fbpx

Can John Walker Lindh “American Taliban” Be De-radicalized?

The United States Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) is set to release the “American Taliban”, John Walker Lindh, after serving 17 years of a 20-year sentence.

US Special Operations Forces and the Northern Alliance arrested the “American Taliban” in November 2001 in Afghanistan. A plea bargain with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) led Lindh to accept guilt for “supporting militants who harbored al-Qaeda as it planned the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001” in exchange for two decades of incarceration.

Origins of the “American Taliban”

Lindh was raised in California and Maryland. He converted to Islam at age 16 (prior to 9/11) and travelled to study Arabic in Yemen in 1998. All this occurred two months before the establishment of Google.

After Lindh completed Arabic lessons, he moved to Pakistan where encounters with members of extremist groups (al-Qaeda, Taliban) compelled him to settle in Afghanistan. There he received training at an al-Qaeda training camp as a Taliban militant.

In the 1990s, Pakistan served as the birthplace for the Taliban and it acted as the center of further extremist development. Operational planning, recruitment, equipping soldiers and brainwashing of children that were brought from vulnerable communities in Afghanistan occurred there. Pakistan recognized the Taliban regime, harbored Osama Bin Laden and supported the Islamic Emirate legacy until the present day.

Impediments to Reintegration
The US federal prison system has a lack of de-radicalization programs thus it is difficult to predict how well Lindh will adapt to reintegration. Certainly, it will be challenging for a person with radical philosophies, such as Lindh, to let go of his grievances and circulation of the mandate of the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban.

Digital technology and communications, such as Google, complicates the scenario for Lindh too. Access to swift and boundless information provides another possible impediment to de-radicalization. Law enforcement and the intelligence community must monitor and regulate his actions. As part of his release, “Mr. Lindh will also be barred from traveling internationally and getting a passport or any other kind of travel document.”

A young American teenager who made his way to Osama Bin Laden and revealed information to al-Qaeda will not cease unless he is de-radicalized. It is foolish to simply trust a loyal member of a terrorist group to renounce those attitudes.

For instance, in 2002, he denounced the 9/11 attacks as “completely against Islam” and tearfully told the judge “I have never supported terrorism in any form, and I never will…I made a mistake by joining the Taliban.” He maintained, “Had I realized then what I know now, I would never have joined them.”

This is in direct opposition to recent statements. In a 2017 report, Lindh “continued to advocate for global jihad and to write and translate violent extremist texts.” Was he further radicalized in the prison system during the US Iraq War in 2003 and later the Arab Spring?

Sober Reality and Solutions

Lindh can be de-radicalized and re-enter society if he is provided with necessary mentoring from those of a similar background while under supervision. If not, two possible reasons foretell why he will not exit his previous life of the 1990s-2000 so easily. First, he accepted his own version of Islam and joined the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. The Taliban view of Islam is harsh, extreme and is not Islamic. So, religiously, he is not going to change unless he is sent to a Muslim scholar to teach him the true Islam.

Second, his loyalty to the Taliban and al-Qaeda may not easily end because one feature that unites membership of terrorist organizations (ISIS, Boko Haram, Al-Shabab, and Taliban, etc.) is their dedication to the mission. They assert a lawful war “jihad” against the United States and allies is right.

Particularly, after 9/11 and the Iraq War, this concept became significant to justification of their actions. Simple operations such as detonating a bomb in a populated area or maneuvering a bus to kill innocent people contribute to a larger lawful war. To them, this is acceptable because their religion, Islam, is under threat by the “crusaders,” “capitalists,” and “infidels.”

There are 346 people convicted of terrorism since 2001 and 88 have since been released. For every convicted extremist facing release, the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies should devote significant attention to individual files and monitor the person 24/7 to prevent any attempt of violence.

Next, US government agencies should fund and support the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE, PVE) organizations so they can mentor and support Lindh as well as other related cases as part of the reintegration process.

The FBOP, DOJ, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and local governments have not yet developed a reintegration strategy to help foreign fighter extremists to reunite with his/her society. There is a substantial need for a comprehensive strategy in the prison system to begin de-radicalization and following programs to aid their reentrance into society.

De-radicalization is the very first step in connecting former extremists to society by helping the individual change his/her ideas and attitudes. It’s a system where the individual receives the opportunity needed to begin a new life, whether it’s granting access to job platforms, libraries, and training, or even an interpersonal or personal relationship to help heal the person’s grievances, beliefs, and confusion. In the case of Lindh, it’s imperative that he gets the support he needs in order to leave behind the radical thoughts and support for groups like ISIS and the Taliban. An engagement as simple as a conversation with a Muslim living in his community can help make a difference in his life.

Jesse Morton, a former extremist, assisted the FBI to arrest more radicals while he was “de-rad”. Jess left his radical thoughts behind as he went through a series of transformations in his life. First, the FBI agents support and non-judgmental demeanor towards him. Later, his employment as a Research Fellow on Extremism at the George Washington University. An finally, today, his organization, Light Upon Light, to counter extremism. Jesse Morton is one of the best examples that de-radicalization is possible and successful. The two individuals share enough similarities and commonalities to suggest that the de-radicalization process for Jesse will work for Lindh.

Ultimately, Lindh needs to understand that the groups (Taliban, ISIS) he advocated and fought for are wrong. To do so, he needs outside help the same way Jesse Morton did. Lindh converted to Islam as a teenager and shortly after joined the Taliban. Soon after that, he was arrested and placed behind bars for 17 years. He doesn’t fully understand the true meaning of Islam or what it means to live in a society where Muslims can pray, protest and work alongside non-Muslim peers in peace, acceptance, and appreciation.

Ahmad Mohibi is Founder and Director of Counter-terrorism at Rise to Peace, a non-profit organization, and a national security expert. He is a published author, journalist and news commentator on TOLONews, and an alumnus of George Washington University and George Mason University. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

Advocates push for additional visas for the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Program

GettyImages 476979067 57607c575f9b58f22e0b9944 - Advocates push for additional visas for the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Program

Photos courtesy: GettyImages. Afghan local interpreter is interpreting for the US military in Afghanistan

The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2019, as enacted on February 15, 2019, authorized 4,000 additional SIVs for Afghan principal applicants, for a total of 18,500 visas allocated since December 19, 2014.

What is the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa program? 

The current visa program for the Afghans who were Employed by/on Behalf of the U.S. Government is called Chief of Mission (COM). Iraqi and Afghan translators and interpreters who have worked directly (not as contractors) for U.S. Embassy Baghdad or U.S. Embassy Kabul are considered to have been under COM authority. Anyone (interpreters, chefs, contractors, guards who have worked directly for the U.S. government programs and projects in Afghanistan are eligible to apply for the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) under Chief of Mission (COM).

In the beginning, visas were only allocated to the Afghan and Iraqi translators who worked with the U.S. Armed Forces or under Chief of Mission authority as a translator or interpreter in Iraq or Afghanistan. In 2009, the program expanded to all Afghan nationals who provided faithful and valuable service to the U.S. government, while employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan and continues until the present day.

Visas and Obstacles?

Visas are limited for the Afghans and it depends on Congress to continue or end the program. But this Fiscal Year (FY), the Congress authorized 4,000 additional SIVs for Afghan principal applicants, for a total of 18,500 visas allocated since December 19, 2014. There are thousands of cases pending to COM approval, waiting for interviews and hundreds waiting to receive visas. Although it seems a big figure, is not enough for thousands of Afghans who courageously supported the United Staes Global War on Terror in Afghanistan risking theirs and families lives.

Legislative History of SIV

FY 2006: Under section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163), up to 50 Iraqi and Afghan translators/interpreters who worked for the U.S. Armed Forces to receive special immigrant visas (SIVs) each fiscal year (FY). This law was later amended and now provides SIV status for eligible Iraqi and Afghan translators/interpreters who have worked either directly with the U.S. Armed Forces or under Chief of Mission (COM) authority at U.S. Embassy Baghdad or U.S. Embassy Kabul.

FY 2007 and 2008: Public Law 110-36 and Public Law 110-242 in which then-President Bush signed on June 15, 2007, amended the law above by expanding the total number of SIVs issued to Iraqi and Afghan translators/interpreters working for the U.S. military to 500 a year for FY 2007 and FY 2008 only.

FY 2009: The Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, Section 602(b) of Division F, Title VI, of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, (Public Law 111-8), This law allowed up to 1,500 Afghan nationals who provided faithful and valuable service to the U.S. government, while employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan after October 7, 2001, for not less than one year, and who have experienced or are experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a consequence of that employment, to receive special immigrant visas (SIVs) annually through FY 2013, with the allocation of any unused visas from FY 2013 to FY 2014. The period of qualifying employment was later extended under subsequent legislation. See law above.

FY 2014: The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Section 7034(o) of Division K, Title VII of Public Law 113-76, This law, signed on January 17, 2014, extended the Afghan SIV Program. It authorized the issuance of 3,000 visas to principal applicants in fiscal year (FY) 2014 and allowed that any unissued visas from FY 2014 be allocated to FY 2015.

FY 2014: Emergency Afghan Allies Extension Act of 2014, Section 1 of Public Law 113-160, This law, signed on August 8, 2014, extended the Afghan SIV Program. It authorized the issuance of 1,000 visas to principal applicants by December 31, 2014.

FY 2015: National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015, Section 1227 of Public Law 113-291, This law, signed on December 19, 2014, extended the Afghan SIV Program. It authorized the issuance of 4,000 visas to principal applicants by September 30, 2016.

FY 2016: National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016, Section 1216 of Public Law 114-92, This law, signed on November 25, 2015, extends and amends the Afghan SIV Program. It authorizes the issuance of 3,000 additional visas to principal applicants with no end date by which they must be issued.

FY 2017: National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2017, Section 1214 of Public Law 114-326, This law, signed on December 23, 2016, extends and amends the Afghan SIV Program.  It authorizes the issuance of 1,500 additional visas to principal applicants with no end date by which they must be issued.  It also extends the date by which applicants must apply for Chief of Mission approval from December 31, 2016 to December 31, 2020.

FY 2017: Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2017, Section 7083 of Public Law 115-31, his law, signed on May 5, 2017, authorizes the issuance of 2,500 additional visas to Afghan principal applicants with no end date by which they must be issued.

FY 2018: National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018, Section 1213 of Public Law 115-91, This law, signed on December 12, 2017, authorizes the issuance of 3,500 additional visas to Afghan principal applicants with no end date by which they must be issued.

FY 2019: The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2019, as enacted on February 15, 2019, authorized 4,000 additional SIVs for Afghan principal applicants, for a total of 18,500 visas allocated since December 19, 2014.

The Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program is a great way to appreciate those who have served faithfully alongside the brave American troops abroad to begin a new life in the United States and bring innovative ideas for growth and success.

George Rockwell: The Original American Nazi

glr 300x210 - George Rockwell: The Original American Nazi

Rockwell at a news conference in 1965. Image credit: Associated Press.

Within the American neo-Nazi movement, there is perhaps no single individual more significant than George Lincoln Rockwell. Rockwell, who founded the American Nazi Party, was an active politician, former military commander, and grandfather of the neo-Nazi movement. Channeling conspiratorial beliefs and a dedication to the ideals of Adolf Hitler, Rockwell sought to bring National Socialism to mainstream politics in the United States.

Prior to his assassination by a neo-Nazi protégé, Rockwell had even run for governor of Virginia, garnering one percent of the total vote. Standing around 6’4” and in sound shape, the former military man seemed on the surface to be a prime example of another hero in a generation of heroes, but something had gone terribly wrong.

Information on Rockwell’s upbringing does not reveal a nurturing of extremist beliefs by family or close friends. In fact, Rockwell grew up with family friends who were Jewish. He was highly intelligent and studied philosophy at Brown University. During his time at Brown, however, Rockwell developed the belief that a sub-culture of communism was being fostered by the university; thus, he dropped out. Shortly thereafter, Rockwell volunteered as a pilot in the United States Navy. Rockwell served in both World War II and the Korean War, finishing his career in the Navy as a Commander- a title he insisted on being addressed by even after completing his time in the service.

Near the end of his military career, a copy of Adolf Hitler’s manifesto Mein Kampf came into his possession and he became obsessed. Observing the civil rights movement and associated civil unrest, Rockwell came to the conclusion that fascism was the only cure for the direction he saw the United States taking.

Rockwell regularly wrote various types of literature, from basic Nazi propaganda to full-length books. Looking into his own past, he stated that his time spent fighting Nazism during the second world war was regrettable. He referred to the war as a battle between criminal gangs consisting of ‘Bolsheviks & Zionists’, and considered himself ignorant for partaking in it.

Rockwell went out of his way to defend a history marked with indicators that he had a mental health condition. In the 1930s, just prior to his volunteering for the United States Navy, Rockwell was committed to an insane asylum; however, he was released after just 10 days of his scheduled 30 day stay, and writes that this is because he proved his sanity. However, his writings indicate a narcissistic personality. Rockwell believed that he possessed a ‘superior mind’ which could truly grasp and understand the universe and all its grand ideas and concepts, unlike the general population whom he describes as idiots. So grandiose was Rockwell that he on multiple occasions stated that he would be elected the President of the United States by 1973.

The American Nazi Party still maintains several of Rockwell’s writings on their website and speak about their founder with great admiration. In a post about Rockwell, the party states that “he single-handedly lifted our banner from the ashes of Berlin into the skies of America”. Interestingly, while the party speaks about Rockwell’s physical, mental, and leadership qualities, they also acknowledge that his rise occurred at least in part due to the social and civil unrest of 1960s America.

Rockwell’s legacy in the neo-Nazi movement in the United States is far from just a distant historical existence. Martin Kerr of the New Order, an organization that descended from the internal factions that split the American Nazi Party at the time of Rockwell’s death, views Rockwell as important to the neo-Nazi movement today. Speaking on the protests in Charlottesville that left one dead and dozens injured, Kerr declared that Rockwell’s spirit was alive and well within the protest.

Rockwell may have not been raised to be a Nazi, but several factors likely led to his ideological outcome. First, despite his claims of sanity, there likely was a mental health condition that led to his time in an asylum. This alone does not lead to the start of the radicalization process, but combined with societal and personal pressures, can contribute to the process. As Rockwell demonstrated in college, he was vulnerable to conspiratorial claims and through his writings he speaks with overtly narcissistic language. However, he also maintained a natural leadership capability demonstrated through his military career and his ability to gather followers once radicalized.

Rockwell was likely victim to, and later beneficiary from, societal stressors. The evolution of the civil rights movement and its accompanying civil unrest would appear to support racial conspiratorial claims found in Nazism. This both reaffirmed Rockwell’s Nazi beliefs and allowed him to market the ideology to others prone to the radicalization process.

While Rockwell’s conception of Nazism was more accurate to actual Nazi teachings and beliefs than some modern neo-Nazi groups, the lessons that can be learned from how Rockwell came to power in the movement are still relevant today. Rockwell was the perfect storm, at the almost perfect time. The civil rights movement allowed Rockwell to capitalize on racist beliefs and fears to attract a following. If it the atrocities of Nazi Germany had not still been fresh in the minds of Americans, there is a real chance that Rockwell’s following would have been much stronger. In the heated political climate of today, we must remember that there will be ‘perfect storms’ who will seek to capitalize on the divides in society.

 

John Patrick Wilson is a law enforcement professional as well as Research Fellow at Rise to Peace.

Who are Warren Christopher Clark and Zaid Abed al-Hamid?

returning extremists - Who are Warren Christopher Clark and Zaid Abed al-Hamid?

Warren Christopher Clark (left) and Zaid Abed  al-Hamid (right) in SDF Custody.

In January 2019, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured a group of men who they state were seeking to launch attacks against civilians fleeing the small pockets of territory still under Islamic State control. The group consisted of men from around the globe, including Pakistan, Ireland, and the United States. Warren Christopher Clark and Zaid Abed al-Hamid, two of the men captured by SDF forces, were named and identified as American citizens by their captors on social media based on forms of identification on their persons. Clark, who goes by the kunya of Abu Mohammad al-Ameriki, has since been positively identified as an American from Texas. Al-Hamid, who now goes by Abu Zaid al-Ameriki, has a much less clear background.

Clark’s background has been explored and significant insight has been gained from Clark himself in videotaped interviews he participated in while in SDF custody. Clark is a former substitute teacher from the Houston metropolitan area. It is believed that Clark is 34 years of age. It has been confirmed that he graduated from University of Houston, where he majored in political science and minored in global business. After several years of being a substitute teacher, Clark began to watch videos of the Islamic State online. Curious, Clark was able to make contact with an Islamic State representative, sending them a resume and cover letter explaining his desire to teach English to children in the caliphate. Clark states that he is a convert to Islam, though it is unclear when he converted. After traveling to Syria via Turkey, Clark states that he never picked up arms for the caliphate. In interviews after he was captured, Clark stated that he did not regret joining the group, and even justified beheadings conducted by the group, comparing them to executions in the United States criminal justice system.

While questions remain about al-Hamid and his background, it is known that he is originally from Trinidad, where he was detained in 2011 for plotting to kill their prime minister. Beyond this, al-Hamid was featured in numerous Islamic State propaganda videos where he discusses converting to Islam and the struggles he faced practicing his religion there. Rumors have circulated that al-Hamid is a dual-US citizen. This has not been confirmed, but his use of al-Ameriki in his kunya suggests some background in the United States. When al-Hamid made his journey to the caliphate, he brought along his wife and multiple children. It is unclear if they are still alive.

Clark, who has been transferred to US custody and brought back to Texas, has since been indicted and charged with providing material support to the Islamic State. The indictment covers a period from 2011, when he first drew the attention of federal law enforcement officials for online activities pertaining to jihadists social media entities.

Early investigation into both Clark and al-Hamid has not resulted in substantial findings in terms of potential solutions for further countering violent extremist ideology. Both Clark and al-Hamid were converts to Islam. In both of their lives, it appears that there was or may have been a feeling of marginalization within society. Clark, despite having a formal education, could not find a full-time position teaching. Al-Hamid, in Islamic State propaganda videos, stated that he struggled practicing his faith in Trinidad and felt like an outsider. Both men appeared to have been at least partially influenced by online extremist sites.

The lessons learned thus far in both Clark and al-Hamid’s cases is limited. However, perceived or real marginalization appears to be an underlying factor in both cases respectfully. Time will dictate policy recommendations to prevent radicalization, but one cannot ignore the continuous appearance of marginalization in case studies of those who have become radicalized towards extremist ideologies.

Developing a Law Enforcement Model for Countering Violent Extremism

Ever since the first police departments were formed in the 1800s, there has been continuous debate over the appropriate model of policing to address criminal behavior and activities. The criminal threat, combined with the demands of an ever changing society, drive this debate and dictate the desired model for law enforcement to pursue. In recent decades, the community-oriented policing model has become increasingly popular and many police forces have implemented elements of it into their procedures. Community oriented policing is believed by many to have the potential to deter some level of criminal behavior, prior to it ever happening. In the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks and The Global War on Terror, intelligence-led policing has received strong levels of attention as many desire to see a more direct approach to addressing serious criminal threats. While debate rages on over the appropriate model for local law enforcement to use, it is worthwhile to question whether a hybrid model would be impactful. This is particularly true when assessing how to properly address and counter violent extremism, which has underlying issues that encompass an array of psychological, sociological, and criminological aspects.

To start the discussion, a brief explanation of both community-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing is required. Community oriented policing is a model of policing that emphasizes community problem solving through partnerships between the community and the local law enforcement agency. This usually is done in conjunction with a reorganization of the police force to diminish the barriers between the force and the local community.

Intelligence-led policing is based on both qualitative and quantitative data and intelligence, leading to directed police activities based on the evidence gathered. An example of this type of policing model would be to analyze data on burglaries in an area. Police can, with enough data collected, determine the time, days of the week, geographic tendencies, and method of entry used by the involved criminals. Forces can then make informed decisions and direct increased patrols during these times and in these areas in an effort to catch the criminals.

Countering violent extremism is related to countering terrorism, but is a distinct discipline. Countering violent extremism requires an understanding of the ideological, sociological, and psychological influences that lead individuals to develop extremist ideologies which leave them more likely to commit acts of violence.

By developing a comprehensive understanding of this process and the ideology itself, one can develop solutions to prevent the radicalization process, intervene in cases where the process has begun, or attempt to roll back the ideology of someone who has been radicalized. Punitive policing and criminal justice measures do little to prevent, intervene, or rehabilitate someone who has become radicalized or is vulnerable to radicalization; in fact, punitive approaches may make the situation worse.

Both models of policing mentioned above are accompanied by challenges unique to each one. For community oriented policing, law enforcement faces the struggle of a changing power dynamic as the community becomes increasingly involved. Further, especially when dealing with organized crime and even violent extremism, law enforcement must come to terms with working with former gang members or violent extremists in order to address the issues with the involved community.

In applying a hybrid policing model which blends community-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing, public perception is critical. On the surface of the model, the focus must be on community-oriented policing as this is critical to develop ties with communities, particularly those which are marginalized. The model must present itself as a grassroots movement whose priority is helping the community, not developing criminal cases to be prosecuted. Once established, relationships with the community will serve as the primary source of methods to prevent the radicalization process from ever starting. Those cases in which the process begins, it will likely be the community members who first become aware of the trend in the individual or group towards extremism. This will allow for proper intervention, preferably led by the community members but in conjunction with local law enforcement. Local law enforcement must not treat these individuals as terrorists, as this may further develop a sense of marginalization in the individual.

In cases that are further along in the radicalization process, these community relationships will also foster intelligence collection efforts for law enforcement. A community that feels valued and important is much more likely to provide information to local police services. Through this intelligence, police can direct strategies to monitor individuals or groups. These strategies must involve other applicable jurisdictions and there must be adequate dissemination of intelligence products to all agencies involved.

However, law enforcement should be careful during this process. Overt surveillance may lead the community as a whole to feel as if the police are working against them. Another area of concern is that once intelligence is developed about an individual or group, strict protocols must be implemented and followed to ensure complete privacy rights of the individual. Being labeled as a ‘terrorist’ before one is even confirmed to be an extremist may lead further marginalization and eventually to full-on extremism.

This hybrid model is meant to be implemented by state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. For this reason, it is highly dependent upon support from state policymakers who understand the strategy and support it to their utmost ability. While this discussion was a very simplistic and brief explanation of the reasoning for, and basic procedures of, this type of hybrid model, it serves as introductory post towards implementing this model of policing.

 

 

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional and Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Strategies for Countering Neo-Nazi Radicalization

American members of the National Socialist Movement. Source: Southern Poverty Law Center.

Decades after the end of World War II, Nazism continues to incite hatred and divide the globe. Thousands have been radicalized into what is now deemed neo-Nazi ideology from dozens of countries across the world. Although the phenomenon of neo-Nazism is well documented, research has yet to establish a common profile of those deemed vulnerable to its recruitment. Several have attempted to establish a potential profile; however, the American cases that have been studied stem from vastly different backgrounds, and their diversity is too difficult to account for with any one theory.

Though the threat of large-scale terrorist attacks stemming solely from neo-Nazi groups is relatively low, such groups present a unique threat. Neo-Nazi groups tend to be embedded with other racist extremist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, and other anti-Semitic groups. Fringe members of these groups present an often-undetectable lone wolf threat which is extremely difficult for law enforcement to counter. Neo-Nazi groups are also often associated with the trafficking of narcotics and prostitution, potentially leading to a large indirect cost on society.

In discussing neo-Nazi radicalization, former neo-Nazi Christian Picciolini has a unique take on the process. Picciolini, who become radicalized into neo-Nazi ideology after attending a gathering of a skinhead group at 14 years old, has since deradicalized and now works to help others do the same. But Picciolini does not attribute neo-Nazi radicalization to an ideology at all. In an informative interview, Picciolini stated that “I can tell you that every single person that I recruited or that was recruited around the same time that I did, up to now, up to what we’re seeing today, is recruited through vulnerabilities and not through ideology”. The vulnerabilities mentioned in the interview stem from both real and perceived grievances, felt by some youths as they grow and learn about the world and their place in it. Like so many youths searching for answers to their anger and frustrations, Picciolini found answers amongst neo-Nazi propaganda. Unfortunately there was not a counter narrative strategy in place to address the statements presented to him.

Exploiting vulnerabilities is a normal gang recruitment strategy. Many neo-Nazis are recruited while in prison, and the process is similar to other gang recruitment methodologies. However, neo-Nazi gangs are distinct in their provision of a more thorough ideological base for those who they radicalize. Further, the agenda of neo-Nazism is the creation of a Fourth Reich, which obviously goes far beyond the belief system associated with a typical street gang. Because of the hybrid nature of the radicalization process between extremist group and street gang that is observed within neo-Nazism, a hybrid approach to deradicalization and a hybrid counter-narrative strategy is needed.

Law enforcement’s response to neo-Nazi groups has begun to change in recent years. Whereas for a long time neo-Nazi groups and skin heads were often associated with the punk rock scene and were considered kids acting out their frustrations, now they are being considered legitimate concerns for homeland security.

Though they may pose a significant security concern, simply addressing neo-Nazi radicalization as a law enforcement matter does not properly address the underlying issues that cause some to become radicalized. In discussion about freedom of speech when it comes to hate speech and propaganda, experts suggest that education is the likely best route for countering extremism. An effective solution will couple education with a strategy in which local governments and communities adapt partnerships with organizations who have experience in deradicalization. One such organization and program is the Anti-Defamation League’s “A World of Difference” campaign, which uses mass media and education in schools to address bias, racism, anti-Semitism, and a variety of radicalization and extremist behaviors. Policy encouraging local communities to embrace programs mentioned above could potentially hold the key to severely disrupting recruitment efforts of the dozens of neo-Nazi groups operating in the United States.

 

John Patrick Wilson is an Law Enforcement Professional and Research Fellow at Rise to Peace.

The Caliphate’s Returnees? From the Refugee Camps of Syria to bin Laden’s Grave

Screen Shot 2019 02 26 at 4.25.10 PM 300x149 - The Caliphate’s Returnees?  From the Refugee Camps of Syria to bin Laden’s Grave

From 2003 to May 2011, I was a prominent Jihadi propagandist, the head of a New York City based organization that set the tone, template, and methodology for radicalization and online recruitment in the West.  It was the era of al-Qaeda, not ISIS. However, as the controversy continues over whether Hoda Muthana, the 24-year-old Yemeni-American who joined the so-called Islamic State and now sits in a refugee camp in North-Eastern Syria, should be returned to the United States, it seems to me that we ought to reflect on a bigger picture. We need to consider that in the Hoda Muthana situation, the true victor will be neither Donald Trump nor Abū Bakr al-Baghdadi; instead we should remember the ghost of Osama bin Laden, whose long-term strategy lives on.

Ms. Muthana was twenty years old in 2014, when she left her Alabama home and made her way to ISIS’ self-proclaimed caliphate.  As the terror group’s territorial control spread from Eastern Syria to Northern Iraq, a terrain the size of Britain, its propaganda became all the more powerful.  Osama bin Laden once claimed that “everyone follows the strong horse,” and at least two hundred and fifty Americans heeded ISIS’ call.

When she first arrived in Syria, Ms. Muthana tweeted a photo of her American passport. She wrote, “Bonfire soon; no need for this!” On Memorial Day in 2015, she called for attacks in New York City.  Now, like most who have survived the collapse of ISIS’ so-called caliphate, she claims that she is “deeply sorry” and wants to return. Yet, the Trump administration contends that her status as a citizen no longer applies.

Like other Western governments, it appears the Trump administration will attempt to deny the rights of those lingering in the refugee camps and prisons of northeastern Syria that should be afforded under international law.  Were I still a propagandist, such a circumstance would have given me fodder for weeks. Guantanamo Bay, Bagram, and Abu Ghraib were all cornerstones of our propaganda machine. ISIS targets Western civilians simply because they are non-Muslim, at least that is what an article in their English-language magazine suggested in 2015.  

I penned the lead article of the first English-language jihadi magazine in 2007. We were fighting the West, in part, because of the unequal application of the rule of law. This made it quite easy to claim that the ‘war on terror’ is actually a ‘war on Islam’. This narrative plants the seed that sprouted and went viral when Syria’s civil war became a front of bin Laden’s global insurgency.  As he described it, “the freedom and democracy that you call for is for yourself.”

The controversy surrounding Ms. Muthana’s return also highlights the danger of sustained height and domestic polarization, two prongs of bin Laden’s strategic plan.  In a 2004 speech directed at the American public, bin Laden explained, “All that we have to do is to send two mujahedeen to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al Qaeda, in order to make generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses without their achieving anything of note other than some benefits for their private corporations…” Does the weeklong controversy that a few women jihadis can stimulate not prove that this remains the case, that, while serious, the threat remains overblown?  The only difference is that it is no longer about waging war and wasting resources abroad, but about whether spending money to bring those that traveled abroad to join the terrorists may one day lead them to wage war on us at home. These are not indicators associated with success.

Also alarming is the polarizing nature of the debate.  The Trump Administration’s position largely has to do with a need to appeal to an anti-Islamic base. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, twenty-five percent of conservatives had unfavorable views of Muslims.  Today, most polling holds that rate at around sixty percent. Anti-Muslim sentiment serves a key-prong of the growing anti-establishment, right-wing sentiment that is sweeping throughout Western nations. In response, the mosqued American-Muslim community has allied with the Democratic Party.  Many left-leaning legislators have supported Ms. Muthana’s return. Nevertheless, around twenty-five percent of Democrats now hold unfavorable views of Muslims, more than conservatives on 9/11. A 2016 poll conducted by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom found that fifteen percent of Democrats thought Islam should be illegal.  All of this conjoins with bin Laden’s plan of inducing collapse from within.

For certain, bin Laden would not have supported ISIS.  Before he died, the godfather of global jihad had already distanced al-Qaeda from their Iraqi offshoots.  And by 2014, the so-called Islamic State was brandishing supporters of al-Qaeda as apostates. In turn, al-Qaeda ideologues warned ISIS that controlling territory would prove impossible.  They had already done so, unsuccessfully, in places like Somalia, Yemen, and Mali. They also warned against ISIS’ excessive zeal and wanton violence. Now, however, in the event that Ms. Muthana and others are not returned to their countries of origin, their expressions of regret will not prove a means of rejecting the notion of an Islamic State modeled on 7th Century norms.  Instead, they may serve as a means of rejuvenating al-Qaeda, proving their criticism of ISIS correct.  Already, pro-al-Qaeda Jihadi groups in Syria, numbering in the tens of thousands are running deradicalization camps for ISIS survivors and defectors.  These jihadists would be all too happy “liberate” women like Ms. Muthana, their children, and men from the refugee camps and prisons of northeastern Syria.  We might recall that ISIS itself was resurrected by way of a prison break at Camp Bucca in 2013.

These considerations are largely missing from the sensationalist debates.  In a similar scenario last week, a British woman, Shamina Begun, set off a jointed firestorm in the United Kingdom when she also asked for return from the same refugee camp.  In an interview, she defended her actions, but said she had not made propaganda, claiming, “I didn’t know what I was getting into when I left.” It is a common narrative. Last year, the story of a Canadian man, Abu Huzaifa, served as the focal points of a popular New York Times podcast produced by the intrepid reporter Rukmini Callimachi.  Hazaifa had returned to Canada after joining ISIS and admitted to carrying out executions in Syria.  Canada went into a frenzy when the government determined that they did not have enough evidence to charge him criminally.  To make matters worse, it seemed that he was not remorseful. Interviewing for that podcast, I described the three fundamental beliefs jihadi propagandists used in recruitment.  It was clear that Abu Huzaifa still held them, but I emphasized the need for patience. Deradicalization is a process, not an event. Often times, it is not unlike the ups and downs of recovery from addiction.  Soon thereafter the controversy subsided and most moved on to the next episode. Now, however, Abu Huzaifa is doing well and an intervention program has helped him turn things around. He is deradicalizing, denouncing some of the core beliefs of jihadism in general, and is re-identifying with the value of Western norms.  I remain hopeful that he will one day become a voice not unlike my own.

The world has changed a great deal since I was arrested outside a mosque in Casablanca in May of 2011.  Just days after the killing of Osama bin Laden, and weeks before my colleagues Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, both American citizens, were killed in a drone strike in Yemen.  Many then proclaimed the beginning of the end on the war of terror. Yet today, almost eight years later, the landscape looks like perpetual war. At home, America is torn into two black-and-white political camps.  Polarization abounds. Nearly eighteen-years after September 11, 2001, we’re waging a war on violent extremism, at home and abroad.

Internationally, we are losing the ability to project liberal values.  We have become an object of resentment, particularly in the Middle East.  Overwhelming numbers of Arab youth now prefer the stability of authoritarianism to democracy.  More Sunnis in Iraq support ISIS-style sharia law than the governance of the Iraqi state. This, of course, is music to the ears of Bashar Al-Assad, Syria, Iran, Russia and China.  A new era of great-power rivalry has returned. Bin Laden’s war of attrition and policy of “bleeding to bankruptcy” does not seem an impossible feat. In fact, Osama’s son Hamza, the godfather’s prince, looks poised to wage his father’s jihad far into the future.

Yet, it is not too late.  To snatch victory from the jaws of unrecognized defeat, it is time to recognize that it is no longer merely about who the Islamic terrorists are, but about who we are, as well.  It is time we stop letting terrorists take us away from the principles that built the liberal world order. To start this transition, we should bring Ms. Muthana, her child, and others like them home.

Jesse Morton is a former extremist and founder of the Parallel Network.

Private Sector Domestic Intelligence

In relation to terrorism, domestic intelligence collection is relatively limited in scope due an absence of an agency or structure dedicated solely to domestic intelligence collection. While the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies participate in intelligence collection and analysis within the United States, it is largely case-based and limited to involved parties. To be clear, domestic intelligence collection does not include subjects discovered communicating with foreign nationals (in those cases, there is a structure to go through with FISA courts that will lead to further intelligence collection and analysis.)

A collaborative effort between non-government parties could address many of the issues found in using government entities to conduct domestic intelligence operations. Such an approach has a proven track record of success, as there is a long history of private companies being tasked with intelligence operations, even domestically, dating back to the very beginning of the United States.

There have been attempts to address flaws in intelligence collection and dissemination by the federal government. Notably, the establishment of Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces was intended to bridge the disconnect between federal law enforcement, the private sector, and state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. These groups have had debatable success, and there are many reports that private sector involvement in these groups is limited.

The objectives of domestic counter-terrorism intelligence collection are broad and seek to acquire data on a variety of activities, including:

  • Recruiting to extremist ideologies and groups
  • Acquiring funds and logistics
  • Training for terror operations
  • Detecting surveillance and reconnaissance
  • Planning of terror operations

Limiting the collection process to government entities, which have limited resources and limited scope of capabilities in domestic intelligence, leaves substantial gaps in which crucial intelligence may be missed. Indeed, there are several private intelligence companies as well as private research entities, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center, that provide a significant amount of data on terrorism and extremism in the United States.
Another key area in which collaboration should be made is the inclusion of subject matter experts involved in numerous areas of American critical infrastructure, of which the vast majority is controlled and operated daily by the private sector.

However, when these groups work individually and do not cooperate, they often fail to close many of the gaps which exist in domestic intelligence.
This large pool of individuals and groups, ranging from non-profits to academic institutions, have created arguably the largest store of knowledge on counter-terrorism and counter-extremism- and yet it is not being fully utilized.

Establishing collaborative groups that unite academics, private companies, non-profits, and researchers could address the ‘explorative’ component of domestic intelligence collection and analysis. This element of intelligence seeks to develop more broad understandings of the threat picture facing the homeland, as well as collect data on individuals and groups involved in extremist ideologies which may lead to operational violence. Utilizing non-government entities to conduct intelligence could bring the technical strengths of the private sector, including innovation strengths and technology, to the forefront of the fight against terror.

The collaborative effort mentioned throughout this writing would work most effectively in collection and analysis of the vast open source data available, which comprises nearly 80% of useful intelligence. While there are brief collaborative efforts on research, the collaboration often occurs on specific, case-sensitive research studies about a specific topic- not long-term collaborations.

How can non-governmental entities be brought together to produce a unified intelligence product? A plausible strategy would be to first hold a conference or a series of conferences to bring together representatives of respected organizations from the disciplines discussed above, conducting meetings about logistical options for such a collaboration. An academic institution may be the strongest location to physically host such a collaboration due to its facilities, space, and readily accessible traditional sources of data. Furthermore, a strong online network in which research can be shared and collaboratively worked on with a clear system of dissemination must be established. All of this would develop a relatively substantial cost, however, and perhaps partial government funding would produce sufficient impetus to begin work on such a project.

Returning Foreign Fighters: A Global Threat

As ISIS concedes its last remnants of territory, governments around the world must confront the return of foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria. These fighters present many issues as they now have combat experience, support networks, and knowledge that can be used to create devastation. To explore the threat that returning fighters pose to nations around the globe, this article will first discuss the fighters’ backgrounds, explaining why some countries will have a higher influx of fighters than others. Next, it will discuss what expertise these fighters bring. Finally, it will discuss the global implications of the fighters’ return.

Number of Foreign Fighters Returned 300x225 - Returning Foreign Fighters: A Global Threat

Image source: The Soufan Center/Statista/Mike Nudelman/Business Insider

Many people around the world believe that the makeup of the Islamic State is predominantly males of Middle-Eastern nationality. This is not an unreasonable assumption, given that the primary theatre of group operations is in Syria and Iraq. However, its’ members nationalities are diverse. Since the group’s inception in 2013, ISIS has attracted those from every corner of the globe, from the United States to Russia. According to a study by the Soufan Center and the Global Strategy Network, thousands of fighters have already returned to Europe and other countries in the Middle East from the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Of the estimated number of foreign fighters that have joined ISIS, around 30 percent have returned to their home countries (EPRS, 2018). Collectively, over 1,000 trained ISIS fighters have returned to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Belgium (Meko, 2018). 900 have returned to their native countries of Turkey, 400 to Russia, and 760 to Saudi Arabia (Meko, 2018). However, these numbers only include fighters that have been confirmed to have arrived- so the actual number of returned fighters is likely much higher.

Foreign women and children are also playing a noticeably larger role. According to a report from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College, approximately 41,490 foreign citizens became affiliated with ISIS from April of 2013 to June of 2018. Of this number, 13% were women, while 12% were minors. Women and minors accounted for approximately 23% of all British ISIS affiliates (Khomami, 2018). Like the men returning from conflict, each of these women and children may pose a major threat as well.

Fighters who have experience engaging in terrorist activities and operations in Syria, Iraq, and other countries in the Middle Eastern theater pose a serious threat for a number of reasons. First, through training and experience, they have mastered the use of weapons such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), guns, vehicles, etc. They have learned an array of methods to inflict the maximum number of casualties possible. Second, these fighters will likely try to pass on their knowledge to others interested in committing acts of terrorism. Many areas throughout Europe have already become hotbeds of radicalization; for example, the Brussels suburb of Molenbeek has produced many Islamic extremists linked to terrorist incidents around the world, such as the 2015 Paris attacks. As hundreds (or possibly thousands) of foreign fighters return to Europe, they may target and train other radicalized individuals in places such as Molenbeek. There are many implications for European governments, who must take heed, prepare to apprehend these fighters, and prevent the spread of radicalization and training to at-risk populations.

Ultimately, the fall of ISIS in Syria will create an outpouring of foreign fighters. A proactive approach to apprehending these individuals is one of the best methods to prevent fighters from passing on their knowledge to others. Given the proximity of many countries in Europe to one another, it is easy for extremists to create international networks to facilitate attacks. By apprehending foreign fighters immediately upon their return, authorities can prevent them from galvanizing already-established networks in Europe- decreasing the likelihood of an effective, coordinated attack, and potentially saving hundreds or thousands of lives.

The Mysterious Case of Mohamad Jamal Khweis

khweis 300x199 - The Mysterious Case of Mohamad Jamal Khweis

Mohamad Jamal Khweis while in Kurdish custody. Image Credit: Associated Press.

Few in Alexandria, Virginia, would have suspected that the man driving a bus for the elderly would travel halfway across the globe to join the Islamic State (IS) and wage violent jihad. But this is the case of Mohamad Jamal Khweis, who went by the kunya Abu Omar al-Amriki while living in the self-declared caliphate. While the story of Khweis can be compared in some ways to others, not much is known about the actual path of radicalization he took in the lead-up to joining the IS. Khweis consistently lied and changed his story throughout his capture, interrogation, and trial, forcing officials to play a guessing game. What is known about Khweis’ case is analyzed here.

Khweis grew up in the suburbs of Washington, D.C., graduating from Edison High School in Fairfax County in 2007. As the child of two Muslim immigrants from the Middle East, Khweis grew up attending mosque. However, according to his parents, he was not particularly religious growing up. After high school, Khweis got a job as a bus driver for the elderly and disabled. He drank and smoked cigarettes, not activities associated with a devout extremist.

However, something happened between 2007 and 2015. Khweis lied to family and friends in late 2015, a month after the IS attacks in Paris, when he began scheduling travel to Europe. In mid-December Khweis travelled to London before making several stops across Europe en route to Turkey. In Turkey, scheduled contact was made with an IS facilitator who directed him, along with several French would-be jihadists, across the Turkish border and into Syria.

Upon arrival in Raqqa, which was under IS control at the time, Khweis underwent religious training and began work doing miscellaneous household tasks for caliphate fighters. According to documents discovered by forces combating the IS, during this time, Khweis indicated that he was willing to become a martyr by utilizing himself as a suicide bomber for the caliphate.

After months of cooking, cleaning, and taking out the garbage, Khweis grew increasingly frustrated by his lack of military training. Throughout his time in the caliphate, Khweis was also routinely ill from consuming poor-quality drinking water. These factors, and possibly more, combined to make his frustrations unbearable. When Khweis was relocated to IS controlled territory in Tal Afar, Iraq, he made an “escape.”

Kurdish Peshmerga forces discovered Khweis walking alone, and after it was confirmed that he was not a suicide bomber, he was taken into custody. When Khweis was captured he carried several hundred dollars in Iraqi and Turkish currencies, three cell phones, and his Virginia driver’s license. At first, Khweis stated to his captors that he had been deceived by a female he met in Turkey into coming into Syria and essentially becoming a slave; however, this story quickly fell apart. Peshmerga forces were able to contact American authorities to inform them of Khweis’ presence, and he was quickly transferred to American custody. In American custody, Khweis changed his story over 15 times between intelligence interviews and criminal investigation interviews.

Even so, authorities obtained enough information to levy criminal charges. Lawyers representing Khweis argue that this was unfair, and that Khweis gave false information to investigators out of desperation to return to the United States. However, many indicators disprove this- including signs of remaining loyalties, such as Khweis’ refusal to identify or provide any information on Americans he knew who had also joined the IS. Throughout his criminal trial, Khweis again changed his story multiple times, at times even indicating that his time in the caliphate was a mistake made after a night partying in Turkey.

Extremist propaganda was discovered on Khweis’ cell phones after capture, but once again eluding to his own radicalization, Khweis stated that the propaganda was only on his devices because he was conducting research into life in Syria. It is unclear if he was radicalized by online propaganda like so many others. There has not been any mention of other radicalized individuals whom Khweis may have been in contact with in the United States. Ultimately, there is no strong evidence to suggest how Khweis fell towards extremist ideology.

Although a clear path towards radicalization cannot be observed due to Khweis’ lack of cooperation, some comparisons can be made to other cases of radicalization. First, Khweis was the child of Muslim immigrants, growing up in the United States in the wake of 9/11. This time challenged many young Muslims, leading many to seek answers about their identities. It was also a time which caused notable marginalization, or at the very least perceived marginalization, of Muslim communities in the United States.

Circumstantial evidence would suggest that Khweis was vulnerable to radicalization due to his perceived marginalized position in American society. As a child of Muslim immigrants in post-9/11 America, Khweis certainly grew up with various forces pressuring him and challenging his identity. While not much more can be properly guessed about what exactly occurred along Khweis’ journey, his uncooperative nature and refusal to provide information about other American jihadists belies the fact that he likely remains radicalized. Fortunately, his 20-year sentence for providing material support to the IS will provide critical time that may lead to more cooperation and insight into his beliefs and radicalization process.

 

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional and Research Fellow for Rise to Peace.

Rise to Peace