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ELN

The Rise of Urban Terrorism in Colombia? ELN Involvement in Citizen Protests

During the last few years, there have been multiple protests in Colombia against the government. Thousands of people have taken to the streets to protest against issues such as tax reforms, government management, and police performance. However, although the ability to protest is a legitimate right, there have also been events that have affected security conditions in the country.  Colombian authorities have indicated that the National Liberation Army (ELN), one of the oldest terrorist groups in the country, is likely participating in the protests.

The Protests

Colombia had serious episodes of protests and riots throughout 2019, 2020, and 2021. Their objectives and motives were distinct, but they shared in their international recognition for their levels of violence and destruction.

The first major protest during the government of President Iván Duque was the national strike of November 21, also known as 21N. Some of the reasons that led to these protests included economic proposals, such as eliminating the state pension fund Colpensiones and increasing the retirement age. Also, protesters demanded more investment in public education, combating corruption in several universities, effective protection measures for indigenous and social leaders, as many have been assassinated, and the full implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC, which was reached in 2016. The protests lasted until the beginning of 2020 and left approximately 769 people injured, more than 100 arrested, and six dead.

The next major series of protests in Colombia were those against the death of Javier Ordoñez in September 2020. The main reason for the protest was the murder of Javier Ordoñez by members of the national police in Bogota. Throughout September, there were clashes between protesters and police and multiple burnings of police stations, known as CAI. The protests resulted in 13 deaths, 72 CAI affected, and 581 injured, 75 of which were the result of firearms.

Finally, the most recent wave of protests occurred in April 2021 and was labeled the National Strike. These protests were primarily against a tax reform promoted by the government. The protests were characterized by their levels of violence and destruction. In fact, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), between April 28 and July 31, reports attributed 63 deaths to the protests. To date, the UN has verified 46 deaths, of which 44 were civilians and two were police; 76% of victims died from gunshot wounds.

The Infiltration of the ELN

Colombian authorities have indicated that there is a high possibility that ELN militants infiltrated the protests to destabilize the country, attack members of the security forces, and cause damage to private and public property.

According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, the protests against police brutality in September 2020 were infiltrated by the ELN and other terrorist groups. The then Minister of Defense, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, stated that the acts of violence were systematic and aimed at destroying public property and citizen infrastructure dedicated towards security.

A few days after the Defense Ministry’s statements, the ELN acknowledged its participation in the protests against police brutality. Through a video on social networks, alias “Uriel,” an ELN leader, stated that the group sought to “put an end to the torture and death centers called CAI (Immediate Action Commandos) of the police”; also that the ELN’s urban militancy actively participates in protests and incites the use of homemade explosive devices.

ELN involvement in protests was also registered in the 2021 National Strike. In June 2021, ELN member alias “Fabian” was captured and storage devices were seized. The devices contained instructions from the ELN central command to inspire acts of vandalism, instructions to attack the police, and money transfer orders for individuals to attack security forces.

Eventually, the Colombian Ministry of Defense indicated that the ELN and FARC dissidents continue to act with the intention of financing violent and criminal activities, including vandalism and violence across Cali and Bogota. Also, reports indicate a potential presence of ELN members at the anti-government protests on July 20th, 2021.

Finally, in 2021 the Colombian National Police found evidence that the ELN had given protesters $70 million to organize attacks against the police and execute riots.

Urban Terrorism: A Challenge that Must be Addressed

The evidence that the ELN was involved in the protests in Colombia seems conclusive. Financing, infiltration of riots, incitement to cause destruction, and the distribution of propaganda are just some of the actions carried out by the ELN.

The ELN’s actions are of particular relevance as they demonstrate the existence of a challenge for the country’s authorities: urban terrorism that can be executed in Colombia’s main cities.

This modality of terrorism is particularly dangerous for the security of cities due to its characteristics. Urban terrorism can be carried out by a small number of people, its perpetrators can camouflage themselves among other demonstrators, it causes great damage to security forces for a low cost, and terrorists can use their propaganda to legitimize it because it occurs within citizen protests.

For this reason, it is necessary that Colombia, and other countries in the region with similar situations, strengthen their intelligence, terrorist identification, terrorist financing, and anti-riot capabilities to mitigate the risk posed by the presence of guerrillas and terrorist groups acting within citizen protests. State action must protect the lives of demonstrators, and public and private property, and avoid the deterioration of security conditions across the country.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

FARC

FARC Removed from Terrorist List – What’s Next for Colombia’s Peace Process?

On November 30th the United States announced plans to remove the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) from its list of foreign terrorist organizations. The decision to redesignate the terrorist status of the former guerrilla group follows the signing of a peace deal between the Colombian government and the FARC in 2016.  In a statement following the announcement, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the FARC “no longer exists as a unified organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or has the capability or intent to do so.”

Background

The FARC was founded in 1964 by a group of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in response to anti-communist repression across Colombia. The group waged a half-century war to overthrow the government, funding its operations through extortion, taxation, kidnappings, illegal mining, and the drug trade. At its height, the FARC counted 20,000 men and women under its command, controlled around 70% of Colombia’s coca crop, and generated well over 1 billion dollars in annual income.

The conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government represented the longest-running war in the western hemisphere, having cost the lives of over 220,000 people and displacing over five million civilians. After decades of meetings and negotiations, Colombia’s 2016 peace accord was signed. The deal was celebrated as one of the most all-encompassing peace agreements in modern history. The FARC agreed to demobilize, and the Colombian government promised to address poverty and inequality across the country’s rural regions.

Why is the FARC Being Removed from the Terrorist List?

The State Department’s decision to revoke the FARC’s terrorist designation comes five years into the deal’s 15-year time frame and represents the United States’ continued support for the country’s peace process. Whilst the move has been criticized by some U.S. politicians, including a number of senior Republicans, many Colombians have lauded it as a necessary step that will allow the United States to play a more central role in the country’s peace-building efforts.

Since the signing of the 2016 peace deal, 13,000 former FARC combatants have laid down their arms, and many of these former members now play crucial roles in the country’s peace process. Indeed, the FARC has been succeeded by a legal, registered political party, and many of the guerilla group’s former commanders now serve as prominent politicians. However, under the FARC’s designation as a foreign terrorist organization, U.S. officials were prohibited from meeting or working with former FARC militants and were unable to fund important peace-building programs, such as a formerly FARC-led campaign to destroy land mines across the country. Mr. Blinken’s statement said that delisting the FARC would allow the United States to “better support implementation of the 2016 accord, including by working with demobilized combatants.”

Preserving the Peace Process

The United States’ decision to redesignate the FARC comes at a pivotal point in the peace process. The Colombian government’s promise to tackle poverty in rural regions was at the heart of the peace accord, but experts are increasingly warning that these efforts are moving too slowly. As of 2020, just 4% of the deal’s rural reform measures are complete and security experts warn that the slow implementation of the promised reforms risk undermining the trust of rural communities and the return of armed conflict.

Colombia is already seeing a worrying surge in mass violence directed at rural communities. The government has been slow to seize control of the territory once held by the FARC, and a number of violent criminal organizations have moved in. The measures of the peace agreement, including the establishment of a national transitional justice court, threaten these groups’ illegal operations, and mass killings are increasingly used to let civilians know the high cost of supporting the deal.

Colombia’s peace process is at a precarious point. Five years have passed since the signing of the 2016 accord, but the peace remains delicate. The State Department’s decision to remove the FARC from its list of terrorist organizations will allow the U.S. to increase its support for the implementation of the 2016 deal by working alongside former members of the FARC and funding important peace-building programs across the country.

However, this alone will not be enough to secure the long-term success of the peace process. Colombia must accelerate the rollout of its rural development program. These promises were central to the peace deal, and failure to honor them will deeply damage the trust of rural communities, exacerbating the same frustrations that fueled the conflict for decades. Colombia must also work to protect communities from violent criminal organizations, providing rural Colombians the security to participate in a democratic society and supporting the efforts of the country’s transitional justice court.

The 2016 peace agreement gave Colombia the chance to move beyond its violent past, but its success is not yet guaranteed. The United States should continue to work with its Colombian partners to advance the cause of peace. The removal of the FARC from its terrorist list is an important step, but the U.S. must remain cognizant of the broader threats to the peace process. It should work with those in the government and those on the ground in rural Colombia to restore trust, promote economic development, and prevent the influx of armed criminal groups.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Otoniel

The Capture of Colombia’s Most Wanted Man Ignites a Series of Terrorist Attacks and Violence

Dairo Antonio Usuga, better known as Otoniel and the leader of one of Colombia’s most feared narco-terrorist organizations, was captured on October 23.  Otoniel is the head of the Clan del Golfo or the Gulf Clan, an armed terrorist and drug trafficking group that poses a serious threat to the Colombian State.

Colombian authorities captured Otoniel, however, his capture generated retaliation from the Gulf Clan against the Colombian security forces. In recent days, armed forces members have suffered terrorist attacks in revenge for Otoniel’s capture.  Additionally, this event will likely start a wave of violence between the factions of the organization as they seek to seize power.

BACKGROUND

The Gulf Clan is a drug trafficking organization that stems from the demobilization of paramilitary forces. They currently operate in areas such as the Gulf of Urabá and the departments of Antioquia and Chocó. It is estimated that the group currently has about 6,000 troops and is present in more than 211 municipalities throughout the Colombian territory. Their primary income comes from illicit drug trafficking and illegal mining.

The financial power of this organization has allowed them to increase military capabilities, expand into new territories, strengthen alliances with other criminal groups and grow their income. Today, the Gulf Clan presents one of the most significant barriers to the stability and security in many of Colombia’s territories.

Consequently, the strengthening of the Gulf Clan in recent years represents a rising threat to the Colombian State and the civilian population.  As a result, the Gulf Clan will continue its narco-terrorist activities until action is taken against them.  While Otoniel’s capture is a major blow to the organization, there is still much work to be done to defeat it.

OTONIEL’S CAPTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

After several months of tracking and intelligence, Otoniel was captured in Antioquia, a rural area in the municipality of Turbo. His capture created a power vacuum in the Gulf Clan, so it is to be expected that there will be internal disputes for control of the organization, mainly among its mid-level leaders.

However, the most worrying implications of Otoniel’s capture are the current retaliations his organization is taking against the Colombian military.  On October 26, army soldiers were attacked by members of the Gulf Clan in the department of Antioquia with explosives and gunfire. In the terrorist attack, three soldiers were killed and three others were wounded.

A few hours later, another military platoon was ambushed by the Clan, leaving one soldier dead and another wounded.

For this reason, it is feasible to affirm that retaliations against the Colombian armed forces will continue in the coming days. It is also highly likely that an increase in homicides and displaced persons will result from disputes within the organization’s factions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the demanding public order and security situation in Antioquia, which will likely escalate, in the short term it is recommended that the Colombian State deploy more troops in the area. This is necessary as greater territorial control is required, and operational results are needed to reduce regional violence.

On the other hand, in the medium and long term, more effective intervention strategies are needed against this narco-terrorist group due to the risk level it represents. From an operational and tactical perspective, it is necessary to attack its sources of financing, such as illicit crops, strengthen intelligence capabilities to anticipate terrorist attacks, and prevent this organization from forcibly recruiting young people from vulnerable populations.

Finally, in terms of public policy, it is necessary to improve the living conditions of the populations in areas such as the Urabá region of Antioquia.  This can be achieved through the generation of formal employment, the provision of public goods and services, and an improvement in the health and education systems. In other words, comprehensive state action is required to guarantee security, but also better living conditions, so risk factors, such as the emergence and strengthening of these groups, disappear or are considerably reduced.

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Rise to Peace