By Nicholas Oakes – Rise to Peace Fellow
For decades, the prominent image of terrorism has been an attack on civilians in a public space. The 20th century model of terrorism has largely fit into this image; the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center, the 2015 attack in Paris – both examples depict public violence aimed at sending shockwaves across the country.
But in the 2020’s thus far, this model has begun to evolve. Increasingly, terrorist actions are not aimed at inflicting mass casualties, but instead at critical infrastructure. The goal is no longer merely to kill, it is to disrupt, and financially weaken. Modern terrorism is opting to target infrastructure that underpins globalization and the overall economic order of states.
This shift reflects both opportunity and strategy. As global economies become more interconnected, from supply chains to renewable energy networks, these shared systems have emerged as attractive targets for non-state actors. Attacking them often inflicts severe harm to a nation’s most crucial interests, but more importantly, provides a tremendous amount of political pressure relative to the resources that went into the attack.
Recent events across the Middle East and Europe demonstrate that terrorism is seemingly entering a new phase.
From Public Spectacle to Strategic Disruption:
Traditional terrorism sought visibility through mass-casualty attacks. A very straightforward logic was applied: kill civilians, generate fear, and use that fear to leverage governments into political concessions. While attacks such as the October 7th attacks in Israel demonstrate the original model persists, the strategic environment has largely evolved.
First, as a result of globalization, shared infrastructure has never been more vulnerable. Shipping lanes and digital systems are the backbone of modern economies. Disrupting them causes effects across continents.
Second, the proliferation of cheap drones, and cyber sabotage techniques has greatly lowered the barrier to entry. Non-state actors no longer need to conduct complex plots to generate impact. A missile fired at a cargo ship holding materials used for every day goods yield large results.
This evolution has not outright replaced the traditional image of terrorism, it supplements it. The most strategically significant attacks increasingly target systems that a state needs in order to function.
The Red Sea: Supply Chains as a Battlefield
Nowhere is this transformation more visible than in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Since late 2023, Yemen’s Houthi group has launched repeated attacks on commercial shipping, using drones and missiles to target vessels transiting valuable resources out of one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait connects the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. A 2018 estimate projected that 6.2 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products flowed through the Bab el Mandeb. Needless to say, the strait is vital for numerous countries across the globe. By targeting commercial vessels, the Houthis were able to garner international attention for their cause, in this case, the liberation of Palestine.
Major shipping companies were forced to reroute vessels around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope to avoid risk. Doing so led to lost revenue for international suppliers, and significant shipping delays.
The Houthi’s actions rippled across global markets, raising fuel costs, increasing insurance premiums, leading to shipping firms being hesitant to return to normal shipping routes three years later. Houthi officials have threatened to close the Bab el-Mandeb and target oil facilities to disrupt exports to Western markets. These statements highlight that the group is fully aware of their strategic intent, attacking infrastructure exerts pressure far beyond the borders of Yemen.
This is terrorism as economic warfare, not aimed at killing sailors, but to demonstrate the ability to hold global commerce hostage. By striking in such a manner, the Houthis have transformed a regional conflict into a systemic economic threat.
ISIS and the Weaponization of Energy:
The evolution toward infrastructure-focused terrorism is also visible in Syria, where ISIS has systematically targeted oil and gas assets as part of its grand strategy. Rather than attempting to seize and govern territory on the scale it once did, the group has shifted toward recurring sabotage operations designed to undermine state authority, generate revenue, and preserve operational relevance.
Since losing most of its territorial control between 2017 and 2019, ISIS cells in central and eastern Syria have repeatedly attacked energy infrastructure in the country’s Badia desert region. Pipelines carrying crude from Deir ez-Zor fields toward refineries in Homs have been bombed or disabled, forcing temporary shutdowns and costly repairs. In August 2020, coordinated explosions struck a natural gas pipeline in the Homs desert, causing blackouts in several government-held areas. The Syrian government was forced to reroute fuel supplies and impose rolling blackouts as a result. Similar attacks occurred throughout 2021 and 2022, often involving improvised explosive devices planted along remote pipeline stretches.
In a nation such as Syria, where energy resources are one of the only areas to generate GDP. gas infrastructure has proven to be an especially attractive target. Syria’s electricity grid relies heavily on gas-fired power plants, meaning disruptions to gas supply can quickly translate into urban power outages. Even short-term interruptions strain an already fragile energy system and force authorities to divert military resources toward protecting remote infrastructure.
Importantly, these attacks blur the line between insurgency and terrorism. They are not designed primarily to produce mass civilian casualties. Instead, they aim to degrade state capacity, undermine economic recovery, and maintain the group’s relevance in a crowded militant landscape. This model, which targets infrastructure to achieve strategic effects without holding territory, has become a template for other non-state actors operating in resource-dependent states.
Syria’s experience underscores how energy infrastructure can function as both a vulnerability and a lever in modern conflict. Pipelines, refineries, and power stations are fixed assets that cannot easily be relocated. They often run through remote areas where protection is difficult and expensive. For groups like ISIS, attacking them offers a way to impose recurring costs and sustain a sense of momentum even in the absence of conventional battlefield victories.
Assessing Examples Within Europe:
The evolution of terrorism is not confined to the Middle East. Europe has seen a growing number of attacks targeting energy and environmental infrastructure, reflecting the evolution of terrorism is not exclusive to one region of the world.
In January 2026, a left-wing extremist group claimed responsibility for an arson attack on Berlin’s power grid, cutting electricity to tens of thousands of homes and businesses. Authorities treated the incident as terrorism, noting that it endangered lives and critical services.
The group framed its actions as resistance against fossil fuels and environmental destruction. It described the attack as an act “aimed at the common good” and an expression of solidarity with environmental causes. Regardless of the rhetoric, the effect was clear: the deliberate disruption of a major urban energy network.
This attack illustrates a broader trend. As societies transition toward renewable energy and electrification, energy infrastructure becomes just as crucial as the economic lifelines previously mentioned.
While the emphasis on sustainability has opened up a new avenue for terror attacks in the modern day, perhaps no contemporary developmental phenomenon can be used to aid attacks quite like digitalization.
The digitalization of infrastructure has opened another front: cyberattacks. Energy systems, dams, and waterways increasingly rely on networked control systems that can be both operated, and infiltrated remotely. In Norway, authorities warned of alleged Russian cyber intrusions targeting dam and waterway infrastructure. While attribution remains complex, intelligence services have highlighted the risk of cyberattacks on hydropower systems, which generate much of the country’s electricity.
Cyberattacks on dams and water systems can have severe consequences. Manipulating water levels or disabling control systems can disrupt electricity generation, threaten flooding, or undermine public confidence in infrastructure security.
Unlike traditional terrorist attacks, cyber operations are unlikely to produce immediate casualties. Their impact lies in disruption, uncertainty, and economic cost. They also allow perpetrators to operate with plausible deniability, complicating attribution and response.
As infrastructure becomes more digitized, the potential for cyberterrorism grows. Non-state actors can exploit vulnerabilities in systems that were not designed with modern threats in mind. The result is a new form of terrorism that targets the digital backbone of physical infrastructure.
The Logic Behind the New Wave of Terrorism:
The growing focus on developmental infrastructure reflects a shift in how non-state actors calculate impact. Modern economies depend on tightly integrated systems; shipping lanes, power grids, pipelines, and digital networks, that are both indispensable and difficult to fully secure. Striking these systems can generate effects far beyond the immediate site of an attack. A relatively inexpensive drone or explosive device can force global shipping firms to reroute vessels and absorb higher insurance costs. A cyber intrusion into a dam, port terminal, or electrical grid can halt activity across entire regions. For groups with limited resources, the appeal is obvious: the cost of disruption is often dramatically lower than the cost required for states to defend, repair, and insure against it.
Infrastructure-focused operations can also present a lower operational risk than traditional mass-casualty attacks in crowded urban spaces. Large-scale attacks against civilians require extensive planning, coordination, and exposure to intelligence detection. Sabotage against pipelines, transmission lines, or construction sites can often be carried out by small cells with minimal equipment. While the consequences may be less immediately visible than a bombing in a public square, the downstream effects, power outages, price spikes, and supply shortages, can ripple widely. Because the harm is indirect, such actions may not trigger the same level of public outrage or international condemnation as attacks designed to maximize civilian casualties, even though they can endanger vulnerable populations and strain public services.
Targeting infrastructure also serves as a form of strategic signaling. Groups that lack the capacity to seize and hold territory can still demonstrate relevance by showing they can disrupt critical systems. Attacks on shipping corridors, energy facilities, or transportation networks signal reach and capability, amplifying a group’s perceived strength. This signaling effect can be as important as the material damage itself, attracting media attention, reinforcing internal cohesion, and reminding governments and publics alike that the group retains operational capacity.
Finally, infrastructure attacks are often wrapped in ideological narratives that seek to justify them. Some groups frame sabotage against fossil-fuel facilities, industrial projects, or energy networks as acts of environmental or anti-capitalist resistance. Others portray attacks on pipelines, ports, or logistics hubs as strikes against globalization or state authority. Such framing does not reduce the real-world harm caused by these actions, but it can help perpetrators position themselves within broader political or ideological movements. In an era of polarized politics and contested energy transitions, infrastructure offers both a strategic target and a symbolic one, representing the economic systems and policy choices that different actors seek to challenge or disrupt.
Another feature of this evolution is the blurring of lines between terrorism, sabotage, and hybrid warfare. State and non-state actors may collaborate or operate in parallel, complicating attribution.
In the Red Sea, for example, the Houthis operate as a non-state actor but are widely seen as aligned with broader regional strategies. Attacks on shipping lanes can serve both ideological and geopolitical objectives.
Similarly, cyberattacks on infrastructure may involve criminal groups, hacktivists, or state-linked actors. The ambiguity complicates responses and raises questions about deterrence.
This convergence suggests that modern terrorism cannot be understood in isolation. It operates within a broader ecosystem of asymmetric conflict, where economic disruption is a central objective.
Implications for Security:
The shift toward infrastructure-focused terrorism carries significant implications for how states think about security. Protecting crowded public spaces remains important, but the systems that underpin modern economies, energy grids, ports, shipping lanes, water systems, and digital networks—now demand equal attention. Much of this infrastructure is privately owned and geographically dispersed, which complicates traditional security models built around centralized protection. Effective defense increasingly requires close coordination between governments, private operators, insurers, and international partners.
Maritime security in contested waterways now involves naval patrols, convoy systems, and real-time intelligence sharing, while energy infrastructure protection must combine physical security with robust cybersecurity measures capable of detecting and responding to intrusions quickly.
At the same time, policymakers are recognizing that prevention alone is insufficient. Complex systems cannot be made completely invulnerable, and determined actors will eventually find points of weakness. As a result, resilience and redundancy are becoming central concepts in national security planning. Governments and companies are investing in diversified supply chains, backup energy capacity, and rapid repair capabilities designed to limit the duration and scope of disruptions. The goal is not only to deter attacks but to ensure that when they occur, their effects can be contained and systems restored quickly. This shift from pure prevention to resilience reflects a broader understanding that economic continuity is itself a form of security.
Legal and strategic frameworks are also struggling to keep pace. Many existing counterterrorism laws were designed around attacks that produce immediate civilian casualties. Infrastructure sabotage, cyber intrusions, and supply-chain disruptions often fall into gray areas between terrorism, sabotage, and hybrid warfare. Determining how to classify such acts, and how to respond proportionately, poses challenges for policymakers and international law. States must adapt definitions, authorities, and cooperative mechanisms to address attacks that are designed to erode economic stability rather than produce instant spectacle.
Finally, there is a need to recalibrate public perception. When people think of terrorism, they often still imagine dramatic acts of violence in public places. Yet the most consequential threats to stability may increasingly come from sustained disruptions to energy, transport, or digital systems. Power outages, blocked shipping routes, or damaged pipelines can create economic and political pressure that unfolds over weeks or months rather than minutes. Recognizing this shift is essential not only for policymakers but also for the public, whose expectations shape political responses. Understanding terrorism in this broader, infrastructure-focused context will be key to building resilience in an era where the targets of attack are as likely to be economic lifelines as crowded streets.
Terrorism has not abandoned its traditional forms, but it has diversified. In the 2020s, the most strategically significant attacks increasingly target economic and environmental infrastructure. From the Red Sea to Berlin, from Syrian oil fields to Norwegian dams, non-state actors are demonstrating that they can disrupt the systems that sustain modern life.
This evolution reflects a broader transformation in conflict. As economies become more interconnected and infrastructure more critical, the targets of terrorism shift accordingly. The goal is no longer solely to kill and shock, but to disrupt and weaken.
The challenge for states is to adapt. Protecting infrastructure, building resilience, and understanding the strategic logic of economic terrorism will be essential in the years ahead. The battlefield of terrorism has expanded beyond public spaces into the networks that power the global economy.
In this new era, the most dangerous attacks may not be those that produce immediate casualties, but those that quietly undermine the systems on which societies depend.
