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Afghanistan
Current Afghan peace talks taking place in Moscow, Russia.
 by Ahmad Mohibi

What To Expect From The Moscow Peace Conference On Afghanistan

The Moscow conference peace talks are being attended by the Troika group, which includes; Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, and the United States. And it may provide a preview for what could take place in Istanbul. The current Moscow summit and the upcoming conference in Turkey are the result of the ongoing stalemate in the Doha peace talks that began last September. 

The upcoming Turkey peace conference has the potential to determine the future of the Afghanistan peace process. The conference signifies a collective and international interest in creating a peaceful Afghan nation. The head of the High Council for National Reconciliation, Abdullah Abdullah seems to regard the Moscow conference in this way. Abdulla’s office has gone on to state that “We strongly believe that the Moscow conference will boost the Doha peace talks, and the upcoming Turkey conference on Afghanistan”. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the aim of the Moscow conference is to help move forward the peace talks in Doha. 

The Bonn Agreement

In order to understand the potential future Afghanistan peace agreement, we can look to previous agreements like the Bonn Agreement. The proposals established by the Bonn Agreement can give us a clue as to what we can expect from current discussions. It resulted in the creation of an interim government which was the foundation for a new constitution and political system. Otherwise known as the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (S/2001/1154), the Bonn Agreement sought to build lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan.

What is important to note is that the creation of the interim government was left to the decision of the Afghan people, through the creation of an emergency Loya Jirga, and not by international actors.  The expectation of an interim government was for a new constitutional government to emerge and for key institutions to reemerge. The Agreement also proposed the creation of a Human Rights Commission as well as equal representation of women, ethnic, and religious groups.

International Influence During Peace Talks

For example, Russia supports the creation of an interim government and the inclusion of the Taliban. According to the statement given by the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova “the formation of an interim inclusive administration would need a logical solution to the problem of integrating the Taliban into the peaceful political life in Afghanistan”.

On the other hand, the current Afghan government is not in agreement with the dissolution of the current administration. Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan’s President, has gone on to say that: “if the Taliban are ready for elections tomorrow, we are also ready to participate in the elections, but I am not ready to transfer the power to my successor without elections”. 

Ghani has stated that he does not want a future peace settlement to be made outside of Afghanistan. Secretary of Defence Antony Blinken’s recent letter outlines the Biden administration’s expectations for the Afghan peace process. Even though the main political actors involved in the Afghan peace process may have differing views on certain issues, they all have one thing in common: they want to create a peaceful Afghan nation. The question is how that peace will look like and how it will manifest. After all, the Bonn agreement did not turn out like the participants expected. 

What Does This Mean For The Future Agreement?

Two important elements to consider are first, what a future peace agreement may mean for Afghanistan’s administration? And second, what role the players involved in the peace process will place in the event of a peace agreement? Furthermore, will peace talks result in an interim government? And will the current Afghan administration be willing to give up their power? The Taliban’s involvement in Afghanistan’s future peace agreement is critical to both its inception and its success. The impact of these separate groups will also affect the peace agreement’s nature. It will affect whether the new administration will follow a secular route or become an Islamic Republic.

Inclusion will also be paramount to the success of the Afghan peace agreement. The equal participation of women, ethnic, and religious groups is as important as the creation of a new political system. This is also true for the reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan society and its potential future political system. It is crucial that peace talks continue to finally end the violence being perpetuated by the Taliban. These conferences and peace talks may allow the international community to come to an inclusive and successful peace agreement. The most important thing is to continue to build on the momentum that is currently taking place. 

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 by Ahmad Mohibi

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad Visits Kabul For Afghan Peace Talks

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, has left Washington DC for a trip to Kabul. His trip aims to resolve the stalemate on the Afghan Peace Process and resume the discussion with the afghan technocrats, the afghan warlords, the Mujaheddin and the Taliban representatives. 

The trip comes just a few days after the anniversary of the Afghan Peace Process, which in the last year has experienced some back and forth. Many factors have affected the process including, a lack of interest from the Taliban in the process overall, a domestic rivalry to the government, and the call from the opposition parties for the current government to be dissolved and replaced by an interim government. All of these factors have posed challenges with compliance to the Afghan Peace Process. 

Amid the looming deadline for the US troops to withdraw from the area, the US government has organised this trip intending to create the conditions necessary not to leave Afghanistan in chaos as it has happened with the cessation of Soviet foreign aid in 1991. All due to the concerns about the increasing violence, the uncertainty, and the stalemate between the negotiation parties.

In fact, as the US State Department has announced, the aim of Khalilzad’s trip was to resume the discussions with all parties in order to achieve “a just and durable political settlement and permanent and comprehensive cease-fire.”

The result of the trip was the request from the US envoy for an UN-hosted conference on Afghanistan in order to have a regional and international debate on the establishment of peace in the area. Eleven major international conferences concerning Afghanistan have already taken place since the insurgence of instability in the area, with the last one held in November 2020 in Geneva and the first being the one held in Bonn in 2001. 

The Bonn conference took place with the aim of re-creating the State of Afghanistan and defining a plan for governing the country following the U.S. invasion in response to 9/11 terrorist attacks. The agreement sought to establish a government with a strong, centralised power, a new constitution and an independent judiciary. But also to hold free and fair elections, a centralised security sector, and the protection of rights of women and also minorities, such as religious and ethnic groups. 

One common critique on the Bonn conference is the exclusion of the Taliban from the negotiations, to which Brahimi refers as Bonn’s “original sin,”. The next conference would be a Bonn-style meeting, where to discuss at the international level the prospect of a participatory government, but that this time it would include the Taliban in the debate. 

As Shahzada Massoud, a close aide to former president Hamid Karzai, has said: “A grand international conference that will be similar to the Bonn Conference will be held, in which the Taliban and the republic side will participate at the leadership level. At the same time, the international community, including the United States and the regional countries, will reach a political agreement that will take its legitimacy from the international community,”.

The strength of setting up international conferences lies in the ability to involve international actors and regional actors, like Pakistan and Iran. The conference lays the groundwork for multilateral discussions and negotiations between parties, encouraging Afghanistan’s neighbours and international actors to support the end of violence and to create stability in the area. The involvement of international and regional actors is pivotal for the creation of peace in Afghanistan. Pressure from the US on the Taliban to cease violence and on state response to terrorism, as well as Pakistan cooperation, are determinants of the future of Afghanistan. 

 

 

Photo Credit: Afghan foreign ministry

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 by Arman Sidhu

What Is Next for Afghanistan’s Sikhs and Hindus?

Before it earned its moniker as the ‘Graveyard of Empires’, the Durrani Empire of Afghanistan ceded a significant amount of its territory to the neighboring Sikh Empire throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries, an event remembered today for being the last successful foreign invasion of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the gains made by the Sikh Empire would prove short-lived, following their defeat at the hands of the British East India Company, which would go on to consolidate similar empires scattered across the Indian subcontinent.

Beyond its relevance to Afghan history, the legacy of the Afghan-Sikh Wars, and the colonial period that followed, helps explain the presence of both Sikhs and Hindus in Afghanistan today. The country’s strategic location as a trading hub, its independence from colonial powers, and its secularist orientation, encouraged hundreds of thousands of Sikhs and Hindus to emigrate from British India to bustling commercial hubs like Kabul, Jalalabad, Ghazni, and Kandahar. Though most Sikh and Hindu arrivals worked as merchants, these families would go on to lay multi-generational roots, taking citizenship and serving in the civil service, the armed forces, and even in political positions as advisors to the Afghan monarchy.

Yet, like most Afghans, the prospects for Sikhs and Hindus swiftly changed amid the deposition of King Zahir Shah in 1973, and the Communist-led Saur Revolution against Mohammed Daoud Khan in 1979. The insecurity that ensued would have a remarkable and disproportionate impact on Afghanistan’s religious minorities, with informal censuses suggesting the Sikh and Hindu population went from over 700,000 in the 1970s to just 15,000 in the first years of Mujahideen rule in the early 1990s. Since then, decades of instability and religious persecution have exacerbated the exodus of Afghan Hindus and Sikhs, leaving their combined population with under 1,500 members today.

The setbacks incurred by the Afghan Sikh and Hindu communities has encouraged them to cluster geographically, lobby collectively, and even share places of worship. For those that remain, the present obstacles to integration have seldom been greater than under the incumbent Afghan republic. During the brief rule of the Taliban, Sikhs and Hindus were considered a tolerated minority, albeit with the expectation of paying the jizya tax for non-Muslims. But the American invasion and the subsequent installation of the Afghan republic saw a sizable spike in the reported grievances of Hindus and Sikhs. These grievances include targeted attacks, asset seizures, and systemic discrimination by the Afghan state and society.

From the security side, the proliferation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which has successfully recruited fighters from hardline elements of the Taliban, has targeted Sikhs and Hindus on multiple occasions over the past 3 years. These incidents include a 2018 suicide bombing that targeted a Sikh and Hindu neighborhood in Jalalabad, and last year’s deadly massacre of Sikh worshipers at a gurdwara (Sikh temple) in Kabul, both attacks were claimed by ISIL.

In addition to the incessant security threat posed by non-state armed groups, the woes of the Afghan Sikh and Hindu communities are acutely felt in day-to-day life. Reports of seized assets, including businesses and property, have largely gone unanswered despite persistent calls for an inquiry into the matter. Sikhs and Hindus have also reported discrimination in obtaining and using government services, including in judicial recourse, and even in sending their children to government-run schools, where they face chronic taunting and bullying. Finally, endemic religious persecution has nott abated much since the fall of the Taliban, with the major sticking point revolving around cremation practices, which are considered standard in the Sikh and Hindu faiths, but heretical to Islamic beliefs.

Such conditions have forced Hindus and Sikhs to insulate themselves, by establishing their own schools, and using temples to house those who have been forces to forfeit their property. The Afghan government’s efforts to redress these grievances has done little to dissuade the community from leaving. A presidential decree reserving one seat in the Wolesi Jirga to represent the Sikh/Hindu community was finally passed by President Ashraf Ghani, after similar measures floundered under his predecessor Hamid Karzai.

But with its members still fleeing in droves, parliamentary representation is unlikely to alleviate the impediments to religious freedom and protection of property. One longstanding demand from Afghan Sikh and Hindu refugees in India has focused on their path to citizenship. Known as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), the legislation crafts a fast-track route for minority religious groups who emigrated from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh before 2015. Though controversial for leaving out Muslims from its criteria, the CAA was well-received by Afghan Sikhs and Hindus and even supplemented with additional Indian initiatives to extend visas to those still residing in Afghanistan. A similar resolution was floated in the United States House of Representatives last year, and aimed to resettle some Afghan Sikhs and Hindus in the US, describing the groups as ‘endangered minorities.’

In the absence of formidable protections of minority religious groups from the current or a future Afghan government, the barriers faced by Afghan Sikhs and Hindus are likely to endure and encourage more to permanently leave, despite familial ties and the strength of their Afghan-influenced culture and identity. Like the Buddhists, Zoroastrians, and Jains that preceded them, the rich history of Sikh and Hindu contributions to Afghan society is all but certain to only be visible in books and museums within the next decade.

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 by Arman Sidhu

What Does Future Trade Look Like in Light of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement?

Following several months of talks between trade representative from Pakistan and Afghanistan, the two countries appear poised to finalize a preferential trade agreement (PTA) by the end of January, just one month before the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) is set to expire. Previous discussions have struggled to resolve numerous trade-related concerns raised by both sides, leading to a sharp decline in bilateral trade between the two countries last year.

Trade remains one of the more complex aspects of the relationship between Islamabad and Kabul. Complaints of extortion by government officials, customs obstacles, and insecurity has culminated in frequent border closures, compelling both sides to seek costlier alternative transit routes and ink multilateral trade deals that exclude one another.

For Pakistan, the opportunity to cultivate strong trade linkages with Afghanistan has little to do with access to the Afghan market. Instead, Pakistan views Afghanistan as a gateway to the more lucrative markets found in China and Central Asia. Having borrowed billions to improve its own transport infrastructure, Pakistan’s economic success is contingent on directing the flow of goods to its maritime ports, particularly the port of Gwadar. As the flagship project of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the port of Gwadar is particularly useful to landlocked Central Asian states like Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, each of whom have seen their South Asian trade aspirations hindered by over 40 years of instability in Afghanistan, which remains the critical bottleneck in linking South and Central Asian supply chains.

Though it has spearheaded a near 26-year old attempt to circumvent Afghanistan via the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA), Pakistan still remains Afghanistan’s primary trading partner, accounting for over 40% of all Afghan exports. Furthermore, Pakistan’s motives in maintaining a stable relationship with the Afghan government stems from its stake in the outcome of ongoing intra-Afghan dialogue. Given the strong possibility of the Taliban converting into a recognized political party in a potential peace deal, Pakistan’s post-conflict relationship with Afghanistan will depend on its ability to operate within the Afghan state, giving it an opportunity to supplement its support base from the Taliban by appealing to a wider coalition of parties and officials.

In spite of their differences, both sides continue to affirm the need and desire to strengthen bilateral trade ties, particularly as it relates to formalizing border markets across the porous and insecure Durand Line. Border skirmishes remain a critical point of contention, as seen with instances like the July 2020 clash that resulted in the deaths of 15 Afghan civilians as well as Pakistan’s unilateral decision to build a 2,600-kilometer border fence that is scheduled to be completed in less than two months. For decades, trade talks have zeroed in on border issues, including the desire to formalize the booming black markets that have proven profitable for traders and militants that traverse the Durand Line to traffic stolen goods, arms, drugs, and humans.

To Pakistan’s chagrin, the Afghan government has been unwavering in its demand to incorporate the trade of Indian goods in the terms of its deal with Pakistan. Lobbying pressure from Afghanistan’s private sector and industry groups have demanded that their government work out an arrangement that would allow Afghan traders to use overland routes through Pakistan to access India via Wagah border, which splits the Indian and Pakistani halves of Punjab province.

Among the main gripes cited by the Afghan business community include inadequate market access and expensive transit costs in its trade with India, which is Afghanistan’s second largest trading partner. The existing trade routes available to Afghanistan and India include an expensive air corridor and the circuitous use of Iran’s Chabahar Port. Barring an abnormal modification in its foreign policy, Pakistan is unlikely to grant accession to such a provision, making it likely that the status quo will persist unless Afghanistan can make several favorable concessions to Pakistan.

The nature of the Pak-Afghan trade relationship underscores the formidable obstacles to both intra-regional trade within South Asia and extra-regional linkages between Southern and Central Asian supply chains. In spite of its natural geographic advantages and the potential for mutually beneficial trading arrangements, the essential prerequisite lies with the trajectory of intra-Afghan talks, where Pakistan remains the most important foreign stakeholder. In the absence of a political compromise, the litany of trade woes afflicting both sides are unlikely to fade, exacerbating infrastructure gaps and the ability to attract and sustain investment to the region, putting it at a further disadvantage to other emerging markets.

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 by Jonad Anderson

Afghanistan: Peace Talks and an Increase in Violence

Since peace talks in Doha commenced in September, violence has escalated in Afghanistan, however, recent developments could present a way to turn this around. It is appropriate to examine what has changed and how it could have positive effects.

Breakthrough

Shortly after the intra-Afghan talks commenced, they were stalled due to both technical and fundamental differences. Afghan representatives and the Taliban could not agree on how they should be referred in the agreement (as they do not recognize each other) and they did not hold similar views on the political future for Afghanistan.

Since then, the parties have now agreed on how to conduct the talks and the negotiators are now likely able to move forward on issues such as a political roadmap and a ceasefire. The three page agreement is an important step, and will be a stepping stone, for the future discussion of peace in Afghanistan and was immediately welcomed by the United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

Escalating Violence

As noted, violence escalated in Afghanistan once the talks got underway in Qatar. According to a report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), there has been an increase of violence since the peace deal between the Taliban and the U.S. was signed. The attacks have increased by more than 50% compared to the quarter before the talks began.

During this quarter, the report stated there have been 2,561 civilian casualties, including 876 deaths. This is an increase of 43% compared with April to June. On November 2, an attack on Kabul University killed at least 22 people of which many were students.

The violence is affecting the talks in Doha, as mentioned in the SIGAR report: “NATO Resolute Support (RS) and USFOR-A commander, General Austin Scott Miller said the high level of Taliban violence around the country ‘is not consistent with the U.S.-Taliban agreement and undermines the ongoing Afghan peace talks’”.

Comments

Violence negatively affects the legitimacy of the current peace process both from the perspective of the negotiating parties and the civilians. Trust between the relevant parties and civilians is an important factor for the peace talks to continue. Without trust, further delays may be expected. Consequently, in combination with an U.S withdrawal and more violence, the result may be an even more violent Afghanistan.

Another factor that can affect violence in the country is the withdrawal of American troops. If most of the American troops leave Afghanistan this might create a power vacuum which in turn can be used by violent groups to harm civilians and the peace process. As stated, the violence undermines the ongoing peace talks and raises the lack of trust within the country.

For the peace talks to move forward it is necessary that violence deceases. When one of the actors at the negotiating table keeps on fighting, it creates a more difficult situation for the negotiators.  Therefore, recent progress can hopefully bring more substantive issues to the table, such as a ceasefire, which can rapidly decrease the violence in the country.

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 by Isabella Bjorkman

How Can Afghanistan Reduce Its Aid Dependency?

While violence escalated across the country, the intra-Afghan peace talks were stalled for weeks because of difficulties agreeing on procedural issues. It has been argued that it was unlikely to see any significant progress anytime soon because neither side “has an incentive to compromise before the incoming Biden administration lays out its policy.”

A recent Rise to Peace article discusses the meaning of the United States presidential election on the Afghan peace talks and indeed, it could have a big impact depending on President-elect Joe Biden’s Afghanistan policy.

However, just a few days ago, the Afghan government and the Taliban announced that they had made a major breakthrough in the talks. They reached a preliminary deal — their first written agreement in 19 years of conflict — which allows for discussions on more substantive issues, including talk of a ceasefire.

The 2020 Afghanistan Conference

As the peace talks are taking place in Doha, Qatar, governments of Afghanistan and Finland, with the United Nations, co-hosted the 2020 Afghanistan Conference, which is a ministerial level pledging conference aiming to set out the development priorities and financial support for Afghanistan for the upcoming four years. It took place on November 23–24 in Geneva, Switzerland, and saw participation from more than 70 nations and organizations.

The issue of dependency on foreign aid is of great importance for the future of Afghanistan since the country has been dependent on foreign aid for a very long time. Regardless of the outcome of the ongoing peace talks “Afghanistan will remain highly dependent on foreign aid for the foreseeable future.” The US alone has, since 2001, appropriated an amount almost equivalent to what the US spent on rebuilding Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II. Moreover, the country depends on donors to fund at least half its annual budget, something which is unlikely to change anytime soon.

The 2020 Afghanistan Conference demonstrated the international community’s commitment to Afghanistan and donors pledged at least US$ 3.3 billion for the first year of the upcoming quadrennial with annual commitments expected to stay at the same level year-on-year. It remains clear that foreign aid is important for the future development of Afghanistan with regards to politics, peace, and security in the country. In addition, it can be a way for donors to place pressure on the parties to reach an agreement in the current peace talks.

However, there is a risk that donors are expecting the Afghan government to do more than it is able to which might jeopardize future aid. In addition, the Taliban were not invited to participate in the Afghanistan Conference, which could turn out problematic since they are a major stakeholder in the peace talks as well as in Afghanistan’s future. In turn, it might create problems should other actors appear committed to a particular Afghan administration. For the same reason, the current Afghan government might be under the impression that it does not have to compromise with the Taliban on certain points.

Addressing Corruption to Decrease Aid Dependency

A recent report shows that approximately 30% of money spent by the US on the reconstruction of Afghanistan since 2002 was “lost to waste, fraud, and abuse.” With regards to corruption, in 2019, the country ranked 173/198 on the Corruption Perceptions Index and this has a negative effect as Afghanistan tries to move towards a more peaceful and just society. It is therefore vital to address issues like corruption which essentially undermine reconstruction and development efforts. Addressing it will, over time, help reduce Afghanistan’s need for foreign aid.

Consequently, the parties involved in the peace talks must do more than agreeing to stop the violence. The talks can potentially be seen as an opportunity for a new start to “lay out a new vision for the country that can assure donors as well as the international community at large that things are going to be different in the post-settlement era.”

As demonstrated, commitment from donor countries is important, but what is of significant importance is that Afghanistan increases its own contribution to national development to convert the rhetoric of self-reliance into reality which will enable the country to, eventually, stand on its own two feet.

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 by Arman Sidhu

Afghan Aid Dependency: Two Alternatives for Foreign Donors

With just over 77% of its government budget dependent on foreign aid, Afghanistan’s prospects of establishing a self-reliant state in the near future appears bleak. In spite of the billions spent by individual countries and multilateral institutions, the question of how to sustainably use donor funds to embed resilience in Afghanistan has confounded policymakers for decades, culminating in several reports highlighting the country’s “phantom aid” problem.

After receiving much criticism for its sudden departure from Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States has since spent anywhere from $800 billion USD to upwards of $1 trillion USD in what remains America’s longest war. Of these expenditures, just 14% is constituted as foreign aid, with 75% of this aid earmarked as military/security assistance, as opposed to economic aid.

Yet, a cursory review of Afghanistan’s developmental woes suggests many of its ailments remain tied to economic obstacles like chronic unemployment, corruption, poor provisioning of government services, and an overreliance on the agricultural sector. Incessant frustrations from the donor community have led to fatigue, which has been exacerbated by political infighting within the Afghan government, as well as an unclear strategy or criterion for when international forces may exit the country.

This perception of little to no return on investment (ROI) for Western taxpayers has made foreign aid a recurring target among populist candidates and parties demanding retrenchment from “forever wars”. In the case of the US, foreign aid to Afghanistan reached its peak in 2012 at $13 billion USD, a sum that was followed by steep cuts that now amount to just under $5 billion USD sent in 2019.

Regardless of the outcome of intra-Afghan dialogue, the continuation of gradual cuts toward aid (which began during the second of the Obama administration) seemingly conflicts with the public-facing objective of the development community, which ostensibly seeks to address underlying socioeconomic factors that feed into conflict.  USAID figures demonstrate that donors remain fixated on funding kinetic solutions to resolve insecurity in Afghanistan, as well as neighboring Pakistan, which has seen its US foreign aid inflows dwindle in a similar fashion.

A peace deal cinched with the Taliban won’t necessarily result in increased revenues or even decreased expenditures from the government. Instead, Afghanistan’s fragility suggests injections of aid will be most critical in the months and years after an agreement is reached and statecraft can begin in earnest. As the appetite toward military-aid dissipates, donors should turn to alternative financing options when allocating funds, including “Aid for Trade” and Conditional Cash Transfers.

Aid for Trade

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines Aid for Trade as an effort “to align donor and partner countries’ strategies in promoting trade as a leverage for poverty reduction.” In short, aid for trade seeks to reduce the cost of facilitating goods and services and promote the recipient nation’s export sector by addressing infrastructure deficits and providing technical assistance to the private sector. Such a strategy has proven successful in funding efforts like port upgrades to improve maritime trade, expanding access to affordable Internet services, and digitization training for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs).

In the context of Afghanistan, Aid for Trade can harness what has traditionally been the country’s greatest economic advantage: its geography. Notwithstanding its status as a landlocked state, Afghanistan sits at the nexus of some of the fastest-growing regions in the world, which provides opportunity to reap advantages in overland trade. Yet harnessing this advantage requires building the necessary physical and digital infrastructure that can support the reliable and safe transportation of goods withing Afghan borders.

At present, the standard mechanism for aid delivery has been conditioned on a number of restrictive measures that stipulate what can be purchased with the aid, and from whom it can be purchased from. Ostensibly, the logic behind the conditional aid was designed to create strict parameters that compelled accountability from the aid recipient. Yet, as exhibited by the “Waste, Fraud, and Abuse” reports published by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), such conditions have not repelled opportunities for graft, which is often carried out through opaque procurement regimes that allow funds to disappear among the lengthy supply chain of contractors and sub-contractors.

Furthermore, conditional aid can often stipulate requirements that damage the recipient’s economy. This is particularly true in the case of food aid, where donor governments will use aid to pay their own farmers to export the products, which undercuts the prices that the agricultural sector in the recipient country can charge. Considering the fact that Afghanistan’s agricultural sector employs roughly 40% of the workforce and is responsible for contributing nearly one-quarter of the country’s GDP, reorienting aid to focus on productive investments (e.g. irrigation, equipment/materials, transportation) that lower the cost of trade is more likely to boost incomes instead of distorting local markets.

Conditional Cash Transfers

Though still conditions-based, conditional cash transfers (CCTs) differ from the status quo in that they tend to be far smaller in scope and scale. The “conditional” in this context refers to the requirement that the recipient fulfill a certain objective before the funds are released, which stands in stark contrast to other programs that deliver larger sums in shorter timeframes. The advantage of Conditional Cash Transfers is latent in the psychology of incentives, where signs of waste, fraud, and abuse can result in the immediate termination of future disbursements, giving donors more flexibility over their purse strings, while also encouraging long-term adherence to specified goals.

CCTs have proven successful in a number of policy realms, including decreasing homicides in Brazil, improving healthcare delivery to vulnerable children in Ghana, and incentivizing farmers across South America to cease the cultivation of illicit crops in favor of legal alternatives. For Afghanistan, CCTs can be especially useful in combating illicit poppy farming which fuels 90% of the world’s opium and heroin production. Though forceful eradication programs have been implemented, they have failed to make a dent in production, leading to an entrenchment and reliance on the opium trade to sustain rural household incomes.

The economic, political, and security ramifications of targeting poppy farmers has made the Afghan government reluctant to tackle cultivation of illicit crops. Yet, CCT programs provide a useful medium in establishing and sustaining evidence-based programs that have demonstrated efficacy in illicit crop eradication such as crop substitution programs supported by subsidies that are paid directly to farmers and that minimize institutional involvement.

The politicization of foreign aid is a consequence of misaligned objectives between donors and recipients, in addition to flawed and ineffectual distribution. Achieving such objectives requires recalibrating the criteria that donors use to both allocate aid and subsequently measure its efficacy. Though security remains pivotal, a lasting reconstruction agenda will depend far more on targeting aid toward economic initiatives that enable Afghans to gradually reduce their dependency on foreign aid, replacing it with sustainable revenues generated by the country itself.

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 by Jamil Ziaey

From Bonn to Doha: Why Is Afghanistan Still at War?

In December 2001, the city of Bonn, Germany hosted a conference on Afghanistan after the joint operation by the United States military and the Northern Alliance toppled the Taliban regime. The conference ushered in a new era for Afghanistan in which a democratic government was established that ensured elections, women and human rights, and civil and political liberties.

War was thought to be over and the reconstruction process funded by massive amounts of international aid that had poured into the country began. Nineteen years later, Doha is hosting another conference on peace for Afghanistan. Why does Afghanistan continue to find itself at war?

After the collapse of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan experienced a couple of peaceful years with no war and political turmoil. As the US redirected its military and political focus on the Iraq war, the Taliban based in their safe haven of Peshawar, Pakistan, used the opportunity to regroup and reemerge. The first question that comes to mind is how did they manage to grow as strong as they are now in the face of coalition forces and the fairly well-equipped Afghan national army?

The first response would be the fact that they have safe havens in neighboring Pakistan. Originally, they were supported by the Pakistani government and used as a proxy army to ensure Pakistan’s benefits in Afghanistan. After their collapse, and especially because Pakistan’s role was completely ignored at the Bonn conference, they still seemed to be of use for fulfilling Pakistan’s strategic goals.

This means that they had both safe havens and the support and encouragement from Pakistan which enabled them to retreat any time they were under attack, get medical services, re-equip and re-launch their attacks wherever possible. The question why the US and the world have not held Pakistan accountable and for supporting many other terrorist groups is yet to be answered.

The second response is ethnic supremacism. New research by Civil Society of Afghanistan indicates that ethnic supremacism is one of the main roots of war in the country. This is in line with the stances of the Afghan presidents since 2001. Hamid Karzai, the former president of Afghanistan, in an interview with BBC denies calling the Taliban a terrorist group. In another interview, he even says that the Taliban have every right to control some parts of the country since they are also Afghans.

Likewise in 2015, current president, Ashraf Ghani, objected that it was unjust that 98% of the prisoners in Bagram prison were speakers of the same language while he knew that those prisoners were convicted of terrorist actions. Both presidents have repeatedly called Taliban brothers instead of terrorists or enemies of Afghanistan.

The former first vice president, Younus Qanuni, in his recent interview said that President Karzai dealt with the Taliban, after their reemergence, under the influence of ethnic emotions. That was one of the reasons why the Afghan government never drafted a clear strategy for fighting terrorism and allowed the Taliban to grow into the deadly group they are today.

In general, one can assume that a decisive determination to fight the Taliban into their collapse did not happen for different reasons. Perhaps, military use was not an ideal solution.

Now that peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government are in progress in Doha, brutal attacks in Kabul saps optimism about achieving peace and security. Recently, terrorist gunmen attacked Kabul University and killed more than 22 students, injuring at least 22 others. Although ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack, the first VP of Afghanistan, Amrullah Saleh, declared that they had found evidence indicating that the attack was performed by the Taliban.

A couple of days before that, terrorists stormed a cultural center in Kabul and killed 41 people while injuring 84 others. Again, ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack. The main question that comes to mind, thus, is if ISIL or any other terrorist groups are capable of perpetrating such deadly attack in the capital city of Afghanistan, to what degree people can be hopeful that a peace deal with Taliban will actually bring peace to their country?

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 by Rejeanne Lacroix

Are There Any Lessons for Afghanistan from Post-Civil War Algeria?

Wars manifest differently in various locales: however, accrued insights can be considered in other scenarios. The Algerian government experienced a brutal decade-long intra-state conflict against Islamist extremist groups that ultimately ended in a statist victory. An official end to conflict left the proverbial door open to experiments in hard and soft government policies to combat terrorism and transition former fighters into contributing members of society. While the Algerian case is imperfect (as in any security matters reliant on fallible political will and resources), it offers some broad lessons for Afghanistan.

Two Very Different Conflicts

Afghanistan has been entrapped in 40 years of conflict, but the last 19 confronting the Taliban have transitioned from primarily a militaristic question into discussions of democracy and the role of traditional elements in any future manifestations of the state. As often noted, the Taliban do not recognize the current government in Kabul as legitimate and ultimately seek an Islamic emirate as their preferred choice of governance. Still, in the circumstance that intra-Afghan dialogue results in a viable and resilient peace deal, matters of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) have to be hammered out, understood, and prioritized.

The civil war in Algeria emerged very differently. Islamist nationalism simmered for decades, but general dissatisfaction over socio-political factors caused by government inefficacy climaxed in the 1980s. As an aside, disenchanted young men travelled to training camps in Peshawar, Pakistan in order to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It was there they gained experience in insurgent tactics and guerilla warfare.

After the 1988 Black October riots (where security forces used excessive force that resulted in injury and death), the fall of the one-party political system dominated by the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), and the emergence of the Islamist political party Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) as victorious in local elections, the stage was set for a political fissure.

The FIS defeated the FLN in the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991, however those in the deep state, les décideurs (the deciders) and le pouvoir (the power), considered this unacceptable. A second round of voting was cancelled by the military and they staged a coup d’état against President Chadli Bendjedid. From this point, civil war slowly but surely materialized. Extremists travelled to the north of the country to train while bombings and targeted killings occurred.

Numerous Islamist insurgent groups took up arms against the government. The armed wing of the FIS, the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS), was composed of moderates that eventually entered into a ceasefire with Algiers in 1997. As part of the deal, the AIS was required to distance itself from hardline affiliates and used this opportunity to pursue a path as a political party. Further, the FIS continues to be barred from the Algerian political process though they maintain an existence by proxy. Even so, they acknowledge a political settlement is the definitive goal as they once sought a (failed) resolution with the Algerian government — the Sant’Egidio Platform.

On the other hand, hardline factions pushed the envelope. The Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) had battle-hardened insurgents from the Afghan front in their ranks as well as former members of Bou Yali — a faction that previously engaged in armed rebellion against state institutions. It was a collective objective to topple the civil-military political arrangement and replace the government with an Islamic caliphate. Additionally, the Groupe Salafiste de Predication et du Combat (a breakaway from the GIA) acted as a key force and this is extremely important as the GSPC are often considered the foundation of al-Qaeda affiliated groups that continue to incite regional security concerns.

The Algerian Civil War first sprung in 1991, but ultimately ended in 2002. It is often called la sale guerre (the dirty war) due to the heavy handedness of the Algerian security forces to counter the insurgency whilst Islamist groups were rebuked for their attacks on civilians. Nonetheless, a fractured country immediately faced the situation of how to reach any semblance of unity as well as deescalate any further eruptions rooted in disparate views of governance. These next steps may provide the Afghan situation some insight.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

In the case intra-Afghan talks reach a sound negotiated settlement, questions over the future of former Taliban fighters remain open. Many elements must be considered such as the extent of the radicalization of individuals or whether they took up arms due to coercion or for gainful economic payouts.

Undoubtedly, Algeria had to contend with a large number of insurgents. Algiers pursued a hard approach to managing extremist groups, especially those intent on the establishment of a caliphate or challenge political security. This was a double-edged sword as the austere measures employed by government forces often crossed acceptable lines and ushered in disapproval in the populace.

Some extremist groups never renounced violence and that is to be expected no matter the quality of any peace accord. The GSPC rejected the 2005 Charter of Peace and Reconciliation that was passed with a 97% approval rating in a referendum simply because they preferred to continue as a terrorist faction. This was a significant blow as they were the largest group still active from the civil war and shared connections with known transnational terrorist organizations.

For example, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a direct outcome of insurgent groups that did not lay down their arms in the post-civil war period. Fragmentation typical of terrorist organizations meant that Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Algeria Province (ISIL-AP) splintered from AQIM and thus it is yet another distant offspring of past fighting.

Extremist organizations are ready to absorb any fighters unwilling to embrace peace and lay down their arms. In Afghanistan, there are numerous groups dedicated to violent methods so this remains an underlying problem, therefore hard approaches must be considered in any future outlook,  though they are not particularly a sunny matter. Just as Afghan security forces require support to ensure national security, Algerian security forces continue to conduct operations in areas of the country known for being hotspots of operational development or locales where insurgents typically and unassumingly cross the border into conflict-riddled Mali.

At the same time, Algiers promoted a soft approach. Afghanistan does not have the same economic means as hydrocarbon-rich Algeria, but both struggle with weak government and contracted economies. Nonetheless, Algeria ushered in a series of economic reforms to secure financing from the private sector as well as international partners. Dividends from these investments as well as energy revenues were allocated towards social programming, such as housing incentives and prospects for employment in state-funded positions. It is often noted that social discontents and the lack of viable employment opportunities prop up the effectiveness of extremist recruitment tactics so it is wise to solicit resources to nip this phenomenon in the bud.

Clemency was sought for those insurgents that were members of radical factions that did not commit serious crimes such as large scale indiscriminate killings or bombings. In clemency, willing fighters found an avenue to reintegrate into their local communities. Those that were convicted of grave offences — but willing to renounce violence — received lighter prison sentences. Some were not convicted or imprisoned at all due to a lack of evidence as crimes committed during civil wars are often messy and ambiguous. This was obviously problematic as justice must come prior to reconciliation and it must be completed in a method that aligns with the zeitgeist of local communities.

While political Islam did not amass an especially large following, extremism exhibited by factions during the civil war turned the Algerian populace even further away from related political philosophies. It is often remarked that Afghans will not renounce the progress and development that has occurred over the last 19 years. Algerians reached similar conclusions. At ongoing political protests, protesters were wary of the involvement of political parties that played a role in the civil war, and one stated, “we are vaccinated against the FIS and its excesses.” A similar viewpoint could be easily expressed by Afghans who are tired of war, Taliban attacks, and chronic stagnation.

The role of women has been transformed from solely a human rights issue into an instrument of combatting extremism in Algeria. While it may seem facetious for a government to adopt this position to highlight the differences between acceptable forms of governance and extremism, women have generally benefitted from this arrangement. A similar approach can be extended to Afghanistan insofar as infringement upon the rights of women has become a red line that will not be crossed or negotiated away. In the words of a young Afghan woman, “We as women need to tell the Taliban that…this is a new Afghanistan.” Highlighting this element is a definitive difference between two philosophies and an applicable lesson from Algeria.

Conclusion

Intra-state conflicts are as unique as the nations that sadly end up engaged in them. Similarly, the means in which a state achieves relative peace will be reflective of its unique political culture. No perfect process exists nor will it ever.

At the same time, experiences of other states that have confronted extremist groups in intra-state conflicts offer valuable insight for others that must engage in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The aftermath of the Algerian civil war taught observers that attractive financial incentives, clemency for foot soldiers, and the tactical use of civil society issues in the context of a negotiated political settlement provided a means to quash further extremist rebellion in the long term.

This framework does not totally subjugate the overpowering allure of terrorism therefore the continued application of the repressive state apparatus is required. The situation is different in Afghanistan, but the case study of Algeria provides interesting food for thought.

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Afghan peace talks
 by Jonad Anderson

Recent American Decisions Will Influence Afghan Peace Talks

Two current events have implications for Afghanistan. Joe Biden was declared as president-elect in the United States presidential election by several news outlets on November 7. He will be the fourth president since the war began in 2001. Further, on November 17, the Pentagon announced that the U.S. will reduce its troops in Afghanistan from approximately 4,500 to 2,500 in mid-January.

Stakes are high. A rushed withdrawal from Afghanistan can affect the country in the short and long term. It is important now is to secure a safe period while the intra-Afghan peace talks take place and then the U.S can leave Afghanistan without the risk of the nation bursting into a civil war. With this in mind, this article will look into what effects the withdrawal can have on the Afghan peace process and the views of different stakeholders.

Joe Biden wrote in Foreign Affairs in March 2020, “It is past time to end the forever wars, which have cost the United States untold blood and treasure. As I have long argued, we should bring the vast majority of our troops home from the wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East and narrowly define our mission as defeating al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (or ISIS).” Biden’s plan was to keep a small number of counterterrorism forces in Afghanistan, but since the withdrawal now seems to start before Biden takes office, it is possible it will inhibit him in his plans.

According to interviews conducted by Al-Jazeera, many Afghans believe that the Trump administration rushed with the peace process and did not prioritize a responsible withdrawal of U.S. troops. The respondents fear that this can lead back into a civil war. On the same note, the Second Vice President of Afghanistan, Sarwar Danish, commented that he wants “a full review of the peace process” and to “apply more pressure on the Taliban to reduce the violence.”

However, the Taliban commented that they expect the new president to remain committed to the peace deal. Moreover, an Afghan analyst stated that it is important to have a permanent ceasefire, agreed to by all parties, in the peace agreement before U.S. troops withdraw from Afghanistan.

In addition, it is argued that the withdrawal will undermine fragile security in Afghanistan and that it will affect the peace talks. The latest announcement from the Pentagon, on the withdrawal of troops before Biden takes office, can put him in a difficult spot and he might have to redeploy troops to secure the situation in Afghanistan for a peaceful agreement.

Given the history of the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, it makes sense that officials in the U.S. want to leave as quickly as possible. However, it is important to bear in mind that a quick withdrawal can affect Afghanistan, both in the short-term with intra-Afghan peace talks, and in the long-term with fear of civil war and more violent attacks on civilians.

It is therefore very important that the withdrawal of U.S troops is done in a responsible way, especially when a ceasefire agreement is signed and the talks have moved forward. As Mitch McConnell, the top Republican in the U.S. Senate told the press on Tuesday, “a precipitous drawdown in either Afghanistan or Iraq is a mistake.”

The war in Afghanistan has been ongoing for almost two decades and since the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan began counting, it has cost the death of more than 100,000 civilians, 45,000 Afghan security forces since 2014 and over 2,300 American soldiers.

While the incoming presidential administration states similar intent as the current one in regard to the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, it needs to be done in a responsible way. Troops should be kept in Afghanistan during the negotiations so that long term goals can be achieved for a peaceful Afghanistan.  As an Afghan official mentioned, “We expect more predictability, a more coordinated withdrawal.”

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