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Arauca
 by Rise to Peace

A Fight for the Border: Clashes Between the ELN and the FARC in Arauca

At least 27 people have been killed over the previous days in Arauca, Colombia. The authorities indicate that the deaths are due to clashes between militiamen from the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC’s) 10th Front. The situation of violence in the department of Arauca has already left several civilian victims.

The Clashes

Clashes between the two terrorist organizations began at the beginning of January. The dispute occurred in the Arauca Department, which is located on the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

While initial reports indicated that 23 people died as a result of the fight on January 6th, the Colombian Prosecutor’s Office stated that the death toll rose to 27.  Likewise, it is likely that this number will continue to grow in the coming days.

Additionally, the investigations discovered that of the 21 identified bodies, 14 are Colombian while seven are Venezuelan. Thus, it is likely that both Colombians and Venezuelans comprise these criminal organizations.

Furthermore, regarding the damage caused against the civilian population, the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office pointed out that in municipalities of Arauca such as Tame, Fortul, and Saravena, 2,000 individuals are at risk of being displaced and seek to escape the armed confrontations.

The Colombian Defense Ministry indicated that among the deceased are high-ranking members of the FARC dissidents. For example, one of those identified is “Flaco Freddy,” a leader of the FARC dissidents, who had two arrest warrants, one for extortion and kidnapping and the other for illegal arms trafficking.

Some sources indicate that the conflict began due to the murder of Álvaro Padilla Tarazona, alias Mazamorro, second commander of the ELN’s Domingo Laín Sáez front, in the town of El Nula, on the border of Apure state. Colombian authorities have also revealed that many of those killed were apparently taken from their homes and shot at close range as revenge for the murder of Padilla Tarazona. However, the reasons for the confrontation stem from further back.

Historical Relationship and Rivalry Between the Two Guerrillas

The war between the ELN and the FARC has been reinvigorated with new actors. The clashes between the two guerrillas in Arauca between 2004 and 2010 left at least 500 civilians and 600 subversives dead and more than 50,000 people displaced.

Eventually, in 2010 the FARC and the ELN agreed to a truce in Arauca. The pact was known as “no more confrontation between revolutionaries” and put an end to the confrontations between the two guerrillas, and they divided the territory. In 2013, both guerrillas formally agreed to undertake a joint offensive against the Colombian Security Forces.

However, after the peace process with the FARC, several dissident groups emerged and called off the truce. The new FARC groups, especially the 10th Front, began to expand to control the regional illicit markets, such as drug trafficking and oil exploitation. Furthermore, Arauca is characterized as a strategic zone for the guerrillas due to its geographic location on the border and weak state presence.

To this day, the dispute for control of Arauca continues as the void left by the extinct FARC has not been filled and there is no clear winner for control of the region.

The State’s Response

In response to the increase in homicides and forced displacements in the Arauca Department, the Colombian Government implemented new measures. Two battalions with 680 army men have already been deployed to the Arauca Department, to strengthen security in Saravena, Arauquita, and Tame. Furthermore, checkpoints were installed on the roads of the affected municipalities, since some residents were confined to their homes for fear of clashes.

The Venezuelan Government also announced the dispatch of the military to the border. The Defense Minister of Venezuela, Vladimir Padrino López, reported that the Bolivarian National Armed Force (FANB) is deployed in the municipalities bordering Arauca.

Although it is true that the presence of the military will likely decrease the homicide rates in Arauca, a comprehensive approach is required to deal with the events that occurred in Arauca. Situations such as forced displacements require the intervention of public entities to guarantee the protection of human rights in the area.

Finally, to reduce the risk factors for sustained conflicts, it is necessary to increase the institutional supply on the border with Venezuela. Moreover, it is necessary to confront the terrorist organizations that operate there and attack their sources of financing, such as drug trafficking.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Latin America / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
MS13
 by Rise to Peace

How to Classify MS13: Gang or Terrorist Group?

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. government accused 14 leaders of the criminal gang Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) of terrorism. The decision of the American judicial branch resembles the 2015 ruling of El Salvador’s Supreme Court, which also classified the MS13 as a terrorist group.

The decision to categorize MS13 as a terrorist organization opens the debate on how to confront these criminal organizations and what should be the means used for to confront them.

What is the Mara Salvatrucha?

The Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS13, originated in the late 1970s and early 1980s in California, where young people and adolescents from El Salvador formed a gang. In the mid-1980s, more Salvadorans joined the gang, morphing it into a criminal organization, operating in cities such as Los Angeles and rivaling other criminal groups.

However, MS13’s biggest rival is the Latino gang Barrio 18. The war waged between MS13 and Barrio 18 has left hundreds of people dead throughout the region.

Eventually, in the 1990s, hundreds of gang members were deported to Central America. In fact, 31,000 criminals were deported, of whom 12,000 were deported to El Salvador, a country riddled with economic and social difficulties. The deported MS13 gang members took advantage of the country’s situation and recruited hundreds of young people, expanding and increasing their territorial control.

Some of the criminal activities of the MS13 include drug sales, extortion, arms sales, kidnapping, robbery, and commissioned killings. In addition, various investigations have identified links between the MS13 and Mexican drug cartels. Collaboration between these criminal structures translates into alliances facilitating drug and arms trafficking in Central America.

Is MS13 a Terrorist Group?

In 2015, El Salvador’s Supreme Court established that maras are considered terrorist groups, especially the MS13 and the Barrio 18 gang.

The court ruling established that a terrorist is defined as anyone who uses means and methods to generate collective terror, affect personal or material legal assets, and cause potential damage to the democratic system or the security of the state. Thus, the Court indicated that the MS13 meets these conditions and therefore can be considered a terrorist group.

El Salvador’s Supreme Court ruling was intended to generate greater sanctions against MS13 gang members and reduce violence in the country.

However, the court’s decision was criticized for a few shortcomings and ambiguities. Some analysts point out that gangs are not necessarily terrorist groups, but that they do use acts that generate terror. In addition, the ambiguity of the law may cause human rights violations, the penalization of social protests, and the interpretation that arbitrary acts are committed in the name of the fight against terrorism.

Years later, a similar court ruling within the United States was made. On January 14, 2021, 13 of MS13’s leaders were indicted on terrorism charges and imprisoned in El Salvador on behalf of the Eastern District of New York. After that decision, the MS13 is considered as an organization at the same threat level as the Mexican cartels or the Colombian guerrillas.

The MS13 leaders were charged with conspiracy to lend and conceal material support to terrorists, conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism that transcend national borders, conspiracy to finance terrorism, and conspiracy of narco-terrorism in El Salvador, the United States, and Mexico.

Again, the decision was made in order to use more powerful legal instruments against gangs. However, it is also noteworthy that terrorism charges have been brought against members of an organization that has not yet been classified as a terrorist group by the State Department, which can be problematic for the judicial system.

How to Classify and Deal with MS13?

To this day, the question about how MS13 should be classified and how it should be sanctioned is debated. Their classification as terrorists offers valuable legal tools for fighting these gangs. However, various analysts have pointed out the risks that this entails.

Therefore, it is important to reflect on how to combat MS13 in a comprehensive manner. It is necessary to understand the causes of the group’s birth and evolution, such as the socioeconomic context of the members they recruit and the economic, political, and social situation of the countries they operate within. With this knowledge, more effective public policy solutions can be identified to prevent new people from joining MS13, reintegrate previous and current members into society, and improve the living conditions of vulnerable children and teenagers.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Latin America / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Bomb
 by Rise to Peace

Bomb Attacks Terrorize the Colombian-Venezuelan Border

On December 14th, two bomb explosions were registered in Colombia at the border city of Cúcuta. The explosions occurred near the Camilo Daza Airport and left two police officers and one civilian dead.

These attacks add to the wave of violence in the Norte de Santander Department, located on Colombia’s border. In recent months, the civilian population and the security forces have been victims of criminal and terrorist actions by various groups that operate on the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

Wave of Violence at the Border

The explosions at the Cúcuta Airport are just one example of the terrorist actions affecting the border area between Colombia and Venezuela. Two factors can explain the disarray of public order at the border. First, this region of the world has the highest concentration of illicit crops, according to the United Nations, such as the enormous production of cocaine in the region of Catacumbo.

Secondly, public order is affected by the presence of dissidents of the FARC and the ELN; Venezuela is a safe haven for terrorist organizations and there is a lack of presence by the Colombian State. In fact, according to the Colombian authorities, 14 criminal organizations dispute the trade in illicit drugs, human trafficking, the sale of weapons, and the smuggling of merchandise in the region.

One of the most relevant terrorist attacks in recent months in Norte de Santander was the car bomb attack against Brigade 30 of the Colombian National Army. The explosion occurred on June 15th and injured 34 soldiers and two civilians. This attack was extremely worrying for the Colombian authorities, given that the vehicle carrying the bomb easily entered the army’s facilities. Although it is not completely clear who ordered the attack, it was likely the responsibility of local ELN cells.

Additionally, another recent terrorist act was the attack against Colombian President Iván Duque Márquez. The attack occurred on June 15th in the municipality of Sardinata, Norte de Santander.

The president was attacked with rifle bursts while boarding his helicopter; however, the attack did not result in any injuries. The mastermind of the attack, a former Colombian military man who joined as a member of the 33rd Front of the FARC dissidents, was captured. In addition, the Colombian authorities indicated that the attack was planned and organized from Venezuela.

Violence and crime do not seem to end in Norte de Santander. According to Brigadier General Fabio Cancelado, there are 1,500 armed men in the department, divided into illegal groups such as the ELN, the “Gulf Clan,” the dissidents of the 33rd Front of the FARC, the “Tren de Aragua,” the “Pelusos,” and “Rastrojos.”

These organizations are financed by illegal activities, such as cocaine trafficking, and are responsible for the murder of 22 social leaders and the displacement of 448 people in 2021.

The Two Explosions 

The explosions on December 14th were attacks that once again terrorized the population at the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

The first explosion occurred when an individual attempted to jump over an airport gate. The individual fell, and the device exploded. Minutes later, a suspicious device was found near the area of the first explosion. When two police officers from the explosive’s unit examined it, the bomb exploded.

The Colombian defense minister emphasized that these terrorist attacks are being planned from Venezuela by terrorist groups. The Colombian authorities believe the ELN and the 33rd Front of the FARC dissidents are responsible for the attack.

How to Stop the Violence?

Despite the fact that the problem of crime, violence, and terrorism at the Colombian-Venezuelan border area is of immense proportions, some actions can, and must, be taken.

Due to the significant amount of illicit crops, coca production and trafficking, and the income generated from this activity, it is necessary to spray coca crops with aerial and targeted herbicides. This will reduce the crops, and subsequently the income, of the terrorist organizations that operate in Norte de Santander.

Furthermore, it is necessary to protect the social leaders who live in this area and mitigate massive forced displacements.

Finally, it is necessary for the Colombian Armed Forces and the National Police to strengthen their intelligence, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics capabilities. This is of the utmost importance to anticipate terrorist attacks and effectively combat illegal armed groups in the region.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Latin America / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Romaña
 by Rise to Peace

Disintegration of the Second Marquetalia: The Death of “Romaña” and “El Paisa”

Two of the most important ex-commanders of the extinct FARC guerrilla were assassinated in Venezuela. Dario Velásquez, known as “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos, known as “Romaña,” died in ambushes last week, which is a great blow to the FARC dissidents, known as the Second Marquetalia.

The death of Velásquez and Castellanos, who were signatories in the peace process, but later abandoned it, reveals the struggle being wedged between dissident groups of the FARC for control of the illicit economies in Venezuela and Colombia.

Background

Hernán Darío Velásquez, better known as “El Paisa,” began his criminal career in the FARC at the age of 19. He joined the eastern bloc of the FARC and was under the orders of the historical commanders of the guerrilla, the “Mono Jojoy.” “El Paisa” rapidly rose through the ranks of the FARC, specializing in activities such as drug and arms trafficking and extortion, especially in his hometown of Antioquia.

Years later, “El Paisa” led the Teófilo Forero mobile column, which was a special operations force within the FARC known for its combat expertise and bloody terrorist attacks.  Notable attacks include the bomb attack on the El Nogal Club in Bogotá, in which 36 people died, and the mass kidnapping of the deputies of Valle del Cauca.  These events led “El Paisa” to become one of the most wanted and feared men in Colombia, and one of the most important members of the FARC.

On the other hand, Henry Castellanos, better known as “Romaña,” commanded the 53rd front of the FARC, one of the most important in areas such as the Department of Meta. “Romaña” was also known as “the kidnapping czar” because of his specialty in random kidnappings on national roads, popularly known as “miraculous fishing.”

These kidnappings were carried out with the intention of financing the FARC’s guerrilla activities and occurred mainly in the Departments of Villavicencio, Cundinamarca, and Boyacá.

Castellanos also participated in the bloody takeover of the city of Mitú, where 43 people were killed and 61 members of the security forces were kidnapped. “Romaña’s” efficiency in kidnappings, extortion, and guerrilla takeovers led him to become a member of the FARC’s secretariat, the leadership of the terrorist organization.

Signing the Peace Agreement and its Abandonment

Both “El Paisa” and “Romaña” participated in signing the peace agreement with the Colombian government in 2016, and both were part of the FARC negotiating team despite being late additions to the negotiating table. The agreement sought to demobilize more than 32,000 guerrillas, reincorporate them into civilian life, and bring an absolute end to hostilities between the Colombian government and the FARC.

In July 2018, “El Paisa” left the Territorial Training and Reincorporation Space (ETCR) in Caquetá, where he was worked alongside other ex-combatants. Velásquez argued that the government betrayed the agreement since the terms were not being fulfilled and the capture of another FARC leader, Jesus Santrich, was a trap.

As for “Romaña,” he decided not to appear before the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) in 2019, arguing that he had received death threats.

Months after the disappearance of “Romaña” and “El Paisa,” the former commanders appeared in a video with Iván Márquez, Jesús Santrich, and other deserters from the peace agreement announcing the creation of the Second Marquetalia. In the video, Márquez points out that the ex-guerrillas were forced to create a new organization because the government did not comply with the prior agreements. Thus, a new terrorist organization with a significant presence in Colombia and Venezuela was created.

The Killings and their Implications

On December 8th, the Colombian Defense Minister confirmed that both “Romaña” and “El Paisa” died in isolated events in Venezuela. The Minister also emphasized that the members of the second Marquetalia were protected by Nicolas Maduro’s regime, which significantly facilitated their illegal operations.

Although it is not possible to fully confirm who was behind the death of two of the most feared FARC dissidents, there are varying hypotheses. Some sources indicate that “El Paisa” was assassinated by the men under his command due to their mistreatment and that they wanted to seize his hidden fortune of millions of dollars.

However, the most viable hypothesis is that “El Paisa” was assassinated in an ambush by the 10th front of the FARC. Gentil Duarte leads the 10th front and disputes for control of drug trafficking routes, the illegal exploitation of minerals, and other activities from criminals in Colombia and in some areas of Venezuela, such as the State of Apure.

“Romaña’s” situation appears similar in nature. A Colombian news portal revealed that the photo where “Romaña” appears dead was taken by the FARC dissidents who ambushed him.

In addition to the deaths of “Romaña” and “El Paisa,” Jesús Santrich was also assassinated this year. The conditions of his death were very similar; there is no clear party responsible, it occurred on Venezuelan soil, and it is suspected that he was murdered due to drug-trafficking disputes.

The deaths of the leaders of the Second Marquetalia represent a great blow to this criminal and terrorist organization. The only relevant leader still alive is Iván Márquez, who is suspected to be hiding in another country.

In the event that “Romaña” and “El Paisa” were indeed killed by Gentil Duarte’s dissidents, this would demonstrate that Duarte’s group is winning over the Second Marquetalia. Meaning that Gentil Duarte’s dissidents are taking over a vast amount of territory in Colombia and Venezuela and that they are increasing in economic and arms power.

Finally, to stop the violence between the dissident groups of the FARC, it is necessary that both the Colombian State and the Venezuelan State confront narco-terrorist groups and gain control over their territories, especially near the borders. However, this is especially difficult since the two countries do not have diplomatic relations, which makes cooperation difficult, especially considering that the Venezuelan regime sponsors and protects some of these organizations.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Latin America / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Hezbollah
 by Rise to Peace

Hezbollah’s Tentacles Threaten Latin America

Hezbollah, also known as Hizbullah, is a Lebanon-based Shia terrorist organization. Its creation dates back to 1982, after the Israeli intervention in Lebanon. Since its foundation, Hezbollah has participated in several terrorist attacks against civilians in the Middle East.

For instance, Hezbollah militants carried out the 1983 suicide truck bombings against the U.S embassy and Marine Barracks in Beirut, the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, the kidnappings of Israeli soldiers in 2006, and the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005.

The Middle East is Hezbollah’s main geographical area of influence. Moreover, Hezbollah has participated in the Lebanese government since 1992, was involved in the Syrian Civil War through the use of militants to support the Bashar Al-Assad Regime, and is backed by Iran in its anti-Israeli and anti-Western activities.

However, Hezbollah’s activities and influence are not restricted to the Middle East.  Their presence has been reported in several areas throughout Latin America, and it is probable that Hezbollah’s tentacles will continue to spread in the southern zone of South America.

Historical Background of Hezbollah’s Presence in Latin America

Hezbollah’s presence in Latin America dates back to the group’s foundation. An essential factor in the establishment of Hezbollah cells was the flow of Lebanese migrants arriving at the Tri-Border Area (TBA) connecting Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay during the 1960s and 1970s. The multi-generational diaspora and zones that facilitated trade for Lebanese migrants enabled Hezbollah militants to infiltrate the subcontinent and carry out their activities.

After Hezbollah was officially founded in 1982, Latin American cells began cooperating with Iranian personnel to commit terrorist attacks in Argentina. For instance, Hezbollah used a car bomb against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 23 people. Furthermore, Hezbollah allegedly participated in the terrorist attack against the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), a Jewish center in Buenos Aires, where 85 people died.

Venezuela, a Safe Haven for Hezbollah’s Criminal Activities

Once Hezbollah’s presence in the Tri-Border area was consolidated, this terrorist organization found a safe haven to carry out its illicit activities. When Hugo Chávez took power in 1999, a relationship began between the regime and Hezbollah, allowing Hezbollah to build a vast network to carry out illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and smuggling.

In fact, Hezbollah established a crime structure in Venezuela that operates through compartmentalized, familial clans, such as Nassereddine, Saleh y Rada, that embed into the regime-controlled illicit economy and the regime’s political apparatus and bureaucracy. Hezbollah has control in zones such as Margarita Island, where they operate freely.

The advantage for Hezbollah operating in an area with so many facilities and where the current government is a close ally is that the terrorist group receives billions of dollars annually, mainly from drug and arms trafficking. However, Hezbollah’s main source of income is the funding it receives from Iran, which is also a close strategic ally of Venezuela.

Hezbollah’s Presence in Other Latin American Countries

Hezbollah has a strong presence in the countries comprising the Tri-Border Area. Activities such as counterfeiting and drug trafficking have been identified in Puerto Iguazú, Foz do Iguaçu, and Ciudad del Este in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.  The authorities found that Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, a Hezbollah militant from this zone, has sent more than $50 million to Hezbollah since 1995.

Hezbollah’s activities and presence have also been identified in Colombia.  The Colombian Intelligence Services has detected enterprises and commercial platforms that operate as money laundering centers. Furthermore, counterfeiting networks were identified in Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Maicao.

In addition, Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) converged to cooperate with crimes such as drug trafficking, which is the most profitable source of funding for both groups. The FARC specialized in cocaine trafficking and production, while Hezbollah specialized in money laundering, thus creating a nexus between crime and terrorism.

Finally, Hezbollah is establishing itself in an area known as the New Tri-Border Area, which is comprised of northern Chile (Arica and Iquique), southern Peru (Tacna and Puno), and Bolivia (from El Alto to the Iranian Embassy in La Paz).

In Chile, Hezbollah seeks to take advantage of its ports and indoctrinate young people to join its cause. In Bolivia, Hezbollah seeks to increase its presence by taking advantage of its poor diplomatic relations with the United States. Finally, in Peru, Hezbollah seeks to profit from cocaine production, again facilitating the crime-terror nexus.

What Should be Done?

Hezbollah’s presence in Latin America illustrates how the region’s crime-terror nexus is a significant security threat. Factors such as little state control in border areas, strategic routes to traffic weapons and drugs, money laundering, and support from regimes, such as Iran and Venezuela, have allowed Hezbollah to transform into a wealthy terrorist organization with a considerable presence in Latin America.

In order to reduce the power and influence of Hezbollah in the region, the United States has implemented financial sanctions against the group. However, sanctions are not enough to reduce the activities and income of this organization.

Thus, it is necessary to improve cooperation among Latin American countries, implement more effective legal instruments against money laundering and terrorist financing, increase security in the Tri-Border Area, and continue efforts to cut off Hezbollah’s tentacles in Latin America.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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FARC
 by Rise to Peace

FARC Removed from Terrorist List – What’s Next for Colombia’s Peace Process?

On November 30th the United States announced plans to remove the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) from its list of foreign terrorist organizations. The decision to redesignate the terrorist status of the former guerrilla group follows the signing of a peace deal between the Colombian government and the FARC in 2016.  In a statement following the announcement, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the FARC “no longer exists as a unified organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or has the capability or intent to do so.”

Background

The FARC was founded in 1964 by a group of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in response to anti-communist repression across Colombia. The group waged a half-century war to overthrow the government, funding its operations through extortion, taxation, kidnappings, illegal mining, and the drug trade. At its height, the FARC counted 20,000 men and women under its command, controlled around 70% of Colombia’s coca crop, and generated well over 1 billion dollars in annual income.

The conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government represented the longest-running war in the western hemisphere, having cost the lives of over 220,000 people and displacing over five million civilians. After decades of meetings and negotiations, Colombia’s 2016 peace accord was signed. The deal was celebrated as one of the most all-encompassing peace agreements in modern history. The FARC agreed to demobilize, and the Colombian government promised to address poverty and inequality across the country’s rural regions.

Why is the FARC Being Removed from the Terrorist List?

The State Department’s decision to revoke the FARC’s terrorist designation comes five years into the deal’s 15-year time frame and represents the United States’ continued support for the country’s peace process. Whilst the move has been criticized by some U.S. politicians, including a number of senior Republicans, many Colombians have lauded it as a necessary step that will allow the United States to play a more central role in the country’s peace-building efforts.

Since the signing of the 2016 peace deal, 13,000 former FARC combatants have laid down their arms, and many of these former members now play crucial roles in the country’s peace process. Indeed, the FARC has been succeeded by a legal, registered political party, and many of the guerilla group’s former commanders now serve as prominent politicians. However, under the FARC’s designation as a foreign terrorist organization, U.S. officials were prohibited from meeting or working with former FARC militants and were unable to fund important peace-building programs, such as a formerly FARC-led campaign to destroy land mines across the country. Mr. Blinken’s statement said that delisting the FARC would allow the United States to “better support implementation of the 2016 accord, including by working with demobilized combatants.”

Preserving the Peace Process

The United States’ decision to redesignate the FARC comes at a pivotal point in the peace process. The Colombian government’s promise to tackle poverty in rural regions was at the heart of the peace accord, but experts are increasingly warning that these efforts are moving too slowly. As of 2020, just 4% of the deal’s rural reform measures are complete and security experts warn that the slow implementation of the promised reforms risk undermining the trust of rural communities and the return of armed conflict.

Colombia is already seeing a worrying surge in mass violence directed at rural communities. The government has been slow to seize control of the territory once held by the FARC, and a number of violent criminal organizations have moved in. The measures of the peace agreement, including the establishment of a national transitional justice court, threaten these groups’ illegal operations, and mass killings are increasingly used to let civilians know the high cost of supporting the deal.

Colombia’s peace process is at a precarious point. Five years have passed since the signing of the 2016 accord, but the peace remains delicate. The State Department’s decision to remove the FARC from its list of terrorist organizations will allow the U.S. to increase its support for the implementation of the 2016 deal by working alongside former members of the FARC and funding important peace-building programs across the country.

However, this alone will not be enough to secure the long-term success of the peace process. Colombia must accelerate the rollout of its rural development program. These promises were central to the peace deal, and failure to honor them will deeply damage the trust of rural communities, exacerbating the same frustrations that fueled the conflict for decades. Colombia must also work to protect communities from violent criminal organizations, providing rural Colombians the security to participate in a democratic society and supporting the efforts of the country’s transitional justice court.

The 2016 peace agreement gave Colombia the chance to move beyond its violent past, but its success is not yet guaranteed. The United States should continue to work with its Colombian partners to advance the cause of peace. The removal of the FARC from its terrorist list is an important step, but the U.S. must remain cognizant of the broader threats to the peace process. It should work with those in the government and those on the ground in rural Colombia to restore trust, promote economic development, and prevent the influx of armed criminal groups.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Haiti
 by Rise to Peace

Kidnappings in Haiti Terrorize the Nation

In recent weeks, two collective kidnappings have been registered in Haiti. After the death of President Jovenel Moïse, Haiti has suffered a wave of crimes and kidnappings throughout the country, which have severely affected the local population.

The situation in Haiti is critical. Despite the fact that two hostages were released a few days ago, insecurity terrorizes the country and the Central American region.

Background

Haiti is currently recovering from the political crisis generated by the assassination of its president, Jovenel Moïse, and from an earthquake in August. In addition, the Haitian State does not have the capacity to effectively address these problems and the increased violence. In fact, the Haitian Armed Forces have not been able to control the territory and prevent the proliferation of armed gangs.

The power of the Haitian criminal gangs can be evidenced in situations such as the blocking of the country’s fuel supply. After Moïse’s death, gangs such as G9 and Family blocked Terminal Varreux, the country’s largest oil terminal. This blockade restricted access to fuel across the country to destabilize the government, impact the nation’s electricity grid, and threaten citizens’ lives and wellbeing. The gangs are so powerful that the blockade only ended due to a truce between the G9 and Family and the local government.

Overall, security and public order in Haiti are worrisome. An estimated 165 gang factions operate in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and these gangs have carried out numerous kidnappings in 2021 alone.

The Kidnappings

The first mass kidnapping occurred on October 16th, when 17 members (12 adults and five children) of a U.S.-based missionary group were kidnapped by the 400 Mawozo gang, which controls the Croix-des-Bouquets area east of Port-au-Prince. According to authorities, the missionaries were kidnapped when en route to visit an orphanage and carry out humanitarian aid. The gang has demanded a $17 million ransom, $1 million per hostage.

In addition, on November 21st 2 of the 17 kidnapped missionaries were released. However, only after FBI agents, Haitian authorities, and the anti-kidnapping unit of the national police negotiated with the kidnappers for more than one month.

The second mass kidnapping occurred on November 23rd, when an armed gang kidnapped 15 passengers from a bus in northwestern Haiti. Authorities have indicated that the gang is asking for a large sum of money to release the hostages, although the exact ransom amount remains unknown.

As of late, the number of kidnappings in Haiti has increased exponentially. So far in 2021, nearly 800 kidnappings have been reported in Haiti. In fact, The Center for Analysis and Research in Human Rights (CARDH) notes that at least 782 kidnappings were reported this year, up until October 16th, compared to 796 cases in all of 2020, without taking into account unregistered cases.

What’s Next for Haiti?

Due to the weak presence and lack of territorial control by the Haitian State, the power of the gangs, the criminal governance in certain areas of the country, the increased crime rate, the difficult economic climate, and mounting social tensions, crimes, such as mass kidnappings, are likely to persist.

Public order and security will only stabilize once security forces, such as the Haitian National Police, are reinforced and improved, allowing them to effectively confront the gangs and regain control of the country. Furthermore, after the death of President Moïse, political power needs to be reorganized to effectively address the ongoing security challenges.

For this reason, the country has experienced events such as the new Haitian cabinet, which will be made up of members of the opposition, the impending delivery of 19 police vehicles and protective equipment to the Haitian police by the United States, and more actions by the armed forces to restore order. These planned actions and events are expected to reduce violent crimes, such as kidnappings, and improve security conditions, throughout Haiti.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Otoniel
 by Rise to Peace

The Capture of Colombia’s Most Wanted Man Ignites a Series of Terrorist Attacks and Violence

Dairo Antonio Usuga, better known as Otoniel and the leader of one of Colombia’s most feared narco-terrorist organizations, was captured on October 23.  Otoniel is the head of the Clan del Golfo or the Gulf Clan, an armed terrorist and drug trafficking group that poses a serious threat to the Colombian State.

Colombian authorities captured Otoniel, however, his capture generated retaliation from the Gulf Clan against the Colombian security forces. In recent days, armed forces members have suffered terrorist attacks in revenge for Otoniel’s capture.  Additionally, this event will likely start a wave of violence between the factions of the organization as they seek to seize power.

BACKGROUND

The Gulf Clan is a drug trafficking organization that stems from the demobilization of paramilitary forces. They currently operate in areas such as the Gulf of Urabá and the departments of Antioquia and Chocó. It is estimated that the group currently has about 6,000 troops and is present in more than 211 municipalities throughout the Colombian territory. Their primary income comes from illicit drug trafficking and illegal mining.

The financial power of this organization has allowed them to increase military capabilities, expand into new territories, strengthen alliances with other criminal groups and grow their income. Today, the Gulf Clan presents one of the most significant barriers to the stability and security in many of Colombia’s territories.

Consequently, the strengthening of the Gulf Clan in recent years represents a rising threat to the Colombian State and the civilian population.  As a result, the Gulf Clan will continue its narco-terrorist activities until action is taken against them.  While Otoniel’s capture is a major blow to the organization, there is still much work to be done to defeat it.

OTONIEL’S CAPTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

After several months of tracking and intelligence, Otoniel was captured in Antioquia, a rural area in the municipality of Turbo. His capture created a power vacuum in the Gulf Clan, so it is to be expected that there will be internal disputes for control of the organization, mainly among its mid-level leaders.

However, the most worrying implications of Otoniel’s capture are the current retaliations his organization is taking against the Colombian military.  On October 26, army soldiers were attacked by members of the Gulf Clan in the department of Antioquia with explosives and gunfire. In the terrorist attack, three soldiers were killed and three others were wounded.

A few hours later, another military platoon was ambushed by the Clan, leaving one soldier dead and another wounded.

For this reason, it is feasible to affirm that retaliations against the Colombian armed forces will continue in the coming days. It is also highly likely that an increase in homicides and displaced persons will result from disputes within the organization’s factions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the demanding public order and security situation in Antioquia, which will likely escalate, in the short term it is recommended that the Colombian State deploy more troops in the area. This is necessary as greater territorial control is required, and operational results are needed to reduce regional violence.

On the other hand, in the medium and long term, more effective intervention strategies are needed against this narco-terrorist group due to the risk level it represents. From an operational and tactical perspective, it is necessary to attack its sources of financing, such as illicit crops, strengthen intelligence capabilities to anticipate terrorist attacks, and prevent this organization from forcibly recruiting young people from vulnerable populations.

Finally, in terms of public policy, it is necessary to improve the living conditions of the populations in areas such as the Urabá region of Antioquia.  This can be achieved through the generation of formal employment, the provision of public goods and services, and an improvement in the health and education systems. In other words, comprehensive state action is required to guarantee security, but also better living conditions, so risk factors, such as the emergence and strengthening of these groups, disappear or are considerably reduced.

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

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 by Alexandra Reguev

Hezbollah and the Terror-Crime Nexus

hezbollah money laundering 1 300x200 - Hezbollah and the Terror-Crime Nexus

Image Credits: Foreign Policy illustration and Getty Images

As the US security apparatus continues to publicly focus on Iran’s expansion in the Middle East, it has done little to actively address the threat posed from Iran’s favorite proxy, Hezbollah, on the southern border. Hezbollah has been known to operate international money laundering and drug trafficking operations via Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico for years. These operations, other than, notably, the Lebanese Canadian Bank case, have most often been prosecuted as drug-related crimes, rather than crimes of terrorism.

Hezbollah’s drug enterprise is not separate from its terrorist activity. Hezbollah, as directed by Iran, began engaging in the drug trade from its inception in the 1980’s, “for Satan—America and the Jews. If we cannot kill them with guns, so we will kill them with drugs.” As such, the American strategy of prosecuting drug crimes connected to Hezbollah as just that, rather than as crimes of terror shows a fundamental misunderstanding of Hezbollah’s motives.

According to a 2018 CDC study, cocaine was involved in 19.4% of drug overdose deaths in 2016— cocaine which has often made its way into the US via Hezbollah channels. In recent years, the spike in prescription drug related deaths has led the Trump administration to declare a national emergency. The opioid epidemic has at least partially driven the decline in US life expectancy, and opioid overdose victims are often found to have also taken cocaine.

The CDC study claims that in 2016 alone, more than 10,000 Americans died from drug overdoses involving cocaine; that number is more than three times the amount of Americans that died in 9/11. When you take into account the stated goal of Hezbollah to use drugs as weapons to neutralize its enemies, one wonders why the American government has yet to address this activity with the same severity as it does traditional acts of terror.

There is a law on the books that could have been used to prosecute this enterprise: the United States enacted a federal terror financing statute in 1994 after 1993’s World Trade Center bombing, under which entities can be prosecuted for knowingly providing “material support or resources” to another entity to conduct terror operations.

While money laundering can often remove the evidence needed to prosecute terror financing under the 1993 statue, the proof uncovered by the Project Cassandra task force directly ties the drug trafficking funds to Hezbollah. However, up until now, the failure to do so appears to be political, as the Obama administration allegedly did not want to engender bad faith during the Iran deal negotiations.

This has resulted in severe immediate threats to US homeland security. In May, a New York court indicted Ali Kourani, a naturalized US citizen and Hezbollah operative who allegedly attempted to identify Israeli targets in New York and obtain information on John F. Kennedy International Airport security protocols. Prior to setting up shop in New York, Kourani was previously involved with a dealership in Michigan that sold used cars to Benin; it is not unlikely this business was part of the network of used car dealerships used to launder Hezbollah’s drug profits.

Even as the United States aims to keep tensions away from its soil by announcing its intent to establish a military coalition to protect commercial shipping vessels in the waters surrounding Yemen and Iran, it leaves its doorstep unguarded by failing to take direct action against these networks.

Now that the current administration has pulled out of the deal, and is faced with rising tensions from Iran, the next move should be to go after Hezbollah’s crime-terror infrastructure under terror financing laws. Project Cassandra amassed the evidence; the Trump administration should use it to protect US citizens and put pressure on Iran.

in Latin America / MENA / Rise to Peace blog / United States 0 comments
 by Simone Matassa

Women of the Irish Republican Army: Powerful or Powerless?

IRAImage - Women of the Irish Republican Army: Powerful or Powerless?

Photographer: Colman Doyle took during the time of the ‘Troubles’ in West Belfast 1970s

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is a paramilitary organization that has operated out of Ireland since 1917. There have been many versions of the IRA throughout time such as the ‘OLD IRA’ and the ‘REAL IRA’ however the focus of the group has mostly remained the same, which is that the whole of Ireland should be an independent republic free from British rule.

The focus of the group has mostly remained the same, which is that the whole of Ireland should be an independent republic free from British rule.

In 1969, the IRA was determined to see the British withdrawal from Northern Ireland but with a differing of opinion, the IRA split into two separate wings: officials and provisionals. Officials used their efforts to gain independence through peaceful action, while the provisionals used violence and extremism to make its agenda known.

This division on part of the provisionals resulted in an estimated 1,800 deaths, which included more than 500 civilians. As the Provisional IRA and other paramilitary organizations continued on what can only be described as a violent path, the British Army in the meantime retaliated which eventually marked the time known as the “Troubles” which affected Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for almost 30 years.

Women have been known to participate in many roles within the IRA. During the 1970s many women were compelled to join in some capacity as the resistance within the community helped to politicize them.

While many of these roles have involved protests and civil rights matters a number of women became known for their roles as combatants during the time of the troubles. This is an interesting development in paramilitary organizations as women were not often included in these physically violent positions.

The IRA stands as a departure in the traditional roles women hold in terrorism and changes the narrative of how they are viewed. This shift in the structure of terrorist groups raises the question of why the change in dynamics and what does it mean for how the group operates.

Does the addition of women to the group make it stronger or vulnerable? There is a tendency in research and in situations where female terrorists are actively observed to view them as victims instead of perpetrators despite overwhelming evidence to suggest otherwise.

There is a tendency in research and in situations where female terrorists are actively observed to view them as victims instead of perpetrators despite overwhelming evidence to suggest otherwise.

Societal norms and constructs have added to a preconceived notion that women are naturally more peaceful and less violent than men but it is naïve to allow this belief to distort the reality that women are active players in terrorism and are not to be overlooked. In fact, it could be argued that they are more dangerous than men in the sense they can use their femininity and this false image to mislead and conceal their violent agendas from others. A key member of the IRA and a prime example of this shift in gendered terrorism is Dolores Price.

In fact, it could be argued that they [women] are more dangerous than men in the sense they can use their femininity and this false image to mislead and conceal their violent agendas from others.

Dolores Price joined the Provisional IRA in the 1970s along with her sister Marian Price. During her time in the IRA, Price was known for her extreme devotion to the cause and her inherently violent nature.

Price was involved with some of the IRA’s most devastating crimes: In 1973 she participated in a car bombing at the Old Bailey in London injuring over 200 people and killing one.

Price and her sister were arrested shortly after the bombing. Originally the sentence was life imprisonment, however, their sentences were eventually brought down to 20 years. Price only served seven years for her role and participation in the bombing. While in prison Price went on a hunger strike in order to be moved to a different prison in Northern Ireland.

Other members of the IRA imprisoned for the bombing joined the hunger strike and it went on for 208 days due to the prisoners being fed forcefully by prison officers in order to keep them alive. The force-feeding was abruptly brought to an end when another member of the strike died.

Price began to resent and blame Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams for the ordering of the abduction and murder of the most high profile victim of the IRA. Price revealed that she was given the order of taking Jean McConville- a mother to 10 children, across the border where she was heinously murdered and buried by the IRA.

Price also made the accusation that Adams was responsible for the creation of a covert unit in Belfast that was used to push out informants of the IRA who were supplying information to defense agencies. Adams, who helped shape the Northern Ireland peace process, denies any knowledge of such. Price continued to be involved with political issues up until the 1990s.

Price also noted that she and her sister were fearful due to threats from other members of the IRA and the political party Sinn Féin after she made allegations against them publicly. Price died in January 2013 after being found in her home in Dublin from a suspected toxic illness due to mixing the medication.

Dolores Price’s role in the IRA raises the issue that is central to the women in extremism program- what motivates a woman to become involved in a terrorist organization and what it looks like compared to the experience of a man.

There is a certain attractiveness for men to join a terrorist organization in terms of the sexualization and allure of violence but there is little to suggest that women do not join for the same reasons.

In this case, we can only theorize about why Price joined the IRA but a lot can be deduced from her actions and involvement.

In an effort to understand more about the motivations of women in terrorist organizations there is a need to explore the attraction of power and loyalty to men in the community as factors for involvement.

Power and attraction are some of the most common reasons for the justification of violence.

Dolores Prices involvement in the IRA should pose as a reminder that combatant women can have a bigger influence in terrorism than men and should not be expected to be less militant or less dangerous due to their gender.

in EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA / Latin America / MENA / Rise to Peace blog / women-in-extremism 0 comments
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