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August 23, 2018October 3, 2018 by Roberto Malta

Two Birds, One Stone: Terror and Drug Trafficking Recruitment

A favela, Brazilian Portuguese for slum, is a low-income, historically informal urban area in Brazil.

The last half of a century has seen a turn away from conventional warfare as armed conflicts shifted to guerrilla and other unconventional war-time tactics. It also saw the rise of two new armed efforts: The War on Terror and The War on Drugs. While there have been limited triumphs in each case, time has proven these approaches have been ineffective at producing stated goals such as putting a definitive end to terror organizations and gangs.

The world over, people are shaken by daily terrorist attacks that leave dozens dead and hundreds injured. All the while, drug traffickers control swathes of countries, destroying promising lives, especially in Mexico and Brazil – two of Latin America’s biggest economies.

For better or worse, humans are unique in their ability to adapt and increasingly, researchers and experts today, especially those studying Conflict Analysis and Resolution point toward the necessity of shifting our approaches if we hope to make real progress in our stated aims. Recruitment is often identified as terror and drug organizations’ Achilles Heel. Besides conspicuous differences in their missions – terror organizations aim to introduce political change through violence, and organized crime aims to profit through any means it can hoard – the pools from which the two cull new recruits are remarkably alike.

Amy Doughten from the Queens University of Charlotte’s Department of Psychology in North Carolina enlightened readers by itemizing similarities between gang and terror recruitment. Such efforts, she wrote, “…focus on young individuals,” and, “…provide an overarching answer and appeal to individuals marginalized from society. Recruited individuals may also have higher than normal levels of alienation and conflict with the larger societal environment.” Simply stated, both types of organizations target young people searching for inclusion in impoverished communities because they are easy to influence.

The international community has the power to cut these organizations’ recruitment bases in the long run, and at root, if it insists on improving the lot of marginalized populations at the local level. Current bellicose strategies, while perhaps well-intended, only produce the hydra-head phenomenon wherein the elimination of the heads of these organizations only see such people replaced with the next belligerents in line. Attack and retribution, in perpetuity, has been the result.

World leaders must learn from their mistakes in the wars on drugs and terror. They can shift their focus toward investing in local, marginalized, poor areas in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Around the world, we can provide a more humane alternative to gangs of any sort for at-risk youth. Terrorists and drug traffickers can be defeated by reducing enrollees in their ranks. Only this can bring terror and drug organizations into their final days. It seems our current strategy necessitates that additional adversaries rise to stand against us. Let’s resolve, not perpetuate the problem.

Sources:
https://cides.fryshuset.se/files/2012/07/differences_and_similarities.pdf
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&context=jss
http://time.com/3716160/terrorism-gangs-white-house-summit/

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Julio Falas, portalvermelho.org Children: between drug traffickers and the oppression of the state

August 15, 2018October 3, 2018 by Kristine Olsen

Youth, Radicalization, and Rehabilitation in Northern Iraq: A Life-Skills Approach

An ISIS video apparently depicting children in a training camp in 2015. Photograph: Isis

The Iraqi government has initiated a series of educational programs in detention centers that focus on the deradicalization of youngsters who were once part of terror groups such as ISIS. In a detention center in Northern Iraq, teenagers who were once ISIL recruits are learning to lead productive, non-violent lives. The detention center houses 75 boys, with the youngest being only 11 years old.

The boys have been accused or convicted of crimes, in some cases, as serious as murder and rape. Rather than having them sit in jails with other criminals and extremists, the center focuses on rehabilitation. The center takes responsibility for providing what it sees as traumatized teens with education and vocational skills, as well as arts exposure in the hopes of transforming a, “…destroyed person, into someone who has a life.”

Despite its honorable intentions, rehabilitation programs like this one are controversial with some. The question asked is whether these youngsters who have lived at least part of their lives dedicated to terror and extremist ideology can change.

Tariq Noori, who works at the Security Council of Kurdistan, believes their chances of a successful outcome are 50/50, a superior stat to the recidivism rate of parolees from Iraq’s prisons. That said, last month an attack on Kurdistan Regional Government headquarters was believed to have been perpetrated, in part, by a young man released from the center.

This is the only center with the capacity to leverage multiple educational efforts to deradicalize the youth. It should be pointed out, if any of these youngsters are released from this center and commit another crime, the government’s next move is to send them to one of the federal prisons run by Bagdad.

Needless to say, there, these young men will find no rehabilitation programs. The communities into which these young men are being released must avail continued support. It will take more than their term in the center to keep such young men motivated for good, and shunning extremism’s allure.

With programs in the communities, perhaps Iraqis can push that 50/50 chance of success to 60/40 or 80/20 in peace’s favor.

To counter violent extremism governments, institutions, and the populace should counter-narratives and help victims find peace and societal acceptance. Educational rehabilitation programs like the Iraqi Rehabilitation Center are critical to deradicalizing youth and ensuring these young men avoid extremist thought – in sum, to be productive members of society.

The rehabilitation center’s providers are optimistic. They hope the program is transformational, allowing boy soldiers to just be boys. In one interview, a young boy talks about leaving the violent part of his life behind and wanting to be a football player. We cannot give up on these boys, or we risk losing another generation to extremism.

August 1, 2018October 3, 2018 by Liam Timmons

Comparing Targeted Killings Across Four Terrorist Groups

Terrorist groups carry out targeted killings for a number of reasons: as a method of internal policing, in response to political repression, or domestic violence, and to exacerbate political or territorial fragmentation. The rate of political assassinations, whether perpetrated by terrorist groups or by regimes themselves, has risen since the early 1970s. Targeted killings are yet another tool in the terrorist’s toolbox, to be deployed against varied targets in the service of any number of motivations.

The Rise to Peace Active Intelligence Database identifies 269 targeted terror attacks worldwide between June 7, 2017, and July 24, 2018. Of these, 180 were claimed by or associated with at least one group, while 89 had unknown perpetrators. The attacks range from individual assassinations to election violence causing dozens of casualties, such as attacks on rallies in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. The most frequent perpetrator was Al-Shabaab with 48 targeted attacks, followed by Naxal groups with 35, and the Islamic State and New People’s Army with 21 each. Combined, these four groups are associated with nearly 70% of attributed targeted killings in the Active Intelligence Database.

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab was responsible for 48 targeted attacks, often using firearms and carrying out the attack in teams of two. In May 2018, Al-Shabaab released a video depicting an assassination team known as the Muhammad bin Maslamah Battalion, which operates within Mogadishu and the Lower Shabelle region. The video shows the battalion’s camp and training activities, as well as the group conducting drive-by shootings and assassinating targets in urban areas. Al-Shabaab focuses its assassination efforts on military officers, militia members, and government officials. These efforts have long been an important part of Al-Shabaab’s strategy. Targeted killings allow Al-Shabaab to disrupt Somali military and political operations and prevent the government from setting up a stable environment in regions seized from the terrorist group. In addition to firearm assassinations carried out by small teams, Al-Shabaab uses targeted suicide attacks to impact the Somali state. Unlike other groups such as the Naxals, Al-Shabaab attempts to avoid targeting civilians in their assassinations, which suggests an emphasis placed on strategic importance in their target selection. Examples of significant targeted killings perpetrated by Al-Shabaab include the August 2017 killing of Mohamed Ali Elmi, then-governor of the Galgadud region, and the shooting of a senior Somali general and his bodyguard in September 2017.

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Image Courtesy: NaxalRevolution

Naxals

Naxal groups were responsible for 35 targeted attacks recorded by the Active Intelligence Database. Typical Naxal targeted killings involve a group of attackers storming a village, seizing their target, and killing them with knives or axes. The perpetrators often leave behind pamphlets advocating their cause and justifying the killing. These attacks are often carried out as a means of internal control, as many targets are killed upon suspicion of being police informants. Naxal attacks on civilians are often carried out in times of economic distress when civilians are more likely to turn to government collaboration. The Indian government offers rewards for information leading to the death or arrest of Naxals and state governments have encouraged civilians to join militant groups that work in tandem with security forces. When civilians are incentivized to become informants or otherwise cooperate with government and security officials, Naxal groups step up targeted killings in order to maintain their regional control. The frequency and brutality of Naxal targeting killings suggest a high level of concern with preventing civilians from turning informant. In addition to attacks on civilians, Naxal groups have plotted the assassination of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and were responsible for a 2003 attempt on the life of Chandrababu Naidu, Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh.

ISIS and ISKP

The Islamic State (including ISIS and ISKP, the Islamic State’s Afghanistan branch) was responsible for 21 targeted attacks. Most often, these attacks were carried out against political leaders and most frequently used either suicide bombs or firearms. Due to the use of suicide bombs, the Islamic State’s targeted attacks often cause collateral damage, with roughly a third of said attacks resulting in more than five casualties. Additionally, with increased targeted killings of police and security personnel, the Islamic State has marked a return to the Soldiers’ Harvest strategy it employed in 2013. The collapse of security following assassinations allows ISIS to maintain hyperlocal control, even after it has lost territory and fighters, as has been the case in recent years. With fewer fighters able to carry out large-scale attacks, targeted killings serve as a force-multiplier with outsized strategic impact, given the resources dedicated to such attacks. The Islamic State also has a history of carrying out assassination campaigns against rival militant groups. ISIS operative Abu al-Baraa al-Saheli was detained and executed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham after a number of targeted killings impacted the militant group. ISIS continues to carry out these attacks against its rivals in Syria.

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Members of the Maoist New People’s Army. | Photo: Reuters

New People’s Army

The New People’s Army was responsible for 21 targeted attacks recorded by the Active Intelligence Database. Most were individualized attacks, with 15 causing only one casualty each, and all but one carried out with a firearm. The attacks targeted mostly low-level politicians such as village chiefs, policemen, and members of the CAFGU, an auxiliary unit within the Armed Forces of the Philippines. NPA assassination teams, known as Sparrow units, have been active in urban areas since the 1980s. In 1984, the Washington Post reported 80 policemen were murdered by the NPA. In a typical attack, Sparrow unit members “…emerged from a crowd, fired a single bullet into the policeman’s head, grabbed his pistol and merged back into the crowd.” This was an effective tactic, with police and business leaders living in fear of the NPA, but with everyday citizens viewing the rebels as their protectors. Sparrow unit tactics changed in 2012; assassins were deployed in localities to carry out assassinations instead of operating from urban safehouses. In March, President Rodrigo Duterte claimed that the Sparrow units had made a come-back, and he proposed a central marketplace for soldiers to protect against attacks.

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July 28, 2018October 3, 2018 by Sara Huzar

About the Under-Covered Attacks Database

UAD Methodology (Updated 4/3/2018)

The Undercovered Attacks Database is meant, especially, to highlight acts of terrorism that do not receive coverage in the United States. The spreadsheet highlights the data from considerable attacks, which we hold were not given attention by U.S. media. Attacks filed here fit three main criteria:

1 – They fall under the same definitions and classifications of terrorism as described in the Rise To Peace Active Intelligence Database (AID). This database serves as an extension and crystallization of the data available in the AID. Any attack in the UAD is filed in the AID first. All input methodology is the same as well, as described on the AID Methodology page.

2 – They are considerable attacks. For the sake of simplicity, we use a Total Casualties level of 21 to denote a considerable level. The level of 21 was chosen as it represents the 90th percentile of Total Casualties inputs into the Active Intelligence Database as of 8 March 2018.

3 – They are not mentioned in pieces published by any of the top five online news outlets in the United States. We use the index provided by Feedspot to create this list, which is comprised of CNN, The New York Times, The Huffington Post, Fox News, and USA Today.

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July 23, 2018December 4, 2018 by Ben Maalouf

Hezbollah: Exporting the Political Paramilitary Organization Model

Thursday evening, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah phoned six fighters in his paramilitary political party recalling them to Lebanon following months of support in Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s defense against Syrian rebel fighters. “You accomplished the greatest [accomplishment] of steadfastness, triumph, and fortitude in the history of Hezbollah,” said the incumbent who has held leadership over Hezbollah, a terrorist group according to the United States among others, since 1992.

The praised fighters were assisting in the defense of two Shia-majority towns from rebel siege in Northern Syria. On Tuesday, a deal was struck between Syrian government backers, Russia, and rebel backers, Turkey, wherein several thousand civilians are to be evacuated, thus ending the siege and allowing the Hezbollah fighters to return home.

In the last five years, this is not an unfamiliar story. This update regarding Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War is part of a spiking-trend involving the organization and its growing influence. This is the case politically in Lebanon as well as worldwide.

Hezbollah is the quintessential political paramilitary organization success story: highly trained, heavily armed, and politically and economically influential. Their influence and highly efficient communication present an even more dangerous situation.

Foreign extremists traveling to train in Lebanon, and vice-versa, hinder the fight to end extremism and strengthens such groups. But how does Lebanon secure an end to such training without drawing the ire of Hezbollah and its patron, Iran?

Beyond Syria, eight Hezbollah fighters were killed less than a month ago by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The fighters were providing military support to the Iran-aligned Houthi (Ansar Allah) group. Hezbollah denied the deaths, but are yet to rule out their involvement in the Yemeni proxy war. Saudi-backed Yemeni government officials have accused Iran, for years, of backing the Houthis in an effort to transform them into a carbon copy of Hezbollah.

Such reports coupled with ones highlighting Hezbollah’s training of Boko Haram fighters in Nigeria to legitimize the idea that Hezbollah has established itself as the manifestation of what terrorist-backers want such groups to become.

Furthermore, the continued development of these organizations’ communication methods reinforces one’s sense that the best way to cripple Hezbollah’s training and scope is to break its communication apparatus. Easier said than done, especially in Lebanon. The Lebanese military can barely secure its frontier. And due to Hezbollah’s Parliamentary presence, any military intervention against it would instantly unravel the country.

Ethical hacking methods exist, and while their implementation is difficult, and therefore improbable, a reduction in the flood of foreign financial support, and increased border security technologies could go away toward limiting extremist trainees’ movement to and from Lebanon. These considerations also come with consequences, so the question lingers, can Lebanon solve its problems without creating new ones?

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Hezbollah training ME Shiites to fight in Syria

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July 19, 2018October 3, 2018 by Ahmad Mohibi

US-Taliban Peace Talks: An Opportunity For Peace?

The United States is planning to lead direct talks with the Taliban in an effort to end the 17 years of war in Afghanistan.

The United States plans to lead peace talks with the Taliban in an effort to end 17 years of war in Afghanistan. The New York Times reported in recent weeks U.S. delegates have visited Kabul and Pakistan to discuss the aforementioned US-Taliban talks.

Last week, Secretary Pompeo promised to support the Afghan government in peace negotiations. Pompeo reiterated the strategy announced last year by President Donald Trump which focuses on additional U.S. troops in the country as a tool to pressure the Taliban to negotiate with Afghan leadership. “The strategy sends a clear message to the Taliban that they cannot wait us out,” Pompeo said.

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The Taliban and Afghan security forces greet each other during the cease-fire in Kabul. Photo by Ahmad Mohibi, June 16, 2018

Tuesday, U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen John. Nicholson said the U.S. is not replacing the Afghan government in the peace talks. “The United States is not a substitute for the Afghan people or the Afghan government,” Nicholson said.

But during his trip to Kandahar, he said, “Our Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has said that we, the United States, are ready to talk to the Taliban and discuss the role of international forces. We hope this will help move the peace process forward.”

The State Department added that “any negotiations over the political future of Afghanistan will be between the Taliban and the Afghan government.”

The Taliban cheered the prospect of direct U.S. talks. They do not want to negotiate with Afghan leadership, which see as illegitimate and incapable of offering them valuable concessions. Sohail Shahin, spokesman from the Taliban’s Qatar office, told Aljazeera, “This is what we wanted, and what were waiting for – to sit with the U.S. directly and discuss the withdrawal of foreign troops.”

Political leaders and Afghans believe peace is possible if Afghans lead the way. Only the Afghans can win this war. Neither U.S. troops nor U.S.-Taliban peace talks will pacify Afghanistan.

In fact, U.S. involvement may be exacerbating fundamental tensions. Former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai stated recently in an interview with Ahmad Mohibi, “The Taliban want to negotiate with the U.S. because the Afghan National Unity Government is weak. The Taliban sees themselves as stronger than the Afghan government. They believe the U.S. is the power-holder in this dynamic.” Karzai advocates an Afghan peace process led and implemented by Afghans. “Peace is possible in Afghanistan if it’s a pure process in which Afghans are involved in every aspect of talks,” Karzai said

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Taliban supporter biking around the city of Kabul during the ceasefire between the Afghan government and the Taliban. June 17, 2018 Photo by Ahmad Mohibi

Attempts at Afghan peace talks date back to 2006 – a year of deadly terrorist attacks and suicide bombings that saw in excess of 4,000 people dead, including 170 foreigners. This was a dramatic uptick in suicide bombings and it came in the wake of the War on Terror, which began in 2001. But that same year, 2006, at a Shia religious gathering, Hamid Karzai invited the Taliban to participate in peace talks. Karzai said, “While we are fighting for our honor, we still open the door for talks and negotiations with an enemy who is shedding our blood and bent our annihilation.”

Since then, Afghan and American governments, the international community, NATO, and Afghanistan’s neighbors have supported peace talks. Yet, despite the deployment of 15,000 U.S. troops and 17 years of U.S. and international support, the Taliban has gained territory, suicide bombings surge, and more terror groups are coalescing. And the Taliban are unwilling to negotiate with the Afghan government.

However, that the role of the United States in the peace process remains necessary to ensure other state actors, such as Pakistan, which continues to provide material support to the Taliban, push them to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table. Together peace can be achieved, but only through a recognition of the Afghan lead in these efforts.

There is still a chance for peace. Afghans are hardworking people with the courage to build their homeland. Americans are thoughtful and passionate people that are willing to help Afghans win the peace.

Ahmad Shah Mohibi is founder and president of Rise to Peace and a national security expert. Ahmad Mohibi is a published writer as well as a George Washington University and George Mason University Alumni. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

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July 18, 2018May 18, 2020 by Rise to Peace

Ahmad Mohibi discusses US’ direct talks with the Taliban on Tolonews

After the New York Times reported that the White House ordered diplomats to hold direct talks with the Taliban, Rise to Peace founder Ahmad Mohibi told Tolonews, “The United States will not negotiate with the Taliban directly. The U.S. is facilitating the peace process, and U.S. talks with the Taliban will expedite the process.” Mr. Mohibi added, “Negotiations must occur between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Because it’s a war among Afghans, they are responsible for fixing it. Peace is critical and achievable, but it must come from the indigenous people.”

Ahmad Shah Mohibi is founder and president of Rise to Peace and a national security expert. Mr. Mohibi is a published writer and a George Washington University and George Mason University alumnus. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

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