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Yemen
 by Hannah Brown

Strikes Against Terrorist Leaders in Yemen Have Little Impact on Peace Efforts

Last week, the White House confirmed that a United States missile strike killed the top Al-Qaeda leader in Yemen While the assassination of Qasim al-Raymi, the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) official eliminated a terrorist whose roots stretch beyond 9/11, it is unlikely that it will impact violence in the country or the overall effectiveness of the terrorist group.

Reporting from several sources recount that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) tracked al-Raymi and executed an unmanned drone strike against him — the second drone attack against the leadership of a US-government classified terrorist group. In recent years, his leadership was even characterized as detrimental to the AQAP’s operations and a successor, likely the reported external operations leader Khalid Batarfi, could provide the group with a sense of renewal.

Nonetheless, operations to neutralize AQAP leadership remains an ineffective way to combat the cyclical violence in Yemen. Fighting between separatist and government forces compound to create an atmosphere that breeds instability and terrorist groups like the AQAP. Prior to al-Raymi’s death, a soldier and a civilian were killed in an ambush linked to the AQAP whilst fighting between the two groups in Yemen’s civil war resulted in the loss of over 100 lives at a military training base around the same time.

American counterterrorism efforts have a long and complex history in Yemen. Since 9/11, the US has utilized everything from drone strikes, surveillance and special operations in the country. The outbreak of the Yemeni civil war in 2011 did not compel the US to shift their tactics or move towards their stated mission to “build the capacity of the local government forces, working by, with, and through these partners to accomplish our common counterterrorism objectives” in a way that proliferates the least amount of violence.

Civilians and ground forces in the Yemeni conflict face the brunt of the lack of policy development. Streets and hospitals are encompassed in the dangerous warzone. These types of situations allow terrorist groups like the AQAP to find a safe haven as those engaged in counter efforts on the ground are preoccupied with daily missile exchanges and the problematic task of sourcing enough medical supplies to treat the wounded.

The United States has suffered the consequences of its lack of amended counterterrorism policy in Yemen too. For instance, the AQAP claimed responsibility for the terror attack on the Pensacola Naval Air Station. It is evident that the war in Yemen pushed all of the players in the conflict to new levels of violent action.

The US needs to participate in peace efforts to deal with terrorism in Yemen. By leaving peace talks to the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, the power imbalance of the negotiating bodies propagate mistrust and devolve into violence. With seasoned diplomats, extensive experience in peace negotiation and a relationship on both sides of the conflict, the US has tools at its disposal to bring peace to Yemen while making the world a safer place for everyone in the process.

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 by Elisabeta Dinu

From Violence to Politics: Will the Taliban Become a Political Party?

The Taliban has rejected engaging in negotiations many times, but President Ghani’s proposal to fully recognize the group as a legal political party in 2018 was a turning point. Terrorist organizations change and many have proven to have the ability to engage in politics. Organizations like Hezbollah or the Irish Republican Army (IRA) changed strategy and came to prioritize politics over violence for advancing their agenda. Perhaps the Taliban too is showing signs of transforming into a political party?

Tapping into politics does not necessarily mean letting go of violence. Estimated to have around 60,000 full-time fighters, the Taliban’s territorial reach does not show signs of pull back. They retain the ability to conduct high-profile urban attacks, demonstrate considerable tactical capabilities, and their attacks have become more effective in the third quarter of 2019.

As security expert Audrey Kurth Cronin points out, many groups that engaged in politics have maintained violent activities. Hezbollah became a fully-fledged political party shortly after the signing of the Ta’if peace agreement in 1989, but like the Taliban showed no signs of slowing down militarily.  Although it has been running in elections since 1992 and has become one of the most important players in the parliament, Hezbollah has not disarmed like other militias in Lebanon. Similarly, the Taliban are unlikely to commit fully to politics.

Perhaps becoming political could be a means to an end. Conflict negotiations are built on the assumption that parties want the conflict to end. However, in the case of the Taliban this is not clear. United States officials assess that the Taliban does not pose an existential threat to the Afghan government at the moment, but signal that the dynamic can change if the US alters its deployments in Afghanistan.

Negotiations could be a vehicle for the Taliban to force US troops out of Afghanistan, so they could defeat the government and other local rivals in order to reinstate the Islamic Emirate by force. Similarly, Hezbollah’s military capacity competes with that of the government of Lebanon, and both analysts and governments have argued the group’s political activity has only been means to their continuous anti-Israel terror campaign.

Engagement in politics could also feature Taliban radical splinters, which may carry on the terrorist campaign. The Taliban may not be a very fragmented organization under the leadership of Haibatullah Akhundzada, but disagreements within the group could occur if the Taliban and the Afghan government strike a deal. Radical factions could be dissatisfied with concessions made during negotiations and carry on terrorist attacks despite opposition from Taliban leadership.

The IRA is such a case – when the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 granted the formation of an Irish Free State, the organization split. The pro-treaty faction grew into the army of the Irish Free State. The anti-treaty faction – under the leadership of Eamon de Valera — carried on the terrorist campaign. Although until the Good Friday Agreement of 1996 the IRA featured multiple radical splinters that carried on terrorist attacks, the factions also engaged in politics, some growing into the most important political parties in Ireland (such as Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein).

Whether the Taliban transforms into a political party is also a regional bid. The creation of the Taliban was catalyzed by Pakistani influence.  Numerous reports have indicated that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency was involved in the creation of the Taliban, and still supports the insurgency as a matter of official policy to contain the influence in Afghanistan of its rival India.  Similarly, Hezbollah surfaced when Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps arrived in Lebanon to provide support for pro-Iranian Shiite militias against Israel, and the political party has been depicted as an outpost of Iranian influence.

Several lessons can be drawn from the experience of the Hezbollah and the IRA’s changeover to politics.

  • A comprehensive strategy for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the Taliban should be formulated. Although the Ta’if agreement called for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, and so did several United Nations Security Council Resolutions, Hezbollah expanded its military power and did not show signs of integrating into the Lebanese Armed Forces.
  • A plan for moderating Taliban aims for Islamist government is necessary, as they will most likely seek reinstating Islamist rule in Afghanistan. In comparison, Hezbollah’s engagement in politics has been granted by the group’s receptiveness to political pluralism – “we are committed to Islam but unwilling to impose it by force”.
  • Any deals should contain areas of deliberate strategic ambiguity to minimize Taliban factionalization. The Good Friday Agreement was ambiguous enough to enable participants to describe the accord in terms that were palatable to their constituents, and so should be any agreement between domestic parties in Afghanistan.
  • The role of third-party states is crucial. In Lebanon, success and failure of conflict regulation depends on the maintenance of positive exogenous pressures, and Syrian and Iranian interests affected the trajectory of Hezbollah. Similarly, the interests of Pakistan must be considered as a key element of any potential Taliban engagement in politics.
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 by Ondrej Palicak

Consequences of the Ongoing Offensive in Idlib

Without the attention it once attracted, the Syrian civil war not only continues, but has even escalated in past weeks due to the ongoing offensive in the last rebel-held province of Idlib. However, what might be perceived as a final push for victory by Bashar Assad’s regime and its allies will most likely bring yet another humanitarian crisis and further destabilize the war-torn country.

In late 2018, Russia and Turkey brokered a deal that was supposed to create a demilitarized buffer zone around the province to mitigate the crisis. Turkey is a key supporter of Syrian rebel groups and thus an important actor in the Idlib region; however, the rebels and Syrian regime continued low-intensity clashes even after the deal was reached. The Syrian Army renewed its offensive with daily airstrikes in December 2019. This offensive is ongoing despite efforts to broker a ceasefire in the beginning of January.

idlibmap 640x476 - Consequences of the Ongoing Offensive in Idlib

(Source: The Guardian)

Idlib province is home to approximately 3 million civilians and an estimated tens of thousands of fighters, therefore, the potential for an increase in internally displaced persons and a refugee influx to Turkey is significant. For example, at least 350,000 civilians have left the province for Turkey since the renewed offensive. In addition, half a million people fled before the offensive started due to fears of the attacks and sought safety in refugee camps on the Turkish border.

Such a wave of refugees may not only cause problems for Turkey, but for European countries as well. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan already threatened the European Union that he would “open the gates” to Europe if Turkey does not receive additional aid to manage the crisis. With more refugees pouring into Turkey as a result of the offensive, Erdoğan might use these developments to put more pressure on the EU.

Moreover, airstrikes have killed dozens of civilians in the past days and weeks. Additionally, the airstrikes left a number of villages in ruins, targeted hospitals and schools. Such actions inflict further damage on the country and its infrastructure resulting in a more expensive, difficult and longer post-war reconstruction in the future.

Besides civilians, the question of rebel fighters present in the province remains. Due to their large estimated numbers, it is improbable that all of them will be killed or captured, therefore, these fighters could pose a security threat in the future. Syria and Iraq have attracted thousands of foreign fighters in the past who could potentially carry out terrorist attacks across the world were they to travel back home or elsewhere. Conversely, they could remain in Syria to continue terrorist activities and make the transition towards peace more difficult.

The Idlib offensive might bring the Syrian civil war closer to an end than ever before, however, the consequences would be severe. Attacks are already taking a toll on civilian lives and exacerbating a relentless humanitarian crisis as hundreds of thousands flee the province. Nevertheless, Assad seems determined to regain control of the entire country. It is a fair assumption that the offensive will mark yet another grim milestone in the 9-year Syrian civil war.

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 by Vasileia Kioutsouki

New ISIL Leader Officially Named and Confirmed

It was recently officially confirmed by two intelligence services that Amir Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi is the new head of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Prior to the reveal of his identity, Al-Salbi was known as Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi: a name implying that he is of Qurayshi descent and thus legitimizes his role as a new ‘caliph’.

Early Years and ISIL Roots

Al-Salbi — alias Hajji ‘Abdallah — was born in the small northwestern Iraqi city Tal Afar; a city once under Al-Qaeda control from 2004 to 2006 and a subsequent strategic base for the Islamic State. He graduated with a degree in Sharia law from the University of Mosul, was a religious scholar in al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and is believed to be a founding member of ISIL.

Like most of the Islamic State’s leading fighters, he is a former officer who had served under Saddam Hussein and played a prominent role in the fight against the United States and its allies. In 2004, he was captured by American troops for associations with al-Qaeda and placed in Camp Bucca detention center where he met al-Baghdadi.

It was only natural that al-Baghdadi took advantage of his period of detention to indoctrinate as many inmates as possible and set up a common vision, namely the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Within Camp Bucca, Baghdadi created a network of hardline fighters that he destined for positions of leadership in the Islamic State.

The new ‘caliph’, nicknamed as the ‘Professor’, is one of those fighters connected with Baghdadi and adopted his unwavering commitment to the Islamic State. He appears to have led many of their international operations and he is considered to have played a decisive role in the enslavement of thousands of Yazidi women and children, as well as the murder of an equal number of Yazidi men in Iraq, started in 2014.

Current Situation

Although the succession of Baghdadi by al-Salbi was only recently confirmed, he is likely to have taken over the day-to-day operations of the terrorist organisation well before the former’s death. Being wounded and suffering from a chronic illness, al-Baghdadi had already designated a successor since last August. During that time, the Rewards for Justice Program (RFJ) of the US Department of State announced a reward up to $5 million for information regarding al-Salbi, placing him on the list with the most wanted terrorists. There is no doubt that he will be an efficient leader that will attempt to reinvigorate the Islamic State. What remains to be seen is whether he will be as inspiring as his predecessor who had been admittedly very successful in recruiting fighters from all around the world and inciting them to fight for a common cause.

Recent discussions around its new leader indicate that the Islamic State is indeed regenerating and confirms fears about a possible re-emergence. The situation both in Iraq and Syria has created a favourable environment for ISIL to rebuild its strengths and organise its operations. This is certainly not a simple task without any territory under their control, however, regional instability has disrupted security and reduced the effectiveness of the security services.

If tensions and conflict are not addressed soon, intelligence gathering will be extremely challenging, and attempts to prevent the Islamic State from breaking their imprisoned fighters out and retaking territory will be even less likely to be successful. Consequently, prisons where IS fighters are held should be properly guarded, in order to avoid a mass break out, and a particular attention must be focused on monitoring desert regions around the Iraq-Syria border, and other areas which are beyond the control of the central government.

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Trump on Afghanistan
 by Ahmad Mohibi

Afghan Promises and a Peace Plan in Trump’s State of the Union Address

At the State of the Union, President Trump endorsed peace talks with the Taliban and promised that he continues to work to “end America’s wars in the Middle East” and bring troops home. He stated:

“In Afghanistan, the determination and valor of our warfighters has allowed us to make tremendous progress, and peace talks are underway. I am not looking to kill hundreds of thousands of people in Afghanistan, many of them innocent. It is also not our function to serve other nations as a law enforcement agency. These are warfighters, the best in the world, and they either want to fight to win or not fight at all. We are working to finally end America’s longest war and bring our troops back home!”

The US-Taliban talks

Mark Esper, the United States Defense Secretary, stated intent to reduce the number of troops to 8,600 from 14,000 with or without a deal with the Taliban. This aligns with statements made this past Monday by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that the Taliban must first give “demonstrable evidence of their will and capacity to reduce violence” for peace talks to progress.

 In the past week, US Special Envoy for Peace and Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad completed talks in Doha, Qatar where he met with the Taliban political office and later with the Afghan political community in Afghanistan. There have been numerous talks behind closed doors and open discussions with the Taliban on issues of reduction of violence, US troop withdrawal, and a possible interim government to end the Afghan conflict. Nonetheless, nothing is promising, and Afghanistan is an unpredictable country with so many elements in flux.

A US deal with the Taliban will be condition-based primarily anchored on the US troop withdrawal, the Taliban commitment to cut ties with al-Qaeda and the renunciation of Afghan soil as a place to plan  attacks against the United States and its allies.

The Afghan dilemma

The prolonged ethnic conflict in Afghanistan is at the root of the political rift in Afghanistan. A race for power and supremacy supplanted any rational opportunities for compromise in the inner workings of the Afghan political community. Ethnonationalism is on the rise thus escalating tensions between tribes and ethnicities and  — most importantly — among the youth of Afghanistan. A September 2019 presidential election stirred deeper chaos and left its people uncertain over the future of their country. 

The Taliban game of politics

Taliban has been rather successful in the advancement of their interests of power and recognition.  A regime that was established in the 1990s and toppled by the US in 2001 has now emerged with a mission to build a global reputation and controls a significant portion of Afghan territory, where they set up an Islamic Emirate or similar form of government. Establishment of such a political system nationwide is their strategic objective and a peace deal — or no deal — will not change that.

Taliban have said recently that they agreed to a short-term ceasefire, but left any questions about a permanent ceasefire unanswered until an agreement with the US on troop withdrawal is reached. They hesitate to hold any talks with the Afghan government as they believe the Afghan government is weak and is unready to negotiate and respond to Taliban demands. The Afghan government simply wants the Taliban to surrender and end the violence. This has become a deal-breaker for intra-Afghan dialogue. 

 Talks between the US and the Taliban are only the first step of a long process. Intra-Afghan dialogue — where the Taliban meet with Afghan officials — is the next step. In this phase, both sides of the conflict will discuss key barriers, demands, amendments to the constitution to increase the likelihood of success in reaching sustainable peace in Afghanistan.

 Promising future?

Convincing the Afghan political community to negotiate with the Taliban is the hardest part of achieving Afghan peace. Throughout the nine rounds of peace talks, the Taliban presented themselves professionally with one voice and one strategy while the Afghan representatives seem to lack a clear vision with a government that appears unsupportive of their efforts. The Afghan government has not finalized the list of peace talk participants yet.

 Here are three possible scenarios for Afghanistan

  1.     Presidential election: A new government should be established through a second round of elections between the two front-runners given that candidates failed to reach 52 percent of the vote. The winner with 52 percent of the vote would become the president of Afghanistan and will have to negotiate with the Taliban in the next 5 years.
  2.     Interim government: It is a reasonable option that an interim government should be formed until a stable Afghanistan can create a new government. The last elections were a complete failure due to security challenges, electoral fraud, technical difficulties and a low voter turnout (approximately 1.5 million voted in a country of 35 million citizens), thus an interim government offers a path forward for now.

  3.      The continuation of the current regime: It is even more likely that the current regime retains power in a situation where a second round of elections are indecisive and the Afghan political community cannot compromise on an interim government.

Afghanistan’s future is unpredictable with so many moving parts though Afghans are hopeful that peace is possible. Trump’s State of the Union speech acted as yet another reminder that the situation in the country continues to perplex domestic and international political actors as they continually seek opportunities to end the decades of violence.

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