fbpx

Blog

This is where we share our experience
MENA
 by Vasileia Kioutsouki

The High Possibility of the Reemergence of the Islamic State

In light of the recent developments in both Iraq and Syria, it is quite understandable that the Middle East faces yet another enduring crisis. Current rhetoric and military actions highlight the fragile security situation and the possible scenario of the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Indeed, the resurgence of the Islamic State is now a likelier outcome and there is a twofold explanation for this. Firstly, the Turkish operation ‘Peace Spring’ against the Kurds in north-eastern Syria, together with the withdrawal of American troops from the region, complicates the operation against any remaining powers of the Islamic State. The Kurds, who had long combatted ISIL, are now preoccuptied by the Turkish military activities, thus leaving unattended many prisons where tens of thousands of IS suspects are held. There are already reports of hundreds of ISIL escapees and, even worse, there are fears that a mass break-out of ISIL members is being planned. Should this be the case, IS fighters will once again become a grave security threat.

Secondly, the death of General Qassem Soleimani disrupted regional security too. As a well-respected member of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and commander of the Quds Force, he was a key figure in Iran and central to the expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East. In addition, he played a pivotal role in the fight against the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which cost the lives of a large number of American soldiers. Nonetheless, although the Quds Force is a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization in the US, they have been especially effective in the fight against ISIL. Consequently, the US move to dispatch him, has certainly benefited the Islamic State, as he was their enermy.

In view of the above, without these credible rivals in their way, the Islamic State is faced with fewer obstacles to regain territory. A mass release of ISIL fighters from prisons and the drone strike on General Soleimani actually distract Iraqis’ attention from their political grievances, namely the corrupted government and the Iranian dominance in the country. The Iraqi people are now more concerned about a possible resurgence of the Islamic State rather than anything else. Despite their discontent due to the Iranian military presence in the country since 2014, they acknowledge the important contribution of Soleimani to ISIL’s defeat.

Moreover, Iran’s determination to take revenge for Soleimani’s death has raised serious concerns for the anti-ISIL coalition. In this sense, they halted operations against the remaining IS fighters in order to focus on protecting their troops and envoys based in Iraq; a decision which turned out to be correct as Iran has launched numerous ballistic missiles against US bases and the US embassy.

It goes without saying that such circumstances provide the breeding grounds needed for the Islamic State to re-emerge. Further, it must be acknowledged that the ever-increasing instability and discontent across the region, as well as the ongoing violence, were some of the underlying causes which motivated ISIL in the past. Therefore, there is little doubt that the Islamic State will again take advantage of the situation created in Iraq and Syria to rise once more, almost unimpeded.

In order to prevent this disastrous scenario from happening, policymakers must stop being distracted and losing direction. Although ISIL has suffered considerable losses in terms of fighters and territories, it has not been completely defeated yet. Consequently, instead of fighting each other, countries such as the US and regional actors, such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, must act together with the joint aim of combating ISIL and preventing their expansion again.

in MENA / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Suleyman Ozeren

Could Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani’s Death Open the Pandora’s Box in the Middle East?

A US drone strike near Baghdad airport killed the Commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qassem Soleimani and the Deputy Commander of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. This move — more important than the assassination of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi yet of similar significance to the dispatch of the former leader of al Qaeda Osama bin Laden —  is a clear sign that the United States raised its bid in ongoing Iran-US tensions. It will be a defining movement in the future of Middle Eastern affairs which could trigger other events in the region.

Escalating Tensions

The escalation of tensions between the United States and Iran had three critical breaking points in recent weeks: attacks by the PMF against US bases in Iraq and Syria, US air attacks against the PMF bases, and the showdown by Iran and the PMF in an attempted raid against the US Embassy in Baghdad. It was reminiscent of the 1979 US Embassy takeover in Tehran as these protesters attempted entry as well.

The international community was surprised by the Trump’s administration bold response to the escalating crisis in Iraq. Soleimani had been the commander of the Quds Force — an operational extension of the IRGC that has been responsible for the Iranian irregular warfare in the Middle East — therefore he was not a common general in the Iranian military.

Quds Force has been very active in training, equipping, and operationally supporting Iran’s proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen as well as bringing other proxy extensions from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Throughout the years, the Quds Force developed country-specific strategies to expand and deepen the Iranian sphere of influence in the Middle East. For instance, while Quds Force has been militarily active in Lebanon, Syria, or Iraq, their agents have recruited Turkish citizens in Turkey to target intellectuals, journalists, and Iranian opposition figures within the country.

Policy Shift and Regional Implications

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s recent statements regarding his efforts to build a common understanding against Iranian aggression followed by these developments are indicative of other measures and a major turning point from a passivist Middle East policy of the US.

This policy shift places substantial pressure on Qatar and Turkey; states with close relationships with Iran. The ‘either you are with us or against us’ paradigm would be enforced on these two countries and force others to make certain quick decisions about continuance of their relationships with Iran. Under such pressure, Qatar will most likely return to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) orbit, but Turkey’s choice would be more difficult given the depth of Iranian involvement in Turkey. Not only has Turkey deepened its relationship with Iran, but it openly targeted Saudi Arabia by aligning with both Iran and Qatar. Under US pressure, Ankara and Erdogan would make concessions with Saudi Arabia, and more importantly, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In this case, Erdogan’s position would be weaker though.

Soleimani had been one of the most critical individuals in Iran’s regional affairs. The other individuals killed in the strike represent the main goal of the US decision: a policy that targets Iran’s proxy operations in the entire region. Arrests of PMF leadership also indicate that targeting Soleimani is part of a larger operation to weaken Iranian affiliated groups in Iraq.

Whether these operations spur tensions or cause larger-scale military confrontations between the US and Iran remains to be seen. Iran managed to expand and deepen its footprint in Iraq and Syria where thousands of members of different proxy groups have been established over the years. Soleimani’s  death could have ramifications in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, or Yemen, but more importantly, it is a very critical threshold in the future of the Middle East.

American interests in the region, such as military bases in the Gulf states, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, as well as several embassies could be directly targeted by Iran or indirectly by its proxies in a more probable scenario. Key actors in the case of a military confrontation include Lebanese Hezbollah, PMF, and other groups who have been recruited from Afghanistan and even Pakistan.

Clearly, targeting Soleimani is an attempt by the US administration to show the Iranian regime that the US military could retaliate and undertake more serious initiatives against Tehran’s aggression. Nonetheless, in response, if Iran chooses to escalate the conflict, the entire region would be affected, and Israel could be one of the primary targets.

The Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure policy’ aimed to corner the regime in Iran so that Tehran makes concessions in regard to its nuclear ambitions. These recent incidents could be considered the peak of maximum pressure policy. In a way, such a policy is also being tested, and the outcome will be revealed in coming days or weeks.

Qassem Soleimani was a point man of the regime in Iran and Ali Khamenei. By targeting him the US administration has sent a very clear message to the regime and its proxies in the Middle which could open the Pandora’s box in the region.

in MENA / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Suleyman Ozeren

Was President Erdogan’s Visit to Washington D.C. a Success?

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Washington D.C. last week received stanch opposition not only from the Kurds and pro-democracy groups in the United States, but also both aisles of the political parties in the US Congress.

The meeting between President Trump and Erdogan included several points of tension between the United States and Turkey: Ankara’s purchase of the S400 missile defense system from Russia; their suspension from the F-35 fighter jet program, military incursion into northeastern Syria; a federal court case against Halkbank (the Turkish state-owned bank) and a Congressional sanctions bill including investigation into Erdogan’s family assets.

Erdogan has a special interest in the case against the state-owned bank due to alleged involvement of his inner circle in the scheme. Halkbank “was charged … in a six-count Indictment with fraud, money laundering, and sanctions offenses related to the bank’s participation in a multibillion-dollar scheme to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran.”

Another obvious important agenda item was the Turkish military incursion and its implications on the future of the Kurds in Syria, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the region in general.

For Turkey, any form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria is considered an existential threat. For the United States, however, the Kurds are reliable allies in the fight against ISIL and their situation became one of the contested issues between Washington D.C. and Ankara. Erdogan pressed the position that the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) are the same and the United States should not be aligned with the ‘terrorists’.

Further, during the press conference, he tried to discredit the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Ferhat Abdi (a.k.a. Mazlum Konabe). By discrediting him, Erdogan aimed to discredit the PYD (offshoot of the PKK). This move aligned with the objectives of the Turkish military incursion into northeastern Syria.

While Erdogan and Trump responded to questions from journalists, Erdogan explicitly criticized Trump and US officials for inviting Mazloum Kobane to the White House. Trump responded to Erdogan by stating “A lot of that is definition – what’s your definition of the various groups within the Kurds. You have various groups and some like them and some don’t.” He implicitly reaffirmed the US position that they consider the PYD very differently than the PKK.

In other words, Trump and the entire US administration have a consensus on the idea that the PYD is a legitimate actor and the sole representative of the Kurds in Syria. Mazloum Kobane and the PYD have now become more legitimate than ever in the eyes of the international community despite the objections of Erdogan and Turkey.

Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government push a narrative that was meant strictly for domestic consumption which created an opposite effect and elevated the PYD’s position. In fact, Turkey’s military incursion acted as catalyst for PYD’s legitimacy and popularity. Using the remnants of al Qaeda affiliated militants as Turkey’s proxies further damaged Turkey’s image in the international community. This had a detrimental effect because Turkish-backed forces have been accused of committing war crimes against civilians in northeastern Syria.

As discussed in my previous piece at Rise to Peace, the US withdrawal and the Turkish military incursion into northeastern Syria have already created turmoil that has taken its toll. According to the Pentagon’s Inspector General report “ISIS has exploited the Turkish incursion and subsequent drawdown of US troops from northeastern Syria to reconstitute its capabilities and resources both within Syria in the short term and globally in the longer term.”

The S400 crisis is another major issue which has overarching implications, including Turkey’s future in NATO and Western Alliance. The purchase of the S400 defense system represents a blueprint of a major shift in Turkey’s axis. Seeing that there has been no concrete response from the United States, rather than considering it as a concerning issue, Erdogan’s leadership started to use the S400 crisis as leverage and exploit it against the United States and the European allies.

However, Erdogan is walking a thin line between the United States and Russia. While he is trying to contain the tensions with the United States, he also does not want to galvanize Russia which could become very costly for him domestically and internationally.

In his most recent remarks, Erdogan downplayed tensions between the United States and Turkey. He reiterated Trump’s critical position and emphasized the importance of US-Turkey relations. For Erdogan, his visit aimed to focus on “the areas of cooperation instead of deepening the chronic problems.” He also reemphasized that Turkey would not take a step back from the S400 deal with the Russians.

So, has Erdogan gained anything from his visit to Washington D.C.? The answer is a soft yes because he did not aim for complete success anyway. Erdogan’s most important gain was to have facetime with President Trump at White House which he desperately needed. In fact, Erdogan’s entire strategy relies on President Trump’s continuing courtship.

Turkey claims that neither Russia nor the United States kept their promises and threatens to expand its area of operation in northeastern Syria. Such an attitude would again create the opposite effect which would bring Russia and the United States against Turkey. In any case, the worst scenario could be deepening instability in the region in which ISIL benefits.

As for the Kurds in Syria, Erdogan’s visit confirmed that US support is firm and will continue notwithstanding the strong objections from Turkey. While concerns over ISIL resurfacing in Iraq and Syria are rising, Turkey’s ability to maneuver and pressure the Kurds will weaken.

in MENA / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Iran
 by Harun Basli

Iran’s Approach to Turkey’s Military Operation in Northern Syria

Iran joined numerous countries that scrutinized Turkey’s military operation (Peace Spring) in northern Syria. The operation has been discussed and commented on not only by the Iranian authorities, but also by the Iranian press, social media, and even in Friday sermons.

Most of these assessments and comments indicate negative views against Turkey’s actions. The level of criticism has at times resulted in what could be considered as a serious insult against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Iran sought a policy focused on stability, such as the advocation of the continuation of the Assad regime. In this context, Iran provides various kinds of support, especially in the military field to Assad. Some high-level Revolutionary Guard Army officers lost their lives during the clashes in Syria, and large ceremonies were held in Iran to honor them. To summarize, Tehran aims to use its position in Syria as a deterrent against regional and international forces.

Statements by Iranian authorities, in particular, President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif, called on Turkey to end the operation as soon as possible. Emphasis on Syrian territorial integrity and that a viable political solution could only come through political negotiations was apparent.

Further, to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the events, Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani cancelled his official visit to Turkey on the day the operation began and the former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad postponed his trip to Istanbul for an event.

The conservative segment close to the Iranian religious leader used more severe expressions in their reaction to the operation. Farhikhtegan Newspaper —which is known for its close ties to Dr Ali Akbar Velayati; the international relations advisor of the Iranian religious leader Khamenei — used the title “Sultanism in the Service of Terrorism”.

The Tasnim News Agency predicted that the future of the operation would be similar to the situation of the Saudi military operation in Yemen. The Friday imams — representatives of the religious leader — also used similar language in their sermons, such as heavy criticism of Turkey, blaming Turkey of having Ottoman dreams and engaging in Mongolian-type aggression.

In the Iranian Parliament, many deputies made statements against the operation. Declarations stated that the operation was illegal and that it would further complicate the situation in Syria. However, some Azeri members of parliament expressed support for the operation. In these statements of support of Turkey, they claimed that the military operations were carried out in order to fight against terrorism.

Iranian artists have not kept their disagreement with the operation silent either. Their reactions mostly focus on the humanitarian dimension and serious allegations, such as genocide and alleged evidence of war crimes. Some Iranian singers cancelled performances in Turkey as a response to the Turkish operation in northeastern Syria.

Additionally, in some parts of Iran, civilians took some form of action. A demonstration held in front of the Embassy of Turkey in Tehran attracted a significant number of participants; even some that wrote anti-Turkey and Erdoğan slogans on walls. Other protests occurred in the cities of Senendec, Bane, Merivan, Chios and Mahabad in the west of Iran.

Such demonstrations do not occur very often and it should be noted that this expression against the Turkish military operation was permitted, or at least tolerated, by the government.

Social media revealed even broader —and often more extreme —reactions of Iranian citizens. Messages went so far as to claim that the military operation would be the downfall of Erdoğan and called for boycotts of Turkish products.

The position — or lack thereof —of the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards is an additional remarkable point to consider. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the religious leader, referred to as the rahbar (guide), and the Revolutionary Guards that act under him are significant actors in the determination of the state’s domestic and foreign policies. Therefore, it is interesting that neither the religious leader nor the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards who typically state their opinions on almost every subject, have not made any statements about the Turkish military operation so far.

This silence drew criticism from all segments of Iranian society, however this lack of public comment can be regarded as an opinion. It is important that in a country like Iran, where every action takes place under strict control by the government, at least the people were allowed to react.

Iran and Turkey —rivals throughout history — remain at odds over their respective interests in the Syrian crisis. Iran perceives Syria as the axis of resistance and it does not want to lose its interest in the territory, therefore it is of little surprise that the reaction of the Iranian public continued after the military operation concluded.

Despite the aforementioned points, the two nations attempt to follow a balanced policy towards each other due to their commercial and cultural relations. Iran currently experiences serious economic difficulties due to sanctions and it will want to maintain its influence in the Middle Eastern countries, especially Syria.

Harun Basli has a MSc. in Persian Language and Literature. He conducted important research on Turkey-Iran relations and Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East, as well as radicalization and violent extremism in the region. He worked as a consultant on security cooperation in Tehran and currently acts as a researcher at the Global Center for Security Studies.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of Rise to Peace.

in MENA / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Rise to Peace

A Profile of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Origins to His Final Days

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a United States’ orchestrated raid on October 26. The well educated and self-made man in many respects was also the world’s most sought-after terrorist due to his position as the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; an organization known for their brutality and cruelty.

Origins

He was born in 1971 as Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri and was nicknamed “the believer” as a child because of the time he spent at his local mosque as well as his dedication to reciting the Koran. In the 1990s, he moved to Baghdad and obtained a bachelor’s and master’s degree in Islamic studies, eventually going onto gain a Ph.D. at the University of Baghdad.

In 2003, the US led a large-scale intervention in Iraq and by then, Baghdadi steadily gained influence in the region as well. Baghdadi reportedly helped create a group that set out to attack US troops and their allies.

Then, in early 2004, Baghdadi was detained by US troops and placed in a detention center at Camp Bucca. The camp itself was considered to be a nesting ground for future violent criminals as they became radicalized and developed their networks and relationships, as well as curating their future plans of attacks while there.

Baghdadi left Camp Bucca early because he was deemed to be a low threat individual. He came to be linked to Al-Qaeda which eventually led to his involvement and succession in the Islamic State of Iraq in 2010. ISI continued to carry out their brutal and rebellious attacks, causing even more chaos in the region. The attacks were based on a very extreme view and interpretation of Islamic law. They targeted those who did not behave or practice Islam in the way the organization saw fit.

The ISIL Years

Over the past few years, ISIL and Baghdadi began to increase their power and domain over the region, but Baghdadi also became significantly less visible to the public eye. While ISIL has been linked to worldwide attacks and killed thousands, the US-led coalition slowly began to drive them out of their ruling territory, forcing them into regroup and move elsewhere.

Many believed Baghdadi was killed in an airstrike in the middle of 2017, but come that September via a snippet of audio, he was believed to be alive still.

He was alive and called for yet more brutality and violence in the region. Finally, earlier this year in April 2019, video of Baghdadi surfaced with him urging his followers to continue fighting and attacks. The information available as of now is that Baghdadi is in fact, dead. Confirmation is said to have come from DNA testing of his remains.

Understandably, confirmation of this sort of attack is desired by a great many people and governments around the world. As to the level of confidence, the US has remained in their stance and level of confidence that Baghdadi was in fact killed during the raid. Baghdadi’s remains are said to have been tested almost immediately giving way to an identification. On-site technicians who were with the US troops during the raid used DNA samples from Baghdadi along with pieces of his body that had been destroyed during a self-inflicted blast.

The Raid

The location of the chain of events was the village of Barisha near the Turkish border. It is said that Baghdadi had been under surveillance for at least the last couple of weeks, with perhaps even former disgruntled employees and wives of his sharing information with authorities after being arrested.

States with armed forces deployed in the region were reportedly given advance notification of the impending raid by the Delta Force, an elite special operations team. Multiple aircraft such as helicopters were used as the special forces team made their short journey from Iraq to the site of the raid. Once on the ground, a short gun battle broke out while the US helicopters fired missiles at the two houses on the site. One house was completely flattened.

The US team, once on the ground, called out to Baghdadi to surrender himself but only two adults and 11 children are said to have emerged from the compound. During this, Baghdadi tried to escape into a tunnel network on the property, but the US kept firing, crumbling walls and doors all around. Baghdadi was in the tunnel when he presumably realized he could no longer hold out or escape, spurring him to detonate his suicide vest bomb. The explosion from the vest killed him as well as three of his children he had brought with him into the tunnel.

There were also other causalities, two of such were women believed to be his wives, but their bodies were left behind as they were deemed too risky to move out of the belief, they too were wearing explosive vests. According to the White House, five enemy combatants were killed inside the compound along with others outside. No US troops were injured with exception of light superficial wounds. Additionally, one of the US military dogs is said to have been seriously injured but left the raid when troops retreated and the mission as over. As or right now, the dog is doing well and back in service.

The End… Or Is It?

Baghdadi is said to have been in Idlib in an attempt to rebuild IS there since much of their territory had been lost in recent years. The likely response to the death of Baghdadi on part of ISIL is to name a successor for the group. Furthermore, revenge-seeking individuals and anger-fueled attacks brought on by his supporters are likely to occur in the aftermath.

in MENA / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
baghdadi ISIL
 by Rise to Peace

Death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Consequences and the Future of the Islamic State?

On October 26, United States special forces conducted a raid in Barisha, in northwestern Syria, that concluded with the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Fear of capture made him detonate a suicide vest while being pursued in a tunnel. According to US officials, the death of ISIL’s former Caliph is the result of five intense months of investigation by intelligence services.

Therefore, there is no doubt that Baghdadi’s last video in April – five years after his last appearance – may have been the catalyst towards his death. Coincidence or not, thirteen years ago, US strikes that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, happened just one month after he appeared in a video in May 2006.

Baghdadi’s death is a turning point and marks the end of ISIL as experienced by the international community. After having lost most of its territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIL has now lost the last link of its so-called Caliphate originally founded by Zarqawi during the US intervention of Iraq.

The short-term success of this unique ideological position could only function through the destruction of communities and the killing of countless lives. However, ISIL under Baghdadi’s authority will always be remembered as the terrorist group that first used new technologies to achieve its goals: drones, propaganda videos worthy of Hollywood movies, and use of the Internet to recruit many foreign fighters.

Despite the lack of information about his real role and powers within ISIL, killing al-Baghdadi still remains truly symbolic as he was the public face and voice of the most pro-active contemporary terrorist organization.

Terrorist attacks across the Middle East and in Europe, heinous crimes such as executions of journalists, aid workers, and a Jordanian pilot, and broadcasting decapitations of civilians were all results of his preaching. He was also the link and the best interlocutor with other affiliate groups throughout this region.

ISIL will experience a period of uncertainty in the short term. Indeed, due to the qualifications of the former, the Islamic State cannot afford to have a leader known solely as a fighter, but a combination of war experience and religious knowledge is a must.

Moreover, the new leader will have to be well known and respected, otherwise, some groups’ leaders may not pledge allegiance. For example, Aboubakar Shekau, leader of Boko Haram in Nigeria, could negotiate strongly his allegiance to the new Caliph.

De facto, this could result in a dispersion of different ISIL branches and a lack of coordination between them. However, ready-made biographies with family trees and organizational charts were found on a number of ISIL leaders who were killed. This is a sign that the Caliphate may have prepared a scenario for the future.

Nevertheless, the death of the former Caliph does not mean the end of ISIL. The terrorist group is now a “brand” and will persist in Iraq and Syria as an insurgency and a franchise in many parts of the world.

Franchises are to be found in Yemen, Libya, West Africa and in Afghanistan. These countries represent a big threat because they possess multiples factors (political, criminal and terrorist) that helped ISIL rise in the first place. This is besides the ongoing threat of the return of foreign terrorist fighters in Europe. It still remains the biggest challenge for intelligence services.

In a short-term vision and from a counter-terrorism perspective, it is always good news that al-Baghdadi has been neutralized. But for occidental governments, they need to be prepared for the next step, as they fear vengeance and revenge from radicalized people within their home countries.

They could be willing to follow orders from al-Baghdadi’s last video in which he stressed the importance of spreading terror worldwide at all costs.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was not as infamous as Osama bin-Laden, but the aftermath of his death is undetermined. It could, however, produce graver consequences.

in MENA / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
ISIL
 by Suleyman Ozeren

Decapitation of the Leader of ISIL and Its Potential Implication?

In a successful operation on October 26, United States special forces killed Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) in Idlib, northwestern Syria. What could be the implications of this very critical operation for the actors in the conflict and the impact on ISIL itself?

From a strategic perspective, this operation could be a sample of the model that the US applies to Syria in the coming years. The United States coordinated the operation with the parties in the conflict, including Russia, Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Syrian Kurds. Given Russia’s dominant role in Idlib, the Assad regime’s presence and Turkey’s control over the northern Idlib, the United States notified them about the US military presence in the area.

The US military launched the operation from Erbil in the Kurdistan Regional Government. Although the Incirlik military base in Turkey is closer to Idlib (around 100 miles) than Erbil in northern Iraq (more than 400 miles), the US military chose Erbil over Incirlik which indicates the United States’ distrust of Turkey given Turkey’s long-time involvement with al Qaeda and ISIL affiliates.

According to President Trump, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were involved in the operation by providing intelligence. Although Turkey has been trying to push the United States against the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), it seems that Turkey’s move has not proved successful at all. On the contrary, SDF and the Syrian Kurds will continue to stay as partners of the United States. In short, although the US military pulled out of northeastern Syria, it will continue to be actively involved in the country.

As for the impact on the group, of course, the operation could trigger a chain of events that could affect ISIL in several ways. Because the group emerged in Iraq as the Islamic State in Iraq and then became ISIL under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s leadership, his death would be a devastating blow for its members. However, given the decision-making structure of ISIL, they could survive this.

Decapitation or targeted killing of a leader of a terrorist organization is considered an effective counterterrorism tactic in the short term. On the one hand, as a short-term effect, it could disrupt activities of the group, create panic and mayhem among the members, resulting in intra-group conflict.

On the other, it could mobilize group members toward more actions and pursuing new attacks against their targets. When the target is a highly charismatic leader, then this could act as a catalyst for future attacks. In fact, research showed that the decapitation of leaders of ISIL may not lead to the intended results unless other steps are taken.

Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was not the founder of ISIL and had not been as charismatic as Osama bin Laden, the founding leader of al Qaeda, nevertheless, he has been the most important figure in the organization. Since the founding leader of IS — then it was al Qaeda in Iraq — Abu Musab al Zarqawi was killed in 2006, ISIL transformed itself into a hybrid organization under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s leadership between 2010 and 2016.

Unlike his three predecessors, under al Baghdadi’s leadership, ISIL’s impact on the region exceeded the boundaries of Iraq. ISIL became the leading terrorist group that created its so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria and attracted thousands of foreign fighters from more than 100 countries.

However, given the continuing decline, loss of territory and recruitment, his death may not create significant repercussions among current membership. But, the fact that he detonated a suicide vest and killed himself could be seen as a sacred sacrifice by other ISIL followers in the region and around the world, which might act as a catalyst for future attacks.

In Syria, between 2013 and 2015, ISIL had been the focal point for those who wanted to join the ‘jihad’ in Syria. Now a reverse trend might be seen in which ISIL members could leave the group and join other local groups in Syria.

According to some sources, al Baghdadi nominated Abdullah Qardash as his successor in August, but his death could lead some members to leave the group and trigger fragmentation within the group, especially if the leadership position is not filled soon. Because of the nature — what I describe as — of the transitivity character of these members, it would not be a surprise to see some of these members joining in the ranks of the al Qaeda affiliated groups in Syria.

Localized ISIL affiliates could take further steps to fill the vacuum and emerge as the dominant group. However, this will all depend on the territory where they are active. For example, IS in Khorasan Province could become the more prominent group within IS.

Successful targeted killings could provide states with the window of opportunity to inflict further damage against organizations like ISIL operationally. But more importantly, such developments could also enable governments and other concerned parties to spend more time and energy on prevention and de-radicalization efforts, reaching out other countries to strengthen cooperation and collaboration to tackle the underlying causes that terrorist organizations have been exploiting.

Regardless, from a counterterrorism perspective, the death of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is a success. While it is critical, the true definition of success in counterterrorism is not just about the decapitation of the leadership.

Like the previous examples, including al Zarqawi and Abu Omar al Baghdadi, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi will be succeeded by another leader. The real challenge is to come up with policies, strategies, and tactics that address the underlying causes, terrorist organizations exploit.

in MENA / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Turkey
 by Zaina Dkaidek

Turkey’s Offensive in Syria Risks the Region’s Stability

For some time, President Trump sought an opportunity to withdraw United States troops from northeastern Syria. He considers regional security issues to be the responsibility of local actors, and thus no longer saw any purpose to remain after the defeat of Daesh.

Trump began the extraction of an estimated 100 to 150 military personnel from the 1,000 US troops stationed in the area despite the perception that this decision could leave the region vulnerable.

The withdrawal of troops provides a little motive for the US to continue its alliance with the People’s Protection Units (YPG). These Syrian Kurdish Forces —along with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — have been instrumental in the fight against Daesh. With the US abandoning them, it gave Turkey the green light to enter Syria.

Why is Turkey moving into Syria?

Only days after President Trump ordered the retreat, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan commenced a ground offensive. The intent of the operation is to clear the Kurdish militias holding the territory in northern Syria. Erdogan planned this action for the last two years, with the end goal of a designated “safe zone” to house at least 2 of the 3.6 million Syrian refugees living on Turkish soil.

Nonetheless, the Kurds explain that Turkey’s actions are risking all the gains made against Daesh. For example, the Kurdish forces have thousands of Daesh prisoners, including fighters and their families, under their control. If a conflict occurs, it is unclear if they will have to withdraw to battle the Turkish forces. The prisoners could escape, and liberated cities could fall back to Daesh.

syriamap - Turkey’s Offensive in Syria Risks the Region’s Stability

The green area on the map is the “safe zone” that Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is attempting to create.

What does this mean for the region’s stability?

Trump’s decision and Turkey’s subsequent assault could result in dire consequences to regional stability. The reemergence of Daesh remains a significant security threat in the wake of this offensive. As SDF deploys forces into northern Syria to battle Turkey, this will leave other parts of the country vulnerable. In recent months, there have already been instances of erratic attacks from the Daesh prison cells as well as tensions rising between the SDF and local Arab tribes.

According to the SDF, there are over 12,000 suspected Daesh members housed across seven prisons, with at the very least 4,000 of them being foreign nationals. These prisons are scattered across the country, but at least two camps — Roj and Ain Issa — are located inside the “safe zone.”

According to the White House, these camps will become Turkey’s responsibility; however, chances of a smooth handover from Kurdish forces to Turkey are unlikely. This situation could potentially lead to hundreds of escapes of alleged Daesh fighters and sympathizers.

Another possibility is an increase of Russian influence in the region, and consequently, the consolidation of the Assad regime. The United States will renounce an essential aspect of its sway in Syria without receiving any concessions in return from the government. Therefore, Russia will be able to extend its influence over Syria’s future.

It is likely that the Kremlin will forge a closer relationship with the SDF, as they search for new allies during the conflict. Damascus could spread its jurisdiction over Syria’s territory and potentially increase control over the country’s oil fields as well as other crucial economic resources.

Finally, the humanitarian aspect of the Turkish operation will likely be catastrophic. The United Nations claims that many of the 758,000 residents along the Syrian border were displaced at least once from conflict. Further action from Turkey could only exacerbate the situation.

It can cause civilians to seek refuge in Arab-majority areas south of the border, or in Iraq, which is currently undergoing violent protests throughout the nation. Also, Erdogan’s plan to relocate over a million Syrian refugees to the “safe zone” could cause further instability by dramatically changing the ethnic composition of the region.

Overall, the decision to withdraw troops from northern Syria based on an erroneous assumption that the Islamic State has been wholly eradicated may only fuel the group’s resurgence. There are already signs of Daesh regrouping, with no changes to its ideology, and with most of its operating structure intact. Therefore, US troops leaving the region will only lead to them reemerging as a threat.

For this reason, Group of Seven (G7) countries must attempt to shift Erdogan’s advances through economic means or political pressure to avoid further instability in the region. Also, for the US to continue to have reliable allies along with some influence over the Middle East, they must not abandon the YPG by withdrawing all troops from northern Syria.

in MENA / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Rise to Peace

Drones: Weapons of Terror?

Yemen’s Houthi rebels have taken responsibility of the drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil sites in Abqaiq and Khurais. These strikes have escalated tensions in the Middle East. Sources report that 5 million barrels a day of crude oil production were impacted; this impacted the half of Saudi’s output or 5% of the world’s output.

The Houthis claimed that the attacks were in retaliation of the years of airstrikes on its citizens and they will continue to expand their targets. They carried out the attacks via 10 drones. The claims of the Houthis have been challenged by the US, which continues to state that Iran orchestrated the attacks. Iran has vehemently denied involvement and warned the United States it would retaliate “immediately” if targeted over the attacks.

This is not the first instance of the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)/drone technology by extremist groups. ISIL has made the most of advances in the field of drone technology. While organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham have their own drone programs, it took these groups a considerable time to apply the drone technology in conflict situations. Compared to the slow adoption by other groups, the Islamic State adopted drone technology exponentially. This can be partly attributed to the development, availability, and commercialization of the technology. The application by ISIL involves a modification of the existing drone’s design or even constructing them from scratch once the basic blueprint from the commercialized drones is available.

ISIL’s first use of drones was for reconnaissance purposes. By September and October 2016, they had managed to weaponize the drones by attaching explosives and releasing them on the intended target. The first recorded incident was in October 2016 when two Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers were killed, and two French special forces soldiers were injured after a drone they were inspecting exploded.

A 2017 report provides detailed insight into the ISIL drone program, identified separate centers for training, weaponization, modification, and maintenance, as well as the existence of a center for storage and distribution. Owing to ISIL’s sophistication, each of these centers, based in Raqqa, also had their own separate command structure.

The Taliban has also used the drones in recent years. Much like other groups in the region, the use of drones has been mostly for surveillance, there not many reports of the Taliban using weaponized drones against its opposers. In October 2016, they released drone footage showing a suicide bomber driving a Humvee into a police base in Helmand province, the largest province in Afghanistan.

In the latest reports, Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan have been using unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor US troops, and their coalition partners in Afghanistan, Air Force Research Laboratory official Tom Lockhart revealed.

Outside the Middle East and Central Asia, drones have also been used in Central America. In August 2018 Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro said he escaped an “assassination” attempt that used an explosive-laden drone after a live broadcast showed him being escorted away by his security personnel when a bang went off during a Caracas military parade. His government said seven soldiers were wounded in the incident.

The easy access, affordability of drones, and the modifications they can undergo, make them a tricky technology to tackle. While it is the militarized drones grab headlines, the real value of UAVs lays in surveillance, according to Paul Scharre, a senior fellow and director of the technology and national security program at Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Small, cheap drones can stay in the air for a considerable amount of time. The military drones are used to get a better view of the battlefield and gain a tactical edge on opponents. That is true for extremist groups as we saw in the example of the Taliban.

Militarized drones, the kind probably available to groups such as the Houthis, are heavier and can carry several pounds of explosives at speeds up to 160km/h with a range of 650km. They have an immense tactical advantage as most can fly lower than current technology is capable of detecting, which was the case for the drone strike at the oil sites.

Countering drone attacks may lie in jamming the communication links that allow them to operate.  Drones generally rely on a GPS or radio link to a human controller, which can be blocked or hijacked. This seems like a good strategy for a conflict zone, but jamming communications in a typical civilian setting, like at an airport, can have more devastating consequences.

Whether the responsibility for the attacks lies with the Houthis or Iran, the attack on Saudi oil sites has demonstrated the difference in the adaptability of the drone technology and the lack of a fitting defensive technology.

Image Credit: Forbes

in MENA / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Carola Angelino

19th Edition of the World Summit on Counter Terrorism in Israel

The 19th edition of the World Summit on Counter-Terrorism was held from 9th to 12th September 2019 in Herzliya, a small maritime city just north of Tel Aviv, Israel.

I had the pleasure to live this unique opportunity, which gathers distinguished professionals working in the field of counter-terrorism under one roof, to facilitate the chance to exchange views and ideas on this very pertinent topic. The first two days of the Counter-Terrorism Summit are reserved for plenary sessions where members of the academia and policymakers set the scene for the Summit and illustrate how the issue is being dealt around the world.

During the 19th edition of the Summit, among the variety of aspects discussed, the growing issue of cyber terrorism, one which has become of very high concern in current times for many Western governments such as the United States, especially in terms of online radicalization.

In today’s times, many terrorist recruiters have moved to social media platforms (exactly the ones we use daily e.g. Telegram or Twitter) to target vulnerable subjects and attract them to join extremist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). For this reason, platforms such as Facebook have recruited over three hundred people to ensure that terrorist content of all kind does not appear on their platforms.

On the second day, the most remarkable and touching event took place as part of the Memorial for the victims of the 9/11 attacks. American Congressmen, Military Personnel and Secretaries of States and all the attendees joined in a minute of silence for the victims followed by both the American and Israeli anthems.  This was an emotional moment where everybody put aside their personal identities to join a unique battle, winning over terrorism worldwide.

The third day marked the start of multiple workshops at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya. Here, numerous topics related to various aspects of terrorism and counter-terrorism were discussed and recommendations were put forth by professionals, research fellows and members of the academia on ways to deal with this worldwide security threat.

Radicalization is among the most compelling issues, stressing the need for more policies able to detect subjects undertaking processes of radicalization. During the workshops, there was a repeated assertion regarding the need to control websites and social media platforms to identify extremist content and push it away from the access of youngsters and vulnerable subjects, a way of countering radicalization by denying terrorist the platform to access their audience.

The last day saw an interesting session on returning foreign terrorist fighters, an issue that demands more focus than it currently gets. However, it should not surprise how this phenomenon involves a variety of different aspects: from fueling the risks of radicalization to questions related to their integration in the society, but the most critical concern in this entire scheme of things is regarding children and women as foreign terrorist fighters often return with their families.

During the discussion, it was highlighted that besides the traumatic experience lived by the children, significant attention needs to be given to the role women have begun adopting over the past few years

During the discussion, it was highlighted that besides the traumatic experience lived by the children, significant attention needs to be given to the role women have begun adopting over the past few years. In this regard, Miss Devorah Margolin provided a thorough explanation on how the role of women has shifted from “staying at home” as wives of the fighters to “fighting on the field”, thus falling into the radar of many extremist organizations. Under these circumstances, it is crucial to remember that women have always been seen part of any conflict, though this role was previously limited to the domestic environment, with women being mothers and wives of the soldiers, but also nurses taking care of the casualties in a conflict.

The closing keynote address of the Summit highlighted on how the Islamic State might have been defeated geographically, but the challenge now is to remove its remaining signs around the world, as remnants of the group are still operating in the Middle East and some other parts of the world.

Finally, the Summit drew the attention to other emerging extremist organizations that are expanding their activities and gaining power in Africa and Lebanon, including Hezbollah and Boko Haram.

The stunning memento of this Summit is definitely the presence of a large number of people from different backgrounds, who gathered together with a sole goal of winning the global fight against terrorism.

Everybody can do something about terrorism, even a single word can help millions of people and we shall not forget this.

Not only is the Summit an opportunity to keep updated on counter-terrorism measures being applied around the world, but also the presence of students, professionals, policymakers or retired fellows suggests that counter-terrorism is not only a job but a mission to share among countries and regions of the world.

Everybody can do something about terrorism, even a single word can help millions of people and we shall not forget this.

in MENA / Rise to Peace blog / women-in-extremism 0 comments
Rise to Peace