kidnappings in Haiti has increased exponentially. So far in 2021, nearly 800 kidnappings have been reported in Haiti. In fact, The Center for Analysis and Research in Human Rights (CARDH) notes that at least 782 kidnappings were reported this year, up until October 16th, compared to 796 cases in all of 2020, without taking into account unregistered cases.

What’s Next for Haiti?

Due to the weak presence and lack of territorial control by the Haitian State, the power of the gangs, the criminal governance in certain areas of the country, the increased crime rate, the difficult economic climate, and mounting social tensions, crimes, such as mass kidnappings, are likely to persist.

Public order and security will only stabilize once security forces, such as the Haitian National Police, are reinforced and improved, allowing them to effectively confront the gangs and regain control of the country. Furthermore, after the death of President Moïse, political power needs to be reorganized to effectively address the ongoing security challenges.

For this reason, the country has experienced events such as the new Haitian cabinet, which will be made up of members of the opposition, the impending delivery of 19 police vehicles and protective equipment to the Haitian police by the United States, and more actions by the armed forces to restore order. These planned actions and events are expected to reduce violent crimes, such as kidnappings, and improve security conditions, throughout Haiti.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Taliban

The Taliban Kingmaker: Haqqani or Durrani?

Author’s note: The Taliban group was founded in the 1990s by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and appointed Mullah Omar as founder and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar as co-founder–the two Pashtun leaders from the Durrani tribe of Afghanistan from heavily populated density provinces in western Afghanistan (Kandahar, Helmand, and Uruzgan regions). In 1996, after the Taliban’s first victory, the Haqqani Network joined the Taliban and since then have committed some of the deadliest bombings and have advanced terrorist targeting capabilities. 

A key factor for the prolonged war in Afghanistan has been the thirst for power among the groups and, subsequently, within those groups, other factions, who all want to rule but are unwilling to compromise. There is a layer of interest within each group. The Taliban are a majority-dominated Pashtun-led group that emerged in the 1990s and are now on their second attempt to form their government. However, they are struggling to unify due to tribal, religious, regional, and political differences.

The Taliban took power in Afghanistan in August 2021 but have struggled to maintain power in their second attempt at forming a government. However, the dynamics of the Taliban government have changed.

While the Taliban seeks global recognition, a political dispute between its factions is occurring. Although the Taliban Islamic Emirate is characterized as radical, anti-democracy, and anti-Western values, there are some differences in how Taliban factions view social norms, politics, and governance. The Mullah Baradar Ghani Group is keen to compromise. At the same time, the Haqqani Network is a hard-core extremist group that is unwilling to deviate from its path of an Islamic emirate. The Haqqani Network is considered an extreme faction of the Taliban with no desire to engage with the world, particularly the West.

In general terms, the Haqqani Network, a designated terrorist organization per the U.S. State Department, is considered a more conservative and radical wing of the Taliban. In contrast, Baradar’s group is more liberal and seeks greater rapprochement with the international community.

20210914 taliban whos who no head 780px - The Taliban Kingmaker: Haqqani or Durrani?

Current Taliban Leadership. Source: The Counter Extremism Project, United Nations, Taliban, Pakistan Foreign Ministry, US Treasury, US State Department Photos: Handout/Taliban, Getty Images, The Counter Extremism Project, US Federal Bureau of Investigation Graphic: Henrik Pettersson, Laura Smith-Spark, Saleem Mehsud, Kara Fox and Tim Lister, CNN

Background

The Haqqani Network was founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a Sunni Islamist, and ex-mujahidin warlord during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. During the 80s, Jalaluddin’s group was aided and supported by several members of the international community, becoming one of the most influential groups in Eastern Afghanistan. Furthermore, Jalaluddin had close ties to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and to Osama Bin Laden.

Despite the fact that Jalaluddin died in 2018 from illness, the group continued under the command of his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani.

The Haqqani Network is one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. During the Afghan war, they were responsible for some of the highest-profile terrorist attacks against U.S. forces and civilians. For instance, the June 2011 assault on the Kabul Intercontinental Hotel and two major suicide bombings, in 2008 and 2009, against the Indian Embassy in Kabul.

The military and financial power of the Haqqani Network derives from its involvement in illegal activities such as smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion. However, they also receives financial support from agencies such as the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and other wealthy donors, which makes the fight against this organization complex.

On the other hand, the Mullah Baradar faction is also seeking political control of Afghanistan. This group seeks to represent the interests of historical Taliban leaders such as Mullah Omar and his son, Mullah Yaqoob, who are originally from the Kandahar region in southern Afghanistan; unlike members of the Haqqani Network, who come from the northeastern region of the country.

Mullah Baradar is the co-founder of the Taliban and participated in negotiations with the United States in Doha during 2020, resulting in the eventual withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. Also, Baradar met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing this year. Mullah Baradar is considered a respected negotiator among the organization and his faction is perceived as the moderate and more liberal wing of the Taliban.

Mullah Baradar’s faction seeks greater rapprochement with the world and is open to negotiation, exemplified by the U.S. negotiations in Qatar. Additionally, this faction proposes a more inclusive government that allows for the participation of ethnic minorities. This approach to foreign policy contradicts the Haqqani Network’s ideals, which, form a more conservative perspective and prefers that other states not interfere in the Taliban government.

The differences between these two factions have led to a current dispute within the Taliban. Mullah Baradar hoped to head the government but instead, he was appointed as a deputy. In fact, on September 21st 2021, there was an armed confrontation between the two groups, resulting in Baradar’s brief disappearance and subsequent move to the Kandahar region.

One of the perpetual afflictions plaguing Afghanistan in the modern era has been an inability for Kabul to consolidate governance over their entire territory. While geography has played a considerable role in this hindrance, it cannot be understated how tribal differences have obstructed the peace process.

In Afghanistan, a significant portion of the Pashtuns are a part of the Durrani confederation and have comprised a large number of the Taliban’s political elite, such as Hamid Karzai. Their power base extends into Pakistan, providing refuge to rebuild strength for future campaigns.

Presently the Durrani are represented by Mullah Baradar, who hopes to continue their monopoly of power within the country. Moreover, with their policy of rapprochement with larger powers, such as China, they can benefit from substantial capital. They could also benefit from arms, which could be used to consolidate power within the country and further transnational infrastructure projects, like the Belt and Road Initiative.

At the moment their primary rivals within Afghanistan are the Haqqani Network, which is primarily composed of the Zadran tribe. The group has traditionally used armed opposition against conflicting foreign powers. Their strength draws from this resistance as well as past alliances with the most dangerous Islamic fundamentalist groups in the region, such as Al Qaeda.

They may see their opposition as only a conduit for foreign influence, and thus feel emboldened to conduct a prolonged conflict against the Duranni faction. Without reconciliation by a third party, the nation may devolve into devastating conflict along tribal and ideological lines, leaving civilians caught in the crossfire.

The most affected: The civilian population

While the Afghan government internally disputes over which Taliban faction should prevail, the civilian population suffers.

Afghans are currently experiencing widespread famine throughout the country. This is due to the current drought, difficult economic climate, and cessation of international food aid.

Today, Afghanistan has a poverty rate of 72%. However, even more worrisome is the notion that the quality of life will continue to decline due to the current political instability, uneconomical public finances, freezing of foreign aid, and the COVID-19 pandemic. If current conditions persist, 97 percent of Afghans could plunge into poverty by mid-2022.

What is next?

The internal dispute between the Haqqani Network and the Mullah Baradar faction is likely to jeopardize the government and consequently negatively impact the civilian population.

Therefore, while the political confrontation between the two factions continues, it is necessary to think about solutions in public policy to prevent and stop the ongoing humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan. It is necessary to evaluate alternatives to intervene on problems such as generalized famine and extreme poverty.


Ahmad Shah Mohibi is the Founder of Rise to Peace and a former US Counter-Terrorism Adviser in Afghanistan @ahmadsmohibi

Christopher Ynclan Jr, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Daniel Ruiz, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Rise to Peace